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METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY:
Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind
by
Laurel Warren Trufant 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1990
This study argues for the mutual impenetration of 
logical, legal and scientific metaphors and attempts to 
determine the role played by them in the construction of 
theory. Specifically it attempts to discover the impact 
which the metaphors of topical logic may have had on the 
construction of American ideology.
Chapter 1 offers a brief discussion of logical meta­
phors and their relation to the social and intellectual 
settings which generate them. Chapter 2 extends that dis­
cussion to principles of positive law and political order 
as they developed in the unstable atmosphere of 16th 
Century Europe. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt to relate the 
metaphors defined in Chapters 1 and 2 to the development of 
the scientific models which emerged during the "scientific 
revolution" of the 17th Century. These chapters proceed n 
the context of a discussion of the interaction of 
Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms.
Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of topical 
metaphors in the establishment of order in the American 
colonies. Chapters 7 and 8 carry the argument for a "New
England Mind" into a national setting and discuss how 
Ramean metaphors contributed to the construction of 
American conceptions of political order and physical law. 
These chapters attempt to identify a controlling metaphor 
of continuity which operated at the base of American 
models.
Chapter 9 claims this metaphor of continuity as the 
logical ground of pragmatic thought, transmitted to C . S. 
Peirce through the German logical tradition via Leibniz and 
Wolff. Chapter 10 extends that discussion to a specific 
investigation of Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of 
Science, considered here as representative of a fundamental 
commitment on Peirce’s part to a methodology which would 
underwrite the rest of his thought. Chapter 11 laments the 
failure of James, Dewey and Royce to appreciate the power 
of Peirce’s model and discusses the effect which their 
fragmentation of his continuous reality had on American 
phil osophy. Peirce’s logic of science emerges as a funda­
mental expression of an "American mind" with roots sunk 
deep in a Ramean logical paradigm.
vi i
PROLOQUB
This is a germinal study, intended more to suggest than 
to convince. It skirts many fascinating issues and scans 
the surface of others. It offers no demographics, no 
charts, no quantitative analyses -- in short, nothing to 
gladden the heart of social historians or sober 
statisticians. Moreover it proceeds under a clear meth­
odological bias to which I may as well confess at the 
start. It patently assumes that there are such things as 
"characteristic German models," "a French intellectual 
milieu," "English epistemolog.v" or "a New England Mind.” I
think there are. The question addressed here is why?
This study offers a possible answer grounded in 
the positive role which metaphors play in the construction 
of theory. It argues for the mutual impenetration of logi­
cal, legal and scientific metaphors embedded in diverse 
intellectual settings and attempts to determine the role 
played by those metaphors in generating characteristic 
principles of order. Specifically it attempts to discover 
the impact which the peculiar metaphors of the topical 
logical tradition may have had on the construction of 
American ideology.
Chapter 1 offers a brief narrative of the 
provenance of those metaphors and their relation to the
2social and intellectual settings which generated them. It 
establishes the topical logic of Peter Ramus as legitimate 
heir to the tradition of Peter of Spain and explores the 
effects which Ramean logic had on European models as it 
interacted with existing forms of analysis. Chapter 2 
extends that discussion to questions of positive law and 
political order as they developed in the unstable atmos­
phere of 16th Century Europe. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt 
to relate the metaphors defined and described in Chapters 1 
and 2 to the development of the scientific models which 
emerged in England, France and Germany during the 
"scientific revolution" of the 17th Century. These chap­
ters proceed in the context of a discussion of the interac­
tion of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms.
Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of 
topical metaphors in the establishment of order in the 
American colonies -- an argument already carefully explored 
by Perry Miller but expanded here to include specifically 
logical perspectives. Chapters 7 and 8 carry the argument 
for a "New England Mind" into a national setting and dis­
cuss how Ramean metaphors and images contributed to the 
construction of American conceptions of political order and 
physical law -- conceptions unique by virtue of being an 
amalgam of the three models defined in earlier chapters. 
These discussions attempt to identify a controlling meta­
phor of continuity which operated at the base of American
3political and scientific models. The proposed metaphor of 
continuity draws directly on the conceptual biases of topi­
cal logic.
Chapter 9 claims the metaphor of continuity as the 
logical ground of pragmatic thought, transmitted to C. S. 
Peirce through the German logical tradition via Leibniz and 
Wolff. Chapter 10 extends that discussion to a specific 
investigation of Peirce's Illustrations of the Logic of 
Science, considered here as representative of a fundamental 
commitment on Peirce’s part to a methodology which would 
underwrite the rest of his thought. Chapter 11 laments the 
failure of James, Dewey and Royce to appreciate the power 
of Peirce’s model and discusses the effect which their 
fragmentation of his continuous reality had on American 
ph ilosophy.
Throughout my bias is clear. I see in Peirce’s 
logic of science an expression of an "American mind" with 
roots sunk deep in a Ramean logical paradigm. The per­
sistence of Peirce’s influence, the continuing impact of 
his insights on the construction of theory and the enduring 
ability of his often paradoxical thought to confound and 
inspire all bear witness to the fundamentality of his 
vision and its crucial importance for an understanding of 





The Construction of Theory
Greek logic had dealt with consciousness as a principle 
of order, focusing its theories on an impersonal mind in 
search of models and norms. Christianity, on the other 
hand, conceived of the individual as the protagonist in a 
cosmic drama whose denouement described nothing less than 
his own salvation. Thus Christian eschatology required a 
logic which could do more than define principles of order. 
It required a logic which could provide the pilgrim with a 
path to Truth.
The psychological immediacy of the Christian message 
encouraged the construction of 'ogical metaphors which 
portrayed cognition as a function of an "inner sense" and 
consciousness as a world of inner meaning. Under the 
operation of these powerful metaphors, human events, as the 
history of man's journey toward God, acquired a sig­
nificance which extended beyond the immediate present to 
encompass a collective past. Christianity, in fact, made 
human history cohere in a type of societas which trans­
cended all previous formulations of the social order.1
5
Under its influence the medieval world developed as a 
society based on interdependent relationships and communal 
ideals -- a complex society in which ritual, politics and 
custom all coalesced and re-emerged in an organic whole in 
which cult and culture were joined.* This total integra­
tion of ritual with life in turn yielded a symbolic view of 
the natural world which acquired an immense metaphysical 
richness when overlaid with the physics of man-as- 
microcosm. Here events possessed archetypal meaning, time 
reflected a moving image of eternity and nature itself 
became a cipher. "The ethic and aesthetic value of the 
symbolic interpretation of the world was inestimable," 
Huizinga asserts. "Embracing all nature and all history, 
symbolism ."ave a conception of the world of a still more 
rigorous unity than that which modern science can offer."* 
But symbolism did little to advance the cause of objec­
tive knowledge.4 Although medieval science achieved a 
certain explanatory force through definition and clas­
sification, it tended, due to its metaphysical assumptions, 
to undervalue secondary causes and to view all phenomena 
sub species aeternatis. Its metaphoric base precluded any 
notion of development in the realm of organisms and 
rendered previous Greek insights into the application of 
mathematics in physics irrelevant. Indeed, the symbolist 
mind viewed Unity as a non-numerical concept and pursued 
mathematical analyses which were purely Pythagorean in 
nature. "Symbolism was like a second mirror held up to
6
that of the phenomenal world itself," Huizinga points out.* 
Laboring under its constraints, medieval science could con­
struct no objective theory and pursue no truly experimental 
course.
E. A. Moody stresses the crucial importance of the fact 
that medieval logic "achieved its distinctive form of 
development in almost complete isolation from scientific 
applications."6 In a symbolic world, logic performed a 
communal function. It maintained the race's consistent set 
of conceptions across time and brought the contingent facts 
of existence into right relation with ethical and spiritual 
ideals. The metaphors which supported the tightly woven 
fabric of medieval culture and symbolic thought expressed a 
theory of knowledge wherein individual terms denoted com­
plex structures understood through penetration into their 
larger reality.7 Under analysis, each of these structures 
yielded a series of forms -- formalitates -- which existed 
independently of the mind as elements in that wider truth 
which symbolism sought to express. But since the symbolic 
view of nature assumed a correspondence between the for­
malities of thought and metaphysics, medieval logic had no 
need to consider whether its forms reflected present 
realities.
Symbolism in fact rendered logic a function of 
metaphysics, removing it from the objective world of 
science. Moreover, it effectively divorced logic from 
rhetoric. In a symbolic world, truth is its own advocate.
7
It requires no exposition. So the logic which dominated 
the Schools into the 12th Century developed in relative 
isolation from both scientific and rhetorical metaphors.
Its dialectic evolved as a discipline primarily concerned 
with the syntactic properties of language and the logical 
form of propositions.* The universal use of Learned Latin 
in the Schools served to strengthen this orientation away 
from contextual concerns and to anchor medieval logic 
firmly in the formalist tradition.* Late in the 12th 
Century, however, the medieval corpus logics was augmented 
by Aristotle’s Topics and Prior Analytics. "Relatively 
slight use was made of the Prior Analytics," Moody notes, 
but the Topics exerted a profound influence on Scholastic 
thought.10
The Topics outlined a system of logical order which 
differed radically from the system of categories which 
governed Aristotle’s logic. Categories defined ideal 
groupings which organized thought qualitatively. Topics 
functioned as headings, or key notions, which organized 
experience quantitatively. The topics thus expressed a 
substantially more concrete system of order in that they 
represented actual "places" in which to "store" the objects 
of experience, rather than extramental constructs under 
which to classify ideas. For example, relation indicated a 
category -- related things occupied a "place." Similarity 
indicated a category -- Similar things occupied a "place."
8
These differences between topical and categorical meta­
phors carried profound methodological implications for the 
construction of logical arguments. Consider the construc­
tion of a categorical argument:
Man is rational -- (an assertion)
What is rational is dialectical -- (a judgement) 
Therefore, wan is dialectical -- (a conclusion drawn
from an assertion and 
a judgement)
On the other hand, a topical argument would proceed quite 
differently:
Is Man Dialectical? -- (a question which sends the
inquirer to examine the place 
where dialectical things 
res ide)
What is rational is dialectical -- (a discovery he
makes when he 
examines the place 
"dialectical")
But man is rational -- (a discovery he makes when he
examines the place "rational”) 
Therefore man is dialectical —  (a consequence of a
question and two 
discoveries)
Note the crucial differences. The topical argument begins 
with a question, not an assertion. It proceeds by breaking 
down the question rather than by further abstraction. The 
middle term "rational" is "discovered" in its "place," 
which is in turn searched for the term "man." And finally, 
all three terms are redistributed to form a statement.
Topical logic thus drew on a completely different set 
of metaphors from those which governed categorical logic.1 1 
The categories organized personalist assertions in abstract 
configurations which in turn led to deductive conclusions. 
The topics governed the spatial manipulation of concepts to
9
arrive ultimately at inductive consequences. The topical 
argument expressed a diagrammatic rather than an abstract 
order. It treated concepts like objects which could be 
"located" to supply predicates and "rearranged" to con­
struct arguments. Under a topical model predication 
involved a search, not an assertion, and judgement involved 
disposition, not deduction.
This shift in logical metaphors had profound con­
sequences for late medieval logic. For Aristotle, 
categorical logic had aimed at defining truth with 
metaphysical certainty, while the Topics had dealt rather 
with the rhetorical art of communicating a perspective on 
truth. Topical arguments thus trafficked in probabilities. 
But, whereas in the Hellenic world the Topics had been con­
fined to the secular art of political discourse, in the 
intensely religious atmosphere of 12th Century Europe this 
art, grounded in probability and directed toward action, 
entered the service of a Christian God whose objective was 
to compel personal conviction. When the rhetorical focus 
of Aristotle's Topics converged with the controlling meta­
phors of Christian logic, there emerged ar. essential cor­
respondence between meaning and truth which influenced 
Western thought in profound ways, shaping pedagogical prac­
tices, encouraging humanist attitudes and underwriting 
revolutionary ideologies. Eventually this correspondence 
acquired concrete expression in pragmatic thought.
10
The exegetical function of medieval logic, which 
required that it not only explicate the Book of Nature but 
also construe authoritative texts in support of doctrine, 
prepared it in a peculiar way to accept the message of 
Aristotle’s Topics.1* The logical metaphors of medieval 
Christianity could easily extend themselves to incorporate 
intensional contexts determined by verbs such as "believe", 
"doubt” or "desire." Indeed, the psychological immediacy 
of Christianity carried a natural potential for blurring 
the distinctions between formal and probable logic. Under 
the influence of Aristotle's Topics, this potential became 
actual in the topical logic of Peter of Spain. Known as 
the logics moderns, this "new" logic formulated its 
propositions metalinguistically, insisted on an extensional 
approach to language analysis and concerned itself with 
both syntactical and semantical issues. It introduced 
questions of meaning into a dialectic dominated by 
certainty. in short, it demanded relevance.13
Greek metaphysics could not have supported logical 
metaphors like those which controlled topical logic. It 
lacked a sufficiently personal psychology to conceive of 
truth as perspective. Such a development required the 
Christian doctrine of the logos - the Word made flesh - to 
justify its implicit assumption that certainty could reside 
within the natural language structures of men. The topics 
portrayed logic as a reflection of the natural world in the 
structures of the mind. Topical arguments procured their
11
premises through the mind reaching back to the traditional 
wisdom of the race and allowing that contact to induce a 
flow of ideas from its loci or "places". The mind then 
arranged these ideas in patterns consistent, not only with 
its own structures, but with those of nature. The "places" 
contained the common experience of all men, stored for 
recall through inquiry. In a sense, topical metaphors 
manifested the drive in medieval culture to subordinate 
individual to group motives and exemplified its communal 
orientation. Closely tied to images of structure, the 
"places" provided a logical mechanism for investigating a 
common past conceived as a racial present. Thus, while 
reorienting logic by incorporating into it the psychologi­
cal constituents of rhetoric, Peter’s "place" or "topical" 
logic continued to draw on the central metaphors of 
medieval realism. It reaffirmed the communal aspects of 
knowledge.
Topical logic exerted a pervasive influence in the 
Schools.14 118 ability to portray thought in concrete 
images made it particularly useful in a pedagogical setting 
where learning took place through indoctrination rather 
than investigation. The "arguments" peculiar to topical 
logic focused on the extension of terms and had a curious 
tendency to "fix" concepts in the external world. More­
over, the "places" themselves encouraged a constant traf­
ficking in concrete images which in turn generated a con­
ception of thought as a process whereby objects were some­
12
how lifted into the mind where they behaved in ways crudely 
analogous to "things."18
By thus treating concepts as commodities which one 
could "store" and "recall," topical logic served as an 
ideal model for teaching. Moreover, by equipping the logic 
of the Schools with the tools of discourse, it provided 
dialectic with an outward reference which made it easily 
adaptible to pedagogy. The need to communicate a body of 
usable knowledge to large numbers of students required a 
simple, concrete method capable of dealing with contextual 
issues. Peter of Spain supplied it, complete with a 
delivery mechanism adequate to the task. The phenomenal 
growth of the Universities during the 12th Century can in 
fact be seen as both cause and effect of the almost 
universal acceptance of Peter’s model.1•
But the comfortable accommodation of topical logic to 
the educational and conceptual landscape of the 12th 
Century disintegrated rapidly with the full-scale assimila­
tion of Aristotle's scientific works in the 13th.17 The 
naive realism of the "places” simply could not absorb all 
the analytical implications of peripatetic science. The 
Aristotelian scheme of the physical world differed radi­
cally from the symbolic view. Its incorporation under 
Christian doctrine would have meant abandoning its entire 
theory of natural substances and dismantling its cosmologi­
cal framework. Moreover, Aristotelian science reached the 
West through Arabian and Jewish commentaries which them­
13
selves carried metaphysical assumptions that had to be 
rationalized or discarded before the scientific knowledge 
they contained could be isolated and merged with existing 
doctrine. These Semitic commentaries all tended toward a 
concern for scientific demonstration rather than personal 
conviction. Yet the psychological focus of Christianity 
continued to demand a relevance beyond the purely objective 
requirements of science.
Confronted with a philosophical model which claimed 
competence in metaphysics yet accepted no evidence other 
than natural knowledge, the Schools at first attempted to 
reconcile their revelatory faith with Aristotelian science. 
But they soon discovered that no general theory of 
reference could satisfy all the requirements of an objec­
tive science without endangering Christian doctrine. Since 
they could not violate the articles of their faith, the 
Schools turned instead to an internal critique of the 
evidential criteria of the new knowledge -- a critique 
which established a radical distinction between the proper 
domains of physics and metaphysics. But from the moment 
the Scholastics chose to insulate their faith from the dis­
solvent effects of Aristotelian science by challenging the 
metaphysical competence of their logic, they ensured the 
ultimate failure of their efforts at assimilation and began 
a descent into philosophical empiricism which could only 
end with the destruction of faith altogether.
14
Aquinas stood at the apogee of this Scholastic effort. 
With him, the metaphorical concreteness of the "places" 
yielded to an uneasy alliance of matter and form in a logi­
cal compositurn.1 • The fertile concept of "inner sense," 
grounded in the communal images of the topics, fell before 
the more empirical intellectus agens which gained knowledge 
through abstraction rather than penetration. Thomas' logic 
kept strictly to the Aristotelian view of matter as pure 
potency and form as an anomaly which of itself existed nei­
ther actually or potentially. From this world of matter 
and form, the mind abstracted the quidditates rerum 
materialium, but could not penetrate to their essential 
structure. Still, Thomas’ theology demanded that the 
intellect function as an independent personality with 
access to metaphysical truth. The impersonal pan-psychic 
principles of the Arab commentaries clearly could not 
satisfy the metaphoric demands of Christian soteriology.
For Peter of Spain, the problem simply had not existed. 
Concrete objects and intellectual forms had functioned as 
woof and warp of the same tightly woven logical fabric.
But for Thomas, encumbered with Aristotelian science, the 
consoling metaphors of topical logic no longer proved apt, 
while the Scholastic critique left him prey to the compet­
ing claims of faith and reason.
Thomas’ logical compositum thus left Scholastic 
philosophy curiously maladjusted, relegating the mind of 
the pilgrim to a world where the present realities of sense
15
experience no longer guaranteed inner perceptions. Thomas 
argued for a disjunctive model of human knowledge which, 
unlike Christian doctrine, ascribed the principle of indi­
viduation to matter alone. Under the metaphors of his 
logic, the objects of knowledge existed wholly in the per­
ceptual order, the translation of the object from matter to 
mind occurring through the mysterious process of abstract­
ing forms from individuating material conditions. But 
since Thomas, like Aristotle, drew a radical distinction 
between matter and form, his theory left the objects of 
knowledge accessible only to the lower faculty of sensa­
tion: particulare sensitur; universale intelligitur.
Thus he ended by denying the possibility of direct knowl­
edge of the material world and rejecting the possibility of 
an objective science.
In reaction, Duns Scotus set out to rehabilitate objec­
tive knowledge and restore the metaphorical foundations of 
science. Significantly, however, he did not attempt to 
reclaim material facts by isolating them from their 
abstract ground or raising them to a level of reality 
inconsistent with their function. Rather he chose to 
reintegrate them into that wider symbolist truth which 
assumed a manifold reality shared through cognition.1* 
Against Aquinas, Scotus argued that the world of objects 
derived from the successive imposition of logical forms on 
a material principle which existed actually, not poten­
tially. Individuality, he claimed, resulted from the
16
limitation of a common natura, of which it functioned only 
as the most immediate expression. The haecceitaa or "this- 
ness" of a thing merely expressed a positive determination 
existing formally within the object alongside its material 
effects. Both the formal determination and the material 
effects, he claimed, remained accessible to the mind 
through inquiry.
By thus investing matter with a positive actuality, 
Scotus reinstated it as an element of shared experience. 
Moreover, by substituting formal for real distinctions 
between the elements in Thomas’ compoaitun, he endowed the 
objects of nature with logical attributes which tied them 
to formal truth. Each material fact, he argued, expressed 
a specifically determined grade of Being which affected the 
mind as a concrete union of sensible and conceptual ele­
ments. The complexity of the process of cognition merely 
reflected the complexity of the object, which existed as 
neither matter, nor form, nor composition, but rather as a 
determined unity constituted of the ultima realitas entis 
of all three. Thought and reality, he concluded, enjoyed a 
correspondence based in the very nature of concepts which, 
although arising in the mind, were occasioned by formal 
principles enjoying an extra-mental status. By thus 
emphasizing the mutual impenetration of mind and matter, 
Scotus revalidated the natural world as a source of common 
experience and confirmed the possibility of an objective 
science.
17
Scotus upgraded the ontological status of Aquinas’ 
logical forms in order to bring the neutral potency of 
Aristotelian matter within the conceptual boundaries of 
Christian doctrine. Significantly he did so in the context 
of metaphors which acknowledged the shared aspects of human 
experience. Ockham, on the other hand, more concerned with 
the logical than the spiritual implications of Aquinas’ 
model, passed beyond Scotus’ l'ealist posture in his own 
critique to a new principle of logical order unrestricted 
by common natures and bounded only by the laws of con­
tradiction. He subjected both Scotus’ and Aquinas’ 
theories of individuation to a long and searching critique 
and ended by denying both their formal and their real dis­
tinctions.20 In the process he pulled the logical ground 
out from under Scotus’ world of common experience and cast 
a new and deeper shadow over the possiblity of an objective 
science.
Formal concepts, Ockham maintained, existed only by 
virtue of being affirmed of individuals. They represented 
only abstract notions under which the mind grouped material 
facts. The problem of cognition, he argued, thus dissolved 
into a purely syntactic problem relating to the referential 
use of terms in propositions. It required no logical 
exposition since it referred to no formal ground. Ockham’s 
razor thereby trimmed all the contextual elements from 
logic, leaving only those terms which could be dealt with 
empirically through an analysis of language structures. It
18
reduced the species intelligibiles, which had given Scotus’ 
logic its contextual import, to environmentally dependent 
"habita" which inclined individual minds through repeti­
tion. But where Scotus* "species” had tied the cognizing 
individual to a collective past -- to that consistent set 
of conceptions which had structured all medieval life and 
thought -- Ockham’8 "habits" supplied only convenient men­
tal fictions incapable of unifying human experience in a 
common frame of reference.*1 All support of a community of 
knowledge thus disappeared. Ockham’s logic no longer 
expressed a common cognitive process or a cultural ideal.
It expressed rather a set of "willed verbal relationships" 
between an isolated mind and its extra-mental surround­
ings.2* Under the metaphors of this logic, each individual 
mind entered into a contractual bond with formal reality by 
"legislating" concepts as tools to manage its perceptions. 
Concepts themselves regressed to the status of conventions 
co-opted by the individual for use in controlling his 
environment.
Ockham removed the entire realm of abstraction from the 
field of logic by isolating and magnifying the quantitative 
metaphors of the topical tradition.** But in the wake of 
his reformulation, the loci retained no independent sig­
nificance. They expressed either terms of second inten­
tion, in which case they functioned as signs and belonged 
to linguistic analysis; or else they expressed terms of 
first intention, in which case they stood for real things
19
and belonged to physics. In either case, they gave no 
insight into truth. This shift in metaphors transformed 
the world of nature from a symbolic universe informed by 
essences to an infinitely various agglomeration of individ­
uals intelligible in terms of their own movement and rela­
tionships. By thus encouraging the observation and 
manipulation of terms as things, Ockham undoubtedly facili­
tated an expansion of objective knowledge.2*
But Ockham's critique did not supply the logical tools 
necessary to construct a scientific world-view. Although 
Ockham expanded logic’s ability to observe and express, he 
sacrificed its ability to explain. He defined a scientific 
logic, but not a logic of science. The controlling meta­
phors of his logic, made explicit in his analysis of lan­
guage, precluded hypotheses as cognitively meaningless and 
reduced cause to an accidental relation perceived empiri­
cally rather than an empirical connection conceived logi­
cally. By reducing Thomas’ real and Scotus’ formal dis­
tinctions to a functional difference between evidential and 
inevidential facts, Ockham in fact created a model of human 
knowledge woefully ill-equipped to support a general theory 
of science.29 He construed general propositions as condi­
tional statements and denied the ability to infer from 
experience anything that transcended it. With no causal 
inferences to link events, perceptions could not cohere in 
rules or generate predictions and the possibility of for­
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mulating the principles of a general science disappeared in 
a crowd of self-sufficient particulars.
But if terminist logic failed to generate metaphors 
which could support the growth of a theoretical science, 
it carried a potent charge for social theory.*• As a con­
comitant of the general movement afoot in the 15th Century 
to repudiate traditional authorities, Ockham’s search for a 
new criterion of meaning coincided with a rejection of 
social theories based in community.*7 Moreover, it encour­
aged a moral scepticism which flourished on the disillu­
sionment fostered by the dissolution of the medieval world. 
As the tightly seamed metaphoric garment which had clothed 
medieval society rent, so also the underlying collaboration 
of custom, revelation and life began to crumble. The rise 
of territorial states and the creation of an international 
commerce introduced a conception of society grounded in 
competition, not community.** With the Pope a puppet at 
Avignon and the Conciliar Movement afoot in France, the 
unity of Latin Christendom fell irrevocably assunder. As 
the Church regressed from a mystical to a political form, 
the "body of the faithful" dissolved into a membership 
governed by the rules of association rather than the tradi­
tions of mutual participation.
The metaphors of nominalist logic perfectly expressed 
this culture. Preoccupied with change and focused on the 
limits rather than the scope of human experience, they 
could readily articulate the encroaching disorder. But
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they could offer no reassurance to minds disoriented by 
profound changes in their social, political and moral 
environments. In vain did the Council of Trent reassert 
the authority of traditional forms. The nominalist pilgrim, 
increasingly isolated from familiar and consoling com­
munities, faltered on his journey, prey to deeply divided 
perceptions about his role in the world -- until the via 
moderna showed him the way.
Renaissance humanism pointed the way to new principles 
of logical order. It provided an escape from the limiting 
metaphors of nominalist logic by explicitly recognizing the 
normative powers of shared experience. In reaction against 
the nominalist tendency to isolate the individual from con­
textual concerns, the humanists reasserted the need to 
reach back to a common fund of knowledge and experience in 
pursuit of truth. At the core of their program lay the 
need to communicate individual perceptions of a shared 
reality. Humanism thus established a new link with the 
past by focusing on the possibilities of human history 
rather than the limits of human knowledge.*• It rejected 
the isolation of the nominalist pilgrim in favor of an 
ideal community achieved through communication.
This new ideal of communication, however, required 
logical metaphors vastly different from those which had 
controlled terminist logic. In Ockham, the rhetorical 
functions of logical discourse had all but disappeared.
The need to communicate shared knowledge which had sup-
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ported the introduction of rhetorical metaphors in the 
topical tradition had no relevance in a logic where all 
knowledge derived from the direct apprehension of individu­
als by individuals. The humanists, on the other hand, 
tended to exploit the latent rhetorical and probabilistic 
elements of topical logic and to make these metaphors more 
explicit. Although, ironically, they condemned the sum- 
mulistas as the arch-villains of scholastic thought, the 
humanists in fact based their entire logical program on the 
"half-conscious blurring of probable argumentation and 
scientific demonstration" typical of the topical logic of 
Peter of Spain.*0 Rhetoric, as the grammar of thought, 
allowed the humanists to grasp the shared structures of 
reality expressed through language. Its incorporation 
under logic promised to draw together the fragmented ele­
ments of experience left by the "narrow seive of contradic­
tions" which nominalist logic had become.*1
In a metaphoric sense, humanism collapsed all 
nominalist diversity into an absolute community by sub­
ordinating general systems to personal perspectives. As 
such it expressed a movement of hope in the general atmos­
phere of moral scepticism and decline endemic to 15th 
Century Europe. Humanism rejected all the harsh formalism 
of the scholastics as well as the rigid limitations of the 
terminists, finding neither sufficient to express the 
mobility and infinite variety of the world of human experi­
ence. With rhetoric, the humanist set himself against his
23
fragmenting environment and attempted to impose a human 
order and community on an open and discontinuous world.12 
The individual himself took on the aspect of a constant 
framework against which a changing reality unfolded.
But the humanist program created a crisis in the 
Schools by challenging the primacy of dialectic and 
championing the rhetorical arts.11 By demanding that all 
logical demonstration be redirected toward shared dis­
course, it undermined the curricular hierarchy and 
threatened to engulf the entire educational canon in an 
anomalous personalism. In an attempt to mitigate the dis­
solvent effects of humanist metaphors on the curriculum, 
Rudolph Agricola, a Rhenish scholar well grounded in the 
topical tradition, propounded a logic which revived the 
loci and brought them once again into the academic 
mainstream. But while professing to purify and reclaim 
logic by differentiating it emphatically from rhetoric, 
Agricola in fact subsumed the rhetorical places under 
logic. He eliminated the distinction between probability 
and demonstration altogether and gave all discourse one 
simple, clear objective -- to teach.
With Agricola, logic became in fact what Peter of Spain 
had purported it to be -- "the art of arts and the science 
of sciences." It spread itself ambiguously over the whole 
field of discourse, expropriating all the primary functions 
of rhetoric. "There are no places of invention proper to 
rhetoric," Agricola declared.12 They all dissolved into
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his "dialectical places" which by definition contained all 
the objects of human knowledge upon which discourse turned. 
The Agricolan places had a tremendous impact on dialectical 
theory.*8 They functioned in a manner substantially more 
concrete than Aristotelian categories and encouraged 
visualist analogies between the field of intellectual 
activity and the objective world. They actually "con­
tained" ideas, conceived as objects susceptible of analysis 
through spatial arrangement. Agricolan dialectic reflected 
a simple process of locating ideas or concepts in their 
places, drawing them out and arranging them methodically in 
such a way as to convince. Thinking became assimilable to 
local motion, regulated by a logic which provided an actual 
"map of the mind" to lead students through the successive 
steps of invention and judgement which comprised learn­
ing.** Through the metaphoric mechanisms of the Agricolan 
places, the entire realm of discourse was made over to doc- 
trina.
Because of its peculiar emphasis on didactics,
Agricolan place logic had a natural affinity to 
Protestantism.* * The reformers identified themselves with 
teaching in a very profound sense by focusing on the 
related functions of preaching.** They needed to convince, 
to communicate the spirit under the letter which formed the 
basis of their faith. The vital principle of congregation, 
which offered mutual reenforcement to a cause adrift in a 
hostile world, implied the need for communication.** Thus
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rhetoric became essential to the Protestant cause as a 
means of persuasively transmitting its perspective on 
truth. But for the reformers, meaning lay at the instinc­
tive level of life. The empirical logic of Ockham could 
not penetrate to the truths they sought. They required a 
logic that could give personal access to spiritual truth 
and at the same time communicate that truth. The metaphors 
peculiar to place logic as it had developed in the environ­
ment of the Schools proved uniquely suited to their needs. 
Within the context of topical metaphors, doctrina was 
acientia. The "places" made revealed truth a teachable 
commodi ty.
Phillip Melancthon adapted the metaphors of Agricolan 
place logic to the ProteBtant cause in his treatise, the 
Loci communes.40 For Melancthon, "clarity was the text of 
truth."41 He claimed that the interior organization of any 
science, including theology, described nothing less than 
its ability to be taught. Logic did not govern thought as 
private inquiry. It expressed the method by which the mind 
identified and communicated truth. It represented an 
ordering process which terminated in teaching. Logic 
itself implied communication.
Melancthon used the loci as a means to define doctrina. 
The "places" held the truths of the faith. Man penetrated 
these truths by extracting the essential elements, or 
"arguments", from their proper places and arranging them 
methodically in such a way as to make them susceptible of
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communication. The method of arrangement provided "a 
straight or direct way or order of investigating and 
explaining...[that] pulls out and ranges in order the 
things pertaining to the matter proposed."41 In short, 
method gave access to truth by rendering the "arguments" 
intelligible -- that is to say, teachable. When viewed 
through the filter of Melancthon’s theological assumptions, 
method became nothing less than a metaphoric road to 
redemption.
Although the notion of method had a long history in law 
and medicine, it first entered the Western logical tradi­
tion through Protestant dialectical manuals.4* Prior to 
the 16th Century, the word "method” had had no independent 
reference. It had simply described an ordering activity 
within the mind attached to other disciplines. In the 
Schools, method had focused on the organization of cur­
ricular subjects, making it highly compatible with 
Protestant paedeia. But although the reformers required a 
teachable catechism, they sought to convert, not merely to 
educate. They aimed at Truth, not just knowledge. So they
needed to extend the metaphors of method to that realm of
certainty ordinarily reserved for formal logic. When the
expanded Protestant conception of method joined forces with
Agricola's objectified places, a powerful new notion of 
dialectic emerged in which order guaranteed truth and argu­
ment compelled conviction.
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Peter Ramus expounded this new logic in a series of 
dialectical manuals which provoked decades of con­
troversy.44 Ramus carried the amalgamation of formal and 
probable logics beyond the "half-conscious blurring" of the 
humanists and deliberately redefined all discourse in 
objective terms. He removed the notion of method from its 
para-logical setting, applied it to dialectic and redefined 
it as procedure, thereby rendering all discourse a set of 
formal operations. He effectively neutralized the per- 
sonalist metaphors of Humanism by occluding the psychologi­
cal aspects of the rhetorical places and representing both 
thought and communication as spatial manouevres with an 
economy based in local motion.
Ramism borrowed metaphoric elements from all aspects of 
the 16th Century intellectual milieu. From the Schools it 
took a preoccupation with didactics; from the humanists, a 
concern for communication; from Agricola, an objective 
theory of predication; and from the Protestants, an 
expanded view of method. Well blended in the atmosphere of 
arts scholasticism, this concoction yielded up a dialectic 
which claimed to provide not only a transcript of the 
processes of thought, but an actual description of the 
image of God.4® Ramism sought a "natural" dialectic which 
reflected the structure of the mind and the world, a 
dialectic capable of producing conviction without resorting 
to psychological or epistemological techniques. In a 
sense, it sought the scholastics’ ideal curriculum —  one
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which could teach itself through the simple disposition of 
its terms.
Like Peter of Spain, RamuB argued that categorical 
logic arbitrarily imposed "artificial" structures on the 
natural world of thought. He declared these structures 
commentitia and blamed them for the murky obscurity of 
scholastic logic. Although the sophistication of his 
anaylsis did not prove adequate to his ambitions, Ramus had 
stumbled here on a fundamental contradiction in scholastic 
metaphors.«• Categorical logic originated in a preliminary 
act of assertion. Its predicates functioned as enuncia­
tions or accusations -- personalist, existential statements 
about the nature of things. Upon this foundation, the 
scholastics had attempted to construct an abstract, formal 
logic. The entire realist/nominalist debate over the 
status and priority of universals turned on issues of cor­
respondence arising out of the attempt to reconcile 
scientific metaphors of certainty with the assertoric 
nature of predication.
But place logic originated in a preliminary act of 
assent -- an unambiguous, shared recognition of "things" in 
their "places". It procured its premises through "inven­
tion", a drawing out of "arguments" from a common body of 
past experience. Each premise thereby expressed the objec­
tive content of a logical locus, not the subjective content 
of a predicating mind. These discrete concepts remained 
psychologically neutral and functioned as the objective
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building blocks of all discourse. All artificial issues of 
correspondence disappeared since the metaphors of place 
logic reduced all priority to the absolute priority in 
nature itself.
Dialectic, under the opertion of topical metaphors, 
promised to yield a true transcript of reality provided 
only that the cognizing mind proceed methodically. Ramean 
dialectic, in fact, operated soley through the machinery of 
method. Judgement, its second and controlling half, con­
sisted simply in the methodical disposition of terms. 
Through judgement the mind assembled or arranged cogni- 
tional units to reflect a structure which corresponded to 
the natural structure of the mind and of the world. The 
process required no psychological explanation. It existed 
as a function justified through application.47 The 
patrimony of the places is patent here. But Peter of Spain 
had deliberately finessed the extensional implications of 
his logic, while Agricola had died leaving his treatment of 
method open-ended and ambiguouB. Ramus, on the other hand, 
explicitly drew the metaphoric implications of topical 
logic out to their ultimate conclusion. He described a 
method so comprehensive that logical operations could 
almost proceed without the aid of thought.
Ramean metaphors clearly reached back to ideas of 
structure.4® Moreover they expressed a communal ideal in 
their desire for an order totally within the ambit of the 
conscious mind.4® They encouraged no personal retreat into
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a private truth, but rather portrayed thought as a shared 
progression toward a vast orderly arrangement of knowledge 
which, in its farthest extension, expressed reality. Each 
cognitional unit, when placed in proper relation to other 
units, led by minute steps to this perceptible order. The 
order itself underwrote the places as receptacles of shared 
knowledge and experience. Method organized that knowledge 
into an "encyclopedia," a circle of learning embracing 
human culture in all the richness of its racial past.*0 
Moreover, it allowed for the persuasive transmission of 
this lore to society as a whole. By moving all the princi­
ples of organization from rhetoric to dialectic and subsum­
ing them there under method, Ramus tied all discourse to 
shared experience and made reason virtually synonymous with 
memory.* 1
This curious dialectic broke on the intellectual scene 
at a crucial juncture. The Wars of Religion had destroyed 
all vestiges of a common ideology. Europe now harbored two 
distinct moralities, two distinct laws, each seeking its 
own philosophical justification. The invention of printing 
had reoriented the flow of information and encouraged 
unprecedented advances through the accumulation and trans­
mission of knowledge.52 Aristotelean science suffered on 
all fronts. The new Copernican cosmology shook medieval 
physics out of the cosy certainty of the crystalline 
spheres and left it floating in neat but ambiguous orbit 
around a desacralized nature. By the end of the 16th
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Century, Brahe and Diggs had broken the bounds of even the 
closed Copernican system.®* By 1640, Kepler had overturned 
theories of perception by discovering the inverted image of 
the eye; Galileo had rearranged perspectives through his 
revolutionary optical theories; and Harvey had reoriented 
physiology by demonstrating the circulation of the blood.54
This mass of new data strained old metaphors to the 
bursting point. As the radical new cosmogony asserted 
itself, it became more and more difficult to conceive of 
the natural world as a symbolic scheme devised by the 
aesthetic imagination. The new sciences laid nature open 
to plain view and revealed it as a penetrable and predict­
able reality, subject to laws and susceptible of analysis. 
This in turn demanded new principles of logical order 
capable of guiding the mind in the construction of theory.
To minds dazzled by the rapid influx of raw scientific 
knowledge, Ramean method offered a preliminary means of 
control. After all, what better tool to organize an anti- 
Aristotelian science than an ostensibly anti-Aristotelean 
logic? Propelled by a burgeoning publishing industry, 
Ramean method swept through Europe, refashioning everything 
in its own diagrammatic image. It exercised a controlling 
influence on European thought well into the 17th Century.55 
Ong even argues that Ramism "mirrors the history of the 
whole intellectual epoch."5® Poetry, art, medicine, educa­
tion, history, law, theology, even the Bible became meth­
odized according to the Ramist canon.57 The com­
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prehensiveness of Ramean method encouraged a faith in the 
ultimate intelligibility of the newly disclosed universe. 
This faith generated the self-confidence necessary to 
approach the unfamiliar cosmos tentatively and to explore 
it scientifically. Method provided that "straight or 
direct way...of investigating and explaining" which could 
bring untested data under manageable rubrics and make it 
applicable to past experience. It allowed for the 
assimilation of scientific discoveries, yet maintained a 
consoling contact with traditional wisdom through the 
mediating role of the places.
But at the same time, Ramism pointed the way toward a 
new means of conceptualization capable of processing the 
vast new data. Scholastic logic had never developed a sym­
bolic system adequate to its formal ambitions. It had no 
language sufficiently abstract to formulate a general 
theory of science. The Ramist critique had revealed the 
insecure semantical foundations of scholastic logic and 
demonstrated the complete inadequacy of subject-predicate 
syllogistics to serve as a warrant for science.** By con­
trast, the Ramist tendency to submerge questions of meaning 
and reference in the places and to represent all logic as 
spatial manoeuvres independent of psychology loosened up 
the field of discourse in ways which prepared it to accept 
a predicate logic of unrestricted generality. Although 
poorly articulated, Ramism in fact promoted a radical new 
view of analysis based in the mind’s commerce with sensible
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nature. Moreover, its naive emphasis on composite syl­
logisms created a new, if somewhat ambiguous, role for 
hypothesis in the construction of scientific models.
Ramism solved the disjunctive with the hypothetical -- 
that is, it subsumed "either... or" statements and 
"if...then" statements under the operation of a single com­
posite form. For example, take the disjunctive statement 
"Either man is dialectical or he isn't." A Ramean would 
solve it thus:
Either man is dialectical or he isn’t. (disjunctive)
If man is dialectical, then he is rational, (hypothesis)
Man is rational (a discovery made when the place
"rational" is examined for the term 
"man")
Therefore he is dialectical, (a consequence of a
discovery)
By thus employing a hypothetical to direct the mind in its 
search through the "places," Ramism gave hypothesis an 
active role in demonstration, something which traditional 
syllogistics could not do. Moreover, by linking disjunc­
tives and hypothetical under the anomolous operation of 
the composite syllogism, Ramism blurred the absolute dis­
tinction between induction and hypothesis which categorical 
logic drew, thereby providing a logical justification for 
an analogical approach to the non-quantitative aspects of 
reality. This ultimately allowed for the extension of 
mathematical expression across the entire field of dis­
course .
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Ramism appears hopelessly inadequate to minds prepared 
to reject it by modern mathematical logic. Ong repeatedly 
emphasizes the deficiencies of its simplistic approach to 
supposition and its naive ability to confuse the comprehen­
sion and the extension of terms.»• But despite its 
unsophisticated nature, Ramean logic had a catalytic effect 
on minds intent on controlling a mass of new perceptions. 
The spatial imagery of its places encouraged a drive toward 
conceiving thought as an operation which took place in an 
observable field.*0 Its characteristic diagrams reenforced 
these visualist analogies. They in fact encouraged the 
development of a quantified medium of communication which 
neutralized the personalist valence of all logical express­
ion. This drive toward quantification eventually issued in 
the analytical geometry of Descartes and the abstract 
matrices of Newtonian space. Ultimately, it underwrote the 
development of modern mathematical logic itself. But these 
later logics, however sophisticated, systematically ignored 
the energizing insight which underwrote the Ramean places. 
They ignored the Ramists’ profound belief in the essen­
tially shared nature of the reality which logic sought to 
express.
The "clarity" sought through the Ramean places had 
derived its value from a set of shared conceptions deeply 
rooted in a common past. But the intellectual advances of 
the 16th and early 17th Centuries all tended to divorce the 
world of shared experience from the world of science.
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After all, despite what Kepler, Galileo and Harvey might 
argue, one saw things right-side up; one felt the earth 
stand still; and the mechanics of circulation rarely 
intruded themselves in everyday life. These startling new 
perceptions had no metaphoric reference in that body of 
common knowledge which underwrote Ramean logic. Indeed, 
the emerging physical sciences required a certain distance 
from the psychosomatic roots of human consciousness in 
order to establish the certainty of their abstract for­
mulations. The empathetic knowledge of the places could 
only serve to contradict their non-experiential hypotheses. 
As scientific advances gradually replaced the testimony of 
the senses with abstractions which in many cases had no 
external reference, consensual knowledge lost its ability 
to serve as a metaphoric ground for truth. The new man of 
science, faced with explicating phenomena removed from the 
world of common-sense, required logical metaphors which 
could portray concepts not susceptible of extension and 
generate conclusions guaranteed by the integrity of their 
own internal structure. In short, he required a logic 
which aimed ultimately at accuracy, not consensus.
The protean concept of method, lifted from Ramean 
dialectical manuals and made transcendent, supplied the 
controlling metaphors for this new dialectic. In Ramist 
logic, however, method had operated as the controlling 
principle only in judgement, leaving the mind free in the 
process of invention to range back across the places in
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search of arguments stored for recall. Ramus, in fact, had 
conceived of method as a limiting concept not unlike what 
Kant would later call a "regulative principle of pure 
reason". But Francis Bacon, herald of the new science, 
passed beyond this regulative principle and enthroned 
method as both the limit and the ground of inquiry. He 
expropriated Ramus' three laws of method and installed them 
as the operative principles in a new apodictic science.*1 
No longer willing to accept the places as a viable source 
of arguments, Bacon placed both judgement and invention 
under the control of method and secured the premises of his 
logic without recourse to mediation.**
In some ways, the humanists' apotheosis of the past had 
ironically served to retard the advancement of learning.
It had promoted a conception of antiquity as the repository 
of a formerly perfect knowledge. Protestant reform tended 
to reinforce this view by looking to the Bible as a source 
of primitive truth. Ramean method had provided a key to 
unlock and critically process this fund of ancient knowl­
edge. It had even allowed for the assimilation of new data 
to the patterns of the old. But it had lacked an actual 
principle of innovation. Bacon, on the other hand, lived 
in an age of emerging science, an age not only pregnant 
with change but conscious of it and with a will for it. He 
conceived of knowledge as incomplete, susceptible of revi­
sion and capable of advancement. The new man of science 
stood at the threshold of discovery. He needed a logic to
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carry him forward, not back. Hence Bacon's logic bore no 
trace of the historical and communal structures essential 
to Ramism. In fact he labelled these metaphors "idols" and 
dismissed them as obstacles in the path of knowledge which 
must be "abjured and renounced with firm and solemn resolu­
tion."* 3 The advancement of learning could come only 
through the careful observation of present experience 
processed to yield new knowledge.
Bacon outlined his new logic in the Novum Organum whose 
frontispiece graphically portrayed its conceptual orienta­
tion, boasting a ship in full sail passing the Pillars of 
Hercules to explore the seas beyond. The Pillars bore the 
inscription plus ultra. Bacon clearly intended his logic 
as a means to pass beyond the knowledge of the ancients.
The loci, as a tool for processing the knowledge of the 
past, therefore had no "place" in his model. Accordingly 
he returned them to rhetoric where they resumed their 
career in somewhat circumscribed fashion.** Then, in a 
crucial shift of metaphors, Bacon redefined Ramean "inven­
tion" as first-order discovery, confined its operation 
strictly to the sciences, and placed it under the control 
of method. Renamed "initiative," Ramean invention became 
that procedure which "discloses and lays bare the very 
mysteries of the sciences."*5 Under Bacon’s revised model, 
the mind "initiated" its premises through induction. From 
the systematic observation of particular facts, it grouped 
phenomena under general rules according to the principles
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of a method which transcended purely logical application 
and entered the world of practical affairs as orderly pro­
cedure. In a sense, method took on a metaphoric life of 
its own, replacing consensual knowledge sb the structural 
element in Baconian science.
Bacon’s logic promoted a new ideal of natural knowledge 
as a source of power.•• Controlled from beginning to end 
by method, it promised to yield up not only an understand­
ing of nature, but actual control over its elements. 
Baconian logic contained images of manipulability at its 
theoretic core. It approached reality in a designedly 
exploratory way, "vexing" nature with experiments to dis­
cover causes which in turn would permit control. According 
to Bacon neither simple classification nor invention con­
ceived as recall could contribute to the expansion of 
knowledge. Only careful observation under strict meth­
odological control could direct the mind deeply into the 
phenomena of nature and guide it in the construction of 
rules. The metaphors of method, made manifest in Bacon’s 
Tables of Induction, provided the key to s c i e n c e . A n d  
only science could provide the means to mastery.
Under the impact of Bacon’s method, the world of nature 
faded as the object of man’s knowledge, and became rather 
the object of his will. Under the motto naturae vincula, 
Baconian logic left the Schools and entered the laboratory. 
It abandonned the search for truth through understanding 
and meaning through communication and concentrated rather
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on obtaining "access to the kingdom of man."*' Form, as a 
property of rational unity, gave way to fixed laws as prin­
ciples of practical operation. "In nature nothing really 
exists besides individual bodies, performing pure individ­
ual acts according to fixed law," Bacon argued. "Yet in 
philosophy this very law is the foundation as well of 
knowledge as of operation." This priority of principle 
over property marked a fundamental shift in logical meta­
phors which would underwrite technical advances in the 
applied sciences for the next hundred and fifty years.6*
But as R. Hooykaas points out, applied science is not 
the same as experimental science. "Its first aim is ...to 
gain power over nature [not] to discover its secrets by 
rationally planned devices."70 Although Bacon supplied a 
means for grounding analysis in carefully inducted 
premises, he provided no metaphoric language for for­
mulating or expressing truly scientific laws. The Novum 
Organum established procedures governing the induction of 
rules, but offered no means for moving beyond those rules 
to the construction of axioms. Hence Bacon could 
understand and appreciate the work of William Harvey, whose 
observations and experiments advanced anatomical practice, 
but he completely missed the significance of William Gil­
bert’s daring attempt to explain the cohesion of the 
universe in one abstract law of magnetism.71 Driven by a 
boundless ambition to dominate and exploit the material 
aspects of nature, Bacon, like Ockham, sacrificed the
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ability to understand its structure. Moreover, by 
rejecting all the structural metaphors implicit in Ramean 
logic, Bacon failed to grasp its latent ability to deal 
analogically with nature through the language of 
hypothesis.7* Challenged by the possibilities of the prac­
tical applications of science, he overlooked the 
extraordinary potential of the mathematical imagination to 
penetrate the secrets of nature.
Ong repeatedly stresses the "blind drive toward 
quantification" characteristic of Ramean logic.7* He 
argues that the increased use of spatial metaphors proper 
to topical logic threw it inevitably into a geometric 
frame.74 The Pythagorean notion of "proof" allowed for an 
easy correspondence between geometric display and topical 
analysis. But Bacon rejected the geometric modes of logic 
as being proper only to an analysis of form. His logic 
dealt rather with phenomena, with principles of operation 
not easily amenable to geometric display. In his wholesale 
rejection of Ramean metaphors, Bacon thus failed to 
appreciate the unique ability of mathematics to express the 
variability of phenomena in formal terms. It was left to 
Descartes, the new apostle of method, to invest the spatial 
analogies of Ramus with a true mathematical force.
The quantified world was the spiritual home of Des­
cartes and mathesis universalis his controlling metaphor.78 
For him all of nature consisted of variables mathematically 
manipulated. Science comprised merely a body of mathemati­
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cal demonstrations aimed at unravelling experience. But 
the mathematical implications of Ramean logic had drawn on 
an ana logy with matter apart from energy and motion. 
Kepler’s dictum "Where matter is, there is geometry," had 
expressed its central vision.7* By contrast, as the new 
science was rapidly revealing, the world of nature rever­
berated with contingent, accidental and fundamentally 
"irrational" phenomena whose infinite variability resisted 
neat display in geometric form. In fact, nature operated 
through "curves" -- ellipses, parabolae, hyperbolae -- all 
vaBtly more complex than the simple figures of geometry.77 
These "curves” manifested the principle of change inherent 
in the processes of nature. They corresponded to that 
active principle, that concern for process, which Bacon had 
introduced into analysis. But the characteristic inability 
of Pythagorean images to portray variability made it inca­
pable of expressing these "curves" analytically.7* Its 
formal modes of analysis simply could not encompass dynamic 
principles. Yet the new sciences required a logical and 
mathematical language which could express not only struc­
ture, but motion.
Descartes supplied this vocabulary in a revolutionary 
algebraic conception of thought. "Give me extension and 
motion and I will construct the world," he proclaimed, his 
Archimedean rhetoric exemplifying the shift away from 
Pythagorean metaphors.7* In an historic mathematical 
insight, Descartes saw that he could represent curves --
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the mathematical correlative of process -- algebraically by 
treating the primary qualities of matter as mathematical 
rather than geometric entities. He saw that by substitut­
ing algebraic symbols for the extensive properties of 
objects he could construct a mathematical language without 
recourse to diagrams. He could thereby extend the meta­
phors of method to that confusion of matter in motion that 
comprised the world of natural phenomena.
By incorporating principles of motion into method, Des­
cartes carried logical analysis a giant step beyond the 
diagrammatic boundaries of Ramism. Cartesian proofs could 
represent ongoing processes and, by reference to a co­
ordinate frame, relate them to the material world. By con­
flating the physical and mathematical sciences, Descartes 
provided a means for analyzing all physical phenomena in 
terms of the specifiable properties of matter in motion.
But by assimilating physical nature to mathematical analy­
sis, Descartes also created a new role for logic and for 
the mind which pursued it. Mathesis universalis operated 
through universal rules. Yet these rules had no formal 
reality -- Bacon had effectively dispensed with that. They 
merely articulated the rational constructions of an inquir­
ing mind which, as the architect of rules, took on a new 
relationship to the nature it sought to explicate. Under 
Cartesian metaphors the mind became more than simply the 
seat of inquiry. It assumed a new role as the author of a 
world which, by authoring, it explicitly reduced to the
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condition of object. By insisting on the deductive rela­
tions of mathematics as the controlling metaphors of 
science, Descartes created what Balz has called the 
"anthropocentric predicament"*0 -- a logical impasse which 
placed the mind in control of a natural world deduced 
exclusively from its own postulates.
Made manifest in the cogito, this "anthropocentric 
predicament" became the controlling principle of Cartesian 
logic. The cogito expressed a new set of logical metaphors 
which rendered the subject the vanishing point of a world 
reduced to mathematical expression. Under this new prin­
ciple of order, inquiry became a process pursued through 
method but guaranteed through self-consciousness. For if 
all logical discourse expressed mathematical relations and 
all mathematical relations expressed rational construc­
tions, a self-validating mind must function as the ground 
of inquiry. The cogito thus represented the final stage in 
the effective isolation of logical metaphors from the world 
of shared discourse. With it the increasingly apparent 
alienation of the world of science from the world of sense 
became a logical principle.* 1
The cogito underwrote a logic whose predicates 
expressed, not outward assertions or a shared assent, but 
simple acts of mental vision -- actual psychological events 
grounded in a self-reflecting ego. Ramean predicates had 
derived from invention and reached back to a common past. 
Baconian predicates had derived from initiation and reached
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out to present experience. But Descartes isolated predica­
tion within the cognizing mind. His predicates originated 
in intuition, the "undoubting conception of an unclouded 
and attentive mind” which reconstructed the entire world of 
common experience from its own perspective. Cartesian 
predicates carried no imperative to convince by conforming 
themselves to a shared reality since they sprang "from the 
light of reason alone."8* Indeed, they stood intuitively 
prior to inquiry itself and served only as witness to an 
inner world of self-consciousness from which all other 
worlds methodically derived.8*
"My design has never extended beyond trying to reform 
my own opinion," Descartes declared, effectively isolating 
his logic from any metaphoric concern with communication.84 
In fact, in the Discourse, Descartes explicitly identified 
the act of communication with the "adulteration" of ideas. 
The "undoubting conceptions" grasped through intuition 
functioned prescriptively, not descriptively. They 
expressed dehistoricized truths which derived their author­
ity from the immediacy of present experience and implied a 
profound disregard for contextual concerns.88 Descartes' 
"clear and distinct ideas" in fact remained totally 
unencumbered by any genealogy in a common past.
From the point of view of a nascent science, this 
proved a great advantage. The ability to isolate immediate 
experience from its contextual base allowed scientists to 
consign to the realm of psychology all those phenomena
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extraneous to the formulation of physical laws. Under 
Cartesian analysis, scientists could ignore secondary 
qualities except insofar as they could be reduced to 
analytical referents. They could thereby construct 
theoretical systems that were sufficiently abstract to 
absorb new data. They could even lay claim to new knowl­
edge through the manipulation of mathematical formulae.
But because of the psychological ground of their logical 
premises, they could never reach outside their own 
theoretical frame to that body of shared experience which 
had supported the topical tradition.
The cogito established logic in a trajectory which 
carried it inevitably away from the world of shared con­
sciousness which had underwritten the "places.". It 
redefined the predicating mind as a uni-valent ego in whom 
ground and consequent merged. It transformed dialectic 
from a function immersed in a world of common experience to 
a method of procedure restricted to the individual mind. 
Mediating language structures gave way to a new analytic 
vocabulary based in mathematics which could express 
abstract relationships without any existential reference.
As the natural world became more and more the object of 
purely private inquiry, logic lost its voice -- the meta­
phorical harmony of the symbolist spheres fading into the 
silent object world of Newtonian space.
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Chapter 2 




The shift in metaphors implicit in Cartesian analysis 
marked a critical moment in the history of logic and the 
development of science. It introduced a new principle of 
logical order which in turn supplied a metaphoric founda­
tion for a new conception of scientific law. The accession 
of the subject to a prescriptive role in inquiry redirected 
logic away from mediational forms and refocused it firmly 
on a specifiable and totally accessible reality. The 
Cartesian subject himself authored the world he explored 
according to the dictates of his own clear and distinct 
ideas. These ideas retained none of the structural ele­
ments which had survived in the Ramean places. Nor did 
they reflect any lingering attachment to the humanist ideal 
of communication. As private acts of vision, they 
underwrote a formulation of knowledge whose validity 
preceeded all contextual concerns. In what Karsten Harries 
has called "an escape from perspective," Descartes isolated 
inquiry from historical modes of thought and accomplished a
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final shift away from a metonymic order to an order of rep­
resentation based exclusively in the present.1
The cogito effectively replaced the historical powers 
of memory with the a-temporal power of intuition. Previous 
logical traditions from Cicero to Augustine had held that 
memory expressed the limitless power of the subject to con­
struct a complex reality out of the manifold of human expe­
rience. Ramus went so far as to absorb memory into logic 
and identify it with method.1 But Descartes regarded 
memory as a weak link in the cognitive chain. It presented 
the mind with ideas of the second order. Only intuition 
could provide it with first premises.1 In place of meta­
phors which drew on a collective consciousness, Descartes 
installed the mathematical process of "enumeration" which 
divided or "resolved" all phenomena into simple parts and 
redistributed those parts in an abstract order appropriate 
to mathematical expression.4
Enumeration reproduced phenomena as series of logical 
propositions which, as constructions of the mind, remained 
accessible to it through mathematics. It encoded objects 
and events in the language of order and measure -- ”en tant 
qu'elles sont comprises par 1’entendement" -- and so 
brought them under the control of the understanding.1 But 
enumeration provided no historical account of experience.4 
It simply rendered events comprehensible by bringing them 
into right relation with the methodological postulates of 
thought. It reduced the complex of nature to schematic
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images -- "figures sch£matiques” -- which could be grasped 
intuitively and so become the object of analysis.7
This reduction of the logical process of comprehension 
to the mathematical process of enumeration underwrote the 
entire Cartesian endeavor. It placed mathematics at the 
theoretic core of a logic controlled by the perspective of 
an individual mind. Enumeration constituted a revolution­
ary conception of logical order whose syntax operated 
solely within the immediate, instantaneous world of intui­
tion. As a quantified, serial system of representation, 
enumeration neutralized all ontological categories, leveled 
all hierarchical judgements of genus and species, and 
abandonned all topical notions of structure. It reduced 
order and measure to methodological postulates and causal 
relations to logical implications. In effect, enumeration 
sacrificed the ontological dimensions of thought to its 
quantitative character and established mathematics as the 
condition of possibility for all human knowledge.* 
Ultimately, the reductive analysis implicit in its 
processes became the controlling metaphor of the emerging 
physical sciences.*
The ability of Cartesian analysis to reduce natural 
phenomena to mathematical signs provided a powerful tool to 
men intent on discovering simple, unifying rules with which 
to control a mass of new data. By dealing reductively with 
phenomena, the scientific imagination could isolate 
specific elements and forces in nature and deal with them
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analytically without reference to the carefully inducted 
qualities and states which had limited Baconian science.
It could move beyond the referential properties of experi­
ence and deal directly and exclusively with its processes. 
But by exporting the necessary connections of mathematics 
to the realm of process in nature, Descartes inadvertently 
confused the order of logic with the actual unfolding of 
physical phenomena and arrived at the correlative conclu­
sion that the natural order in fact conformed to the meth­
odological postulates of thought. "Enthralled by his own 
metaphor," Turbayne argues, "he mistook the mask for the 
face, and consequently bequeathed to posterity more than a 
world-view. He bequeathed a world."10
Descartes’ bequest consisted of a neat, systematic 
world governed by mechanical principles and necessary rela­
tions which answered at all points to the mathematical 
precision of his logic.11 Such a world invited inquiry.
In fact it promised to yield up its secrets to scientific 
investigation provided only that the scientist not violate 
his methodological rules. But Cartesian metaphors did sub­
stantially more than simply validate the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge. They actually fixed the character of 
science and determined its content.1* Descartes
explicitly required that any object, in order to fall under 
scientific inquiry, be susceptible of reduction by enumera­
tion to algebraic symbols which could be grasped intui­
tively and manipulated through calculation. This effec­
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tively excluded the investigation of anything "except that 
'matter' susceptible of every sort of division, shape and 
motion, which geometers call quantity, and which they 
presuppose as the subject matter of their proofs."1* 
Cartesian logic thus redefined reality as measurable 
quantity. It withdrew inquiry from the world of motive and 
meaning and confined it to a one-dimensional realm which 
systematically excluded all contextual concerns.
Medieval science, by contrast, had rested on an analogy 
of God with the world. Its symbolic structure had 
expressed a profound belief that the multi-form and vital 
world of nature fulfilled a purpose. Its logical metaphors 
had supported a conception of scientific law grounded in 
justice and truth. But Cartesian analysis shed all the 
protections of this analogy in favor of an analogy with 
mathematical certainty. It replaced the qualitative rich­
ness of the medieval world with the quantitative precision 
of a mathematically determined world -- a world confined to 
the present, devoid of consciousness and animated by 
mechanical principles. In such a scheme, the very regu­
larity which made the world knowable made it meaningless as 
well. Cartesian metaphors effectively released the natural 
world to scientific inquiry by unravelling its mysteries 
through enumeration. But it failed to knit it back up 
again in a way which could satisfy the complex psychologi­
cal needs of men. ”'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence 
gone," John Donne protested.1* Driven by an ideal of pure
65
quantity, Descartes proposed a theory of inquiry which, 
exhausting the meaning of consciousness in its logical 
function, removed man as the central source of analogy in 
the construction of theory.1*
The cogito itself expressed the supreme functional 
postulate. The procedural doubt which controlled its 
operation effectively isolated the functional aspects of 
thought from the thinking thing, leaving the mind to be 
described only in negative terms -- a kind of para- 
mechanical hypothesis convenient for explaining the fact of 
inquiry. In a sense, the cogito actually replaced the 
independent functions of the mind with the quantitative 
functions of mathematics. Under its impact, the mind 
operated constructively only in the sphere of the irra­
tional where intuition took place. As such it retained a 
transcendent analogical force as the source of truth, but 
became totally irrelevant to the construction of rules in 
the practical econony of the natural world. Cartesian 
analysis, in fact, viewed the mind only as a limiting con­
dition to an otherwise perfect prescription for inquiry.
The concomitant shift in metaphors seriously undercut 
the ability of science to construct comprehensive models 
relevant to the complex of human experience. Eventually, 
the lack of emotional satisfaction attendant on the appli­
cation of reductive analysis to the natural order encour­
aged a search for metaphors which could reinstate issues of 
motive and value in the world of the emerging physical
66
sciences. But in the wake of Descartes' devastating criti­
que, only the functional postulates of mathematics remained 
as a source of scientific analogy. Descartes’ defense of 
enumeration had rendered quantitative relations the sole 
means of articulating either physical or logical order. 
These quantitative relations, when formulated algebrai­
cally, expressed the self-validating "laws" which governed 
self-regulating phenomena. Hence both the laws and the 
phenomena they described satisfied the methodological 
requirements of Descartes’ science. But Cartesian analysis 
assumed substantially more than the quantitative integr ity 
of its mathematical laws. It assumed the implicit 
quantitative structure of the reality which these laws 
expressed.
Edgar Zilsel points out that the concept of "physical 
law" in nature occurred fully developed for the first time 
in Descartes.1• Although Francis Bacon had used the term 
in the Novum Organum, he had equated it with principles of 
form. "The form of heat and the law of heat are the same 
thing," Bacon argued.17 But Descartes declared that he 
had discovered the actual operative "laws which God has put 
into Nature" and that these laws were "identical with the 
rules of mechanics."1' Cartesian laws expressed genuine 
regulative postulates congruent not only to the laws of 
mathematics, but to the structures of reality itself.
The consequent conviction that the natural world 
actually conformed to the metaphors of mathematics
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ultimately proved just as satisfying in its own way as the 
old belief that nature fulfilled a purpose. In fact, it 
acted as a heady tonic on scientific minds in search of a 
controlling vision.1' Descartes' mathematically formulated 
"physical laws" promised not only order, but control. 
Whoever can construct a law can predict. And whoever can 
predict can preempt. Here was a metaphor to conjure with! 
It perfectly expressed that ideal of mastery initiated by 
Baconian science. Moreover, its quantitative syntax 
allowed for the extension of "law" by analogy across a 
broad spectrum of human experience.
The introduction of the metaphor of physical law into 
science correlated directly to the conceptual shifts 
implicit in Cartesian logic. The principle of enumeration 
inevitably encouraged a mathematical view of reality which, 
in turn, justified the construction of analytical laws. 
Moreover, these two mutually reenforcing notions coincided 
with and perhaps underwrote significant changes in the 
political, social and religious spheres." Zilsel has 
argued that "the idea of a comprehensive multitude of 
rational physical 'laws' could not have arisen in feu­
dalism, even if the corresponding physical facts had been 
known." God had served as the principium of the medieval 
world. Since He guaranteed the internal coherence of
nature, there was no need to investigate its rules. But as 
the integrated structures of feudalism broke down, percep­
tions of nature ceased to enjoy their easy correspondence
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with metaphysics. In defense against the more factious 
ideologies of the 16th Century, Zilsel claims, natural 
science turned to the juridical metaphor of "law" to 
explain the perceived regularities of the natural world.
In fact, he suggests that the social connotations of the 
law metaphor did much to shape the developing sciences.21
If one accepts the central thesis of the present study 
-- that the metaphors of logic and science are mutually 
dependent -- Zilzel's argument can provide a convenient 
frame for tracing the general influences of logical theory 
in the 16th and 17th Centuries as well. For the crucial 
juncture at which the concept of physical law made its 
appearance in the world of science coincided precisely with 
that point at which Cartesian metaphors began to supplant 
the topical images of the Ramean tradition. An investiga­
tion of the joint careers of the legal and logical models 
operative in this historical context may, therefore, add an 
interesting dimension to the study of an era crucial to the 
development of American thought.
The concept of physical law entered the European con­
sciousness as the disintegrating socio-economic structures 
of the High Middle Ages began to give way to developing 
national cultures. In fact, the rise of nation states can 
itself be seen as an overt political and social recognition 
of the regional and historical differences which became 
more apparent as the feudal order faded. Many forces 
worked to reshape the mental contours of Europe during this
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period. Voyages of exploration taught new lessons in per­
spective and space. Colonial experiences broadened eth­
nological knowledge. The promise of vast riches in the new 
world gave impetus to an emerging money economy and encour­
aged the development of competitive enterprise. From the 
relatively closed compass of feudal Europe, emerging 
nations moved out into the indefinite and unfamiliar world 
of global politics, while religious wars at home shattered 
the cohesive orthodoxy of the Universal Church and replaced 
it with a fractious heterodox truce.1*
All these trends undercut the univocal structures of 
feudalism and reenforced notions of difference. They 
undermined existing principles of order and neutralized 
operative conceptions of law. The disenfranchisement of 
the Universal Church left Europe without a Law of Nations 
and encouraged the development of discrete legal models.
The discrediting of clerical authority placed administra­
tive law in the hands of political partisans. Dynastic 
tensions and religious upheavals tended henceforth to 
resolve themselves according to regional and political 
interests which became the foundations of distinct national 
traditions.** Nor did national self-assertion limit itself 
to the political and religious spheres. The general 
upheavals of the 16th Century made it impossible to enforce 
orthodoxy in intellectual matters as well. Developing 
legal theories required justification through new princi­
ples of logical order which could support their distinctive
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characteristics. The rise of vernaculars attendant on the 
breakdown of Latin Christendom coincidentally emphasized a 
conception of truth as a commodity which could be articu­
lated in different ways by different groups.1* Subsequent 
national developments in logic and science hence tended to 
acquire their own distinctive vocabularies.
The interactions between logic and science stand out in 
sharp relief against this background of emerging nation 
states. The ability to isolate trends in logic and science 
as they emerged into developing national settings affords a 
singular opportunity for assessing the mutual inter­
dependence of the two disciplines. Moreover, three of 
these emergent national traditions assume special impor­
tance in the present context because of their relevance to 
American intellectual history. England, France and Germany 
developed radically different political and religious 
structures in the 16th Century. Hence their conceptions of 
"law" operated within fundamentally different frames. When 
scientists in the 17th Century reached out to these dif­
ferent formulations of "law” in search of a controlling 
metaphor, the results were correspondingly different. The 
divergent paths taken by science and logic in these three 
environments thus provides an interesting insight into the 
ways in which the metaphors of logic relate to the con­
struction of legal and scientific theory.
In England, the intervention of Henry VIII effectively 
tied theories of law and sovereignty to questions of reli-
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gious doctrine.1® Drawing on an amalgam of Tyndale's doc­
trine of Christian obedience and Luther’s theories of 
divine Kingship, Henry early severed England from Roman 
jurisdiction and established himself as the Supreme Head of 
the Church in England. He unilaterally replaced canon law 
with the Sovereign will. But by invoking divine-right 
theories, Henry violated ancient English Parliamentary 
principles grounded in the Magna Carta and disclosed the 
ambiguous role which positive law played in the English 
political process. He forced an early and definitive con­
frontation between developing theories of absolute 
sovereignty and traditional theories of common law.1*
The debates precipitated by the Royal Supremacy Act 
prompted a general reassessment of English legal theory 
which resulted ultimately in a reaffirmation of the power 
of Parliament and the formulation of an unambiguous legis­
lative theory which guaranteed the rights of men before the 
law.1’ This theory became a powerful tool in the hands of 
later reformers bent on concentrating political power in 
the hands of religious partisans. For, although under 
Henry’s guidance the English Reform remained strongly 
Anglican, essentially aristocratic and fundamentally con­
servative, with the accession of Edward VI a major 
reorientation in English religious life began which radi­
cally changed the relationship between Parliament and the 
King and brought the full impact of Henry’s actions to bear 
on English legal theory.
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Edward came to the throne a pliant child of ten under 
the Regency of the Duke of Somerset who encouraged him in 
an aggressive Reform policy. During his short reign,
Edward initiated many far reaching changes in English 
ecclesiology, all of which tended to diminish the 
aristocratic nature of the Anglican Church while coinciden­
tally reenforcing lay interests. Most significantly, he 
offered shelter to a large group of Protestant scholars and 
refugees fleeing the severities of Charles V. These exiles 
came predominantly from areas in Germany dominated by Cal­
vinist rather than Lutheran doctrine. Many assumed key 
positions in English universities, while others became out­
spoken political agitators.11 And they all brought with 
them a conception of reform which, like Calvin's Visible 
Church, reached far beyond the confines of purely religious 
doctrine and entered the legal and political worlds as 
well. But when the religious program of Calvinism reached 
out into English political life, it found already estab­
lished there a firm conviction of the efficacy of positive 
law and the inviolability of the legislative act.
Calvin’s ecclesiology proved curiously amenable to 
English Parliamentary forms. It found a particularly 
strong ally in traditional English conceptions of the com­
mon law.*1 Calvin established the inner life as a norm for 
collective behavior. He insisted on each man’s obligation 
to answer personally, not only to God, but to his fellow 
men. His Visible Church provided a matrix in which all
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social activities converged toward man's primary function 
of achieving salvation and glorifying God. This external 
reference translated questions of private religious con­
science into questions of public vocation, ultimately 
reducing theories of divine right to principles of original 
sovereignty.*0 Moreover, the didactic charge of 
Protestantism in general, and of Calvinism in particular, 
encouraged a further shift away from law as a metaphor of 
divine justice toward a new conception of law based in the 
"commonweal." The law in England consequently came to 
represent a legitimate means of securing and improving pub­
lic welfare.
Under the joint impact of political and religious 
reform, English legal theory thus moved from an interpreta­
tion of law as a private jurisdiction toward a new concep­
tion of law as a public function which assigned men con­
structive social roles related to the search for individual 
salvation. The Visible Church extended the revolutionary 
implications of Luther's Christian Liberty to questions of 
public authority and political legitimacy and placed juris­
diction firmly in the hands of laymen. It reduced 
government to "a sort of secular intellectual corporation 
whose vocation was the analysis and regulation of human 
relations" and made public utility the basis of political 
power.*1 In the wake of Edwardean reform, the law in 
England became the legislative guardian of civic order, an
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instrument contrived and administered by men to ensure the 
integrity of a godly society.
In the six short years of Edward’s reign the socially 
potent metaphors of Calvinism permeated all levels of 
English life. Nor could the five years of the Marian 
interlude shake their influence. By 1600, with the 
Elizabethan Settlement and the recall of the Marian exiles 
from their sojourns in Geneva, Zurich and Strasburg, the 
image of Calvin’s Visible Church had established itself at 
the very center of English life. It had remade theories 
of divine sovereignty over into an explicit theory of posi­
tive law which claimed jurisdiction based on its ability to 
interpret present experience and procure the "commonweal." 
This early identification of Calvinist ecclesiology with 
parliamentary forms established characteristic images in 
English political and intellectual life which would exert a 
powerful influence on the development of its logical and 
scientific models in the century to come. At a crucial 
point in the growth of a national consciousness, it sup­
plied distinctive legislative metaphors to scientific minds 
reaching out for new principles of physical law and logical 
order. Henceforth when English scientists elaborated 
"laws" or appealed to "order", they would do so under the 
controlling influence of metaphors peculiar to their own 
political heritage.
In France, on the other hand, the turmoil of the 16th 
Century generated a radically different legal vocabulary.
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The interactions of political and religious unrest in 
France tended, by contrast, to reenforce a native cen­
tralized absolutism. Gallicanism had traditionally 
expressed an authoritarian ideal. France, more than any 
other European power save perhaps Spain, had historically 
maintained an ideological conservatism in both religion and 
politics. Even in what Kelley has called "this age of 
ideological pandemonium," France remained an essentially 
conservative, authoritarian and Catholic power.** The 
Parleaent of Francis I thus bore no resemblance to the Par­
liament of Henry VIII. It held no traditional legislative 
power but remained virtually and actually subservient to 
the Sovereign will. Consequently, metaphors of positive 
law and legislative process acquired no status in France, 
where all jurisdiction continued to rest firmly in the 
hands of the King.**
In France the Reformation identified itself with 
dynastic power, not positive law. From Francis I to 
Charles IX, French monarchs pursued religious policy 
wherever their political interests dictated. From the 
Treaty of Viterbo, to alliances with the Turks, to flirta­
tions with German Protestants against Charles V, the Valois 
used religious unrest in Europe to consolidate the absolute 
power of their line and advance the political interests of 
France. With the accession of Charles IX and the regency 
of Catherine de Medici, religious issues became explicitly 
identified with dynastic politics as the Guise and Conde
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factions struggled for power under their respective doc­
trinal flags. This identification became even more 
apparent in the reign of Henry III as Navarre waged 
dynastic warfare against the Guises under cover of reli­
gious controversy. The characteristic French subordination 
of religious doctrine to political expediency became offi­
cial State policy in 1593 in Henry IV’s famous dictum con­
cerning the relative worth of Paris and a Mass. With the 
Edict of Nantes in 1598, Henry brought the religious con­
flict in France to an uneasy close in a political settle­
ment which instituted no sweeping changes, acknowledged no 
fundamental breaks with tradition, and left French legal 
models much as they had been in 1515 when Francis I took 
the throne and Luther nailed his theses to the door.
Thanks to the political pragmatism of the French monar­
chy, canon law retained a qualified force in France, 
although patently at the pleasure of the King. The "civil 
law" which replaced it in certain jurisdictions reflected 
in fact an absolute authority resting, by divine right, in 
the hands of the monarch. 16th Century French legal theory 
thus never experienced the creative interplay between 
absolutist and legislative metaphors which had shaped 
English legal models in the wake of the Establishment. 
Despite the attempts of Huguenot politiquea to formulate 
theories of resistance in support of their religious dis­
sent, the concept of law in 16th Century France acquired 
none of the interpretive cast which it had in England
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thanka to doaeatic political developaenta.*4 The law in 
France remained essentially authoritarian and absolute, 
propounded unilaterally and imposed from above. It found 
its adequate expression in Jean Bodin’s Republic (1576) 
which stands as the quintessential statement of political 
absolutism.
The political conservatism characteristic of France in 
the 16th Century supplied its scientists in the 17th with a 
distinctive set of legal metaphors destined to control the 
development of logical and scientific models. As French 
scientists reached out in search of a metaphoric base on 
which to construct new principles of physical law and logi­
cal order, they encountered images and analogies which dif­
fered substantially from those which underwrote the devel­
opment of English science. And their own formulations of 
logic and science would differ accordingly.
In England, Henry's intervention encouraged the devel­
opment of legislative paradigms which in turn encouraged a 
positive theory of law. In France, a conservative politi­
cal regime enforced the maintainance of absolutist legal 
models grounded in the Sovereign will. In Germany, by con­
trast, the extant political institutions generated a com­
plex pattern of conflicting legal metaphors which reflected 
the political realities of the Empire itself. Germany in 
1515 comprised a loosely knit collection of principalities, 
free cities and imperial territories joined together under 
the aegis of the politically ambiguous Holy Roman Empire.
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These units lacked a clear national identity and owed 
allegiance to no centralized authority. This political 
fragmentation had a crucial impact on Gerian legal theory 
and a consequent inpact on the development of German logi­
cal and scientific models.**
"Europe's chief exit from the feudal age," Thomas Brady 
notes, "moved through the dualistic prince-estates con­
stitution toward the absolutist monarchy of the early 
modern era."1* In England, a centralized national 
government stepped into the vacuum left by disintegrating 
feudal forms and provided principles of order and theories 
of law which controlled the national life. In France, a 
strong dynasty gathered the loose threads of feudal power 
into an aggressive theory of political absolutism which 
compelled ideological order and guaranteed the operation of 
law. But in Germany, the political ambiguity of the Holy 
Roman Empire tended to perpetuate the hegemonic values 
which had characterized the old feudal order. The Hapsburg 
imperial structure not only permitted but encouraged the 
survival of small autonomous political units which a cen­
tralized national monarchy would have absorbed. As a 
result, the power struggles which took place in Germany 
during the 16th Century expressed a contest for local 
supremacy, not national unity. The dizzying sequence of 
political and religious events which comprise German his­
tory in the 16th Century clearly reflect the localization
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of interest which lay at the heart of the German Imperial 
order.*1
Through its conscious exploitation of competing local 
interests, German Imperial politics unwittingly provided 
what Brady calls a "second exit" from the feudal age which 
derived, not from the "prince-estates" complex operative in 
England and France, but rather from the "main line of late 
medieval social development," communalism.* * By permit­
ting the survival of locally autonomous units, the Empire 
ensured the growth and development of the free cities of 
South Germany -- urban units peculiarly well-suited to 
maintaining medieval functional theories of society as an 
alternative strategy to Imperial rule. The free-cities had 
been founded as special cases of feudal priviledge within 
the Empire. Their notions of liberty thus derived from 
legal metaphors of exemption and immunity, not from classi­
cal notions of the polis like those which grounded the 
developing political theories of England and France. The 
German free cities clothed their civic ideals in Christian, 
not classical images. They drew on concepts of the sacral 
commune and the common good (Genoaaenschaft) for political 
justification. In short, they maintained an allegiance to 
those elements of structure and community which had 
underwritten symbolic modes of thought.**
Rich in resources and centrally located along strategic 
routes, these South German cities quickly became centers of 
trade, manufacturing and investment. As such they provided
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the Imperial government with an effective foil against the 
political and territorial ambitions of aggressive Princes. 
The cities in fact played an active role in maintaining the 
precarious balance between Imperial, Princely and urban 
interests which characterized German politics throughout 
the 16th Century.4* This balance, in its turn, prevented 
the ascendency of any consistent or univocal theory of law 
within the Empire.
In fact, the persistence of these three competing 
political interests actually encouraged the development of 
three distinct legal models -- the G&ttliches Recht (divine 
law basically congruent to canon law, imposed from above 
and expressing the absolute authority of the Emperor), the 
Herrschaftsrecht (seigneurial law more closely akin to 
hierarchic notions of fidelity and duty) and the altes 
Recht ("old law," which appealed to traditional communal 
rights grounded in medieval customary law).** The Imperial 
government, quite naturally, encouraged allegiance to the 
Gottliches Recht. The Principalities answered to the 
Herrschaftsrecht. The cities of the South recognized the 
jurisdiction of the altes Recht.
The competing sets of legal metaphors which grew out of 
the political realities of the Empire both dictated and 
reflected the unrest which plagued Germany during the 16th 
Century. The election of Charles V in 1519 placed unprece­
dented territory and power in the hands of the Emperor.
Thus threatened, the Princes moved to consolidate their
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position by pursuing aggressive policies against the 
cities. At the Imperial Diet at Worse in 1521 , the Princes 
appealed to the Herrschaftsrecht in an attack against the 
cities’ crucial right of monopoly -- a right grounded in 
traditional immunities guaranteed by the Crown under the 
altes Recht. This and similar threats forced the cities to 
defend their ancient priviledges, in part by forming a 
strong alliance with the Crown and in part by appealing to 
legal principles drawn from their urban past. In 1524, 
however, Charles effectively neutralized this two-fold line 
of defense by the Edict of Burgos, which unilaterally 
invoked Imperial rights and authority.
But by invoking the Gdttlischea Recht against the 
burgeoning Reform, Charles placed the cities in a dangerous 
position. Internal pressures militated against their com­
pliance with the Edict. Without abbrogating the civic 
ideals which they sought to defend, the urban governments 
simply could not continue to align themselves with the 
Crown. On the other hand, the very altes Recht which they 
sought to protect drew its force from priviledges and 
immunities granted by the Crown under the old order.41 
Denying one necessarily meant denying the other.
In 1525, under the force of political and religious 
eventB, the Gottiisches Recht, the Herrschaftsrecht and the 
altes Recht came into open conflict in the Peasant’s War. 
During the War, Brady claims, urban communalism "emerged as 
the rebel’s leading political ideal" against the military
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and political threats of the Princes.** But this unprece­
dented intervention of the urban commons and the altes 
Recht in the high politics of the Empire drove a decisive 
wedge between the cities and the Crown. Even in the inter­
ests of a precarious political balance, Charles could not 
ignore the threat posed by outright resistance in the 
cities. Ultimately the Peasant's War forced an unequivocal 
response. In 1530 Charles ordered a full reversion to the 
Catholic faith in Oermany and attempted to compel 
unqualified allegiance to the Gotti itches Recht which 
underwrote his Imperial authority.
The Edict of Augsburg marked the final dissolution of 
the partnership between cities and Crown. Predictably this 
definitive break greatly enhanced the power of the Princes.
The cities scrambled to regroup. Deprived of the pro­
tections of the altes Recht by the invocation of Imperial 
authority, they cast about for a new principle of order
which could validate their ancient immunities. In the end,
they discovered the metaphoric justification they sought in 
a variation of the lex Christiana of the Lutheran heresy.
Urban ideologies translated Luther's "law" into a 
theological version of the altes Recht, rendering the meta­
phors of customary law universal by assigning them juris­
diction in a sphere of meaning which transcended all 
political authority.** Thus interpreted, the lex 
Christiana converged with and immeasurably strengthened the 
ancient desire for self-rule in the cities and supplied a
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potent weapon for the defense of priviledges and immunities 
against the power of both the Princes and the Crown.
Indeed, the Reform ideologies which developed out of 
Luther's lex Christiana in the cities inadvertently mobi­
lized a collective consciousness latent in the urban 
enclaves of the South. The cities already saw themselves 
as organic parts of a cosmopolitan order. Luther’s call to 
freedom merely added fuel to the civic fires.4® By 
extrapolating a new defense for an old social ethic from 
the priesthood of all believers, the South German cities in 
a sense took their case for the altes Recht to a "higher 
court," rejecting the law of both Lords and Empire in favor 
of spiritual as well as political autonomy.
The political and doctrinal splits which occurred 
within the Empire following the Augsburg decree olearly 
reflected the legal models operative within their respec­
tive spheres.4* Those territories under direct Imperial 
control of course remained loyal to Rome until such time as 
the Emperor declared for a different source of divine truth 
to underwrite his political power. The principalities 
tended through duty and necessity to follow the religious 
preferences of the Princes, most of whom ultimately recog­
nized the political expediency of Luther’s two swords.47 
The cities of the South, on the other hand, found the 
theocratic visions of Zwingli and Bucer to be most com­
patible with their communal traditions.4® Each of these 
three political environments, controlled by its own charac­
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teristic set of legal metaphors, would provide a distinc­
tive climate for the development of principles of order and 
conceptions of physical law in the 17th Century. And the 
political and economic influence of the South German 
cities, along with their characteristic commitment to 
education as the guarantor of civic righteousness, would 
ensure that the logical and scientific models developed 
under the influence of the altea Recht would come to 
dominate the further development of German thought.4*
England, France and Germany thus each offered charac­
teristic sets of legal metaphors to minds reaching out in 
search of new principles of order at the opening of the 
17th Century. English civil or positive law gave priority 
to the individual, celebrating his self-mastery and, by 
extension the virtues of the society which accomodated him. 
French absolutist or divine-right law gave priority to the 
Sovereign, affirming his power over all aspects of his 
realm. South German customary law gave priority to the 
community, encouraging a structural ideal derived from 
medieval social theory.
But as scientists within each of these traditions 
reached out to their respective legal models for analogies 
on which to construct their physical laws, they did so 
under the determining guidance of three equally distinct 
sets of logical metaphors. As previously noted, the cru­
cial juncture at which the conception of physical law 
obtruded into the world of science coincided precisely with
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that point at which the analytical metaphors of Descartes 
began to supplant the topical images of Ramus. Moreover, 
as Ramean and Cartesian logic vied with each other for 
dominance in the Schools, they each interacted in charac­
teristic ways with the Aristotelian tradition which per­
sisted there. This interaction produced three distinct 
logical models, each curiously congruent to the national 
setting in which it emerged. If the underlying presupposi­
tions of these logics can be shown to correspond in 
meaningful ways to the legal models described above and to 
the theoretical models emerging in English, French and 
German science, it may provide important clues to the role 
of legal and logical metaphors in the construction of 
scientific theory.
Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean logic each 
approached the worlds of thought and nature from strikingly 
different perspectives. Aristotelian logic proceeded under 
metaphors grounded in the categories which grouped concepts 
under ideal headings and organized thought qualitatively.
It obtained its predicates through existential assertions 
made about the nature of things and the relationships which 
pertained between them. Under the postulates of 
Aristotelian logic, the objects of knowledge existed as 
derivative entities whose analytical nature depended on 
fixed principles of hierarchic order. Although inquiry 
could pursue these principles through their perceived 
effects and could express them through the ideal mechanism
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of the categories, it could never penetrate to the true 
origin and nature of the order itself. Under such a model, 
knowledge of the natural world had to be inferred from 
experience and then related referentially to an assumed 
metaphysical order.
Cartesian logic, on the other hand, ordered all things 
according to the perceptions of an individual cognizing 
mind and expressed that order exclusively through the func­
tional postulates of mathematicp. Descartes’ logic 
obtained its predicates through intuition and developed its 
arguments through enumeration. Under the operation of 
these metaphors, the objects of knowledge existed as 
rational constructs, reducible to mathematical formulae and 
manipulable through calculation. Inquiry could thus 
determine both their nature and their function by investi­
gating the quantitative relationships which pertained 
between them. Enumeration, Descarte’s controlling meta­
phor, thus embodied a changed attitude toward the nature 
and role of evidence in inquiry. It reduced physical 
objects to minimal units which one could expect to yield 
promptly and entirely to inquiry. Under enumeration, 
scientia thus expressed an impoverished ideal which denied 
the individual integrity of natural things, confined 
scientific inquiry to the matrix of possible experience and 
emasculated causal principles by reducing them to mechan­
ical constructs.
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Ramean logic, in contrast to both, proposed a genetic 
principle of order grounded, not in ideal categories or 
mathematical relations, but in a collective consciousness. 
Ramean logic operated not so much by addition or division 
as by accretion. It sought truth through the impenetration 
of perennial principles and obtained its predicates through 
a process of invention which reached back through the 
"places" to enduring truth-values grounded in the permanent 
existence of the natural world, not in its ideal forms or 
its present functions. Under the metaphors of Ramean logic 
inquiry brought the mind into contact with that store of 
common experience which served to structure the traditional 
wisdom of the race. By penetrating the structure, one pen­
etrated the meaning. Nature itself expressed scientia.
Predictably, the scientific models constructed under 
the guidance of such radically distinct modes of analysis 
developed correspondingly different conceptions of physical 
law. The following chapters will explore the ways in which 
these distinct logical and legal vocabularies helped to 
shape the emerging scientific traditions of England, France 
and Germany and provided each with a set of metaphors ade­
quate to the expression of its own peculiar theory.
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the importance of the delayed introduction of Roman law 
into Germany, a phenomena which he claims caused "an inter­
ruption in the cultural traditions of the German people 
such as did not occur in other lands” ("Changing Ideas...", 
433). For a general reference on German legal traditions 
see F. Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S. 
Chrimes (Oxford, 1948).
42. Ozment describes these internal pressures and 
their role in the institution of the Reformation in the 
Southern cities in Cities. 121-164. See also "Pamphlet 
Literature of the German Reformation" in Reformation 
Europe. 85-106 "The cities saw the Crown as their best 
chance for the establishment of law and order," Brady 
explains -- a need the more deeply felt as trade and com­
merce in South Germany expanded. This expansion, on the 
other hand, also served to provide the cities with a common 
political interest against the crown (Swiss. 227).
43. Brady, Swiss, 29. Brady claims in fact that the 
Revolution of 1525 "revived the old communal ethos and 
raised into prominence once more the ideas of commune and 
federation (Ibid., 228). Elsewhere he argues that Germany 
was "the one area in Europe where the looseness of the 
structure of power permitted the revolt within the Church 
to penetrate the masses and allowed pressure for change to 
be exerted from below. In England, by contrast, the 
Reformation came from above, and the broad mass of the pop­
ulation did not become involved before mid-century; while 
in France the Reformation captured neither the court nor
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the masses" ("Social History..." in Reformation Europe. 
163-167). Blickle also argues for the importance of the 
participation of the common man in the revolt (Reformation 
Europe. 173) while Janine Garrisson-Estebe notes that, by 
contrast, the peasantry in France remained essentially 
impervious to the Reformation (Protestants du Midi 1559- 
1598 (Toulouse, 1980)).
44. Moeller claims that Luther’s doctrine supplied a 
"theological anchor” to late medieval urban ideals"
(Ozment, Cities. 6, 145-147). See also Brady, Swiss. 156.
45. Moeller observes that "the Protestant movement in 
the cities [confronted] as nowhere else a special 
world...that was aware of its own value" (Imperial Cities. 
69). Blickle argues that the Reformation throughout 
Germany tended to reenforce the latent communal structures 
of German society (The Revolution of 1525 (Baltimore,
1982).
46. The extent to which the Reformation differed in 
regions across Germany is a hotly disputed issue. Ozment, 
for instance, suggests that scholars have "exaggerated the 
intellectual disunity of Protestantism" and argues that 
"evidences... of serious differences between Luther, on the 
one hand, and Zwingli and Bucer, on the other, is hardly 
overwhelming" (Cities. 8-10, 121-123, 135-146). He 
attributes what he sees as the superficial differences in 
their political stances to their different responses to 
concrete historical crises. Moeller, on the other hand, 
develops the argument that the urban character of the 
cities was directly responsible for both their doctrinal 
stance in the Reformation and the sequence of events which 
followed upon it (see Imperial Cities). But while Moeller 
argues that Luther’s lex Christiana provided a "theological 
anchor” for late medieval urban ideals, Ozment points out 
that "his teaching about the two kingdoms rather threatened 
to scuttle them" by harboring a modern theory of the sepa­
ration of Church and State (Cities. 7).
47. Ozment describes a reciprocal relationship between 
Lutheranism and the Princes. In the context of the politi­
cal realities of the Empire the metaphor of the Two Swords 
aided the territorial consolidation of the Princes against 
the Crown. It allowed the Princes to turn to Roman law as 
an instrument for consolidating their power over the German 
countryside and helped them to transform feudal relation­
ships of mutual dependence into a relationship of sovereign 
to subject (See Scribner, "The German Peasant’s War" in 
Reformation Europe. 109-117 and Ozment, Cities). Berndt 
Moeller claims that Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms 
harbored a serious "modernizing flaw" which played into the 
hands of the aggressive princes (see Imperial Cities).
Brady agrees, claiming that, with the defeat of the 
peasants in 1525, Luther led the faithful back into the
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arms of a feudal aristocracy, and "the Reformation became a 
prisoner of the princes" (see "Social History" in Reforma­
tion Europe. 173). Roland Bainton and Ernst Troelstch 
both point out the affinities between the political thought 
of Luther and Machiavelli and emphasize its utility for the 
Princes (Bainton, "Changing Ideas...", 432; Troelstch, The 
Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. (London, 1931), 
532, 857-958)
48. The Southern cities rejected the political 
quietism of Luther. J. M. Kittleson goes so far as to say 
that "Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms was virtually 
ignored by his followers [in the South]" ("The Confessional 
Age: The Late Reformation in Germany" in Reformation 
Burope. 363). Brady points out that Zwingli and Bucer 
both clothed their Evangelical message "in the language of 
civic and communal ideals, the language of the sacral cor­
poration" (Swiss. 203). Zwingli’s On Divine and Human 
Righteousness and Bucer’s contemporaneous One Should not 
Live for Oneself Alone (1523) clarified the role of civic 
righteousness in a religion based on sola tides and argued 
for a close integration of religion and society. Luther 
had driven religion and society apart. But, in what Moel­
ler calls "a correcting and deepening of Luther", Zwingli 
and Bucer propounded a "citified theology" whose main con­
cern was to preserve the medieval ethical and social struc­
ture of the South. Zwingli and Bucer, Moeller claims, were
"more medieval than Luther" in their support of late 
medieval Genossenschaft ideals. For a discussion of 
Bucer's almost Dantesque view of law and civic righteous­
ness see Ozment, Cities. 64-66; 101-109.
49. "The South was the heartland of the Empire, Brady 
points out, "where its Diet always met, and where its two 
most powerful federations...kept the peace. It also became 
the heartland of all the social movements of the Reforma­
tion era." He even argues that "the political structure 
of the Holy Reman Empire was to a very great degree a South
German one" (Swiss. 226, 10).
Chapter 3 




In the context of the argument presented in Chapter II, 
the respective careers of Ramean and Cartesian logic take 
on a special significance. Although most authorities agree 
that Ramean logic enjoyed a preponderant influence across 
Europe between 1543 and 1600, modern scholars often dismiss 
the permanent effects of Ramism. Yet Ramean logic in fact 
left an indelible mark on Western thought which perpetuated 
its influence well beyond the 17th, and indeed, into the 
19th Century. Ong documents 1100 separate printings of 
Ramus' works between 1550 and 1650 alone. In the context 
of the early days of printing this represents an enormous 
impact. Nonetheless, he observes, Ramism tends to dis­
appear into the huge intellectual and historical perspec­
tives in which it is set, exerting an anonymous and often 
intangible force. Indeed Ong makes the important point 
that Ramism becomes increasingly difficult to identify 
"when the very forces which it spearheaded gain momentum 
and finally swallow it up. By the time method and logical
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analysis have established themselves firmly in the Western 
European psyche, the paramount role of Ramism in their 
establishment has been forgotten." Craig Hardin agrees, 
pointing out that logical analysis as we know it today 
began with Ramus. Hardin maintains that, although quickly 
assimilated to other systems, "the popularity of Ramus is 
not to be questioned."1
Bibliographic studies by Walter Ong, Perry Miller and 
others have made it possible to trace the relative 
influence of Ramean and Cartesian logic across national 
boundaries and so to establish patterns relevant to the 
present study.* Moreover a close examination of the pub­
lication patterns described by Ong revealB an interesting 
and potentially important fact: although Ramism exerted a
strong and far-reaching influence across most of Europe, 
this influence developed differently in different areas, 
both in intensity and in focus.
Exported through the efforts of wandering humanist 
scholars, Ramism spread along two major routes: one up 
through the Low Countries, down through Scotland to England 
and thence to the New World; the other out through the 
Rhineland and into Switzerland, Prussia and Moravia.*
Thus, despite its prevalence throughout Europe, Ramism 
developed in three distinct environments —  one centered in 
England, another in its native France, and a third in South 
Germany. In fact, the geographic patterns which emerge 
from Ong’s Inventory prove to be curiously congruent to the
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geographic spheres of the legal models discussed above.
The different ways in which Ramean metaphors interacted 
with Aristotelian and Cartesian logic in these three set­
tings provides an interesting perspective on the correla­
tive development of English, French and German theoretical 
models.
Ramean logical theories entered England in 1574 when 
the Huguenot AmigrA Vautrollier produced two London edi­
tions of the Dialecticae.* The first appeared 
anonymously, the second under the name of Roland M ’Kilwein, 
a Scot about whom little is known except that he matricu­
lated in 1565 at the University of St. Andrews. But 
M ’Kilwein’s edition of the Dialecticae presented a rather 
selective version of Ramean method. Ramus had maintained 
the traditional distinction between what he called the 
"natural" and the "prudential” methods of communication, 
the one appropriate to learned discourse, the other 
appropriate to the persuasion of an unread public. 
M ’Kilwein, on the other hand, ignored this important dis­
tinction, virtually omitting the role given by Ramus to the 
latter. Howell claims that M'Kilwein "converts Ramism into 
English with this part almost completely missing."1
By disregarding the traditional separation of learned 
and popular discourse, M ’Kilwein refocused Ramus’ theory of 
communication in important ways. Indeed his omission of 
prudential method misrepresented the balance between 
rhetoric and logic and distorted Ramus’ original inten-
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tions. By effectively subsuming the methods of logic under 
the art of persuasion, M ’Kilwein transformed Ramus’ logic 
into a theory of communication which reached into the prac­
tical world of the politician, the educator and the 
theological controversialist.* Ramus, on the other hand, 
had considered his dialectic to be totally uncontaminated 
by rhetoric. He had wanted to make communication more 
logical, not rhetoric more methodic. But M ’Kilwein’s 
peripheral expansion of the metaphors of method diminished 
the importance of purely logical forms and established 
English Ramism in a trajectory which carried it rapidly 
into a social, political and economic world well prepared 
to receive its message.7
Consequently British Ramism exhibited an almost exclu­
sively rhetorical focus from the start. Ong calls it "the 
central route over which the Ciceronian rhetorical tradi­
tion moved in reorienting itself in the modern world."8 
Introduced by figures associated with the lower arts cur­
riculum and with literature in particular, it entered the 
Universities under rhetorical auspices. M ’Kilwein’s edi­
tion of the Dialecticae coincided with the return of Andrew 
Melville from France where he had come under the direct 
influence of Ramus. Melville carried Ramean theories home 
to the University of Glascow where he initiated a Ramist 
reform which, by 1578, had spread to the Universities of 
Aberdeen and St. Andrews. Meanwhile, a third dose of 
Ramism had arrived in the intellectual baggage which Sir
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Phillip Sidney brought home from Frankfurt am Main where he 
had lodged with Andr6 W6chel and Hubert Languet, Ramus’ 
printer and companion respectively. Sidney directed the 
flood of works pouring from the WAchel presses into England 
and ultimately into Ireland. In 1575, Gabriel Harvey 
introduced Ramist theories at Cambridge where he held the 
University Chair in Rhetoric. Harvey’s Ode in Memory of 
Peter Ramus launched a native British Ramism which, from 
the first, possessed its own peculiarly rhetorical charac­
ter. This selective focus became even more pronounced in 
1584 when Ramus’ Dialecticae appeared for the first time in 
English translation with its companion work, the Rhetorics 
of Omer Talon.*
Indeed, the explicit linking of Ramean method with the 
art of rhetoric articulated a bias endemic to English 
society as a whole, closely linked to English conceptions 
of law.10 By the late 17th Century, England had beheaded 
one king, deposed another and witnessed the rise of a 
politically and economically powerful middle class. More­
over, the Establishment had made controversy a fact of 
political as well as religious life. As the role of Par­
liament grew, shifting political power and influence from 
aristocrat to commoner, it became increasingly clear that 
men could attain political power in direct proportion to 
their polemical skills.11 And the Ramism peculiar to 
England, which confined logic as a discipline to the func­
tions of statement and proof, provided the perfect stone
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against which to whet the rhetorical tools appropriate to 
the controversial needs of the age.
Conceived, organized and taught less as a master guide 
to inquiry than as a tool for persuasion, English Ramism 
"perfectly fitted its times."11 Its rhetorical focus 
played well against the conditioned belligerence of the 
religious and political milieu.11 The English legislative 
system proved particularly receptive to the Ramean promise 
that conviction followed naturally upon the application of 
method. Parliamentary forms tended to give verbal strategy 
priority over rationality and emphasized impact rather than 
logical consistency. The rhetorically focused Ramism of 
men like Phillip Sidney and Gabriel Harvey provided a con­
venient theoretical justification for incorporating these 
dialectical skills into the econony of practical and 
political life. English Ramism carried the curious 
implication that everything one uttered in fact expressed a 
self-evident truth, making it the perfect tool for dog­
matists. Moreover, the activism implicit in its didactic 
forms harbored a kind of built-in social conscience which 
carried over into proselytizing programs of religious 
reform.
Ramism had a permanent effect on the English rhetorical 
tradition. Championed in the lower arts curriculum by fig­
ures like Charles Butler, whose 1597 edition of Taleaus’ 
Rhetorica was the first Latin edition to appear in England, 
it established itself as authoritative in the arts of dis­
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course. In 1629 Butler produced his own version of Ramus’ 
dialectic which transformed the Ramean doctrine of the 
places into a system of subject-predicate relations 
appropriate to rhetorical invention. Known as the 
Oratoriae Libri Duo, its title alone reveals the substan­
tial reorientation of Ramean dialectic in England. "That 
he wrote on logic in 1629 and called his subject oratoria," 
Howell points out, "is a liberty that Ramus would never 
have allowed himself." Howell calls Butler an 
"adulterated Ramist” who enjoyed a broad influence in pub­
lic schools and played a major role in preparing the minds 
which would dominate 17th Century intellectual life. As 
late as 1659, Butler's Rhetorica and his Oratoriae still 
reigned as the "supreme authority" in the academy.14
William Dugard perpetuated Butler’s theories in his 
Rhetorices Elementa (1648), which presented an elementary 
version of Talaeus via Butler. Dugard’s work had reached a 
fifth edition by 1657. In 1671, John Newton produced an 
English version of Butler, published as An Introduction to 
the Art of Rhetorick. By this time, Butler’s Ramistic doc­
trine had "1ost some of its compulsiveness," but its 
genealogy remained sufficiently clear to identify Newton as 
at least a partial Ramist. Dudley Fenner and Thomas Hobbes 
collaborated on a primarily Ramist rhetoric as late as 
1681, and a final edition of Butler’s Rhetoricae Libri Duo 
appeared in London in 1684. Howell traces its effects well
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into the 19th Century, tying it to the British Elocutionary 
Movement and figures like Betterton, Sheridan and Mason.13
But the strongly rhetorical focus achieved by English 
Ramists tended to obscure the purely logical aspects of 
dialectic. Thus, although in rhetoric the introduction of 
Ramean theories resulted in what Howell calls "a complete 
victory for the French invader," in the upper reaches of 
the curriculum -- that is in logic proper -- the effects of 
Ramism proved substantially less pronounced. In fact, the 
Ramist "logics” which appeared in England between 1587 and 
the late 17th Century all carried the same rhetorical twist 
which Sidney and Harvey had given the doctrine. William 
Perkin’s The Arte of Prophecying (1606) typically focussed 
on the arts of communication and preaching. George 
Downham’s Commentaries on the Dialectic of P. Ramus...
(1610) continued this bias, as did Alexander Richardson’s 
The Logician's Schoolmaster (1624), which had a tremendous 
impact on early American thought. William Ames’ 
Demonstratio Logicae Verae and These Logicae (1646) both 
clearly bore the stamp of Harvey’s refocused Ramism, as can 
perhaps best be seen by the influence they had on Ames’ 
student William Chappell, who produced a dialectical 
treatise with the curious title of Methodus Concionandi 
(1648) which appeared in English translation as The 
Preacher (1656). It was Chappell’s Preacher which shaped 
the Ramism of John Milton, whose Latin text of Ramus’ 
Dialecticae appeared in 1672.l*
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Although controversy between Ramists and Aristotelians 
raged at Cambridge and Oxford, particularly in the 1580’s 
and 1590's, Ramist logic itself never gained a significant 
foothold in the English Schools.17 English logic in fact 
remained strongly and somewhat naively Aristotelean in 
character, following rather the "logics that were written 
in England to restore scholasticism while preserving some 
of Ramus’ innovations," among them Thomas Blunderville’s 
Art of Logike (1599), John Sanderson’s Inatitutionum 
Dialecticarum Libri Quatuor (1589), Samuel Smith’s Aditus 
ad Logican (1613) and Edward Brerewood’s Elements Logicae 
(1614).1* These logics, which explicitly revived the 
predication theory abandoned by Ramus in favor of the 
places of invention, "taught logic to all England during 
the 17th Century." Indeed the two most widely read, Robert 
Sanderson’s Logicae Artia Compendium (1618) and Richard 
Crakanthorpe’8 Logicae Libri Quinqui (1641), played a 
great part in the education of Isaac Newton at Cambridge 
between 1661 and 1665, as well as that of Jeremy Bentham at 
Oxford nearly a hundred years later.1* Perpetuated in 
works like Henry Aldrich’B Artia Logicae Compendium (1691), 
this Neo-Aristotelianism maintained the outlines of 
Aristotle’8 logical doctrine in England well into the 19th 
Century, in fact "for the entire period between Bacon’s 
Novum Organum and John Stuart Mill’s A Syatem of Logic."10
The early adulteration of Ramean logic by a dis­
proportionate emphasis on its rhetorical components, and
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the concomnitant revival of Aristotelian doctrine, 
diminished the effects which Ramean method had on the 
development of English scientific models. When English 
scientists sought a method, they followed Sanderson, not 
Ramus. "Few remembered," Ong laments, "that the cult of 
method, which now meant almost exclusively the cult of 
routine, had once meant not that but the cult of clarity. 
Men no longer felt the quest for method as the quest for 
logical lucidity which had stirred the soul of Des­
cartes."11 This in turn tended to minimize the effects 
which the logical theories of Bacon and Descartes had on 
English science as well. Indeed no logic based directly on 
Bacon’s Novum Organua appeared in England before 1700.
And, although a derivative Cartesian logic appeared in the 
Logique de Port-Royale after 1664, this also proved incapa­
ble of dislodging the strong Neo-Aristotelian tradition 
which dominated the English universities well into the next 
century.11
In fact, Howell concludes, "it looked as if English 
logicians had permanently turned their backs upon the pos­
sibility of reforming logical theory in the direction of 
the revolutionary teachings of Bacon and Descartes.”11 
Aldrich saw no future for logic in the experimental 
sciences as outlined by Bacon and Descartes. Indeed he 
accused Descartes of simply replacing logic with mathe­
matics and Bacon of replacing it with experiments.
Likewise, John Sergeant (The Method to Science, 1696), dis-
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missed Descartes as excessively speculative and Bacon as 
insufficiently so. He attacked Descartes specifically on 
the grounds that the cogito expressed an a-logical princi­
ple incapable of acting as the foundation of true 
scientific knowledge. Baconian induction he rejecced as 
incapable of producing demonstrative certainty.**
In the meantime, however, the emerging physical 
sciences continued to extend the limits of the field of 
inquiry. Baconian methods effected a revolution in 
scientific practice, if not in theory. And Descartes' 
advocacy of mathematics found a ready audience among expe­
rimentalists. Consequently, the models of English science 
drew farther and farther from the metaphors which control­
led the logic in which its practitioners were trained.**
In reaction, English scientists sought their own forum in 
the Royal Society which, under the motto Nullius in Verba, 
renounced the logic of the Schools and asserted the right 
of the physical sciences to explore and define truth 
according to their own lights.
Significantly, however, the scientists of the Royal 
Society did not turn to Ramus, Bacon or Descartes for illu­
mination. In fact, a strong Neo-Aristotelian lobby kept 
all three from having a determinate impact on the develop­
ment of English science. When the pioneers of the Royal 
Society sought logical metaphors, they turned instead to 
one of their own -- John Wallis, whose Institutio Logicae 
(1687) ironically perpetuated many of the main features of
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the very Neo-Aristotelian tradition which the Society 
sought to escape. Wallis systematically dismissed Ramus' 
reliance on hypotheticals, ignored Bacon's doctrine of 
induction and denied Descartes' mathematical insights. Yet 
this was the logic which shaped the theoretic core of 
English science and bequeathed to the 18th Century the 
metaphors which would control its models.
Wallis represented the conservative wing of the Royal 
Society. Indeed other, less influential, efforts within 
the Society attempted to produce a logical theory more in 
keeping with scientific advance, but these proved largely 
unsuccessful. Represented principally by the works of John 
Wilkins, Robert Sprat and Joseph Glanville, these efforts 
focused, characteristically, on the rhetorical aspects of 
logical presentation and sought a dialectical theory which 
would provide for the transfer of experimental knowledge 
from scientist to scientist. Sprat's History of the Royal 
Society of London (1667) proposed an impartial vocabulary 
which would subordinate argumentation to exposition and 
make persuasiveness a natural consequence of accuracy.
John Wilkins attempted to provide this vocabulary in a cum­
bersome work called An Essay Towards a Real Character, And 
a Philosophical Language (1668), which presented a 
philosophical grammar specifically designed to enumerate 
and describe all things. Appended to the 454 pages of the 
main text, Wilkins set out an Alphabetical Dictionary, 
Wherein All English Words According to Their Various Sig­
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nifications, are either referred to their Places in the 
Philosophical Tables, Or Explained by such Words as are in 
those Tables. Wilkin's work stands as a clear example of 
the Ramean rhetorical influence run amuck. Although his 
passion for a new scientific medium of communication had 
little effect on the course of English science, it did 
encourage the development of the plain style which Ong 
claims became the literary arm of the new science.**
Wallis’ Institutio Logicae, on the other hand, pre­
sented an explicitly, if somewhat modified, Aristotelian 
logic. It reaffirmed singular propositions as a distinct 
class of universals and insisted that hypothetical state­
ments and other composite arguments be brought under the 
rules governing categorical syllogisms. Most sig­
nificantly, it denied that induction represented an inde­
pendent form of argumentation. Wallis did not associate 
induction with observation, experiment or first-order dis­
covery as Bacon had. Induction, he claimed, expressed 
rather a variant form of the syllogism incapable, except in 
instances of complete enumeration, of producing 
certainty.*7 Wallis’ textbook went through four 18th 
Century editions, influenced Dugald Stewart as late as 1809 
and was mentioned with approval by Richard Whately in his 
Elements of Logic in 1826. L. T. More claims that his 
work in mathematics "became the standard work on the sub­
ject and is constantly referred to by Fermat, Barrow [and] 
Newton."*•
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The Neo-Aristotelian metaphors which controlled Wallis’ 
logic emerged clearly in the theoretic constructs developed 
by the scientists of the Royal Society. Men like Gilbert, 
Hailey and Newton operated under an elemental faith that 
the fundamental regularities of nature could be expressed 
in universal laws which ranged phenomena under ideal 
mechanisms. But here was a scientific vision fundamentally 
different from that of Baconian logic which had insisted on 
initiating scientific reasoning through induction. Nor did 
it reflect Cartesian logic, which rejected the categories 
as tools of inquiry and relied rather on intuition for its 
self-sufficient propositions. Indeed the vision which 
drove the men of the Royal Society to construct their math­
ematical models derived rather from logical metaphors which 
represented particular propositions as reflections of a 
categorical order. It derived, in short, from the Neo- 
Aristotelianism of men like Sanderson and Wallis.
Newton's methodology clearly illustrates the influence 
which Neo-Aristotelian metaphors had on the scientific 
models developed under their guidance. Under the princi­
ples of the logic in which he was schooled, Newton could 
not represent the process of induction as apodictic except 
in instances of complete enumeration. Nor could he employ 
hypothesis as an investigatory tool. Sanderson had said so 
and Wallis had concurred. And yet the developing physical 
sciences increasingly demanded the formulation of com­
prehensive laws. In response, Newton proposed a logical
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subterfuge. In order for laws to be universally applica­
ble, he argued, they must first be logically "inferred from 
the phenomena", not induced from experiment or deduced from 
hypotheses. Only then could they be "rendered general by 
induction".** Newton’s reliance on inference in the con­
struction of first premises gave his axioms a rational base 
compatible with Neo-Aristotelian predication theory. And 
his reliance on induction in the verification of rules 
brought his laws into conformity with the demands of the 
new science.
Newtonian "inference" operated through metaphors 
closely akin to those of mathematics. Note for example the 
way in which Newton arrived at his law of centripetal 
force. He simply stated that if a body moves around a sta­
tionary point in such a way that radii drawn between the 
body and the point mark out periodic areas, then the body 
must be impelled "by a centripetal force directed to that 
point."J# But as Gerd Buchdahl points out, "to get from 
the kinematical antecedent to the dynamical consequent, the 
proof, apart from geometry, employs the first law of 
motion, according to which since the body is not moving in 
a straight line, it must be subject to 'the action of some 
force that impels it’. It also uses the second law [again, 
Newton’s own], from which it follows that the acceleration 
of the body takes place in the direction of the straight 
line in which the force is impressed."*1 In other words, 
Newton simply deduced the law of centripetal force from
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unilaterally formulated "laws of motion" and several 
Euclidean proposition. His inferred "law" thus expressed a 
purely logical construct deduced from mathematical theorems 
assumed from the start to reflect the phenomena -- a far 
cry from Baconian induction!
Indeed the extension of Newtonian rules from particular 
events to universal phenomena took place entirely under the 
auspices of Newton's own third "Rule of Reasoning" which 
authorized the investigator to rely on "the analogy of 
Nature" in the construction of laws. "The qualities of 
bodies... which are found to belong to all bodies within the 
reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal 
qualities of all bodies whatsoever," Newton’s rule bluntly 
stated. "And this [process of inference] is the foundation 
of all philosophy."**
With this sweeping definition of inference, Newton jus­
tified his science according to the metaphors of his logic, 
thereby avoiding any overt reliance on hypotheticals.
Wallis had dismissed hypotheses as inferior syllogistic 
forms. Ramus, on the other hand, had endorsed their use. 
Newton, for his part, was content to smuggle hypotheses 
into his arguments disguised as "rules” inferred from 
phenomena. His dictum of hypotheses non fingo makes 
sense, in fact, only in the light of his negative defini­
tion of hypothesis as simply "Whatever is not deducible 
from phenomena" -- a definition which rested squarely, if 
somewhat ironically, on his sweeping definition of
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inference as virtually anything which is deduced from 
phenomena.11 But by grounding his logic in inference, New­
ton did substantially more than simply maintain the meta­
phoric base of his logic. He also fixed the character of 
his science.
Inference supplied Newton with a logically articulated 
metaphor for representing the formal operations of the nat­
ural world. Around this metaphor he built a set of 
underlying images and conceptual analogies which supported 
his mathematical physics. Inference allowed Newton to 
explain the complexities of experience using such abstract 
concepts as universal attraction and the void while still 
arguing for an inductive science. It justified the inclu­
sion of non-empirical entities such as idealized material 
particles in the construction of "objective" scientific 
laws. Although these inferred forces and particles were at 
base just as imaginary as the substantial forms and 
qualities which they purported to replace, Newton could 
treat them, according to his Rules, as first principles in 
chains of deductive reasoning which aimed at laying bare 
the underlying "realities" of nature.11
Ultimately this method made Newton’s inferred laws 
appear more real than the observed phenomena they purported 
to explain. Donald Ault comments on how the metaphors con­
trolling Newtonian science had the tendency "to isolate 
those features which do not change and reify them as the 
features of the world which are "real" while the shifting
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features of time are taken to be ' a p p e a r a n c e * Newton’s 
laws thus became Eternal Forms which expressed a meth­
odological correlate of the categories. By subsuming these 
powerful metaphors of organization within a logically con­
sistent theoretical structure, Newton gave his scientific 
laws the ability to extend themselves analogically across 
virtually all disciplines -- a characteristic which 
accounts for his profound influence on 18th Century 
thought.1•
Newtonian science thus operated through continuous laws 
inferred from experience -- laws not unlike the positive 
laws established by English Parliamentary forms. Paul 
Feyerabend points out that Newtonian laws in fact bore a 
close resemblance to the Protestant Rule of Faith which 
governed private and political life in England. Both 
enthroned experience as a new authority within a deductive 
framework which remained "logically vacuous." Experience 
for the Puritans and for Newton operated within a community 
already committed to certain ideas and faced with a 
psychological need to support the process of indoctrination 
on a logical base. "In the case of Protestantism this base 
supported a faith. In the case of Newton, it supported a 
scientific theory. In both cases,” Feyerabend claims, "we 
are dealing with nothing but a party line.” Feyerabend’s 
rhetoric is perhaps a bit strong, ignoring the genuine 
abstractive qualities of Newton’s mathematical language.
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But the similarity between the supporting metaphors proves 
striking in the present context.17
Indeed Newton’s portrayal of law as logical inference 
rested on a central paradox born of his attempt to accom­
modate the methods of an inductive science to the metaphors 
of a Neo-Aristotelian logic. And in fact the logical 
ambiguity of Newton’s claim to derive universally valid 
inferences from particular events ended by creating what 
Gerd Buchdahl has called a "crisis of intelligibility" 
within his physics.*• This crisis manifested itself in 
Newton’s inability to forge an existential link between his 
inductive data and his theoretical laws. It raised impor­
tant questions as to the logical status and modus operandi 
of these laws. What actual physical properties cor­
responded to the mathematical functions expressed by the 
law of gravitation? Through what physical medium did these 
laws operate? Newton claimed "only to give a mathematical 
notion of those forces, without considering their physical 
causes and seats."** But clearly the analogical ground of 
his Rules of Reasoning expressed a commitment to provide an 
actual physical account of universal laws.
Faced with this crisis of intelligibility, the 
scientists of the Royal Society reached out for logical 
metaphors which could more adequately express the relation­
ship which pertained between Newton’s data and his laws. 
They needed a logic which could articulate the meth­
odological structure of scientific hypotheses -- one which
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could arrive at valid laws without reference to the 
idealizing tendencies of Newton’s Rules. John Locke 
addressed this need in his Essay Concerning the Human 
Understanding and later in his more explicitly logical 
treatise, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which pro­
vided a new set of metaphors which could validate the use 
of inference in the construction of laws.
Like Newton, Locke accepted experience as the "new 
authority" in inquiry.*® But Newton had arrived at a meth­
odological impasse by trying to adapt his scientific model 
to the demands of his logical metaphors. The originality 
of Locke’s approach lay in his revolutionary commitment to 
adapt his logical metaphors to the demands of his science. 
Thus he rejected Newton’s tendency to portray experience as 
phenomena and laws as logical consistency. Experience, 
Locke claimed, "extends as far as the present testimony of 
our senses, employed about particular objects, that do then 
affect them, and no further."41 Since there existed 
nothing in experience so necessary as a logical law, the 
whole "scientific" enterprise of constructing models that 
conformed to logical metaphors became meaningless.
Newton had identified particular experimental results 
with phenomena in general. This had allowed him to ascribe 
an actual logical status to phenomena. Note, for instance, 
the way Newton represented Kepler’s laws in the Principia. 
For Kepler, these laws had expressed the theoretical con­
clusions of an elaborate analysis of observational data.
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But for Newton, they formed part of a logical argument 
which led back and forth between selected and carefully 
controlled experiments and the articulation of a universal 
theory. The logical status with which Newton endowed expe­
rience gave his laws their prescriptive power. But this 
same self-reenforcing definition of experience also led to 
what D. M. Clarke has called the "theory-ladeness" of New­
tonian science -- that is, its characteristic need to 
create ideally isolated systems, to eliminate the 
irrelevant from the observational field -- in short, to 
control the experiment.4*
Locke, on the other hand, replaced Newton's categorical 
ideal of consistency with a new scientific ideal of 
accuracy. He set out to provide an "historical, plain 
method" for exploring nature which operated solely on the 
data of experience.4* Consequently, he ignored the 
ontological status of the products of inference which had 
so confounded Newton and focused rather on the process of 
inference itself as it related to inquiry. While he 
admitted the functional role which inductive inference 
could play in guiding the conduct of science, he denied the 
ability of purely logical inference to underwrite scientia 
in the older Aristotelian sense.44 For Locke, inference 
consisted, not of rules which governed the operation of 
reason, but rather in the process which the human reason 
followed in forming its ideas. "The Understanding is not 
taught to reason by...Rules,” Locke claimed, "It has a
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native Faculty to perceive the Coherence, or Incoherence of 
its Ideas."4® Scientific laws embodied no "reality" dis­
covered through the application of reason. They described 
tentative mental constructs legislated through the applica­
tion of method. They portrayed the way nature behaved as a 
matter of fact, not as a matter of necessity.
"To infer," Locke declared, "is nothing but by virtue 
of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as 
true, i.e. to see or suppose such a connection of the two 
Ideas." Inference thus represented an instantaeous natural 
action of the rational faculty in its proper functions of 
sensation and reflection. What had been deemed by the 
Neo-Aristotelians an imperfect form of reasoning became for 
Locke a perfect form of inquiry, since what "shews the 
force of the Inference, and consequently the reasonableness 
of it" is not its conformabi1ity to a categorical order, 
but rather "a view of the connection of all the inter­
mediate Ideas, that draw in the Conclusion, or Proposition 
inferr’d." Since the mind itself was "able to judge of the 
Inference," inquiry could proceed "without any need of a 
Syllogism at all.” In fact, Locke concluded, all knowledge 
consisted in inference, being "nothing but the perception 
of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repug­
nancy of any of our Ideas."**
Locke’s redefinition of inference as a cognitive 
process made the logical crisis implicit in Newton's meth­
odology painfully apparent. Newton’s inferred laws had
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derived their power from their ability to be theoretically 
predicable throughout the universe. Newton’s Rules had in 
fact made his mathematical forms isomorphic, if not identi­
cal, with the actual coherence of the world. But Locke 
portrayed inference as cognition, pointing out the total 
inadequacy of Aristotelian categories to contain the 
scientific spirit. As a corollary to his phenomenalistic 
theory of inference, Locke maintained that all abstractions 
shared an intrinsic inability to represent physical 
reality. Under his critique, mathematical laws and logical 
categories alike became mere "inventions and creatures of 
the understanding" which remained ontologically distinct 
from physical reality. They could not express any actual 
coherence or objective truth. In fact, they presented only 
an incomplete description of accidental connections per­
ceived between analogous phenomena. Since physical science 
could investigate only these accidental connections, and 
since "there is no discoverable connection between any sec­
ondary quality and those primary qualities it depends on,” 
Locke concluded that science must abandon its theoretic 
pretentions altogether and content itself with simple expe­
rimental statements grounded exclusively in present experi­
ence .4 7
It is important in the present context not to 
exaggerate the influence which Locke ultimately had on the 
construction of 18th Century scientific models. Although 
Locke’s Essay underwent 20 editions between 1706 and 1805
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and offered an increasingly effective foil to the 
Aristotelianism of Aldrich and his school, his logic never 
achieved total dominance in England. The ambivalence of 
Locke’s position in the English logical heritage is made 
evident by the persistence of Neo-Aritotelianism even in 
the face of his revolutionary epistemology. "It must 
always be remembered,” Howell points out, "that Locke’s 
Essay was getting its first readers at the very moment in 
history when Henry Aldrich in his Aristotelian treatise, 
Artis Logicae Compendium, was denying to Bacon and Des­
cartes the right to be considered as true logicians, and 
that under Aldrich’s guidance the old logic seemed to have 
withstood successfully the assaults of its two most formid­
able early seventeenth Century adversaries, and to be no 
longer in danger from them for the indefinite future."4®
In fact, English logic did not come to terms with induction 
until after the development of its most influential 
scientific models, most of which were developed under the 
influence of the Neo-Aristotelianism described above.
On the other hand, Locke’s juxtaposition of a cognitive 
theory of inference with a mathematical physics placed the 
metaphors of English logic on an inevitable collision 
course with the ideals of its science. By making the con­
ditions of the mind’s own functioning the metaphoric ground 
of inquiry, Locke made the frontiers of science coextensive 
with the limits of human experience. But here was a 
scientific ideal vastly different from the mathematical
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vision of Newtonian physics! Locke's logic of inference 
thus presented the English scientist with a fundamental 
dilemma. Methodologically confined to the investigation of 
present effects, yet metaphorically committed to the 
expression of theoretical laws, he would henceforth have to 
justify his theoretical aspirations in the light of his 
methodological postulates.4*
Much of the subsequent history of English science can 
in fact be written as the history of various attempts to 
resolve this dilemma. Berkeley pursued an explicit criti­
que of the limits and validity of mathematical models, 
claiming that mathematics, as subordinate to experience, 
had no role in the construction of theory. His attack 
against the value of numbers as a source of abstract con­
cepts appears most clearly in his attempt to develop an 
adequate theory of the processes of vision and perception 
-- a theoretical problem paradigmatic of the general 
philosophical difficulties arising from the introduction of 
sensationalist theories of knowledge into a scientific 
world conditioned by a mathematical physics. Newton had 
discussed perception in mathematical terms, presenting a 
theory of vision which operated through geometric meta­
phors. But Locke had converted consciousness itself into 
an optical analogy with his image of the camera obscura.*0 
Berkeley, in turn, carried Locke’s optical metaphor over 
into metaphysics and arrived at a whole new interpretation 
of what it meant to be "real" -- esse is percipi.5l
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Likewise Hume, convinced of the critical inadequacy of 
Newton’s methodology, took both Locke and Berkeley at their 
word and proceeded to show what the ultimate consequences 
of a phenomenalistic theory of inference would be. He dis­
missed both logical and psychological inference as a means 
for arriving at existentially valid statements, thereby 
reducing science to a purely experimental discipline devoid 
of any ability to make existential statements beyond the 
limits of concrete sensible effects. Methodologically 
committed to provide experimental descriptions of a purely 
functional nature by his reductive analysis of cognition, 
Hume arrived ultimately at a description of knowledge in 
which all noetic structures proved derivative and therefore 
subordinate to pure sensation. On this foundation he pro­
ceeded to build a psychological theory of knowledge founded 
on prelogical beliefs which would eventually destroy the 
logical basis of all theoretical science.®*
18th Century British scientific models thus developed 
out of attempts to bring Locke’s redefinition of inference 
to bear on the powerful metaphors which controlled New­
tonian physics. Indeed only with the radical dissociation 
of these metaphors from scientific inquiry accomplished by 
John Stuart Mill in the next century could English science 
be said to have come to terms with its own logic. Mill 
gave Lockean metaphors of mental mechanism their fullest 
possible expression. For Mill, ideas became mere points of 
consciousness -- Newtonian particles made mental -- and
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their construction took on a palpably mechanical quality 
absent from Locke and even Hume. Locke had preserved 
resemblance as a mental analogue of Newtonian "attraction”. 
But Mill, recognizing the deeper philosophical motives 
lurking under the surface of Newton’s Rules, explicitly 
denied inference, resemblance or relation as operative 
principles in concept formation. He simply denied the 
analogical role of logic in the structuring of scientific 
hypotheses. Contiquity alone accounted for the construc­
tion of concepts, he claimed. With Mill’s System of Logic 
in 1843 English science finally acquired a fully articu­
lated logic of induction after the model of Bacon. Mill's 
System made induction "the main question of the science of 
logic" and put the Neo-Aristotelian tradition of Wallis and 
Aldrich "into permanent eclipse."®3
Hence the career of Ramism and its interaction with 
Aristotelian paradigms in the English intellectual milieu 
did indeed have an impact on the development of English 
scientific models. The naive Aristotelianism which per­
sisted in the English Schools arose in reaction to the dis­
proportionately rhetorical focus which English Ramists gave 
to the art of dialectic. Howell in fact argues that "the 
two systems are so intertwined that the problems of the one 
are in fact variations upon tne problems of the other, and 
a firm grasp of the history of both is essential to the 
understanding of the fate of either one."*4 As a con­
sequence of this characteristic development, the logical
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doctrine which shaped the minds of English scientists in 
the 17th and well into the 18th Centuries continued to draw 
on metaphors grounded in Aristotelian logic -- metaphors 
which perpetuated the paradox of basing a universal science 
on the assertoric predicates of categorical logic. These 
metaphors dictated Newton’s Rules and shaped his com­
prehensive laws. Ultimately they encouraged the construc­
tion of a scientific model which ended by denying its own 
ability to legislate in the natural world.
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Chapter 4 




Just as Newtonian laws and Lockean epistemology 
reflected the logical and legal metaphors operative in 
English society during the 16th and 17th Centuries, so also 
did French scientific models reflect the logical and legal 
models upon which they drew. France, throughout the 
turmoil of the 16th Century, had maintained a native cen­
tralized absolutism. Its legal models continued to express 
an authoritarian ideal which conceived of laws as 
incontrovertible dicta, propounded unilaterally and imposed 
from above. These political structures precluded the 
introduction of legal metaphors based in inference. 
Moreover, whereas in England the liberalizing effects of 
Protestantism militated against the extension of dogma 
across the entire field of inquiry, in France the continued 
dominance of the Catholic Church tended to represent 
political, religious and intellectual orthodoxy as coor­
dinate value-systems. As early as 1534, Francis I estab­
lished a policy of monarchical control over the French
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intellectual community.1 This policy, reenforced by Jesuit 
ideologues, insured a level of control over the 
intellectual milieu in France which would have been 
impossible in the religious and political atmosphere of 
17th Century England. As a result, logic in France through 
the 17th, and indeed much of the 18th Century, hued essen­
tially to a party line grounded in absolutist metaphors and 
authoritarian ideals.
The Edict of Nantes sealed the fate of Ramism early in 
France. The implicit rhetorical focus of Ramean dialectic, 
to say nothing of its explicit identification with the 
Protestant cause, insured that Ramus would never receive in 
France the sympathetic hearing which he enjoyed in England. 
The need to convert, so central to English political and 
religious life, had no meaning in Bourbon France. So 
Ramean rhetoric found no audience. Likewise the anti­
authoritarian valence of Ramus' dialectic made it unlikely 
that he would find a constituency among the politically 
dependent scholastics who served the French universities 
after Henry's accession. Henry’s Edict left the field 
entirely to scholastic defenders of traditional 
Aristotelianism.*
As a result, French logic never felt the creative 
effects of the interplay between Ramean and Aristotelian 
metaphors which generated the Neo-Aristotelian theories of 
Wallis and Aldrich and supported Newton’s formulation of
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law as inference. The ultimate effects of Ramism emerged 
in absolutist France rather as a latent preoccupation with 
method which Ong claims "haunts the French mind." Where 
Ramism had served as a catalyst in the freer development of 
English logical theory, in France it served "as a crystal 
introduced into a supersaturated solution, suddenly 
precipitating and giving structure to the interest in 
method with which the scholastic world in Paris was 
charged."*
Descartes supplied the medium through which Ramean 
method precipitated into French logic and science. But 
Descartes’ logic, although revolutionary in its mathemati­
cal insights, proved curiously conservative in its practi­
cal effects -- a consequence which derived explicitly from 
its primary dependence on method. Autonomous by nature and 
always self-identical in operation, Descartes’ method pro­
vided the ground for his logic. So, unlike Newton, he had 
no need to enthrone experience as a new authority in 
inquiry. His innatist logic stipulated that the materials 
of knowledge were given to the mind by the mind.4 Experi­
ence provided occasions for the application of method, not 
data for the operations of reason. Moreover, since his 
method guaranteed the perfect intelligibility of his 
system, Descartes had no need to justify his mathematics in 
existential terms. He could leave those questions of cor­
respondence which had so confounded Newton in the hands of
134
traditional authorities and focus exclusively on the inter­
nal operation of reason within ideal Mathematical con­
structs .
Predictably, this type of "scientific revolution" 
played well in the political atmosphere of 17th Century 
France. Descartes' acquiescence in a traditional ontology 
placed issues of authority outside the field of science.
It divorced the unsettling discoveries of the new sciences 
from the inviolable claims of Church and State and cleared 
the path for an autonomous investigation of nature. Coin­
cidentally it provided welcome support to an intellectual 
community committed at once to a revolutionary science and 
a conservative regime. Despite his appearance on the Index 
in 1663, Descartes consistently avoided any break with 
orthodoxy. In addition to having firBt obtained the 
sympathetic approval of the influential Cardinale de 
BArulle and his Oratoire for his theories, Descartes con­
tinually tested his ideas against clerics such as Mersenne 
to determine their acceptability. He repeatedly professed 
a full submission to the articles of the faith and desisted 
from any test of methodic doubt in the realm of revela­
tion . *
Moreover, Descartes furthered neutralized adverse reac­
tions to his analytical model by propping up his 
mechanistic physics with an Augustinian doctrine of the 
spirit. Thus, although at first uniformly opposed by reac­
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tionary Jesuit writers, Cartesian logic rapidly gained a 
hearing as a viable alternative to an Aristotelianism which 
was becoming increasingly untenable in the face of 
scientific advance. By 1662, Descartes’ logic had become 
sufficiently respectable to acquire systematic expression 
in the Logique de Port-Royale, which Howell claims 
"achieved a phenomenal popularity in France." The Port- 
Royale Logic attacked the doctrine of the places as 
insufficiently methodical and the categories as unproduc­
tive of certain knowledge, establishing Descartes’ theories 
of predication, as well as his deductive method, as the 
cornerstones of French science.*
Supported by apologists like Gassendi and Malebranche, 
Cartesianism was rapidly assimilated to the cause of 
orthodoxy. Pierre Gassendi early merged his atomistic 
theories with the corpuscular hypotheses of Descartes. 
Together the two conceptions lent strong support to the 
enterprise of explaining all natural phenomena in terms of 
bodies in motion. Indeed Gassendi’s attempt to define the 
soul in relation to certain highly refined atomic movements 
found welcome justification in Descartes’ automatist 
theories. Similarly Nicholas Malebranche concentrated on 
bringing the Cartesian theory of the vortices into cor­
respondence with Mosaic physics. His theory of 
Occasionalism, anticipated by de la Forge and Cordemoy as 
early as 1666, proved central in reconciling Cartesian and
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Catholic doctrine. Malebranche's "chriatianization" of the 
central tenets of Cartesian physics allowed for its full 
acceptance in the orthodox milieu. Varantian calls his 
work "the subtlest and profoundest apologetics of the age, 
converting innate ideas into a Christian-Platonic ‘vision 
in God’ and mechanistic dualism into a providential theory 
of occasional causes."7
Ultimately Bishop Bossuet brought Cartesianism right to 
the treshold of officialdom in his Connaissance de Dieu et 
de soi-m&me, which combined the Augustinian features of 
Cartesian psychology with the strong Thomistic tradition of 
the Parisian schools and made it acceptable in a university 
milieu committed to the maintainance of traditional forms. 
Even the Jesuits gave up in the end. Indeed they 
ultimately found in Descartes a powerful ally in the strug­
gle against the deistic, materialistic and atheistic 
tendencies of the Enlightenment.* By the time of the 
establishment of the AcadAmie Royale des Sciences in 1666, 
Descartes had become authoritative. To attack him invited 
official censure.
The acceptance of Cartesian logic by an authoritarian 
regime insured its metaphors a determining role in the 
creation of French scientific models. The ability of 
French universities to maintain a high level of orthodoxy, 
particularly in a discipline as central to the curriculum 
as logic, allowed the controlling metaphors of Cartesian
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logic to penetrate the French intellectual milieu in a way 
which they could not in England. As a result, Descartes' 
reliance on deductive method and his desire to eliminate 
all vestiges of topical or categorical images in predica­
tion embedded themselves at the very center of French 
scientific inquiry.
Nor could the influx of Newtonian-Lockean theories of 
inference dislodge Descartes’ deductive model. Locke’s 
logic may, in fact, have been robbed of some of its initial 
impact by the circumstances which surrounded its introduc­
tion in France. Locke’s Essay first appeared there in 1688 
in the form of an epitome by Jean Le Clerc. But Le Clerc’s 
work provided only a small portion of the text of the 
Essay. Howell points out that "in 1688 the Essay had not 
yet reached its completed form in Locke’s mind, and thus 
the epitome which he submitted to Le Clerc was a reduced 
version of something not yet fully worked out. Such a ver­
sion would inevitably be incomplete in emphasizing the 
basic points of the final work." Nowhere, Howell claims, 
is this more evident than in the treatment given by Le 
Clerc to Locke’s explicitly logical theories, and particu­
larly his critique of the syllogism. The capacity of this 
epitome to discredit the deductive theories of Descartes 
thus proved minimal.*
Indeed not until the mid-18th Century did the hegemony 
of Cartesian logic in France begin to be questioned in any
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fundamental sense. Varantian argues that the standard 
scholarship which claims that the theories of Newton and 
Locke submerged the Cartesian view is faulty at best and 
"typified by a reluctance to probe beneath the surface." 
Newtonian and Lockean metaphors, he contends, met with a 
"tenacious resistance from the majority of the members of 
the Acad6mie des sciences.” Although Descartes' physics 
itself began to be discarded in the face of the more objec­
tively convincing Newtonian physics, the scientific meth­
odology that had inspired it remained and proved to be the 
dominant factor in the development of French science. This 
accounts, Varantian claims, for the persistence of the 
tourbilion theory as late as the 1770's —  a theory which 
survived, not on any physical merit of its own, but rather 
because it conformed to the metaphors of science developed 
by Descartes.10
Indeed in 1752 Fontenelle lent the enormous prestige of 
the AcadAmie to a defense of Cartesian physics in his 
Th6orie des tourbillons CartAsiens which unequivocally sup­
ported the vortices against Newtonian attractionism. Sig­
nificantly, Fontenelle’8 defense rested almost exclusively 
on an attack upon Newtonian inference. According to 
Fontenelle, Newton’s method extended its mathematical meta­
phors without justification to the existential world. The 
fact that calculation confirmed Newton's law, he argued, 
did not in any way prove that attraction existed in the
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material world. He pointed out that Descartes’ mathemati­
cal laws, on the other hand, provided a matrix which need 
not necessarily extend to material reality. Cartesian laws 
expressed the world en tant qu’elle eat comprise par 
1 ’entendement, unlike their Newtonian counterparts, which 
defined a universal standard to which all reality, through 
inference, must conform. Working from the deductive postu­
lates of Cartesian logic, Fontenelle explicitly denied New­
ton’s right to bridge the gap between theory and reality 
with an inferential logic.11
Likewise Condillac, although ostensibly supporting 
Lockean inference in his Traits des sensations in 1754, in 
fact relied on the "esprit de syst&me” still so powerful in 
the Cartesian tradition to carry him beyond Locke to a 
theory of knowledge which buttressed established religion 
and defended traditional metaphysics. Etienne Gilson 
points out that Condillac "shows himself a disciple of Des­
cartes more than of his beloved Locke."1* In fact, his 
Essai sur l'origine des connaisaances huaaines sought, not 
to propagate Lockean theories in France, but rather to cor­
rect what its author saw as several serious defects in 
Locke’s owr. Essay. Condillac pointed out that Locke 
ignored the central question of how the understanding 
achieved the transition from sensation to cognition. In 
effect, he pointed out that Lockean theories of inference 
had the same difficulty dealing with issues of cor-
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resondence that Fontenelle had identified in Newtonian 
physics. Although ironically characterized as the champion 
of Locke in France, in fact Condillac’s aim was to bring to 
completion a logical task which he felt Lockean inference 
left incomplete.**
The AcadAaie remained sufficiently in thrall to "la 
grande id6e de Descartes" in 1765 to endorse an official 
Eloge to its author. In fact, throughout the entire period 
characteristically styled the "Age of Newton," Cartesianism 
remained the official position of French science. Even in 
defeat, the metaphors of Cartesianism triumphed in subtle 
and telling ways. "The decline of Cartesianism was not 
exactly a rout," Varantian points out. "There is reason to 
believe rather that it was an orderly, even if inexorable, 
retreat. It left behind many all-embracing vestiges, which 
proved all the more effectual for being too ’intangible’ to 
be challenged by the philosophes."*4
A perfect example of the tenacity of Cartesian logic in 
the French scientific world appears in the work of 
Christian Huygens, whose brilliant theoretical work on 
oscillating pendulums attacked one of the toughest dynami­
cal problems of the age. Huygens sought to calculate the 
center of oscillation of a compound pendulum. His experi­
ments and calculations brought him to make potentially 
important observations on the operation and magnitude of 
centrifugal force. Huygens clearly possessed the gifts and
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the data to apply these observations to the development of 
a comprehensive theory of centrifugal or even gravitational 
force. But Huygens "was in bondage too long to Descartes’ 
philosophy." He accepted as given Descartes’ logical 
deduction of the vortex as an invisible "subtle matter" 
which caused the restraining effects he observed in his 
pendulum experiments. He therefore ignored the theoretical 
impact of his own observations, explaining them rather by 
reference to Cartesian mechanics. Likewise, in his impor­
tant work with vacuum pumps and optics, Huygens dismissed 
the theoretical implications of his own experiments and 
"bent" his results to accommodate the Cartesian plenum.19 
By so doing, he left the field to Newton.
The entire difference between the scientific models 
developed in England and France during this period can in 
fact be expressed by the metaphors implicit in their 
respective logics. As discussed above, Newton identified 
inference as the operative principle in the construction of 
laws. But inference, from the Latin inferre, means "to 
carry toward" or "bring into". Thus for Newton, laws 
expressed the product of a method which reached outside the 
inquiring mind to "bring into" the reasoning process the 
data of external experience. The scientific mind in fact 
went through an actual legislative process in the construc­
tion of laws not unlike the process pursued by political 
minds in the construction of positive law.
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Descartes' logic, on the other hand, operated through 
deduction, from the Latin deducere, "to lead away from" -- 
or, even more significantly, the French deduire, "to 
deduct," "to draw out," "to discourse of."1* Deduction 
provided Descartes with a means of explaining ideas which 
were logically prior to the process of inquiry itself.
But while deduction could "draw out" concepts from a logi­
cally antecedent system, it contributed nothing to the 
creation of that system in the way that Newtonian inference 
did. In fact, Descartes consistently held that experience 
remained extrinsic to his method. While it might supply 
middle terms useful in determining the correctness of a 
judgement made about a scientific system, it had no logical 
status in the construction of laws.
D. M. Clarke makes some perceptive comments on the 
ambiguous senses of the word experience in Cartesian writ­
ings, claiming that at no point in his works does Descartes 
use the word experience in a sense even roughly parallel to 
the sense in which Newton uses it. "Descartes’ concept of 
experience," he notes, "is not univocal, nor does he 
normally reserve any special term to discriminate between 
scientific experiments and any other empirical procedures 
which might be more generally classified as experience. 
Instead he uses the word experience in French and experi- 
entia or experimentum in Latin and their corresponding verb 
forms experimenter and experiri, in as many senses as we
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ordinarily use the words "experience" or "to experience" in 
English. In a few cases he also uses Spreuve (and 
eprouver) and sentiment (and sentir) with almost the same 
ambiguity of meaning as experience. The Cartesian 
repertoire does not, however, include the word experi­
ment. "» »
Hence "experience" in the sense in which Newton used 
the word, had no logical status for Descartes. This may 
account for Descartes' inclination to be so "unambiguously 
hypothetical" in works like the Dioptrics and the Meteorol­
ogy. Where Newton felt the need to disguise his hypotheses 
as inferences, Descartes could acknowledge them for what 
they were because of his disinclination to justify them in 
terms of objective experience. Thus Cartesian laws sup­
plied the source of a method whose role consisted in the 
explanation, not the legislation, of concepts. In a very 
real sense they expressed the absolutist frame within which 
political law operated in France throughout the 17th 
Century. Within that frame, Reason reigned supreme. Out­
side it, Reason had no jurisdiction at all.
But the comfortable accomodation of Cartesian logic to 
the French political scene dissolved rapidly with the rise 
of Jacobin power. The explicit conservatism of 
Cartesianism could not readily supply a nascent Republican 
movement with metaphors appropriate to the overthrow of 
traditional authority. The libertins required a logically
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sound theory of law which could justify their revolutionary 
aims and still provide a philosophic base for the estab­
lishment of a stable regime. Yet when they looked to their 
logic for metaphors which could sanction their political 
activism, they found only deductive models which tended 
rather to reenforce traditional forms. The logic in which 
they had been schooled provided no opportunity for develop­
ing legislative models grounded in inference. Diderot, for 
instance, received his formal schooling at the College 
d ’Harcourt in the late 1720's under Guillaume Dagoumer, a 
professor of philosophy who had championed the introduction 
of Cartesianism in the Schools. Diderot entered the 
College shortly after Dagoumer had succeeded in estab­
lishing Descartes as the center of the school’s philosophi­
cal program.1* Likewise his fellow encyclopGdiates matured 
in an intellectual atmosphere where "almost all learned 
societies [were] permeated...with the conception of science 
proper to Cartesian tradition."1*
For want of logical metaphors which could support their 
political program, the libertins reached out instead to the 
latent implications of Descartes’ innatist theory of 
predication. The potentially radical aspects of Descartes’ 
"lumi^re naturelle toute pure", previously kept in check by 
the political conservatism of the 17th Century, emerged in 
the 18th as a beacon to free-thinkers and skeptics.*0 
Reformulating Descartes’ innatist images in a political
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vocabulary, the libertina succeeded in fashioning a charac­
teristic conception of natural law which, although revolu­
tionary in its political effects, remained curiously con­
sistent with the conservative metaphors of Cartesian logic. 
This implicit, if rarely acknowledged, adoption of 
Cartesian method by Enlightenment ideologues proved crucial 
to the development of 18th Century French thought.
Almost all French writers in the Age des lumiAres 
explicitly denied any debt to Descartes. In fact, Des­
cartes acquired a certain propaganda value for a 
libertinism which sought to discredit all traditional 
authorities. Moreover, inasmuch as the innatist 
metaphysics of official Cartesianism represented a position 
which the philosophea unanimously rejected, they 
understandably refused in good faith to be styled 
Cartesians. Not until the 19th Century, in fact, had 
French criticism recovered sufficiently from the trauma of 
revolution to accept at face value the contributions which 
Cartesian logic had made to the development of Enlighten­
ment thought. By 1891, Hippolyte Taine could admit that 
the innovations of the philoaophes were deeply rooted in 
Cartesian images and that, notwithstanding the superposi­
tion of Lockean and Newtonian theories, they derived from 
an essentially a priori conception of scientific method.*1
Nonetheless Cartesian metaphors emerged clearly in 
works like Montesquieu's Esprit des lois, which articulated
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a concept of natural law fundamentally different from the 
physical laws which controlled Newtonian science. Newton’s 
mathematical laws expressed a poateriori concepts -- 
abstractions inferred from the infinite variety of nature. 
But Montesquieu’s natural laws existed a priori, as neces­
sary relations that derived from the quantitative structure 
of the world. Within a cohesive world of matter in motion, 
Montesquieu identified "permanently established relations" 
-- operative ideals actually inherent in the constitution 
of things.** These "natural laws" controlled the effects 
of nature in a manner not unlike the way innate ideas con­
trolled Cartesian logic. By following the light of reason, 
men could deduce the rules of political association from 
them, but the resultant positive laws, as deductive exten­
sions of anterior relations, remained essentially dependent 
on natural law itself, just as the deductive conclusions of 
Cartesian logic depended ultimately on its intuited 
premises. Natural law remained logically antecedent to 
authority, just as intuition remained logically antecedent 
to inquiry. From this fundamentally Cartesian conception 
of law, the philosophea deduced their entire political 
program. And, in turn, this theory of natural law supplied 
metaphors for the construction of a scientific model pecu­
liar to Jacobin France.**
The "universality" of Descartes’ method gave it the 
implicit ability to extend its metaphors with equal ease
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across political platforms or scientific agendas. In fact, 
under the potent influence of Jacobin politics, the inves­
tigator of nature became the guide and benefactor of 
society. Many of the themes animating the political 
ideologies of the Enlightenment -- human progress, moral 
perfectability, obligation to posterity -- derived directly 
from a method which seemed to promise that the penetration 
of the secrets of physical nature would furnish a cor­
responding competence in all areas of human concern. This 
tendency in Descartes’ universal method provided the 
"c8terie holbachique" with an excuse for referring all 
moral and social questions to the laws of matter in motion. 
And although Diderot would criticize this physico- 
determinist conception of human affairs, it nevertheless 
exercized a determining influence on the social theories of 
the Enlightenment, ultimately issuing in Condorcet’s Pros­
pectus of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Huaan 
Mind which sought to establish an actual physics of social 
facts whereby it would become possible to engineer the 
political conduct of nations.
The protean images which supported natural law appear 
fully developed in the Encyclopedic, sacred book to a new 
cult of scientific naturalism which developed in France at 
precisely that point in time when Newtonian physics, 
according to the prevailing wisdom, should have been at the 
height of its influence. In fact, however, the naturalism
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developed by the encyclop^distea differed radically from 
the models developed under the metaphors controlling New­
tonian science. Newtonian inference had spawned a 
physico-mathematical universe governed by an assumed 
isomorphism between mathematical laws and the natural 
order. Locke had further restricted the scope of this 
model by subjecting it to a rigidly empirical epistemology. 
The end result was an experimentalism constrained by dis­
crete data which offered at best a somewhat disjointed 
explanation of an inferred order. The encyclopSdiatea, by 
contrast, ignored the issues of correspondence which 
plagued Newton’s inferential logic. By conceiving of law 
as antecent to inquiry, they eliminated contingency as a 
constituent of their models. This in turn fostered a 
physics committed to an absolute coherence in nature. And 
this faith in the integral lawfulness of all natural 
processes ultimately encouraged the development of 
scientific naturalism.
The naturalism of La Mettrie, Buffon and Diderot 
acknowledged the right of science to give the most complete 
interpretation of the physical universe within the compass 
of human reason, not merely human experience. It sub­
ordinated experimental procedure to a method of hypotheti­
cal deduction which, driven by Cartesian metaphors, allowed 
the mind to grasp the essential order of all physical 
phenomena. Experience itself provided only "several iso­
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lated and disjointed fragments of the great chain that 
unites all things,” Diderot declared in his Interpretation 
de la nature. One of the principal differences between a 
simple observer and a scientist, he argued "is that the 
latter starts out from the point where sense-perception and 
instruments abandon the former. ...From the order of 
things he draws abstract general conclusions...[and] rises 
to the essence itself of that order."14
The Encylop6die article on Hypothdae clearly sought to 
vindicate this method.15 But the naturalists’ hypotheses 
operated on a different level entirely from Newton’s, being 
primarily imaginative constructions suggested by certain 
key phenomena. In fact, for the philoaophea, hypotheses 
proved true or false, not as they corresponded to present 
fact, but rather as they demonstrated an ability to lead to 
fresh hypotheses. Varantian even argues that in the natu­
ralists the ideas of hypothesis and system in effect merged 
to form a single concept.1* Indeed Voltaire alone among 
the philoaophea, strongly influenced as he was by Lockean 
and Newtonian constructs, showed a signal incomprehension 
of the scientific use of hypothetical constructs, calling 
them only "suppositions”.
The "esprit de divination" made manifest in the 
philoaophea' legitimation of hypothesis underwrote a 
scientific method which stood as a polar opposite to New­
ton’s physico-mathematical model. Its overtly hypothetico-
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deductive method tended to diminish the importance of math­
ematical analogies in physics and to explain nature rather 
in its concrete and variable effects. Diderot, in fact, 
argued that "the object of the mathematician has no exist­
ence in nature," while Buffon agreed that "that which is 
called mathematical...posseses no [objective] reality."17 
The philoaophea in general maintained that mathematical 
science remained "idealistic" in that its laws applied only 
under certain absolute conditions which need not actually 
exist in nature. It remained true ultimately, not to 
physical reality, but only to its own primary definitions. 
Naturalistic science, they argued, thus actually 
represented a truer experimental ism by accounting 
hypothetically for physical events in all their diversity 
and variability. Although Diderot early in his career 
experienced a fascination for mathematical science, by 1748 
he could claim that "if mathematical subjects were once 
most familiar to me, to question me today about Newton 
would be to speak to me about last year’s dream."**
By releasing physical reality from the mathematical 
constraints of Newtonian physics, the naturalists 
guaranteed a maximum degree of autonomy to their investiga­
tion of phenomena and prepared the way for an entirely 
independent and mature philosophy of nature. Indeed from 
the point of view of physical science, the convergence of a 
hypothetico-deductive method with Enlightenment legal
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models had the great advantage of extending the field of 
inquiry across a multitude of phenomena which had been 
methodologically excluded from previous scientific models. 
Descartes had consistently subordinated his physics to an 
orthodox ontology. Although he had supplied a concrete 
instance of how a vast cosmogonic deduction might be 
carried out in his tourbillon theory, he had hedged it 
round with so many disclaimers in order to accomodate it to 
Mosaic physics that it had lost its effectiveness as an 
actual physical hypothesis. Newton, constrained by his 
inferential logic, had endeavored to fit his physical laws 
into a teleological scheme which could account for their 
operation in the world. But he had left the key to his 
clock-work universe in the hands of a Great Conserver who 
had no logical status.
By contrast, the philoaophea built their scientific 
models on the logically antecedent structures of natural 
law. This allowed them to portray the processes of nature 
as inherent properties of matter which required no 
ontological or teleological explanation. They could there­
fore view the Cartesian postulates of matter and motion as 
ultimate principles of phyaical causation. This in turn 
encouraged them to construct cosmogonic theories which 
encompassed the entire natural order from its most minute 
organic effects to its most remote causal principles.
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By dismissing ontological causes and teleological 
effects from their physical constructs, the philoaophea 
released not only the materials but the mechanisms of 
nature to scientific investigation. They rendered the 
cosmos an active and dynamic organism which developed 
through the continuous processes of matter in motion, 
thereby divesting it of the static qualities which had 
characterized the Cartesian model, as well as the pass ivity 
which had constrained the Newtonian. Moreover, the 
philoaophea, through an anological extension of the meta­
phors of natural law, demonstrated that the natural order 
would in fact continue to operate indefinitely in conform­
ity with its present effects through the subsistence of its 
physical causes. They described nature as "a ceaselessly 
active worker who knows how to utilize everything; who, 
working on her own initiative with always the same 
materials, far from exhausting them, renders them inex­
haustible: time, space and matter are her means, the 
universe her object, motion and life her ends."1*
From this naturalistic vision of dynamic matter in per­
petual motion, grounded in the metaphors of natural law and 
innatist logic, La Mettrie would deduce his vitalist biol­
ogy. Indeed La Mettrie's Homme machine described a logical 
extension of Descartes' automatism. A cross reading of the 
basic assumptions of the Traits de l'homme and Le Monde 
made it superfluous to consider the role of non-material
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factors in animal faculties and conduct. Moreover, the 
central tenet of Cartesian physics that all organic 
phenomena derived uniformly from matter in motion supported 
a belief in the continuity of all living forms. Further 
encouraged by pertinent discoveries in zoology -- Trem- 
bley’s discovery of the "polyp," Bonnet's disclosure of 
parthenogenesis, Needham's discussions of spontaneous gen­
eration -- La Mettrie moved beyond Descartes' automatism to 
a theory which dissolved the traditional barriers between 
animal, vegetable and human natures and established the 
natural history of the soul as a phase in the natural his­
tory of the body. In a brilliant hypothesis, La Mettrie 
introduced the powerful concept of organization as a 
determining force in nature, describing a cosmos con­
tinually and progressively organizing itself and expressing 
this organization through organic as well as inorganic 
functions. The epistemological consequences of La Met- 
trie’s theories reached out across all disciplines, focus­
ing attention particularly on the mechanisms of learning 
and the development of symbols.
Diderot, perhaps more than any other philosophe, 
accepted the metaphors of natural law as constituent ele­
ments in nature. But in the light of scientific advance in 
general and La Mettrie's vitalistic biology in particular, 
he ceased to view natural law as an immutable rationalist 
construct and began to view it rather as a dynamic concept
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grounded in organic unity. In other words, he came, 
through La Mettrie, to lay emphasis on the empirical basis 
and pragmatic effects of natural law rather than on its 
metaphysical content. In his Elements de physiologie, he 
presented a cosmos in a state of perpetual construction and 
reconstruction consistent with the laws of moving matter. 
But within this frame, Diderot ascribed an actual 
developmental pattern to organic processes which added a 
dimension of progress to the mechanisms of nature. 
Ultimately Diderot's naturalistic science would have its 
greatest and most lasting effect in the fields of ethics 
and social theory, issuing in works like Condorcet's Pros­
pectus. 1 #
The work of the philosophes established French science 
in a trajectory which would carry it from naturalism to 
positivism in the next century. Laplace’s celebrated 
nebular hypothesis, Lagrange’s work on the conservation of 
energy and Lamarck’s evolutionary chemistry are all exam­
ples of the determining influence of Cartesian metaphors, 
via naturalistic theory, on the development of French 
science. Laplace’s formulation of a purely material theory 
of creation earned him renown as "the Newton of France" -- 
not without some irony, since his theories systematically 
refuted some of Newton’s central assumptions about the 
nature of the solar system. Beginning from his nebular 
theory in his Exposition du syst&me du aonde (1796),
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Laplace deduced the essential stability of the universe, 
showing that the disturbing irregularities which had led 
Newton to fall back on teleological explanations were 
actually periodic and contained within narrow limits. His 
reliance on metaphors of inherent lawfulness allowed 
Laplace, in a now famous aphorism, to dismiss as irrelevant 
"that hypothesis” of divine intervention with which Newton 
had shored up his physics.11
Likewise Lagrange, in his MAchanique Analytique (1788) 
made use of the concept of potential introduced into natu­
ral acience by the philoaophea in order to complete New­
ton's work on the conservation of kinetic energy. By 
introducing potential into Newton's essentially static cal­
culations of force, Lagrange laid the groundwork for impor­
tant advances in the fields of magnetics and elec­
trostatics. Most significantly in the present context, 
Lamarck developed the philosophical bases of Buffon's natu­
ral history into a full-blown chemical theory of evolution 
which provided a materialistic explanation for the gener­
ation and gradual development of all organic functions.11 
Moreover, he offered his naturalistic theories in direct 
opposition to the "new chemistry" being developed by 
Lavoisier under Newtonian models.11
Thus, just as the Neo-Aristotelian biases of English 
logic and methodology had helped to shape the models of 
English science, so also did the Cartesian metaphors
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embedded in the French intellectual milieu have a determin­
ing impact on its constructs. In Bngland the operation of 
Neo-Aristotelian metaphors encouraged the development of an 
inferential logic and generated a physico-mathematical 
science which drew on domestic legislative paradigms. When 
further circumscribed by Lockean epistemology this 
scientific model issued in an empiricist, and ultimately, a 
materialist philosophy. In France, on the other hand, the 
universal acceptance of Cartesianism by a conservative 
regime encouraged the development of a deductive logic and 
generated a mechanistic science which relied on an author­
itarian ideal. Further modified by Jacobin theories of 
natural law, French scientific models developed in the 
direction of naturalism, and ultimately, positivism. Once 
again the joint operation of legal and logical metaphors 
conspired to generate a characteristic body of theory which 
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In contrast to the respective receptions which it 
received in England and France, in Germany Ramean logic 
emerged as the controlling dialectical theory. Interacting 
with a native Rhenish humanism and a tradition of customary 
law, Ramism there assumed its classic form as a master 
guide to the organization and transmission of all knowl­
edge. Propelled by a thriving publishing industry and 
institutionalized by systematic educational reform, Ramean 
dialectic embedded itself in the uppermost reaches of the 
German curriculum and established itself there as the meta- 
ph oric ground of all inquiry.
Ong speculates that the greater age of the French and 
English universities prevented Ramism from producing any 
comprehensive approach to the higher branches of knowledge. 
But "the German universities," he points out, "were rela­
tively new, their accumulation of tradition thinner, so 
that the didactic drive indigenous to the whole university 
movement, appears in Germany unmasked and bare. ...Else­
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where the Ramist reorganization of the curriculum tends to 
affect chiefly the rhetorico-dialectic dyad. ...In 
Germany, however, its diagrammatic approach to knowledge 
fires the imagination of polyhistors and of codifiers of 
all the sciences, so that Ramist method moves into the 
uppermost branches of the curriculum with a drive which 
cannot be matched in any other country."*
Ong’s Inventory bears this out. Editions of Ramean 
texts produced in Germany and Switzerland outnumber their 
English counterparts by more than three to one and their 
French counterparts by more than seven to one (259 in 
Germany to 75 in England and 35 in France). Even more sig­
nificantly in the present context, the bulk of the Ramist 
texts produced in Germany between his death in 1572 and the 
end of the 17th Century were logics, not rhetorics. While 
by contrast in England the balance is clearly weighted in 
the opposite direction, in Germany Ramean Dialectics out­
number Ramean Rhetorics by more than two to one (149 to 
65). The picture appears roughly the same for Switzerland 
(25 Logics and 17 Rhetorics) and the Alsacian regions, 
which produced no Rhetorics at all, only Logics. In fact 
Ong's Inventory names 34 cities in Germany, Switzerland and 
Alsace which saw the active production of Ramean texts, as 
opposed to only five in France and four in Scotland and 
England.
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Ramean theories entered Germany early. Ramus himself 
spent several years there as a royal commissioner to the 
Rhineland and travelled extensively throughout Germany dur­
ing his exile from Paris, lecturing frequently from Basle 
to Heidelberg and as far east as Nuremberg. Ramus found 
the philosophic soil of Germany well-conditioned to support 
his dialectic by earlier Rhenish manualists such as 
Caesarius, Titelmans and Sturm, all of whom had carried on 
the logical traditions of Agricola within the broader out­
lines of Northern Humanism. Anti-Aristotelian in spirit, 
these German manualists emphasized what Ong calls the 
"Agricolan development" in logic -- that is the centrality 
of judgement and invention, rather than predication, to the 
logical process.
Johann Sturm, Ramus’ mentor at the University of Paris, 
played a particularly important role in preparing the way 
for Ramus in Germany. It was Sturm, in fact, who had first 
brought Agricolan logic to Paris, where he taught from 1529 
to 1536. In 1538, Sturm returned to Germany to open a gym­
nasium at Strasburg where he expounded a logic firmly 
grounded in Agricolan principles. Kelley calls Sturm "the 
guiding spirit of [the Protestant] pedagogical enterprise" 
and comments on the "spectacular growth" of his academy.1 
The natural links between Agricolan method and Protestant 
paedia insured that Sturm’s logic would thrive, not only in 
Strasburg, but throughout the sphere of Protestant
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influence in southern Germany. Moreover, the scholars 
trained at his academy, particularly Hotman and Bucer, 
played a central role in establishing Ramism at the heart 
of the educational establishment in the theocratic South.*
This prior conditioning, Ramus’ acknowledged skill as a 
rhetorician and teacher and his developing Protestant 
affinities, all combined to insure that Ramean theories 
would receive a sympathetic hearing in the Rhineland and 
earn a place there as a viable alternative to the logic of 
the Schools. Moreover, Melancthon’s Loci communes had 
prepared Rhenish audiences to accept Ramean dialectic as a 
powerful tool for the conversion of Saints and the 
indoctrination of the faithful. A conspicuous martyrdom 
underscored the natural ties between Ramism and militant 
Protestantism, while the publisher Andr6 W6chel’s emigra­
tion to Frankfurt am Main in 1572 provided German Ramists 
with a powerful domestic organ for the dissemination of 
their method.4 By prompting the flight of many other 
influential Huguenot exiles to the cities of South Germany 
in 1598, the Edict of Nantes further enhanced the Rhineland 
as a natural seedbed for Ramist doctrines.
The theocratic atmosphere of the South German cities 
proved particularly well-adapted to receive the message of 
Ramism. The convergence of a powerful dialectical method 
with the needs and aims of the sacral communities along the 
Rhine assured that Ramism would flourish there. Sig-
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nificantly, not all German cities, nor even all German 
Protestant cities, found Ramism appropriate to their needs. 
Ong observes that Ramism "was most intense in the sectors 
of Germany...[which] correspond roughly to the Rhineland 
and its environs and weaker in the more Lutheran parts of 
the country," pointing out that "theologically, Ramus stood 
for a mild Zwinglianism." "Most Lutherans," he claims,
"and many others who were in the heat of the religious fray 
paid [Ramus] little heed and less respect."5 Perry Miller 
agrees, stating that Frankfurt "seems to have been the con­
tinental center [of Ramism]," and pointing out that, 
although the Southern cities "were in general inclined to 
Ramus,” Luthern cities maintained their allegiance to 
Aristotelian doctrine.*
In the context of the present argument, some related 
observations made by Stephen Ozment provide an interesting 
aside. In attempting to identify reasons for the distinc­
tive development of Lutheranism as a coherent orthodoxy in 
the Late Reformation, Ozment compares its decidedly 
unsystematic structure with the highly systematic 
ecclesiology which emerged in the free cities of the South. 
He concludes that Lutheranism remained "intentionally 
unsystematic" due to its politically dependent position 
within the Principalities. While this, of course, is true 
(and incidentally serves to bolster the current argument), 
Ozment only briefly touches on what this author sees as a
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much more telling issue. "Unfortunately," he observes, 
"scholars have so far evinced scant interest in how the 
Lutheran version of Latin Christianity was conveyed to what 
amounted to two generations of Lutheran pastors. ...Who 
taught them? How, in detail, were they taught? ...The very 
methods the Lutheran theologians used may have had effects 
upon their conclusions.”T
The foregoing discussion suggests that the lack of 
systematic structure which Ozment describes derived, not 
only from the different legal models which characterized 
the Principalities and the urban South, but also from the 
different logical models which underwrote their respective 
educational systems. The universities in the Lutheran 
cities retained Aristotelian logical doctrines at the core 
of their curriculum. Indeed Lutheranism, with its 
Augustianian view of the spirit, encouraged the use of 
theological images which could accomodate the assertoric 
predicates of Aristotelian logic. Moreover, the legal 
metaphors implicit in the herrschaft Recht which operated 
within the Principalities reflected structures of rank and 
estate which correlated directly to the categorical struc­
tures of Scholastic logic.
All these tendencies militated against the adoption of 
topical metaphors. The mediated nature of premises 
obtained through invention, as well as the leveling tenden­
cies of the "commonplaces" made topical logic unacceptable
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to both the religious and political forces behind 
Lutheranism. Thus, the "cult of method", which found such 
a congenial home in the theocratic communities of the 
south, never penetrated the "priesthood of all believers" 
in the Lutheran strongholds of central and northern 
Germany. Consequently, the compulsion to systematize 
endemic to the topical tradition never drove Lutheran 
ideologues as it did Zwingli and Bucer. This difference in 
the logical substructures of Lutheranism and the Reformed 
Churches of the South undoubtedly contributed to the dis­
tinctive evolution of their respective confessions.
Clearly the priority given by Ramus to the 
communication of knowledge provided welcome support to the 
bourgeoning evangelical movements based, for reasons of 
spiritual and intellectual affinity, as well as political 
necessity, in the Southern cities. Protestantism in gen­
eral relied heavily on didactics and encouraged a view of 
education as a tool for both social and spiritual control. 
In the cities of South Germany, this didactic charge merged 
with the characteristic urban notion of education as a pub­
lic responsibility essential to the preservation of civic 
ideals. The strong pedagogical bias of Ramism could hand­
ily support programs of public indoctrination designed to 
shore up civic virtue as well as catechize the faithful. 
Driven by the powerful notion of method, the Protestant 
Academies which opened in the cities along the Rhine
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rapidly became effective arms of their respective 
ecclesiatical and political establishments.
Chief among the educational centers which actively 
propagated Ramean theories was the High Academy at Herborn, 
located southwest of Marburg in the heart of Rhenish 
Reformed Protestantism. Here an influential group of 
Phi 1ippo-Ramists -- so called for their attempts to recon­
cile Ramist doctrines with the logic of Melancthon -- 
systematically applied the methodological tenets of Ramism 
to everything from theology to education to politics. 
Bartholomew Keckermann, along with others such as Johannes 
Piscator and Andreas Libavius, maintained Ramean method as 
the natural means of pursuing knowledge and relied on the 
familiar Ramist dichotomies to display the results of 
inquiry. The group as a whole continued to view knowledge 
as "encyclopedic" -- hence their characteristic title of 
the Herborn Encyclopedists -- and upheld the topical method 
as the key to the circle. These Philippo-Ramists, also 
known as Mixts or Systematica, succeeded in maintaining 
Ramean theories at the forefront of the German academy 
throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries.®
Through their continuing emphasis on pedagogy and their 
attention to the collective aspects of knowledge, the 
Phillippo-Ramists provided the cities with powerful dialec­
tical tools for the defense of their beseiged communal 
values. The structural elements implicit in Ramist doc­
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trine not only satisfied the ideological needs of the 
cities but supplied them with a set of logical metaphors 
which vindicated their uncertain legal status within the 
Empire. Significantly, however, the Ramism which developed 
in the urban enclaves along the Rhine never underwent the 
major revisions which had reoriented English Ramism. In 
England, substantial changes had been necessary to make 
Ramean theories acceptable to a strong Aristotelian lobby 
and a tradition of parliamentary law. But in Germany, 
interacting as it did with a native logical tradition 
grounded in the Agricolan places and a legal tradition 
grounded in the sites Recht, Ramism escaped drastic revi­
sion and maintained its explicitly dialectical focus. In 
the urban South, Ramean metaphors could merge with the 
broadly topical logics of Melancthon and Sturm to produce a 
theory of inquiry which maintained the original contours of 
Ramism.
Under the sponsorship of influential educators, and 
propelled by its own internal penchant for didactics,
Ramism quickly became a part of the "sinews and bones" of 
the Rhenish educational establishment.* Carried throughout 
Germany and most of Southeastern Europe by the systematic 
educational reforms of Johann Comenius in the 17th Century, 
Ramean method, reborn as pansophism, became a part of the 
intellectual baggage of countless German scholars who, in
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turn, helped to shape the German intellectual milieu for 
generations to come.
Comenius, a Moravian educator trained at Herborn by 
Heinrich Alsted, clearly followed in the footsteps of 
Johann Sturm. Combining the teachings of Alsted and Sturm, 
Comenius developed an expanded version of Ramean didactics 
whose success relied, in his own words, "entirely upon a 
suitable supply of encyclopedic textbooks" intended to 
cover the whole range of the curriculum -- methodized, of 
course, according to Ramist principles. Dovetailing hand­
ily with the Protestant "cult of the Book" as well as with 
the pedagogical bias of Ramism in general, Comenian educa­
tional principles became deeply embedded in the German 
educational system through a series of reforms of Grammar 
schools and Gymnasia undertaken at the request of author­
ities in Sweden, Prussia, Bohemia and Moravia. Through 
Comenius' efforts, preparatory schools throughout Germany 
became so thoroughly immersed in overtly Ramean textbooks 
and procedures that the further history of Ramism in 
Germany has to be traced through its effects rather than 
its substance.10
The Comenian reforms established Ramean dialectic as 
the proper mode of inquiry throughout Germany. It is 
important, however, to define Ramean "dialectic" in its 
proper context. In the operation of Ramean method, the 
term "dialectic" refers only obliquely to its normal mean­
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ing of "reasoning by dialogue.” Because of the subsumption 
of the rhetorical places under logic as the places of 
invention, any "dialogue" which took place in Ramean logic 
took place as a process of discovery or invention. One 
"asked" a place if a concept in fact resided there and was 
"answered" according to the content of the place. This 
constant interplay between the object of present experience 
and its logical locus constituted the "dialogue" of method, 
and supplied the cognitive bridge between the particular 
and the general. This process of purely logical dialogue, 
which clearly implied the existence of a comprehensive 
frame of reference against which to test all experience.
Hence the dialectic established by Comenius at the core 
of the German curriculum operated under its own peculiar 
rules, according to which the goal of inquiry lay in 
understanding the unity of all knowledge, not merely in 
amassing facts. Science must seek the dialectical rela­
tionships which exist between reality and thought, Comenius 
argued, through a method "which can state all things of 
this or any future age, hidden or revealed, in an order 
inviolable and in fact never broken." This pansophist 
ideal clearly reached back to those metaphors which lay at 
the heart of the topical tradition. It looked to the "all­
ruling force of order" not as a legislative principle (as 
in English constructs), nor as a mechanical rule (as in 
French models), but rather as an actual metaphysical force
171
operating within nature. "Order is the soul of things," 
Comenius declared, and dialectic the means of mastery.11
"Let us assume,” Comenius admonished the members of the 
Royal Society, "that you have conquered the whole domain of 
Nature. If you rest content with that...your work will be 
a Babylon turned upside down, building not towards heaven 
but towards earth." Science must go beyond facts, he 
argued, and seek an understanding of that harmony which 
"really holds together the fabric of this world of ours."11 
Experiment alone could not hope to reveal the workings of 
nature, since it explored only the particular. Nor could 
enumeration suffice. Reductive analysis must be followed, 
not only by synthesis, as for Descartes and Newton, but by 
integration. And only Ramean dialectic, which tied the 
particular to the general in meaningful patterns congruent 
to the natural structures of the mind, could provide the 
tools with which to gain insight into the actual workings 
of the world.1*
These dialectical metaphors imposed themselves 
virtually unmediated on the German intellectual milieu and 
had a determining impact on German scientific models. In 
fact, Newtonian theories never gained an official hearing 
in Germany until 1747 when Frederick the Great brought 
Maupertuis to Berlin. And it was not until 1775 that 
Germany turned to any distinctly empirical modes of 
thought. Moreover, as Klaus Fischer notes, "Locke’s first
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appearance in Germany... passed largely unnoticed" until as 
late as 1754 and even then, "whatever his influence was in 
England or France, it was negligible in Germany. His 
philosophic impact on [Germany] was always limited by 
native traditions inimical to his thought.”14 The present 
argument suggests that at least one of the "native tradi­
tions" which militated against the acceptance of the Lock­
ean/Newtonian complex was a strong logical tradition 
grounded in the topics and systematized by Ramean method.
Likewise, Fischer observes that "French materialism, as 
expounded by Holbach or LaMettrie, was regarded in Germany 
with unmitigated horror," explaining this by the hollow 
fact that "modern science replaced the qualitative medieval 
ideology of science later in Germany than elsewhere.” R.
S. Calinger agrees, pointing out that the Cartesians "had 
little success" in Germany, limited primarily to the Prin­
cipalities.13 Calinger’s geographic reference is important 
in the present context. But Calinger does not address the 
issue in terms of logical models and, in fact, seems to 
miss the continuity between Ramean and later German con­
structs. Similarly, Fischer singles out "a backward social 
environment," "a deep urge of the German mind for order," 
and "a scholarly community which prized the spirit of 
thoroughness” as reasons for the rejection of Newtonian 
models. But in fact, all these amorphous reasons can be 
stated more concisely and explicitly as clear derivatives
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of the logical methodology of Ramus reenforced by the legal 
metaphors of customary law. Once again, the foregoing 
suggests that the tardy intrusion of modern science in the 
German intellectual milieu resulted, at least in part, from 
the persistence of a topical tradition which rejected the 
hypothetico-deductive methods of Descartes and the physico- 
mathematical methods of Newton and depended rather on a 
methodological paradigm grounded in the "places."
Indeed the survival of Ramean metaphors in the German 
intellectual tradition had a determining impact on the 
development of German scientific models. Under the meth­
odological postulates of its logic, German science could 
pass beyond the empirical data which had embarrassed New­
tonian models and could enrich the mechanical constructs of 
Cartesianism with dynamic principles expressing the struc­
tural and organic dimensions of nature. Moreover, the 
metaphors which controlled its logic invested German 
science with a characteristic drive toward conceptual com­
pleteness which both English and French science lacked.16 
The convergence of this drive with the underlying metaphors 
of customary law which survived in the educational centers 
of the South tended to reenforce and validate scientific 
models which sought to disclose the origins as well as the 
operation of law. Under the joint impact of the metaphors 
implicit in Ramean method and the altea Recht, 17th Century 
German science developed as a semantic rather than a
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syntactic discipline, committed to the exploration of human 
experience in all its contextual richness and historical 
depth.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, chief architect of German 
science in the "Age of Newton," drew on these metaphors to 
develop a scientific model which perfectly demonstrates the 
differences between the logical substructures of Newtonian, 
Cartesian and German science. Enlarging on his native 
logical tradition, Leibniz propounded a theory of inquiry 
which granted the formal possibilities of thought. But he 
abandoned traditional subject-predicate relationships in 
favor of a system of logical order in which all issues of 
correspondence dissolved into a principle of identity and 
all categorical hierarchies yielded to harmony as an 
organizing principle.
Leibniz’ ties to the Ramean tradition are clear. An 
ardent supporter of Comenian pansophism, Leibniz came under 
the influence of the Herborn Encyclopedists early in his 
career. Loemker claims that his "reaction to the writings 
of Alsted, Bisterfeld and Comenius, though never uncriti­
cal, was early and enthusiastic.” Leibniz’ own New Method 
of Learning was clearly influenced by Comenius’ Analytic 
Didactic and throughout his career Leibniz defended Com­
enian doctrines. Although he found Comenius deficient in 
logic, Leibniz admired his pansophist approach to knowledge 
and his structural views of nature. An admiring student of
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Alsted, Leibniz praised him, along with Keckermann, for 
"joining method to things," adding that Alsted’s 
Encyclopedia represented the summit (caput) of knowledge in 
his time. Leibniz in fact projected a revision of Alsted’s 
Encyclopedia in which he proposed to incorporate new 
scientific advances. Loemker points out that although 
Leibniz reacted against the excessive dichotomizing 
indulged in by the Encyclopedists in general, he was "none­
theless affected by their formal method of explicating and 
analyzing problems through definitions, and inspired by 
their pansophic labors and ideals."17
The most important influence from Herborn came to Leib­
niz through the works of Johann Bisterfeld, whose Epitome 
of the Art of Meditating inspired Leibniz’ own De Arte Com- 
binatoria. Loemker notes that Leibniz’ marginalia have 
been preserved in his copy of Bisterfeld*s Epitome and pro­
vide important clues in tracing the genealogy of some of 
Leibniz' own central logical tenets. Bisterfeld’s Epitome 
presented a logic in which concepts replaced terms and 
propositions as the fundamental units of knowledge. Each 
concept had a formal aspect which represented the thing 
known under its primary attributes, and an objective aspect 
which symbolized the object and assimilated it to the mind. 
The relations between these aspects constituted the formal 
structure of the act of knowing. "Logic," Bisterfeld con­
cluded, "is nothing but a mirror of [these] relations."
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(To which Leibniz responded marginally, "Nota bene"). 
Inquiry proceeded through a process which Bisterfeld called 
immeation -- an "ineffable and inexplicable penetration of 
thoughts by which one concept prepares, feeds and augments 
another...[through] a certain intrinsic conformity or as it 
were, configuration."
Clearly Bisterfeld drew heavily on the metaphors of the 
topical tradition. And Leibniz acknowledged his own debt 
to that tradition through Bisterfeld in the Arte Com- 
binatoria where he explicitly required that "everything be 
derived from the metaphysical doctrine of the relations of 
being to being. ...I believe that the most sound John Henry 
Bisterfeld had seen this in his ...Epitome...all of which 
is founded on the universal immeation." Leibniz, in fact, 
carried Bisterfeld’s logical immeation over into an entire 
metaphysics in which the doctrines of proportion and rela­
tion reappear as a universal harmony. Loemker concludes 
that "the notes on Bisterfeld thus show Leibniz giving gen­
eral assent, but often pushing the clarification of his own 
thought further..until, in the early Hanover years, refined 
and clarified by mathematical learning, an appreciation of 
the mechanical order of nature, and a clear theory of per­
ception, they are reformed into his mature monadology."*•
Following Bisterfeld, Leibniz defined first terms as 
dialectical concepts comprised of two interdependent prop­
erties: unity, or identity, and harmony, or congruence.
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The process of Inquiry aimed at unravelling the ontological 
relationships which pertained between terms considered 
under both these aspects. It served to establish the 
underlying patterns of congruence which supported self­
identical units as they interacted to generate those 
phenomena which men perceived as material reality. For 
Leibniz, in fact, the entire structure of the natural world 
consisted solely in the relationships which pertained 
between these terms.
Leibniz argued that to know something absolutely was 
simply to know its sufficient reason for existing -- that 
is to grasp the essential connections of all its implied 
predicates (or, as Ramus might have put it, to perceive 
simultaneously the entire content of its logical locus).
He stated the principle of sufficient reason as a law "by 
which we believe that no fact can be true or real, no 
statement trustworthy, unless there is a sufficient reason 
why it should be so and not otherwise."19 This law per­
sonified the contextual metaphors implicit in Ramean logic 
and customary law. It gave concepts the power to retain in 
existential fullness all the apparently contingent states 
which could be predicated of them. Under its rule, the 
truth of a concept became, in a sense, a function of its 
origin. By extension, any inquiry into causal principles 
became an inquiry into history.
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By contrast, Newton and Descartes had both deliberately 
finessed all explanations of origin due to what Leibniz 
would have seen as the shortcomings of their logic. Newton 
accepted physical causation as a brute fact of nature 
induced from the phenomena and referred final causation 
back to the action of Qod. Descartes made God himself the 
logical ground of all causation and thereby avoided issues 
of correspondence and origin. But Leibniz insisted on a 
metaphysical explanation of cause. He insisted on bridging 
that gap between physical and final causation which both 
Newton and Descartes had been willing to leave unbridged.*0 
Leibniz’ law of sufficient reason found logical 
expression in the principle of identity which he developed 
through an explicit critique of the validity of inference. 
Passing beyond both the mathematically inferred truths of 
Newton and the psychologically evident truths of Descartes, 
Leibniz developed a definition of first premises in which 
absolute certainty derived from an essential identity of 
the concept with itself. "First truths are those which 
make a self-identical statement in themselves," he argued. 
Leibniz objected to those who "use only incomplete and 
abstract concepts which thought supports but which nature 
does not know in their bare form." "In identities," he 
noted, "the connection and comprehension of the predicate 
in the subject is in fact expressed; in all remaining 
propositions, it is merely implicit."*•
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In this dramatic reduction of the order of existence to 
the order of logic, Leibniz dismissed all inferential 
knowledge as derivative and all hypothetical deductions as 
irrelevant to the true nature of things. Co-incidentally 
he relegated all Newton's inferred laws to the status of 
second-order propositions and subsumed all Descartes* 
mechanical constructs under an overarching principle of 
causation grounded in a notion of origin.
Leibniz' logic in fact moved in a direction contrary to 
that of both Newton and Descartes.21 Newton and Descartes 
had relied on abstractions -- whether inferred or intuited 
-- in the construction of their laws. But Leibniz' logic 
moved from the purely conceptual to the absolutely con­
crete, a drive typical of topical invention. For Leibniz, 
a complete concept consisted of the sum of its predicates. 
The more completely specified a subject became, the more 
real it became. For Newton and Descartes, specificity had 
implied contingency. But for Leibniz, only completely 
determined concepts could express a necessary truth. 
Reaching back to the symbolist ideal which had inspired 
Scotus, Leibniz claimed that "individuality includes 
infinity."23 But this claim in turn reached out to the 
metaphors controlling Ramean logic. For Ramus, demonstra­
tion had meant simply complete definition. Leibniz' 
portrayal of a self-identical concept as a subject which 
virtually contained within itself all of its possible
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predicates merely presented an intellectualized version of 
Ramus' description of a logical locus. Of course, substan­
tial differences pertain between Ramean and Leibnizian 
logic, particularly in their levels of sophistication. But 
the metaphors which controlled their respective models 
prove strikingly similar.
Leibniz drew on his principles of identity and suffi­
cient reason to construct a science which replaced the 
explanatory models of Newton and Descartes with one derived 
from the Comenian ideal of the structural coherence of the 
world. Newtonian physics and Cartesian mechanics had each 
made discrete material particles the ultimate ground of 
their respective physical and mathematical laws. These 
discrete particles were irreducible by the standards of 
inferential or deductive logic and could therefore function 
as axioms for the construction of laws. But Leibniz' prin­
ciple of identity would not allow him to accept material 
particles as the ultimate components of reality. As a 
logical subject, the concept of matter proved deficient 
since it did not comprise within itself its primary 
attributes of extension and motion. Extension, in fact, 
expressed a derivative notion of the second order logically 
inferred from our perceptions of the operation of force in 
nature. Moreover, motion, as conceived by both Newton and 
Descartes, contained no sufficient reason for its operation 
in the world.
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Newton and Descartes had both been led by the metaphors 
implicit in their logic to beg questions of ultimate causa­
tion. Newton had defined force as a prior concept which, 
while inexplicable in itself, was responsible for those 
motions which we perceived in nature. While we could 
explore the motions, we could never discover the force. 
Descartes had likewise defined force as only apparent —  a 
kind of optical illusion derived from the movement of 
invisible particles. His algebra allowed him to represent 
motion, but only as an accidental quality derived 
ultimately from his ontological vision of God. Descartes' 
static coordinate frame could thus accomodate principles of 
reciprocal action, but not an actual principle of force. A 
clear example of the fate of Cartesian dynamics without a 
mitigating principle of integral force appears in the works 
of Spinoza.
By contrast Leibniz conceived of force as a logical 
attribute integral to the notion of substance itself which 
supplied the sufficient reason for motion. His logical 
method thus added a dynamic dimension to his analysis of 
nature which both Newton and Descartes lacked. By chal­
lenging the fundamentality of the ideas of extension and 
motion on the grounds of their logical complexity, Leibniz 
could subordinate the concept of matter to a simpler, more 
primitive notion of force. This force, which obtruded 
into the world as a vis viva, constituted the actual
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metaphysical source of all extension and all motion.1* 
Derived logically through the principle of identity and 
validated by the law of sufficient reason, this notion of 
primitive force provided the metaphoric ground for an 
entire cosmogony in which substance became energy and law 
expressed potential.
Leibniz expounded the cosmological correlate of his 
logical notion of force in the Monadology, which portrayed 
the natural world as a vast assemblage of harmoniously 
related, vitalistically conceived individuals interacting 
in ways analogous to the laws of mathematical series. But 
Leibniz’ mathematical series differed in important ways 
from Newtonian and Cartesian constructs. Newton had 
expressed his theory of fluxions, which was intrinsically 
algebraic, in classic geometric terms, proceeding by 
modelling a smoothly continuous curve out of a succession 
of equal straight-line segments. Thus Newton dealt with 
the curve as he dealt with nature -- by breaking it down 
into distinct particles which could then be brought under 
the laws of geometry.** Likewise Descartes, through his 
differential coordinates, had supplied a matrix within 
which he could represent all the possible variables along a 
single pre-determined curve, thereby generating laws of 
motion. But Descartes’ mechanical laws always operated 
with reference to his static coordinate frame.
183
Leibniz, on the other hand, developed a mathematical 
series which could express every point along an infinite 
number of interrelated curves. By supplying the general 
equation of a curve in parametric form and varying the 
appropriate coefficients, Leibniz could thus generate a 
whole family of curves, each controlled by the "law of the 
series." This integral model supplied Leibniz with a sym­
bolic language which could portray the actual living pro­
gression of curves. And the fundamental differences 
between it and the more static geometric and algebraic 
models of Newton and Descartes derived directly from the 
logical substructures on which they each built.**
"Dynamics is to a great extent the foundation of my 
system," Leibniz admitted, describing his monads as the 
ultimate building blocks of a cosmos in which "all nature 
is full of life."*7 The monads, in keeping with the prin­
ciple of identity, expressed complete logical subjects 
which contained all possible predicates. Under the law of 
sufficient reason, they were endowed with a primitive vis 
viva that allowed them to develop according to an inner law 
of change. These perpetually self-unfolding individuals 
interacted dialectically under a related law of concomitant 
variation to reflect a universal harmony deduced itself 
from the law of sufficient reason. In a scientific model 
completely controlled by the metaphors of his logic, Leib­
niz thus presented a view of nature which included dimen-
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sions of development impossible in the mathematical and 
mechanical constructs of Newton and Descartes.
In Leibniz’ cosmos "every present is great with the 
future."*• Every tendential concept and every contingent 
notion contributed to a larger truth. Everything in 
process served to complete a larger process. In fact, the 
whole system of nature rested on a gradual movement toward 
the realization of an innate potential grounded in the vis 
viva. This model helped prepare the way for a mature 
evolutionary science and raised theories of probability to 
a new level of respectability.** Indeed it supplied meta­
phors for the construction of German scientific models 
which would maintain their force well into the 19th 
Century.
The principles of identity and sufficient reason became 
permanent substructures of the German logical tradition 
through the work of Christian Wolff, an academic whose 
ubiquitous influence on German thought earned him the title 
of "The Preceptor of Germany" among critics and champions 
alike.10 Born in Moravia and educated at Jena and Leipzig, 
Wolff came under the early influence of both Comenius and 
Leibniz, whose logical doctrines he systematized (with 
important modifications) and established as the foundation 
of philosophical instruction in German universities in 
direct contra-distinction to the logical doctrines of both 
Locke and Descartes.
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Wolff’s influence on the development of German thought 
in the 18th Century is undisputed. Although many scholars 
disagree on the originality and sophistication of his work, 
all agree on his controlling influence on the German 
academic milieu for well over a century after his death. 
Established at the core of the German educational system by 
what Etienne Gilson refers to as "multifarious, immense and 
determining manuals," Wolffian logic quickly became an 
integral part of that Ramean/Comenian educational tradition 
which Ong described as "the sinews and bones" of German 
culture. Wolff’s disciples "captured most university posi­
tions in Germany," Klaus Fischer observes, citing a source 
which claims that, in 1738, 231 of Germany’s top 
intellectual figures acknowledged Wolff as their precep­
tor.*1 Gilson marvels at Wolff’s "extraordinary 
influence," while Howell quotes a French contemporary as 
claiming that "Mr. Wolff is certainly the greatest 
philosopher that there is in Europe...to be compared to 
Descartes of France and to Newton of Great Britain."** 
Perpetuated through the derivative logics of Martin Knutzen 
(1747), G. F. Meier (1752) and Alexander Baumgarten 
(1761), Wolffian doctrines remained a determining factor in 
the development of German philosophic and scientific models 
well into the 19th Century.
It is also significant in the present context to note 
that, unlike England and France, Germany did not feel the
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impact of revolutionary political ideologies until well 
into the 19th Century. In England, the political and reli­
gious "revolutions" actually preceeded the systematic 
development of its scientific models. In France, revolu­
tionary ideologies imposed themselves on scientific 
theories already in the making but still sufficiently 
receptive to accomodate the philosophes’ conceptions of 
natural law. In Germany however, where the Revolution did 
not occur until 1848, scientific models had already assumed 
their characteristic shape before the underlying metaphors 
of the altea Recht were substantially disturbed. This 
allowed the logical and legal substructures of German 
scientific thought to take a stronger hold on its models 
and to maintain that influence over a longer period of 
time.
Wolff’s logic, drawing on the metaphors of structure 
and coherence explicit in his Comenian background, con­
tinued to insist on identity and congruence as the logical 
ground of a nexus rerum which underwrote the phenomenal 
world and supplied the structural links which men perceived 
as regularity in nature. But, in a crucial shift in meta­
phors, Wolff reversed Leibniz’ ontological priorities. 
Leibniz had subordinated the principle of identity to the 
law of sufficient reason, expressing it as the logical 
adjunct of a metaphysical truth. Wolff, by contrast, 
established the principle of identity as the source of the
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law of sufficient reason -- a logical inversion made 
manifest in his strong endorsement of syllogistic as the 
primary mode of inquiry.
Leibniz' law of sufficient reason clearly contained a- 
logical elements grounded in theology. Wolff, on the other 
hand, subordinated these elements to the process of syl­
logistic, claiming that the link between subject and predi­
cate derived from an ontological connection between essen­
tial constituents rather than on a relationship of logical 
entailment. By insisting on the ontological nature of this 
relationship -- that is by presupposing that subjects 
objectively "contained" rather than subjectively "entailed" 
their predicates -- Wolff could claim the syllogism as an 
actual matrix for representing thought. This clearly 
reached back to Ramean metaphors in its preference for 
logical structure over subjective order or purposive law. 
Wolff claimed that the syllogism articulated the natural 
logic of the mind itself. It expressed an inherent ordina­
tion within the human mind toward the attainment of knowl­
edge. In other words, far from being commentitia, syl- 
logistics offered access to the very structures within 
which all human thought proceeded.*1
By placing a logical law rather than a metaphysical 
principle in control of his analytical model, Wolff effec­
tively reduced concrete existence to a mere complement of 
logical possibility.14 If existence functioned as the
188
predicate of a logically identical subject and if all 
predicates expressed dependent modes of being, then exist­
ence itself must constitute a secondary attribute derived 
from conceptual analysis. Conversely, the existential 
reality of any conceptual term must depend ultimately on 
the extent of its logical development. In the context of 
German pansophism, this ontological stance allowed Wolff to 
interpret logical metaphors as methodological correlates of 
the structural coherence of the world. Moreover, by sub­
ordinating questions of actual existence to the analytical 
structures of his logic, Wolff could provide a theoretical 
justification for hypothetical reasoning grounded in Ramean 
forms.
Wolff’s reformulated ontology generated a character­
istic scientific model controlled by a metalogical notion 
of contingency -- contingentia. mundi. Since the principle 
of identity took precedence over the law of sufficient 
reason in Wolff’s logic, potential necessarily preceeded 
existence in his science. Since Wolff defined "being" in 
terms of "possibility" -- quod possibile eat, ena eat -- he 
consequently defined inquiry as an investigation of the 
possible, not an analysis of the extant -- acientia poa 
sibilium, quatenua eaae poaaunt.15 Under the postulates 
of Wolff’s logic, inquiry into the natural world thus 
became a hypothetical investigation into the compleaentum 
possibi1itatia of any given phenomenon.1* Hypotheses
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could function in inquiry as "substitute reasons” which 
when tested brought the mind closer to the genuine suffi­
cient reasons for the underlying structures of nature.
They could supply the data for an ars inveniendi which 
investigated the natural world through a set of heuristic 
techniques grounded in syllogistic, but capable by exten­
sion of reaching outside the confines of strict deductivism 
in the pursuit of new knowledge.17
It is important, however, not to confuse Wolff’s doc­
trine of possibility with the traditional doctrine of 
Aristotle which stipulated possibility as a complement of 
existence. Wolff, through his inversion of Leibniz’ ontol­
ogy, clearly rejected the classical scheme of possibility 
which defined actualization as a causal effect of 
metaphysical tendencies. By contrast, Wolff opted charac­
teristically for a purely logical explanation. "In Wolff’s 
view," Van Peursen points out, "actual existence is the 
outcome and part of possible existence, or, in Wolff’s 
terminology, part of ’ens’, being, inclusive of all logical 
possibilities."11 In an apparently inadvertent use of lan­
guage, Van Peursen goes on to make a comment of particular 
interest in the present context. He describes Wolff's con­
cept of being "as a kind of logical space" which contains 
notions corresponding to possibilities. He even points out 
that Wolff himself used the term receptaculum to describe 
general notions. But Van Peursen never ties these images
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to the logic of the places. In fact, he misapplies his own 
image to the extent of claiming that Wolff’s logic "gives 
profile to the line of Bacon [and] Descartes." Clearly 
Van Peursen has recognized the operation of topical meta­
phors here without perceiving their provenance or 
understanding their importance in underwriting the con­
ceptual continuity of German thought.
In fact Wolff’s endorsement of hypothesis underwrote 
crucial differences between his scientific model and those
of Newton and Descartes.** Newtonians had treated
hypotheses as second order propositions capable only of
testing impermeable facts. Cartesians had used them as
speculative explanations of mechanical events. But Wolff, 
like Ramus, employed hypotheses as actual working premises 
in chains of composite reasoning designed to penetrate the 
order and structure of nature.«• The principle of 
identity stipulated that any given phenomenon could 
logically have come to exist in an infinite variety of 
ways. But logical possibility alone could not provide 
sufficient reason for a concrete thing to exist. Each 
actual phenomenon in fact came about through a specific, 
though not necessary, series of events. The determination, 
or cause, of any physical state therefore carried no logi­
cal necessity, only a physical dependence on preceding 
states. In Wolffian terms, physical phenomena, as opposed
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to logical concepts, had their sufficient reasons outside 
themselves.* 1
Wolff therefore insisted that the investigation of 
physical phenomena must proceed through hypothetical 
inquiries into the chain of concrete events which actually 
led to the realization of one, rather than another, of the 
complement of possibilities. The scientific investigation 
of a discrete fact must work to determine its "place" 
within a series of empirically verifiable events. This 
could be achieved only through a sequence of inquiries each 
of which built upon the outcome of the last. In short, 
Wolff’s logical metaphors rendered experiment the meth­
odological correlate of hypothesis.
Indeed, Wolff’s entire scientific model rested on meta­
phors of integration and mutual dependence which clearly 
derived from the theories of men like Bisterfeld and Com- 
enius as they worked to accomodate Ramean theories to the 
logic of Melancthon. By contrast, Newton and Descartes 
tended to rely on the investigation of the proximate cause 
of an event as revealed by specific experiments designed to 
isolate phenomena from their contextual base. Wolff 
appealed rather to contextual metaphors. He explained 
cause as a process through which each experienced 
phenomenon simply constituted the sufficient reason for the 
next in an endless series of interrelated events. Wolff’s 
sequential explanation of cause clearly illustrates the
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direct operation of logical metaphors on his scientific 
model. Where reductive analysis and enumeration had gener­
ated an atomic view of phenomena, the process of logical 
integration generated a contextual, even an historical, 
view.
The topical metaphors which controlled Wolff’s logic 
become particularly significant when considered in com­
parison to Bacon’s rejection of the "Idols" or Descartes’ 
"escape from perspective." Consider, for example, Wolff’s 
characteristic reformulation of Descartes' cogito:
"Whatever being is actually conscious of itself and of 
other things outside itself, that being exists. But we are 
actually conscious of ourselves and of other things outside 
ourselves. Therefore we exist."4* The crucial addition 
of external reality to the determination of first premises 
and the significant introduction of the first person plural 
to the proposition clearly articulates the fundamental dif­
ferences between the metaphors operative in Cartesian and 
Wolffian logic. Wolff’s entire analysis in fact proceeded 
under the assumption that a community of consciousness 
existed as the ground of inquiry and that the act of 
predication itself expressed consensual knowledge. More­
over, the foregoing argument suggests that this predisposi­
tion to subordinate the singular to the plural derived, not 
only from Ramean logical metaphors, but also from the legal 
metaphors which supported medieval functional theories of
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society and customary law in the urban enclaves of Southern 
Germany.
The characteristic ability of Wolff’s logic to portray 
any concept as a mediate term in an endless series -- an 
ability which derived directly from his reliance on topical 
metaphors —  gave his science the correlative ability to 
view empirical facts as discrete stages within a coherent 
sequence of related phenomena. Facts had histories which 
functioned as their cause. Moreover, they had a future 
controlled, but not dictated, by an actual principle of 
development operative within the limits of the series. But 
Wolff’s principle of development invoked no divine plan, as 
Leibniz’ had. It merely expressed the sequential trans­
formations which occurred within the logical structure of a 
given event as it subsisted at various stages within the 
series.** This ontologically independent conception of 
development, when applied to the natural world, produced a 
powerful new notion of law grounded in the historical and 
structural reality of phenomena themselves. When combined 
with Wolff’s methodological endorsement of hypothesis and 
experiment, this morphotic principle of order generated a 
distinctive set of metaphors which would dominate German 
scientific theory for the next hundred years.
The metaphors of structural change implicit in Wolffian 
doctrines emerged in German science as Naturphilosophie. 
This cosmological model presented the natural world as an
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organic structure possessed of an inherent logic which 
directed its phenomena and determined its effects. In con­
trast to English science, which concerned itself primarily 
with physico-mathematical constructs, or French science, 
which concerned itself with physico-mechanical functions, 
18th Century German science evidenced a characteristic 
preoccupation with morphological studies focused on the 
origin and transformation of phenomena. The Natur- 
philosophen were committed to exploring nature in all its 
logical complexity and historical depth. They proposed a 
systematic investigation of the correlations between struc­
ture and function which underwrote the perceived regu­
larities of things. In short, they proposed a programmatic 
application of Wolffian logical metaphors to the dis­
ciplines of natural science.44
German morphologists sought an understanding of the 
functions of nature through an understanding of its struc­
tures. Thus Jacob Fries developed a theory of organic 
instinct grounded in the laws of crystalline structure 
which he defended against Descartes' mechanical laws of 
equilibrium. Fries contended that the laws of crystal­
lization in fact displayed the universal morphotic princi­
ple behind organic growth. By contrast, Descartes had 
argued that organic forms derived from particles of matter 
in motion achieving a state of equilibrium -- a theory 
which clearly reflected his mechanical model. But Fries’
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attempt to reduce organic to crystalline processes clearly 
manifested the drive in Wolff's methodology to subordinate 
existential events to logical structures. Fries played a 
central role in the founding of modern cytology as the 
mentor of Matthias Schleiden, who extended the search for a 
theory of free crystallization to a study of the pathology 
and life history of cells. His related attempts to explain 
self-maintaining organic processes according to the circuit 
laws of the voltaic cell made him influential in subsequent 
studies of polarity, magnetism and galvanism. Fries was a 
Moravian educated according to Comenian principles by the 
United Brethren at Herrenhut. Moreover, he was a disciple 
of the Moravian Karl Reinhold, an avowed Ramist.
Inspired by Fries, Karl Ernst von Baer applied the 
principles of Naturphilosophie to anatomy in a study of 
vertebrate morphogenesis which rested entirely on his 
ability to envisage the organism as an historical entity. 
Baer’s theories led to a unifying theory of embryology.
His discovery in 1826 of an egg in a mammalian ovary ended 
a search begun in the 17th Century and pursued by such 
lights as Gabriel Harvey. In contrast to the theories of 
the French naturalists, Baer developed an epigenetic theory 
which stipulated that development occurred from the general 
to the special -- a theory clearly grounded in the Wolffian 
principle of identity.
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This characteristic theory of development allowed 
German anatomists later in the Century to reject the 
recapitulation doctrine central to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. In a striking expression of a closed categori­
cal model, Darwinians argued that "ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny.” As a result, they were unable to provide a 
logical bridge from invertebrate to vertebrate species. By 
contrast, the German dialectical model allowed for a prin­
ciple of development grounded in logical, not existential, 
structure. This left the structures of nature open to con­
tingent effects which had no status in Newtonian or 
Cartesian paradigms. Baer’s epigenetic theories rendered 
German evolutionary science more flexible and more open to 
the fruits of experimental research. Further developed by 
Haeckel and Gegenbauer later in the Century, this struc­
tural approach to evolution eventually issued in a theory 
of ''caenogenesis" which could account for new evolutionary 
acquisitions, effectively negating the recapitulation 
theory. In fact, as evolutionary theories matured 
throughout the 19th and into the 20th Century, they tended 
to follow the German rather than the Darwinian model.
Baer’s theories, in turn, led to studies in metabolism 
which eventually replaced the mechanistically conceived 
"combustion" theory of the Cartesians with a structural 
model portraying the living organism as a dialectical unit 
engaged in a constant exchange between its own constitutent
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parts. Carl von Voit established an influential school of 
metabolic studies at Munich. His theories grew out of 
Liebig’s "metamorphosis" theory of animal chemistry which 
stated the laws of animal nutrition as transformational 
principles. Again, the evidence of Wolffian metaphors is 
clear. And again, it is interesting to note that Voit was 
a Bavarian and educated at Gottingen, a center of Ramist 
activity in the crucial period following Ramus’ death. 
Another pioneer in morphological studies, Albrecht von Hal­
ler, also taught and pursued research at Gottingen. Haller 
demonstrated, through experiments in capillary action, that 
the laws of hydraulics could not, in fact, be applied to 
the functions of living organisms as the Cartesians had 
claimed they could.4*
Meanwhile, at Jena, Carl Gegenbauer developed Baer’s 
morphogenetic theories into a new science of comparative 
anatomy, arguing that reductive analysis was methodologi­
cally incapable of exhibiting the underlying structural 
relationships that pertained among organisms. Indeed 
Gegenbauer’s defense of comparison as a methodological tool 
is particularly significant in the context of Wolffian and 
Ramean logic. Gegenbauer insisted on comparison as the 
basis of all phylogenetic reconstruction. Given the formal 
and temporal priority of the cell, he argued, the only way 
to establish the morphological relationships which existed 
between organs, organ systems or entire organisms was
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simply to experimentally determine and then compare their 
respective structures and development. Structural analysis 
within an historical context provided the foundation of 
this scientific model, just as they had in Wolff's logical 
model.*•
To meet the demands of these emerging disciplines, 
which necessarily pursued their inquiries at the cellular 
level, an entire science of microscopy developed at Bonne 
under the direction of Max Schultze and Ernst Briicke.
Indeed the bare conception of microscopic analysis fits 
more comfortably within a logical model determined by 
Wolffian rather than by Newtonian or Cartesian metaphors. 
Newton portrayed the ultimate components of his science as 
abstract mathematical points hardly receptive to structural 
analysis at any level. Likewise, the material components 
of Descartes represented impermeable atoms irreducible by 
logic, much less by analytical instruments. But Wolff con­
ceived his elements as actual physical constructs whose 
very existence implied a structure derived from the 
specific determination of a spectrum of possibilities.
Such an ontology could easily accomodate the notion of 
structural analysis carried on at a level which subtended 
normal perception.
With microscopy supplying the analytical tools and com­
parative research in zoology, botany and anatomy supplying 
invaluable experimental data, German science developed an
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independent discipline of experimental medicine character­
ized by clinical observation, physical diagnostics and cel­
lular pathology. Pioneering in the use of experimental 
laboratories and morphological techniques, both of which 
drew on the metaphors central to Wolffian logic, German 
medicine attained an ascendency in Europe that would not be 
challenged until well into the 20th Century. In the pre­
sent context, it is significant that all these emerging 
disciplines developed in Universities which fell within the 
geographic sphere dominated by the altes Recht: metabolic
studies at Munich; vertebrate morphology and comparative 
anatomy at Jena; plant pathology at Leipzig and Halle; cel­
lular pathology and experimental medicine at Wiirtzburg; 
embryology at Konigsberg; microscopy at Bonne. The argu­
ments developed above suggest that these geographic con­
gruences are not accidental, but rather co-incidental with 
the dominance of powerful legal and logical metaphors 
deeply embedded in the intellectual traditions of South 
Germany.
Likewise in the fields of psychology and epistemology 
the principles and methods of Wolffian logic, grounded in 
Ramean and Comenian metaphors, underwrote the development 
of a theoretical model which issued eventually in the 
establishment of experimental psychology as an independent 
discipline. German psychological theories developed out of 
one of the primary assumptions of Wolffian logic -- that
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modal linkages, rather than occult forces or substantive 
communication, underwrote the processes of perception.
This became, in psychological terms, the theory of psycho­
physical parallelism. English psychology, in keeping with 
its inferential logic, attempted to explain perception 
through "occult" forces directly analogous to those of New­
tonian physics. Cartesian analysis generated a psychology 
which exhausted the meaning of consciousness in its logical 
function and explained perception through mechanical causes 
directly analogous to those operative in the material 
world. By contrast German psychology, building on meta­
phors of identity and congruence, developed a model in 
which structural relationships conditioned the process of 
perception.
Johann Friedrich Herbart developed a theory of percep­
tion which, in an explicit use of Ramean images, described 
consciousness as an "apperceptive mass” which functioned 
through its ability to "glue" together simple concepts to 
form complex ideas. In a direct application of Comenian 
ideals, Herbart also established the first experimental 
program in pedagogy at Konigsberg where he tested his 
purely Wolffian theory that education proceeded through 
morphological changes within the individual. Herbart drew 
explicitly on spatial analogies and principles of structure 
in developing his theories of relative intensities and
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sensory thresholds to explain the physical processes 
involved in perception.
Furthermore, the images which lie at the base of Her­
bert's theories prove to be curiously persistent throughout 
the German psychological tradition. German psychological 
theories in fact encouraged the use of spatial analogies 
and metaphors of local motion drawn directly from the 
Ramean tradition. Consider Gustav Fechner’s treatment of 
psychology as an exact science of functional relations and 
Ernst Weber’s reduction of those relations to an integrated 
Bystem of arithmetical and geometrical series. Consider 
Hermann Lotze’s theory of perception as a system of local 
signs governed by a network of structural relationships. 
Consider Wilhelm Wundt’s arguments for the localization of 
function based in a structural definition of consciousness 
and Karl Ewald Hering’s development of an actual diagram­
matic matrix for the spatial ordering of sensations. Above 
all, consider the structural metaphors and spatial analo­
gies controlling the theories of Gestalt psychology which 
described perception as a holistic grasp of generic struc­
tural features.
Moreover the foregoing anaylsis suggests that the 
Ramean images and analogies which lie at the base of the 
German psycho-physical tradition were reenforced by those 
legal metaphors characteristic of customary law. This 
premise becomes even more tantalizing in the light of a few
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geographic facts. Herbart pursued his researches at 
Konigsberg, Jena and Gdttingen. Weber and Fechner estab­
lished their theories at Leipzig and Halle, where Lotze 
studied before succeeding Herbart at Gottingen. Wundt, 
educated at Heidelberg and TObingen, spent his career at 
Heidelberg, Leipzig and Zurich. Hering, educated at Leip­
zig under Wundt, carried on his research there and at 
Vienna and Prague. Brentano, educated at Wurzburg, 
pursued his career there and at Vienna. Just as with the 
physiological disciplines, developed out of Wolff’s mor­
phological metaphors, the psychological disciplines, 
grounded in his principles of structure and identity, seem 
to be centered in precisely that region controlled by Com- 
enian ideals and the sites Recht.
Even in the traditionally analytical field of physics, 
German science maintained a philosophical commitment to the 
logical metaphors which shaped its theories. Helmholz, who 
declared himself in open reaction to the principles of 
Naturphilosophie, drew nonetheless on the metaphors 
implicit in its tradition. His interest in force conver­
sion, which resulted in the development of the laws of 
thermo- and electrodynamics, derived principally from ear­
lier researches in optics and acoustics -- researches 
grounded in visual localization and a structural theory of 
resonance. Likewise his reduction of body movement to 
chemical forces built on the metabolic theories of Voit and
203
other morphologi8ts. Indeed, Helmholz was character­
istically dependent throughout his career on spatial analo­
gies. He viewed force and intensity as functions of posi­
tion, rather than velocity, basing his entire argument on 
the claim that, if all matter is in fact dispersed into its 
ultimate components, the only way to conceive of motion is 
to conceive of the change in relationships as spatial. 
Again, it is interesting to note that Helmholz was educated 
by leading morphologists and pursued his scientific career 
at Konigsberg, Bonne and Heidelberg.
Thus it seems evident that the respective careers of 
Aristotelean, Cartesian and Ramean logic did indeed have a 
significant impact on emerging European scientific models. 
The centrality of logic to the scholastic curriculum, still 
in substantial control of all European universities in the 
17th Century, ensured that the principles and methods of 
the logic taught in the respective Schools would be a con­
trolling factor in the construction of theoretical models. 
Moreover the distinct political environments in which these 
models arose also exerted a determining influence by sup­
plying characteristic sets of legal metaphors to scientists 
reaching out for new conceptions of physical law. In 
England, Neo-Aristotelian constructs interacted with 
domestic legislative paradigms to produce an inferential 
logic and an empiricist science. In France, Cartesian 
principles interacted with a native centralized absolutism
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to produce a hypothetico-deductive logic and a mechanist 
science. In Germany, Ramean models interacted with a 
native Rhenish humanism and an urban tradition grounded in 
the altes Recht to produce a dialectical logic and an expe­
rimental science.
Each of these logical and scientific models would in 
turn have an impact on the American intellectual tradition, 
unique by virtue of being an amalgam of all three. The 
following chapters will assess the relative impact which 
these metaphors of physical law and logical order had on 
American thought and examine the ways in which they 
prepared it to cope in the 19th Century with a revolution­
ary new scientific model which would, in turn, demand meta- 
ph ora adequate to its theory.
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Chapter 6 




Investigations of the metaphors underlying the con­
struction of physical law and logical order hold a special 
relevance for discussions of American intellectual history. 
Concepts of law and order took on a compelling urgency for 
colonists clinging to the edge of a remote wilderness. In 
the New World the demand for prescriptive law and a viable 
order expressed neither an abstract philosophical quest nor 
an innate conceptual drive. Here it expressed an exist­
ential need which ranked second only to the more immediate 
concern for food and shelter. In a frontier environment 
the menace of disorder threatened more than the conceptual 
coherence of the colonial endeavor -- it threatened its 
actual survival. The early colonists desperately needed 
the protections of law and the assurance of order to 
succeed in establishing a foothold in the New World.
But the conditions of settlement themselves isolated 
these fledgling communities from traditional models of law 
and order which might have served to underwrite their
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polity. Moreover, this isolation tooJt place at a crucial 
juncture in the development of Western Thought -- at 
precisely that point in time when European conceptions of 
physical law and logical order underwent significant revi­
sion. Colonists in the New World thus found themselves 
doubly isolated -- both from consoling contact with tradi­
tional models and from that invigorating interplay between 
competing logical systems which effectively restructured 
thought throughout 17th Century Europe.1 This double 
isolation forced the early colonists into a defensive pos­
ture. Far removed from familiar patterns of authority yet 
faced with the necessity of maintaining order in a hostile 
environment, they fell back on that logical model which 
offered the greatest degree of control. They then pro­
ceeded to adapt that model to the organization of colonial 
perceptions and the management of colonial experience.
It lies beyond the scope of this study to examine and 
evaluate the myriad forces which helped to reshape the 
European intellectual heritage in its American image. That 
task has been ably undertaken by an endless stream of 
scholars intent on identifying tangible processes of cause 
and effect in the construction of an American ideology.*
The present chapter will restrict itself rather to the more 
basic task of uncovering and articulating the conceptions 
of physical law and logical order developed by Colonial 
Americans in their attempt to deal with wilderness experi­
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ences. According to the current argument, the delineation 
of this logical substructure should provide valuable 
insights into the formulation of legal and scientific 
models peculiar to the American intellectual milieu.
The initial and most potent influence on the develop­
ment of colonial thought came undeniably from English 
sources. But the radically different historical and social 
contexts from which English conceptions of order derived 
guaranteed that they would not impose themselves unmediated 
on colonial life. Moreover, it remains an essential fact 
of the colonial search for order that this search went on 
in the wider context of general political and intellectual 
disorder at home. The stresses placed on English legal 
models by the Commonwealth, the Restoration and the 
Glorious Revolution combined with the inadequacies revealed 
in English logical models by the developing physical 
sciences tended to lessen the impact which these would have 
on developing colonial constructs.*
This proved particularly true of the forms of Puritan 
polity which emerged in the northern colonies.4 Here the 
crisis of legitimacy endemic to any transplanted community 
became excruciating due to the peculiar circumstances of 
establishment and growth. The settlers of Massachusetts 
Bay arrived in America armed with a holy mission to estab­
lish a new Zion. Their faith underwrote that mission and 
guaranteed its legitimacy. "The Lord hath given us leave
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to drawe our owne Articles," Winthrop declared.* But the 
secular legal foundations of Puritan polity proved less 
clear. In fact the architects of the Citty held a clouded 
title to that Promised Land upon which they built.
Although their patent derived ultimately from the Crown, 
the Royal prerogative extended only as far as those 
specific purposes set forth in the document of incorpora­
tion. De facto authority rested within the community 
itself and emanated entirely from the agreement of its mem­
bers.' Moreover, by remaining in actual possession of the 
instrument of power upon which their community was founded 
-- that is, by bringing their Charter with them to the New 
World -- the colonists of Massachusetts Bay cast a second 
shadow over the legitimacy of Royal authority, subordinat­
ing it not only to God but to the General Court.
The chartered company, while a useful instrument for 
economic organization and control in England, proved a 
hopelessly inadequate source of order under the vastly dif­
ferent conditions of New World settlement. Designed to 
administer a limited commercial enterprise within an estab­
lished political regime, the corporation functioned well 
within the confines of European order. But in colonial 
America, the charters represented the only order. Their 
authority extended by default to the administration of all 
civil relationships. In actual operation, the everyday 
administration of colonial affairs reverted to local
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authorities who, in turn, justified their power under the 
tevms of the charter. But the charters offered no logical 
justification for the de facto order, only a hazy appeal to 
the "rights of Englishmen" which, although supported and 
defined by centuries of common law at home, proved tenuous 
at best under wilderness conditions.7
Yet the confusion of the political and religious 
errands upon which the settlers of Massachusetts Bay 
embarked ensured that they would seek a logical justifi­
cation for their polity. If the Balvific experiment were 
to succeed, it had to conform not only to the pragmatic 
demands of the frontier, but to that model of Eternal Truth 
revealed in the Scriptures and expounded through logic.
And the religious confession of the Fathers determined in 
advance that the logic upon which they would draw to jus­
tify their errand would be that of Peter Ramus. Miller, 
Morison, Ong and Howell have made it essentially super­
fluous to argue for the congruences between Ramean logic 
and the "New England Way." Their works provide a clear 
genealogy for New England Ramism, transmitted through the 
curricula of colonial colleges and, subsequently, through a 
system of public education administered by a profession 
trained up in its principles. Logic, Morison tells us, 
remained "the basic subject in the curriculum... and the 
most esteemed writer on this subject was Peter Ramus."* 
Perry Miller claims that the transmission of Ramean
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theories to New England is "clearly traceable," pointing 
out that "almost all the principle works of Ramus appear in 
the New England lists.”•
Moreover, Aristotelean paradigms lent support to 
Popery, while Cartesian logic came too late to the New 
World to contribute to the construction of its models. 
Cartesian logic first entered Harvard in 1689, under the 
administration of William Brattle. But Brattle's 
ostensibly Cartesian Compendium did not discard Ramean 
principles. It merely translated them into Cartesian 
images, thereby giving them a new life and force. As late 
as 1719, Miller points out, logic in New England "continued 
to be closer to Ramus" and remained essentially unchanged. 
Indeed the first serious threat to Ramean logic did not 
appear until well into the 18th Century when the logic of 
Locke, not Descartes, began to make inroads on the Colonial 
consciousness.10 Throughout the formative Colonial period, 
in fact, the logic of "that Great Scholar and Blessed 
Martyr, Peter Ramus,"11 which subordinated all questions of 
priority and legitimacy to the ordering role of the places, 
provided logical justification for the emerging Puritan 
order.
Indeed "the fundamental fact concerning the 
intellectual life of New England," Miller contends, "is 
that they ranged themselves definitely under the banner of 
the Ramists."1* In the New Canaan of Massachusetts Bay,
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Ramean logic found its spiritual home. Here, in the 
splendid isolation of a colonial frontier, its methodizing 
techniques could extend themselves not only across a cur­
riculum but across the entire spectrum of practical, 
intellectual and spiritual life. Moreover, the "baptismal 
efficacy of the ocean-crossing" cleansed New Bngland Ramism 
of the disproportionate rhetorical focus which had con­
taminated its English counterpart and allowed the purely 
logical components of Ramism to reach out in all their 
naive simplicity across a physical and intellectual 
environment which cried out for controlling principles of 
order.13 Ramism, Miller claims, provided the colonial mind 
with a framework which survived "without serious modifica­
tion, for the remainder of the 117th] century and well into 
the eighteenth."14 As a means of organizing and classify­
ing all experience, it became the very heart and soul of 
the Puritan endeavor.
But the Ramism developed in the northern colonies dif­
fered, predictably, from that expounded in Europe. Under 
the impact of the colonists’ millenial expectations, the 
perfect rationality portrayed by the Ramean places in fact 
became an objective means of salvation. The colonists 
required principles of order with which to organize and 
control their community. Yet those principles had to 
operate within the context of their holy mission. By tying 
the logical mechanisms of Ramism to the struggle for exist­
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ence aa well as the quest for spiritual truth, New England 
divines found they could provide justification for both 
their piety and their polity. The exigencies of the fron­
tier rendered the pursuit of objective order synonymous 
with the pursuit of grace. This led the colonials, by 
extension, to view disorder as a substantive evil brought 
on by a lapse of method.13 Encouraged by the conditions of 
settlement to thus reformulate their piety in the language 
of their logic, Puritan theorists effectively integrated 
the processes of redemption and rational endeavor. And 
this integration became the central paradox of intellectual 
life in the New World.
Yet, although the colonists grounded their sacral com­
munities in a minutely articulated intellectual system, the 
faith which had launched their mission still demanded a 
piety whose "emotional propulsion was fitted into the 
articulated philosophy as a shaft to a spear-head."1* 
Although conversion in its practical aspect might occur as 
an enlightening of the mind, it remained in its theological 
aspect a humbling of the heart. Hence New England Ramism 
always harbored the implicit hazard of fostering a 
pietistic anti-intellectualism such as that raised up by 
Anne Hutchinson in the Antinomian crisis of the 1630’s. In 
England, the force of tradition conspired with the vested 
interest of the clergy to thwart enthusiasm in religion and 
"levellers” in society. But in the New World, the frontier
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conspired with uncertain political structures to lessen the 
prestige of rationality and encourage the pursuit of truth 
through direct revelation. This incipient threat to an 
already precarious order in turn forced colonial divines 
into the perilous position of placing a special emphasis on 
perfect rationality as the only path to righteousness.
"If every heated imagination is free to people the 
world with the hypostasies of its own fancy," Paul Shorey 
warns, "the result is chaos, not a teachable catechism."l1 
But above all colonial leaders required a teachable 
catechism with which to invoke order. They had to bring 
revelation under the aegis of reason in order to enlist it 
in the service of a redeemed community. Significantly, 
Puritan doctrine maintained that God had bestowed revela­
tion on man only after the Fall. He had added it, so to 
speak, to a completed creation as compensation for the loss 
of Grace. Revelation thus occurred as an afterthought, 
Miller claims, "devised for the emergency, but serving 
incidentally to substantiate and reenforce the pattern of 
ideas upon which the natural universe had been con­
structed. "1# The fact that Puritan dogma portrayed 
revealed truths as exemplars of creation allowed New 
England theologians to justify their emphasis on 
rationality as a means of salvation, thereby expanding the 
sphere of natural knowledge to the very boundaries of their 
faith.
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Ramean method supplied them with an ideal mechanism for 
accomplishing this in its promotion of composite proposi­
tions. Ramus had claimed composite statements as the 
rational constructions which most clearly reflected the 
natural configurations of the mind. Going the "blessed 
martyr” one better, New England Ramists substituted Bibli­
cal authority for the "if” clauses in hypotheticals and 
prelapsarian rationality for the "inner monitor" which 
guaranteed disjunctives. In a crucial move, they rendered 
composite statements axiomatic and placed them in control 
of discourse.
A typical Puritan construction of a hypothetical 
proposition might run thus:
-If God has commanded that his children form 
churches, then all Saints in covenant with God 
must form churches.
-The Bible clearly states that God has so 
commanded.
-Therefore all God’s children must form 
churches.
A typical Puritan construction of a disjunctive proposition 
might run thus:
-Either God created the world or He didn’t.
-Any fool possessed of method must come to the 
conclusion that the rational order of nature 
could only have orginated with God.
-Therefore, God created the world.
Under the rules of this logic neither the establishment of 
the Visible Church, nor the justification of political 
order, nor the creation of the world itself remained a sub­
ject for revelation. Natural reason could penetrate these
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and all other questions as well. Indeed logical arguments 
of this stripe could lend authority to just about any 
statement, provided only that the Bible be sufficiently 
searched for premises and the method accepted as apodic- 
tic.1•
This characteristic colonial reformulation of composite 
reasoning generated a correlative soteriology which stipu­
lated that spiritual regeneration occurred as an actual 
event within the natural order. Since God had specifically 
structured human rationality for the apprehension of truth, 
he could treat with man through regular psychological chan­
nels. Moreover, he could reveal hiB truth through the 
objectively existent laws of method. Method, as a trans­
cription of the divine order, gave immediate and infallible 
access to truth without recourse to supernatural means. 
According to this "doctrine of means" the process of con­
version originated in nature with stimulae received through 
the senses.20 Through the logic of the places, man could 
interpret these impressions in the light of divine truth 
and so gain access to "natural revelation." The reenforce­
ment of composite statements by Holy Writ and innate 
rationality conveniently guaranteed the absolute identity 
of these logical "arguments" with objective truth.
The doctrine of means effectively linked the Puritans' 
piety to a logical ground which justified their emerging 
theocratic order. By embedding "the light of logic and
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dialectic" in the actual structures of the mind and confin­
ing revelation therein, New England Ramiats declared 
philosophic allegiance to a naive realism which effectively 
delimited the role of personal vision and ensured a 
preeminent place for natural reason in New England 
thought.*1 Moreover, by assuring Puritan divines that 
reason could not possibly encroach upon the truths of 
faith, the doctrine of means left them free to pursue natu­
ral knowledge wherever their innate rationality led them. 
Ramean logic, with its trust in direct perception, its 
immediate adjudication in disjunctives, and its fundamental 
reliance on the existence of an objective order, allowed 
the authors of the New England Way to dichotomize their 
theology into the separate spheres of faith and reason** -- 
and then to place almost total reliance on the latter. 
Spiritual revelation could serve only to validate the order 
and vindicate the method.
The comprehensive Ramist ars technologicae perfectly 
expressed the order and method in which New England placed 
its faith. It stipulated that the natural universe 
embodied the pattern of God’s intention toward the world.*1 
Logic served simply to direct the reason toward those ends 
enunciated by God in creation. Technologia thus effec­
tively tied the pursuit of knowledge to the identification 
of purpose and wove "means” and "ends" into the very fabric 
of logic. Under the terms of the Ramist ara technologicae
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all rational endeavor aimed at eupraxia, a Greek term mean­
ing roughly "application" or "good conduct".*4 But in the 
New England canon eupraxia acquired the additional connota­
tion of that practical use to which any theoretical con­
struct oust be put in order to justify its participation in 
God’s wider purpose. The combined operation of technologia 
and eupraxia thus supported a significant shift away from a 
conception of logic as contemplation or inquiry to a power­
ful new conception of logic as a rule for action.
The conceptual link forged between "means” and "ends" 
by the application of Ramean constructs to colonial experi­
ence guaranteed that a deep-seated affinity would develop 
between the colonists’ logic and their polity. And in fact 
the political implications of New England’s peculiar logic 
did emerge in one of its most creative theoretical con­
structs -- the federal covenant. Miller describes the com­
plex mechanisms of federal theology as "the capital 
instance of the Puritans’ deliberate effort to combine 
their piety with their intellectual concepts, to preserve 
the irrational force of revelation and yet to harmonize it 
with the propositions of reason and logic."** Indeed 
covenant theology was not unique to the New World. The 
concept of the covenant as an organizing principle had in 
fact developed in the context of the Calvinism which 
dominated English and South German civic models. But 
covenantal theory in Europe had always operated within an
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established political order. It never had the opportunity 
there that it enjoyed in the New World of contributing to 
the actual construction of a regime.
In the covenantal theory peculiar to New England, 
colonial divines invoked the controlling principles of 
Ramean logic in a forthright pragmatic injunction which 
made faith without performance a logical impossibility.
They tied the inward obligations of their faith to the out­
ward obligations of their fellowship and made ethics a 
corollary of election. Manifested politically in the Mas­
sachusetts Body of Liberties, the federal covenant effec­
tively linked religious confession to social 
responsibility. It established the sacral community as a 
political entity with a clearly delineated program for the 
legitimation of communal values.2* Further reenforced by 
the Cambridge Platform, covenant theology provided the 
institutional means for satisfying the conceptual demands 
of New England's logic and the spiritual demands of its 
faith.
In the federal covenant, New England magistrates found 
a logic of social control which, while offering an effec­
tive means of imposing external order, still expressed the 
positive ideals of their errand. By defining the justice 
of God in the rational language of Ramism, colonial leaders 
harnessed the master motive of salvation to the success of 
their communal enterprise and rendered the establishment of
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political order a logical correlate of redemption. Under 
the terms of the covenant, and thanks to what Miller calls 
the "awe of logic" which controlled Colonial thought, the 
naive realism implicit in Ramism imposed itself virtually 
unmediated on the development of Puritan polity.*7 The 
covenant supplied an external standard for the foundation 
of law in the apparent lawlessness of the frontier and gave 
man a definite legal status within a rationally com­
prehensible order. Technologia guaranteed that man could 
comprehend the standard. Eupraxia guaranteed that he could 
achieve the order. Thus armed with the strength of their 
faith and equipped with the tools of their logic, the chil­
dren of the covenant set out to incorporate the metaphors 
of both into a powerful new conception of community which 
would have a determining impact on the construction of 
American political models.
As the frontier settlements matured, however, the care­
ful balance struck between reason and faith by Ramist 
mechanisms became increasingly precarious. External pres­
sures from political events in England, increased migration 
and economic growth, and the dispersion of the Saints to 
outlying districts combined with the dialectical tensions 
intrinsic to Ramism itself to set up a kind of "sympathetic 
vibration" between sacred and secular interests which shook 
the redeemed communities to their very foundations and 
forced them to revise their errand.
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The adjustments attendant upon the abrogation of the 
Charter and the Restoration exemplify those required across 
the entire spectrum of political and intellectual life.
The establishment of the Dominion renewed the crisis of 
legitimacy endemic to the colonies and forced a reevalua­
tion of concepts of order and authority.** Compelled to 
support a policy of toleration and to replace their appeal 
to chartered rights with an exclusive appeal to the "rights 
of Englishmen," colonial theorists vainly tried to extend 
familiar constructs to encompass new and unsettling social 
realities. But they were caught with their doctrine in 
disarray by the Restoration, which restored them to 
citizenship, not orthodoxy. The enforced endorsement of 
tolerance spelled the end of their organic community. And 
the restructuring of political authority under the new 
regime reduced the Saints' unique status under the covenant 
to one specifically circumscribed by a compact designed to 
protect the Royal prerogative, not foster righteousness.
The reformulations precipitated by the social and 
political unreBt in Stuart England paralleled and encour­
aged a similar process in the religious and intellectual 
sphere at home which permanently altered the disposition 
and thrust of colonial values.** As the "emotional propul­
sion" of the wilderness errand dispersed itself among the 
determined socio-economic forms of more established com­
munities, the residual rationality which had driven the
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mechanisms of Ramism asserted itself full force on the 
emerging order. The Half-Way Covenant gave further impetus 
to this process by enlarging the operational sphere of the 
doctrine of preparation and refocusing Christian endeavor 
on secular pursuits.** Faced with the attendant erosion of 
piety, New England divines fell back on rational method as 
a corrective for flagging faith. Significantly, however, 
political events forced this crucial revision before the 
introduction of Cartesian logic. Moreover, the ensuing 
process of adjustment had already achieved a certain 
precarious equilibrium before the introduction of Lockean 
constructs. This in turn ensured that, in the New World, 
Ramean models would underwrite the decisive transition from 
a religious to a secular axiology.11
Faced with the need for ideological reconstruction, 
Puritan leaders drew on the metaphors of technologia as a 
means to shore up their polity and those of eupraxia as a 
means to reinvigorate their faith. But in so doing they 
called down the full consequences of the rationality 
implicit in their logic. Indeed as the theological barrier 
of the covenant gave way and the energizing faith of the 
Fathers faded, the emphasis on human ability which had 
underwritten the doctrine of means gained force, until nat­
ural reason itself was deemed an adequate qualification for 
citizenship in the Citty. Forced to redefine their mission 
in the light of existing social conditions, the colonials
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arrived ultimately at the conclusion that the New Zion lay 
outside the boundaries of Eden altogether, in that region 
controlled and defined exclusively by reason.
The decade of the 1720’s marked a crucial moment in the 
joint processes of political and philosophical declension 
in New England. Within that decade the last of the true 
Saints died, leaving their troubled flock to cope with a 
series of social and intellectual crises which served only 
to aggravate the latent tensions which lay at the heart of 
their logic.11 The judgement of the smallpox and the 
trauma of the witches forced the colonists to reevaluate 
the relationships which pertained between rational con­
structions and revealed truth. Under the stipulations of 
Ramist technologia, issues like "innoculation" or 
"testimony" could not be isolated within in a purely 
secular context. Questions of contagion related neces­
sarily to analogical questions of spiri' al affliction and 
redemption. Conversely the notions of confession and con­
version central to the withcraft trials related by analogy 
to secular principles of probity and truth.
Moreover, the concurrent controversies over currency 
and the Land Bank spun out a whole new set of metaphors 
which New England divines had to weave into the rational 
fabric with which they clothed their evangelical message. 
The introduction of mercantile metaphors opened a new logi­
cal frame of reference against which to judge the utility
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of propositions. Henceforth the "if" clauses in composite 
statements could originate in the language of the market­
place and disjunctives could appeal to purely practical 
standards of utility. The result, Miller claims, was "an 
ethical quagmire to which ancient rules seemed every year 
less and less applicable."** And in one last decisive 
shift in metaphors, John Wise translated the outright dis­
play of anti-ministerial sentiment precipitated by declen­
sion into the language of politics, thereby transforming 
the theological issue of covenantal obligation into a 
sociological conception of compacted rights.*4
All these eddying cross-currents of rapid social, 
political and intellectual change tended to muddy the logi­
cal waters of New England. This in turn diminished the 
ability of colonial leaders to formulate rational 
responses. Manifested rhetorically in the jeremiad, this 
conceptual disorientation appeared as an attempt to sub­
stitute an officially endorsed myth as a logical explana­
tion for a complex of experience which no longer fit within 
accepted forms.*5 But the anomolous reliance of this myth 
on the direct perception implicit in composite reasoning, 
which in the context of the covenant had fostered an 
increased role for rationality, became something of an 
embarrassment to spokesmen trying to justify their author­
ity under the new regime. Yet appeals to reason 
unsupported by an anological order conceded far too much to
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competing secular interests, while an unmediated appeal to 
intuitive perception always carried with it the incipient 
threat of enthusiasm.
"Enthusiasm... and method...are normally polar oppo­
sites," Ong notes. "But they are reconciled, or at least 
yoked to one another, in the Ramist cult of logic or 
dialectic."** The logical construct of the covenant had 
held these two in a precarious balance. But as the mil- 
lenial dream faded and the organic polity fragmented under 
the impact of social and political forces, this balance 
degenerated into an uneasy tension.*7 The inability of 
colonial leadership to provide convincing rationalizations 
for the encroaching disorder encouraged a mounting sense of 
crisis. The faithful found themselves cast in a 
psychological drama whose text was logical confusion. This 
drama climaxed in the compelling scenes of the Great 
Awakening.
The Awakening embodied the inevitable confrontation 
between the "emotional propulsion" of Puritanism and its 
logical substructures. The systematic application of 
Ramean metaphors to the redemptive scheme of Calvinism had 
elicited the unforeseen correlary that spiritual regenera­
tion could take the form of rational conviction. The 
dominant theories of faculty psychology, imported intact 
from 17th Century Oxford and Cambridge, had tended to reen­
force this view.** Moreover, Ramism and all its attendant
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theoretical constructs had relied entirely on their ability 
to enforce a strict conformity between logical method and 
the objective order. Thus New England philosophy had 
always run the risk of having its spiritual dimensions sub­
sumed under the causal postulates of its logic.
Indeed throughout the 17th Century, the doctrine of 
means had encouraged New England divines to accept 
scientific advances at face value without examining them 
for hidden threats to doctrine. But as the full implica­
tions of Newtonian physics began to assert themselves on 
the colonial consciousness, the dangers inherent in mechan­
ical constructs became ever more apparent and more acute. 
For if in fact the objective order conformed to the demands 
of Newton’8 model, the implications for orthodoxy under 
Ramean dialectic proved devastating. If the psychological 
reflex invoked by the doctrine of means actually complied 
with the mathematical laws of mechanical causation, the 
notion of moral responsibility vanished in a puff of logi­
cal smoke, leaving the covenanted community without a logi­
cal ground on which to stand.
Seen in this context, the Awakening expressed a renewed 
search for metaphors capable of expressing the changing 
realities of colonial life.** The perfect rationality of 
Ramism could no longer support or express the actual expe­
rience of the community. To make matters worse, the all- 
powerful Ramean method no longer seemed able to absorb the
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data of the physical sciences -- at least not without 
endangering its doctrinal base. Clearly the Citty needed a 
new logical prophet, one who could restore the original 
errand to conceptual conformity with present experience 
without sacrificing its evangelical thrust to the 
mechanisms of science. Jonathan Edwards complied with a 
unique philosophical program which integrated Newtonian and 
Lockean metaphors into the logical substructures of Ramism. 
Armed with a working knowledge of the new learning and a 
passionate devotion to the old faith, Edwards forged an 
analytical link between the two which would carry the 
Saints forward to citizenship in a national Eden.
Edwards relieved the intolerable tensions endemic to 
New England logic by formulating a psycho-logical identi ty 
for the faithful.40 In reaction against the increasingly 
irrelevant federal covenant, Edwards recentered the 
spiritual life in the individual. Locke’s empirical 
psychology provided him with metaphors ideally suited to 
the task. By deemphasizing the importance of the external 
covenant and tying the internal covenant to the processes 
of association, Edwards found that he could revalidate the 
spiritual, regenerative features of Puritan piety without 
overtly disavowing the intellectual structures which sup­
ported Puritan polity.
The Ramists themselves had prepared the way for Edwards 
by systematically dissecting the psychology of conversion
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in order to clarify the fatal principle of preparation.
But, always fearful of enthusiasm, New England divines had 
consistently emphasized the purely rational aspects of con­
version. Edwards, by contrast, employed the associative 
principles of Locke to extend the operation of Grace beyond 
the understanding to include the affections and the will.
He had learned from Locke that the reason, imagination and 
will did not function as separate faculties as the Ramists 
had assumed. Rather they expressed functionally discrete 
aspects of an integrated human personality. Replacing the 
metaphors of faculty psychology with Lockean images,
Edwards argued that the human mind in fact operated as a 
single organic unit in cognition. His orthodoxy naturally 
led him to identify God as the ultimate source of human 
thought and action. But his Lockean orientation led him at 
the same time to insist on a psychosomatic conception of 
man. Through "laws of...union which the Creator has fixed 
between soul and body,” he claimed, man became a totally 
integrated creature whose psychological make-up held him in 
perfect harmony with the natural order.41
Edwards extended Locke’s epistemology across the econ­
omy of salvation by subsuming the protean concept of expe­
rience under the covenant of Grace. Under Edwards’ analy­
sis, the Lockean metaphors of experience expanded to 
encompass all of man’s physical and spiritual reality. 
"Divine things” became a part of the data of the senses.
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Man could therefore "experience" Grace as a psychological 
reorientation which permitted him to perceive more clearly 
-- not understand more fully —  the loveliness -- not the 
order -- of God. Through a "spiritual sense," man gained a 
taste of the "superlative excellency of divine things” 
rather than a rational comprehension of their design. 
Edwards defined the infusion of Grace as God's means of 
determining the will to virtuous action, not as his means 
of bringing reason into right relation with truth. "In 
religious matters," he warned, "the spring of [men’s] 
actions are very much religious affections; he that has 
doctrinal knowledge... without action, never is engaged in 
the business of religion." Hence in a crucial shift in 
images, Edwards relocated the "spiritual sense" which 
governed conversion in "the will and inclinations" of the 
heart.4 *
Edwards thereby ensured that notions of moral 
responsibility would survive despite the application of 
mechanical models to the natural order. Indeed Edwards, 
from the vantage point of his Lockean psychology, could 
recognize what the Ramists, as slaves to their method, 
could not -- that the ultimate enemy to faith lurked in an 
identification of God with the laws of motion. Although 
Edwards’ theology would allow him to accept Newtonian 
physics as an accurate description of the natural order, 
his psychology militated against accepting that order as a
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complete explanation of man's spiritual reality. So, as 
Paul Conkin explains, "while the Deists were using Locke to 
justify a rational and unemotional religion and Newton to 
justify a mechanistic and self-sufficient universe, Edwards 
used Locke to explain the phenomenon of conversion and New­
ton to prove the Glory of God."«*
Ironically, however, Edwards’ Lockean defense of the 
will, intended as a psychological argument for orthodoxy, 
coincidentally reenforced the Ramean doctrine of natural 
ability. The Ramists had argued that the natural structure 
of the mind gave man a rational ability to pursue truth. 
Edwards redefined that rational ability in psychological 
terms, as a "moral agency" which gave man the ability to 
pursue virtue. Differentiating between "natural" and 
"moral" ability, Edwards described the first as arising 
from external factors and therefore irrelevant to issues of 
conduct. Moral ability, on the other hand, he portrayed 
as intrinsic to the will and arising from "propensities" 
which resolved, in the last analysis, into motives. A 
moral agent, he claimed, possessed "a moral faculty... and a 
capacity... of being influenced in his actions by moral 
inducements or motives.” But, under the influence of 
Locke, Edwards’ had grounded his defense of the will on 
principles of association and this had led him, in turn, to 
formulate virtue in psychological rather than theological 
terms. "If a man’s will is truly right and lovely,"
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Edwards argued, "he is morally good or excellent."44 And 
this crucial shift in perspective effectively placed 
spritual redemption on the same analytical plane as ethical 
probi ty.
Indeed only Edwards' orthodoxy kept him from developing 
his argument for a "spiritual sense” into a purely secular 
theory of "moral sense" after the manner of Hutcheson. For 
although within the confines of orthodoxy Edwards’ 
reconstructed will reaffirmed the sovereignty of the God 
who shaped and determined it, outside the boundaries of 
faith the psychological argument for moral ability in fact 
supplied a logical justification for human agency. Thus, 
although by establishing a role for "religious affections" 
in the process of conversion, Edwards mitigated the 
theological dangers implicit in Newtonian physics, he coin­
cidentally supplied therein a logical mechanism for trans­
ferring the evangelical thrust of the original errand onto 
the emerging secular order.
Edwards’ reformulation of the will clearly offered a 
psychological release to Saints torn between the emotional 
demands of their faith and the rational demands of their 
logic. By joining the "emotional propulsion" of 
Protestantism to the perfect rationality of Ramism through 
the medium of Locke’s psychology, Edwards provided an out­
let for the tensions which had precipitated the Awakening. 
Eventually the religious affections which drove Edwards’
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will would supply the impetus for a characteristic American 
theology which subordinated the forensic elements of 
Puritanism to a new ideal of practical activity in the 
Church. Under Edwards' metaphors of moral agency, the nar­
row sectarian vision of the Citty ultimately gave way to 
the wider concept of "universal benevolence" which offered 
a rational explanation of the relationship which pertained 
between Newton's laws and the decalogue.4*
But in the context of the present study, Edwards' 
revised logical metapors had a more far-reaching con­
sequence. For while he redefined the moral agent as an 
individual motivated by objective truth, Edwards nonethe­
less maintained the characteristic Ramean commitment to a 
fully articulated and rationally ordered world.4* Indeed 
only his deep faith in the transcendent conceptual order 
reflected in the ars technologicae saved him from the 
philosophical fate which the Deists suffered as they 
struggled to adapt Newtonian physics to a religious world 
view. Hence, while arguing for "religious affections" as 
the engines of salvation, Edwards coincidentally argued for 
the possibility of independent action within a rational 
framework of order and authority. At a crucial moment in 
the development of a national consciousness, Edwards 
offered a rationally defensible means by which freedom and 
law could work together within an overarching logical 
structure.
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In the context of colonial America, and particularly in 
the atmosphere of disruption which engulfed New England at 
the turn of the 18th Century, these principles of personal 
freedom and positive law acquired a special urgency. 
Colonial theorists, faced with a rapidly changing political 
reality, had to maintain authoritative order at home 
without subjecting themselves to it abroad. They therefore 
needed to define the freedom of the individual within a 
lawful community while simultaneously articulating the 
freedom of that community in relation to the Crown. At the 
hands of Whig theorists in London, Lockean constructs had 
translated easily into theories of rights which fit into an 
existing framework of common law. But colonial theorists, 
forced to wrest a viable order from a chaotic frontier, 
could not rely on the slow, cumulative processes which sup­
plied the principles of common law. The political con­
structs derived under the impact of Lockean theories in the 
colonies thus proved quite different from those devised by 
English Whigs. And the conceptual differences between the 
two in fact relate directly to the logical substructures 
upon which they rested.
Locke had based his political theories on an inferen­
tial logic. But for Locke, inference had no ontological 
status. It consisted simply of a cognitive process which 
traced "the order and connection of ideas” and supplied 
contingent premises for existential propositions. Edwards,
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on the other hand, defined the connection between ideas as 
logical, not psychological. Although he abandonned 
faculty psychology for Lockean constructs in his discussion 
of the will, on methodological issues Edwards remained 
firmly in the Ramist camp. The order and connection of 
ideas, he argued, expressed no purely cognitive process, 
but rather a "full and fixed connection between the things 
signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition."47 
This "full and fixed connection" conveniently allowed 
Edwards to deny the operation of efficient causes outside 
the natural order, which in turn rescued the spiritual 
process of regeneration from Newton’s mechnical models.
But although theologically motivated, Edwards’ argument for 
a "full and fixed connection" between terms remained 
explicitly logical.
According to Edwards, three types of propositions could 
express a "full or fixed connection" -- the first "self- 
evident," the second "historical” and the third "com­
posite." A self-evident connection occurred when the 
obverse of a proposition implied "a contradiction, or gross 
absurdity." An historical connection pertained when "the 
existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now 
become necessary." And a composite connection merely 
expressed "the connection of two or more [such] proposi­
tions one with another."4* These three principles of con­
nection, Edwards claimed, controlled all logical method.
240
Edwards' debt to his Ramean forebears is patent here. 
His "self-evident” connections in fact express disjunctive 
propositions placed under the jurisdiction of prelapsarian 
rationality, while his "historical" connections collapse 
easily into hypothetical statements grounded, typically, in 
the data of experience referred back to Biblical authority. 
Moreover, Edwards’ "composite" connections explicitly 
recall their Ramean counterparts, which similarly merged 
the disjunctive and the hypothetical into a hybrid argu­
ment. Indeed, all three of Edwards' "principles of connec­
tion" relate back to composite forms, since, as he himself 
stipulates, all composite reasoning "is either fully and 
thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely neces­
sary in its own nature [i.e., the self-evident], or with 
something which had already received and made sure of its 
existence [i.e., the historical]."«• Hence, although 
undeniably committed to the psychological aspects of the 
new learning, Edwards remained committed in the construc­
tion of his logical model to principles markedly similar to 
those which had controlled the logic in which he was 
schooled -- a logic explicitly grounded in Ramean meta­
phors .
Edwards’ Ramean principles of connection provided the 
vocabulary for his defense of moral agency, which rested on 
the assumption that the rules of method themselves pre­
cluded the possibility of natural causes producing moral
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effects. Natural and moral causes, Edwards claimed, 
operated within different orders -- that is, they resided 
in different "places." Therefore one could never 
demonstrate a self-evident or historical connection between 
a natural event and a moral consequence. And since com­
posite connections, the only other acceptable form of argu­
ment, consisted simply of combinations of these two, a 
"full and fixed" connection between a natural cause and a 
moral effect became a logical impossibility. Freedom in 
the moral order could therefore subsist as an integral but 
autonomous part of a strictly determined natural order. 
Under the operation of Edwardsean logic, moral agency in 
fact expressed a kind of independent "law of motion" which, 
within the limits of human ability, contributed to the pat­
tern of existence.
Edwards’ argument for moral agency portrayed freedom as 
an antecedent law grounded in logic, not a derivative right 
grounded in inference. And herein lay the fundamental dif­
ference between the respective political models developed 
on either side of the Atlantic. English Whigs had inferred 
the concept of individual freedom from an established 
political model and treated it as a derivative right within 
that model. But in the colonies, freedom had asserted 
itself as an existential reality coincident with a compell­
ing need to establish principles of order. Since the cir­
cumstances of colonial life demanded that concepts of order
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be cut from the whole cloth of colonial experience, and 
since individual freedom constituted an important part of 
that experience, colonial political models had to 
incorporate concepts of freedom into their logical struc­
ture -- not as a derivative effect, but as an integral 
cause. Edwards’ logic, building on Lockean psychology but 
grounded in a Ramean ontology, supplied the means to 
accomplish just that.
Although the drama of the Great Awakening had substan­
tially played itself out by 1750, the theoretical con­
structs developed under its impact remained to become 
permanent features of American intellectual life.30 Oscar 
Handlin points out that "few colonists, by 1750, had 
actually read the works of Sir Isaac Newton or of John 
Locke."*1 But most had been drawn into the ferment of the 
revival. This allowed Edwardsean models to be imposed 
largely unmediated on a colonial consciousness amply 
prepared to receive them by its Ramean heritage. Indeed 
Locke and Newton ultimately entered Colonial political and 
scientific models clothed in a fabric woven from the meta­
phors of Edwardsean orthodoxy and the images of Ramean 
ontology. Moreover, although Edwards died in 1758, his 
influence persisted through the posthumous publication of 
two of his major works as late as 1788. Indeed, even into 
the 19th Century, Edwards still reached out into American 
intellectual life through an educational system staffed
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primarily by teachers thoroughly schooled in his principles 
and itinerant preachers who fanned the flames of subsequent 
revivals.**
By releasing the psychological tensions endemic to 
Puritan logic, the Awakening freed colonial theorists to 
make constructive use of the logical metaphors preserved in 
Edwards’ model. Thus, in a sense, it served to hypostatize 
the structural elements of the New England Way. For 
although ostensibly the application of Lockean psychology 
seemed to discredit Ramean logical constructs, in fact 
Edwards’ insistence on a "full and fixed" connection 
between ideas insinuated them anonymously into the sub­
structures of American thought. Through Edwards’ 
reformulation of the will, the metaphors of the naive 
realism which lay at the base of Ramean logic became a part 
of "the huge, unrecorded hum of implication" which 
sustained American intellectual life.5* In the decades 
which followed, the architects of the Revolution would con­
struct legal models on the foundation which Edwards had 
laid -- models which institutionalized the metaphors pecu­
liar to his logic.
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benevolence issued in the social gospel of Nathaniel 
Taylor, which stood on the characteristic composite state­
ment that universal depravity is not consistent with the 
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Chapter 7 
ORDER IN THE COURT:
The Logic of Law 
in 
America
The Awakening evoked the first expression of national 
consciousness in colonial America. Under its impact the 
metaphors of conversion central to the original errand 
became the cornerstone of a national identity in which the 
perfection of the individual extended to a new social 
ideal. As itinerancy undermined insular local models and 
forced the expansion of political perspectives, the 
unrealistic sense of total community which had underwritten 
Puritan polity eventually shaded into a more pragmatic 
sense of actual community.1
By integrating the millenial axiology of the Saints 
into the wider economy of secular values, the Awakening 
provided the colonies with a comprehensive national ideal. 
In the light of the revival experience, the redemptive 
meaning of America became legible in the promise of the New 
Jerusalem. Edwards himself had developed this theme in 
his Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Works of God, 
where he described the movement of the Holy Spirit in the
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Great Awakening as a probable prelude to the conversion of 
the world. The establishment of the Visible Church in 
America, he claimed, constituted the last act in the drama 
of salvation.* The debates surrounding the Half-Way 
Covenant had anticipated this projection of Puritan ideals 
onto secular models, but the Awakening legitimized the out 
ward focus of religious energies and justified their appli 
cation to the national myth.
By transferring the evangelical thrust of the errand 
from the first to the second table of the decalogue, 
Edwards had supplied a means for translating the logical 
language of the covenant into an expression of social and 
political purpose. The development of revolutionary senti 
ment throughout the 1760's thus amounted to a swelling 
ritual of national affirmation.* In a reciprocal process 
of reenforcement, religious leaders incorporated the 
rhetoric of politics into their salvation history, while 
revolutionary ideologues usurped the images of a Holy War 
to support their political platforms. Whig sermons 
replaced the jeremiad as a litany of hope and political 
pulpits rang with the promise that independence would 
initiate the chiliad.
At the base of American revolutionary rhetoric, there­
fore, lay an ontology which perpetuated the metaphors of 
Ramism in American political life. Ramean forms in fact 
supported an entire national mythology which emerged as
254
justification for the political case against George III.4 
Boorstin defines this national mythology as "a belief in 
'giveneBB1t [which] seeped into the interstices of the 
Puritan dogma and was gradually to dissolve... into a more 
general faith in the magical definition of American pur­
pose." Americans enjoyed a characteristic belief, he 
claims, "that values are in some way or other automatically 
defined: given by certain facts of geography or history 
peculiar to us, ...[or] that values are implicit in the 
American experience."* Paul Conkin likewise argues for a 
characteristic "backdrop of theory" against which Americans 
constructed their theoretical models.* But neither Boor­
stin nor Conkin ties their observations to the logical 
vocabulary controlling the construction of those models.
The present argument, on the other hand, suggests that this 
"backdrop of theory", this "belief in giveness," derived 
directly from the metaphors implicit in Ramean constructs, 
perpetuated, in modified form, by the logic of Jonathan 
Edwards.
Thanks to the translation of millenial expectations 
accomplished through Edwards' logic, America had in fact 
been conceived in thought before it became a political 
reality. The Awakening had produced a national mythology 
long before the Revolution produced a nation. And this 
ideal informed all the theoretical constructs which flowed 
from it. 18th Century Americans could thus represent their
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emerging institutions as models for the world. They were 
"among the last children of an expanding West," Conkin 
claims, "who could, out of innocence rather than racial or 
cultural arrogance, still marshall cosmic support for their 
fondest aspirations."7 Yet this "cosmic innocence" could 
not have survived in the face of Lockean reductionism. It 
required the realist ontology of Ramism to support and jus­
tify it.
As a consequence of their Ramean heritage, American 
political theorists in fact explicitly demanded that their 
models express a universal content.* Derivative rights 
inferred from human events could not provide a sufficient 
logical ground for a nation "conceived in liberty." In 
Ramean terms, Lockean rights expressed "inartificial argu­
ments" -- that is, predicates derived from a logically 
inadequate process which had a merely notional base. Lock­
ean rights defined equity and a political psychology. But 
they expressed no logical truth. The millenial mission of 
America, however, required that political principles be 
grounded in an antecedent order derived methodically from 
"artificial" arguments which actually expressed the con­
currence of rational forms with objective truth. Locke, 
working from an inferential logic, could view rights as 
opportunities for individual activity. But American 
theorists needed to view rights as legal obligations to an 
antecedent moral order.* They required objective laws
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grounded in inherent structure -- laws which could provide 
normative principles but still ensure that the society 
developed under them would fulfill its larger purpose.
At the heart of Revolutionary rhetoric, Lester Cohen 
observes, lay "an unstated epistemological assump­
tion ...[ which ] entailed the articulation or, at the very 
least, the presupposition of an immutable standard of value 
against which the necessity and the propriety of the 
Revolution could be measured."10 The present argument sug­
gests that this "immutable standard" in fact expressed a 
political extension of Ramist technologia, filtered through 
Edwardsean logic. The "unstated epistemological assump­
tion", which Cohen mistakenly locates in colonial rhetoric, 
in fact subsisted as the realist ground of colonial logic. 
(Indeed, any good Ramist would accuse Cohen of having com­
mitted the crime which Ramus himself found most dire -- 
that of assigning a rhetorical function to a logical 
"place"!) Revolutionary spokesmen simply subsumed the 
metaphors of Ramism, along with the rest of their 
intellectual heritage, under their political models. But 
where New England divines had controlled their method 
through the invocation of Holy Writ, political ideologues 
controlled theirs through juridical evidence drawn from 
Vattel, Pufendorf and Burlamaqui. The result was a unique 
amalgam of rationalism, moralism and piety derived from 
classical sources, but developed through Ramean forms.
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The circumstances of the colonial environment conspired 
with the millenial axiology of the Awakening to make New 
England models dominant in Revolutionary thought. A system 
of public education established as early as 1641 and sup­
ported consistently thereafter, more compact patterns of 
settlement, and an urban mentality all encouraged the 
articulation of a cogent body of New England "thought" 
which could be effectively developed and transmitted 
through a sectarian educational system. By contrast, 
larger agricultural holdings in the Tide-water colonies 
encouraged settlement patterns which militated against pub­
lic education. There, education remained primarily a pri­
vate affair enjoyed by a landed elite. The promising young 
minds of the Middle Colonies pursued advanced education on 
the Continent -- or at Harvard or Yale.
The characteristic American formulation of sovereignty, 
when compared with developing European constructs, clearly 
illustrates the emerging nation’s reliance on the metaphors 
of New England Ramism. The millenial identity forged dur­
ing the Awakening obviated all concern for original 
sovereignty in American political models. In a nation con­
ceived as the New Jerusalem, original sovereignty resided 
logically in the hands of an omnipotent God. Yet the 
American deference to an omnipotent God bore no resemblance 
to the Cartesian submission to authoritarian forms.
Because of their absolutist frame, French theorists could
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simply transfer all sovereignty from God to the State. 
American theorists, on the other hand, could not make the 
state a political absolute since the antecedent order which 
underwrote its power resided in a different "place." Hence 
the enormous quantity of American literature between 1790 
and 1815 which denounced the French Revolution with, as 
Miller points out, "proportionately almost nothing on its 
behalf.">*
Likewise French moral theorists, working within an 
intellectual heritage defined by Cartesian logic, could 
trade moral bondage for intellectual freedom. But this 
trade-off clearly would not work for American ideologues, 
working within the context of a realist logic and a 
covenantal polity. The logical substructures of colonial 
thought made moral responsibility an essential ingredient 
in the natural order -- an ingredient which precluded the 
construction of provisional forms.** For this reason the 
mechanist constructions of militant French Deists never 
really made serious inroads on American thought. Although 
works like Ethan Allen’s Reason the Only Oracle of Man 
(1784) and Elihu Palmer’s Principles of Nature (1802) 
attempted to articulate an American Deism, they had little 
effect against the relative theological conservatism of men 
like Adams, Madison and Jefferson. The effects of French 
rationalism on American moral theory ultimately emerged in 
the characteristic constructs of Universalism and Unitarism
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rather than in a militant Deism. But the debates between 
men like Chauncy, Ware, Mayhew and Channing all took place 
within the confines of a liberal Christian orthodoxy which 
the French, because of their logical orientation, could 
effectively ignore.1*
For similar reasons, American theories of sovereignty 
differred markedly from those developed under the impact of 
Lockean constructs. Unlike English Whigs, who arrived at 
an ideological impasse by equating sovereignty with the 
empirical operations of positive law, American theorists 
continued to conceive of sovereignty as a logical premise 
which resided in God. They refused to subordinate 
sovereignty to the products of legislative inference. From 
a Ramean point of view, English political theorists simply 
reasoned without major premises.14 But even as Newtonian 
physics encouraged the reduction of their own First Premise 
to an anological expression of a mechanical First Cause, 
American ideologues, working in an intellectual tradition 
controlled by Ramean metaphors, maintained the antecedent 
logical status of sovereignty. American political models 
therefore described the empirical aspects of political 
order as an expression of proximate rather than original 
sovereignty. And the Ramean metaphors which supported 
those models ensured that the proximate sovereignty they 
defined would reside, not in the individual, but in the
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covenanted conmunity as it stood in relation to objective 
truth.
The Awakening had made the covenanted community a meta­
phor of the American body politic.1* Puritan covenant 
theory did not, however, express merely an ecclesiastical 
extension of Lockean contractual ism. Lockean contracts, 
like the premises of nominalist logic, operated through 
willed agreements and verbal conventions which offered 
equity and control under specific conditions. By contrast 
a covenant, as developed under Ramean logic, implied a 
rational unanimity between consenting parties who 
voluntarily took on a mutual obligation to strive toward a 
logically antecedent purpose. Moreover, a covenant presup­
posed a "full and fixed connection" between the consenting 
parties and the purpose they strove to achieve.1* Thus a 
social covenant possessed an ontological dimension which a
social contract did not. In a covenant, positive law
became merely eupraxia, or the pragmatic means of securing
a rational end. And popular sovereignty became, not a
legislative tool for determining derivative rights, but the 
institutional means by which the transcendent community 
could achieve its political ends.
John Adams supplied the classic formulation of the 
American political covenant.17 Combining the predominant 
concerns of the Enlightenment with the attitudes and 
institutions of his Ramean heritage, Adams affirmed the
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antecedent sovereignty of law and then placed its adminis­
tration firmly in the hands of consenting communities. 
Positive law, he argued, must enunciate the laws of logic 
and the laws of nature in order to command obedience from 
those who stood in covenant under it. "Laws," Adams 
claimed, expressed "emanations of the Divine Mind” and 
functioned as "silent magistrates" to administer eternal 
truth.1* A rational appreciation of the objective order 
which underwrote positive law in fact represented the 
ultimate political virtue to Adams, a virtue which streng­
thened the commitment of the individual to the values of 
the group.
In this respect the conservative drift of Adams’ 
political thought perfectly reflected the rational elements 
of America’s Ramean past.1* But as Edwards had clearly 
demonstrated, Ramean forms always harbored an alternative 
aspect which Adams, like a good conservative, chose largely 
to ignore. Accordingly, Adams political model acknowledged 
no role for that "emotional propulsion" which Edwards had 
articulated in his defense of moral agency. It reserved no 
objective status for individual freedom and "missed the 
spiritual exaltation of an immanent deity, knowable in 
every encounter with natural symbols."*0 Significantly, 
the "enthusiasm" implicit in Ramean models -- that 
spiritual autonomy against which Puritan divines had fought 
so hard -- entered American political models not through
262
the Brahmin Adams, but through the naturalist Jefferson, 
whose moral theories created an active role for individual 
freedom within the confines of antecedent communal values.
Jefferson, like Edwards, found spiritual truth ade­
quately symbolized in the empirical facts of nature.
Indeed, for Jefferson, nature itself became the receptacle 
and vehicle of all knowledge and value. Jefferson claimed 
that "facts" alone could express reality. But Jeffersonian 
"facts" did not reflect Cartesian "innate ideas” or Lockean 
"sense impressions." They expressed rather an objective 
reality which could be grasped as "self-evident" by the 
natural structures of the mind. In short, they reflected 
an Enlightenment variant of Ramean first premises, stated 
in the context of a realist ontology.
Research by Wilbur S. Howell indicates that this 
affinity between Jeffersonian and Ramean constructs is not 
accidental or contrived, but indeed derived from Jeffer­
son’s direct exposure to Ramean principles via the Elements 
of Logick of William Duncan. Howell describes the text -- 
found in Jefferson’s library -- as a derivative Ramean 
treatise filtered through the Scottish Schools. Moreover, 
Howell points out, Jefferson’s tutor at William and Mary -- 
who Jefferson himself claims "probably fixed the destinies 
of my life" -- had himself been a student under Duncan at 
Marischal College in Aberdeen. Thus, Howell argues, "there 
is every reason to suspect that, if Small fixed the
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destinies of Jefferson’s life, William Duncan helped to fix 
the destinies of the Declaration of Independence." Howell 
even goes so far as to argue that the rhetorical construc­
tion of Jefferson’s "self-evident" truths in fact drew 
directly on arguments in Duncan’s treatise.*1
Howell'8 findings certainly tend to support the current 
argument. By placing the "Deist" and "philosophe" Jeffer­
son under the direct influence of a Ramean logical model, 
Howell suggests fascinating new dimensions in the develop­
ment of American political forms. But Jefferson’s "Ramism" 
differed from that of Adams in significant ways. Unlike 
the Puritan Adams, the naturalist Jefferson defined the 
individual as a functioning member of a biological species, 
not as a rational member of a social group. His political 
science, although developed under Ramean principles, thus 
dealt less with the logical consistency of institutions 
than with the biological characteristics which underwrote 
them. In a sense, Jefferson collapsed Adams’ essentially 
medieval theory of community into an Enlightenment for­
mulation which viewed political forms as an empirical con­
sequence rather than a rational cause of the social 
order. * *
Jefferson's naturalist metaphors rendered man’s innate 
capacity for communal life the mechanism whereby he con­
trolled his environment and thereby achieved happiness. 
Jefferson’8 concept of "community" thus no longer carried
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an imperative for political organization and control. 
Communities fulfilled the empirical promise of nature, he 
claimed, not the rational promise of God. Their values 
reflected objective structures inherent in the environment 
which supported them, not external systems of political 
administration. Accordingly the social destinies of Jef­
ferson’s communities became more than constituent elements 
in the political destiny of a nation. They in fact became 
identified with the natural destiny of the species itself.
Jefferson's subsumption of the community under the 
species, and his subsequent description of the species in 
Ramean images, led ultimately to his characteristic sub­
stitution of "happiness” for Lockean "property" as the 
object of pursuit in the Declaration of Independence.** 
Locke had grounded his right to property in a theory which 
generalized a private prerogative into a social right 
through inference. But Jefferson, under the influence of 
Ramean metaphors, grounded his rights in an antecendent 
order. Under the rules of his logic, "property," as a 
source of individual fulfillment, simply did not contain 
the logical attributes necessary for the construction of a 
"right." Happiness, on the other hand, could be taken to 
signify the material prosperity and survival of the species 
as a whole. It could therefore support the formulation of 
a right with ties to a wider purpose. By substituting 
"happiness" for "property" in the Declaration, Jefferson
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thus declared conceptual allegiance to a logical model 
which could subordinate the individual to the health and 
prosperity of the biological group without sacrificing his 
personal worth. Jefferson still celebrated property, but 
in a manner vastly different from the legal-minded English 
Whigs or the French physiocrats. The right to property 
survived in his agrarian model as a vehicle for advancing 
the happiness of the species, not for gratifying individu­
als .
Jefferson’s naturalistic morality, held in tension with 
John Adams' characteristic rationality, perpetuated the 
dialectical structures of American political life. Jeffer­
son placed more emphasis on the processes of moral behavior 
than on the content of moral law. Indeed his contention 
that the relationship of every individual to the species by 
birth provided the best proof of the original and natural 
equality of all men precluded any concern with equality as 
a moral absolute. Like a good Ramean, Jefferson acknowl­
edged the logical antecedence of moral laws. But he inter­
preted those laws as a framework of opportunity for the 
development of the species, not as a framework of authority 
for governing the community.
Thus although Jefferson’s biological definition of com­
munity implied an informing ideal of the common good, his 
naturalistic "means” of government left the moral "ends" of 
his political philosophy vaguely implicit in nature.
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Indeed, while both Jefferson and Adams maintained the 
priority of common purpose at the center of their political 
models, they approached that purpose from two radically 
different perspectives -- perspectives which in fact 
reflect the dichotomous elements of their Ramean heritage. 
In a sense, while Adams argued for the virtues of tech- 
nologia, Jefferson argued for those of eupraxia. Together 
they constituted a complete Ramist!
The dialectical structures established at the base of 
American political life by Adams and Jefferson emerged full 
force in the "enlightened realism" of James Madison, who, 
like the Constitution he fathered, worked to maintain a 
dynamic balance between these conflicting ideological 
impulses.1* Madison drew heavily on the works of Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers in the construction of his political 
model. He received his grounding in Scottish thought under 
John Witherspoon who "had recently come from Scotland where 
he had been immersed in its intellectual and public life." 
Witherspoon put "all the leading Scottish authors...on his 
reading lists" where Madison found them in 1768 and 
absorbed their realist orientation.1 *
Chief among Madison’s sources was Thomas Reid, who like 
Jefferson’s tutor Small, studied under William Duncan at 
Marischal College. Reid’B Brief Account of Aristotle's 
Logic (1773) contained numerous references to Ramus, call­
ing him at one point a reformer "who had a force of genius
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sufficient to shake the Aristotelian fabric in many parts." 
Reid argued for a Ramist aodel of cognition which operated 
through "an instinctive prescience of the operations of 
nature.” Inquiry, he claimed, depended for its validity on 
"a fixed and steady course of nature" which man could 
anticipate through the natural structures of his mind.2* 
While Reid’s logic hardly qualifies as an overtly Ramist 
text, it nonetheless perpetuated some crucial Ramean ele­
ments, primarily that naive confusion between induction and 
hypothesis which Ong noted as the source of Ramean realism 
and which the Puritans had adopted as the methodological 
ground of their doctrine of means. It seems reasonable to 
assume that Madison absorbed at least a portion of Reid’s 
Ramean bias.
In fact, Madison’s "enlightened realism" can be seen as 
a political variant of a Ramean logical paradigm, trans­
mitted to him primarily through Reid. Madison constructed 
a political model which viewed societal change as a devel­
opmental process driven by a dialectical exchange between 
man and his social environment. Unlike Adams and Jeffer­
son, Madison refused to celebrate America as the ideal 
embodiment of either a natural or a political Eden.
Instead he built on the developmental concepts expounded by 
the Scots in their "four stages theory" to construct a 
political model which celebrated the potential of 
America.2 7
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The "four stages" theory, developed by Smith, Ferguson 
and Millar, described social change in rudimentary evolu­
tionary terms. Madison followed Ferguson in placing great 
value on ongoing human relationships within a society. He 
could therefore, unlike Jefferson, appreciate the contribu­
tions of succeeding generations to the process of societal 
change. Moreover, by adapting the discussions of Smith and 
Millar on the origins of property to a broader political 
perspective, Madison could further argue that laws in fact 
reflected a social consensus evolved over time in response 
to changing conditions. This in turn led him to formulate 
a cummulative legal model which, unlike English common law 
theory, acknowledged society's ability to change and 
advance within the context of transcendent political forms.
Furthermore, the dialectical exchange between man and 
his environment which dominated Madison's political model 
gave it the unique ability to accomodate factional inter­
ests as legitimate features of political order -- something 
which neither Adams’ rationalism nor Jeffersons' naturalism 
could ever do.1* But Madison modified the Scottish defense 
of faction in significant ways. In fact, he brought the 
Scottish theories more explicitly under the operation of 
Ramean metaphors by translating them into the character­
istic language of covenantal theory. By portraying 
political factions as voluntary associations intersecting 
across traditional forms of association, Madison in effect
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cast the legitimating mantel of the external covenant over 
the field of private interests.
Indeed Madison's ideal of America as "the workshop of 
liberty" clearly expressed a political version of Ramist 
eupraxia. It portrayed the nation as a logical nexus in 
which practical means would work to realize transcendent 
ends. By tying the pursuit of goods and knowledge to the 
fulfillment of the nation's wider purpose, Madison gave a 
vital impetus to the developing commercial and economic 
life of the new nation. Coincidentally he perpetuated the 
dialectical structures which lay at the base of American 
thought. Drawing on a native Ramean tradition reenforced 
by the Scots, he set the new nation on a realist course 
from which it would not substantially deviate for the next 
hundred years.
The Constitution, for whose final form Madison was 
chiefly responsible, defined the institutional means by 
which the dialectical impulses of American political life 
could be maintained in equilibrium. In a sense, the Con­
stitution did for American politics what Edwards had done 
for the Awakening and Ramus had done for the Citty -- it 
furnished a realist ground for the constructive interaction 
of conflicting ideological drives without sacrificing the 
energizing ideals behind them. The Constitution explicitly 
defined the moral ends of the national government 
( technologia), while providing a pragmatic means for the
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implementation of political power ieupraxia). As such it 
offered a corrective for Jefferson’s unwillingness to give 
rational form to his biological community, while supplying 
Adams with a vehicle for bringing his rational community 
under a viable political order. Put simply, the Constitu­
tion outlined a set of methodological postulates for con­
trolling the political discourse of the nation.
In the present context, it is interesting to note that 
the primary sources of American constitutionalism are in 
fact German, not French or English. Morton White points 
out that in spite of a nominal homage paid to Locke, "the 
framers of the Declaration and the Constitution never use 
his reasoning in what is probably the most powerful piece 
of political and moral writing that Locke ever 
influenced."1* Likewise Michael Durey claims that "Sidney 
was mentioned only rarely, and then usually in a general 
litany of heroic names," while John Werner points out that 
Revolutionary leaders "execrated Hume’s work" and "had no 
use for the man."10 Similarly, the patriots’ rejection of 
French political models was both patent and outspoken. In 
fact, those political models on which American theorists 
relied most heavily were Rhenish models developed under the 
operation of a Ramean logical tradition. In political 
theorists like Althusius, Vattel, Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, 
who Conkin claims were "all celebrated in America,"
American ideologues found models much more compatible with
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their own intellectual heritage than those of Locke or 
Montesquieu.* 1
Indeed Althusius propounded theories of sovereignty and 
consent which Conkin claims to be "almost indistinguishable 
from those of the Puritan leaders in New England."
Likewise Vattel, a disciple of Christian Wolff who 
developed theories which tied popular sovereignty to com­
munal consent, exerted his strongest influence "not in 
Europe, but in America," where he provided Adams with a 
Ramean perspective on the ancient respect for tacit consent 
grounded in custom and compact.12 Pufendorf supplied not 
only John Adams, but John Wise before him, with a Ramean 
justification for the objective grounding of moral law. 
Miller claims, in fact, that whole paragraphs of Wise's 
Vindication "turn out to be paraphrases of Samuel 
Pufendorf's De jure Naturae et Gentium."** And Burlamaqui, 
who rewrote Hobbes in a Ramean context, exerted a strong 
influence on Jefferson's formulation of moral science as a 
derivative of antecedent forms. The present argument sug­
gests that all these Rhenish models found a philosophic 
home in America due to a shared Ramean heritage.
The Constitution itself presented a Ramist argument.
It predicated no theoretical construct, formulated no amor­
phous rights, propounded no abstract principles. It simply 
"invented" and "disposed" of logical "arguments" in a com­
posite proposition. Its Preamble invented a major premise
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whose arguments its subsequent Articles disposed into 
appropriate loci. In fact its entire structure can be 
described as a huge composite statement in the "if-then" 
mode. If "we the people do ordain and establish a more 
perfect union,” then the following conditions must apply. 
Edwards would have called the "full and fixed connection" 
which pertains an historical one.
Replacing Holy Writ with popular sovereignty as the 
guarantor of truth, the Constitution simply declared an 
antecedent disposition of objective political powers and 
duties as the inviolable order within which the "perfect 
Union" would hereafter function. The Framers had no need 
to define the theoretical form which their government would 
take. Under the operation of their logic, they needed only 
to "invent" it -- that is, to lay open to view that logical 
locus which contained its predicates and then dispose the 
arguments found therein. The subsequent Articles 
accomplished this by locating the various powers and 
prerogatives of government in their appropriate places.
Political powers in fact subsisted in the Constitu­
tion’s Preamble and were methodically "vested" in particu­
lar "places" by the ensuing Articles. Article I located 
the legislative powers while Article II disposed the execu­
tive; Article III, in a crucial move, placed judgement -- 
the second half of Ramean method -- in a separate judicial 
"place;" Article IV articulated the Ramean Law of Justice
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by guarding against overlapping jurisdictions; Article V 
endorsed hypothesis by allowing for tentative interpreta­
tions known as "amendments;" and Articles VI and VII sealed 
the covenant. Significantly, however, by placing the major 
premise of the Constitution in its Preamble, the Framers 
effectively precluded the possibility of its revision under 
Article V. The "union" thus ordained supplied the minimal 
and universal conditions for human happiness and would 
admit of no revision.**
The Ramean structure of the Constitution significantly 
militated against the inclusion of "rights" among its Arti­
cles. Individual rights -- "the blessings of liberty" -- 
subsisted as part of the major premise expressed in the 
Preamble. They therefore underwrote the logical loci which 
contained the powers of government but had no "place" in 
the disposition of terms. This was essentially the stand 
taken by James Wilson in his Defense of the Constitution
(1787) and by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist #84
(1788). Wilson argued that a Constitution must operate on 
the logical premise that it would ensure the welfare of the 
whole people, not protect the rights of a few. Hamilton 
agreed, noting that, from this perspective, the Preamble 
expressed "a better recognition of popular rights than 
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principle figure 
in...bills of right, and which would sound much better in a 
treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government."
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In a sense, both Wilson and Hamilton argued that there 
was "no place" for inferred rights in the Constitution. 
Under Ramean logic, inferred rights such as those defended 
in Lockean constructs remained irrelevant to logical law 
and therefore had to reside outside the antecedent con­
stitution of powers. Addenda might be so constructed as to 
remove specific governmental prerogatives from a given 
locus, thereby ensuring individual freedom within a certain 
sphere. But "rights" per se could never function as an 
justification for the disposition of powers.** The isola­
tion of rights outside the main body of the U. S. Constitu­
tion has been claimed as its most distinctive feature, 
clearly marking it off from its French and English counter­
parts. The foregoing argument suggests that this charac­
teristic form derived directly from the Ramean metaphors 
which supported American political ideology.
The logical exclusion of rights from the formal con­
stitution of powers in America proved crucial to political 
debates relating to sovereignty and suffrage in the 19th 
Century. The political pressures brought to bear by 
increased immigration and rapid internal expansion early in 
the Century rendered the careful balance achieved through 
Madison's realist policies increasingly precarious.** The 
decades of the 1820's and 1830’s witnessed the disruption 
of familiar patterns of settlement. The influx of 
immigrants from widely diverse cultural backgrounds, along
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with consequent demographic shifts from urban to rural dis­
tricts, tended to increase factional pressures while 
weakening the force of covenantal logic. This in turn 
clouded the political issues of sovereignty and suffrage.
The problem of suffrage proved particularly 
intransigent to American ideologues. The franchise had 
never been addressed explicitly in the Constitution. "We 
the people," stated as an irreducible logical premise, had 
never been scrutinized for its logical content. Moreover, 
as an argument "invented" in the Preamble, "We the people" 
stood definitively outside those powers disposed in the 
Articles, among them the power of amendment. This logical 
idiosyncracy militated against addressing the issue of suf­
frage on a national level. In fact the logical form of the 
Constitution ensured that issues of suffrage would be 
addressed at the state level until such time as the rights 
of the states to legislate on such questions collapsed into 
the wider issues of the Civil War.*7
Since, in effect, the franchise had no "place" in the 
Constitution it could not be "relocated" among its Arti­
cles. Yet the social realities of a burgeoning nation 
demanded that the government clarify its constitutive 
premise and adjust its legislative formulas to accomodate 
expanding perspectives. The theoretical challenge lay in 
finding a means to define the social substance of the Con­
stitution’s major premise without impugning the integri ty
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of its logical argument. The Jacksonian Democrats claimed 
to have a political program which could accomplish the 
first. The question remained whether they could do so 
without sacrificing the unique covenantal character of 
American political life.
Jacksonian democracy can best be understood as an 
exploration of the political issues raised by the logical 
exclusion of the right of suffrage from the U. S. Constitu­
tion. The populist program sought simply to clarify the 
logical ground of American political power by defining that 
anomolous community which had occupied the conceptual cen­
ter of Adams’ and Jefferson's political thought. To 
accomplish this, the Democrats merely carried the political 
implications of Jeffersonian naturalism out to their logi­
cal conclusion. They conceived of the political community 
as an aggregate of private interests underwritten by cohe­
sion rather than by a vague rational or biological unity.*® 
In a sense, they atomized the rational and biological com­
munities of Adams and Jefferson and reassembled them, fol­
lowing Madison, under concrete principles of association 
rather than abstract principles of obligation. Under 
populist theory, "We the people" became a community of dis­
crete individuals driven by private interests to maintain 
social order through the imposition of political forms.
Had this definition of community expressed the entire 
content of the Democrats' political program, however, they
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would rapidly have found themselves in possession of a 
failed ideology. Clearly such a Hobbesean view, while 
appropriate to Whig theories developed under an inferential 
logic, could not survive in a political atmosphere fed by 
the philosophic currents of Ramism. But the Jacksonian’s 
concept of the individual in fact rested on a logical foun­
dation not unlike that which had supported Adams’ and Jef­
ferson’s own concepts of community. Indeed the voluntary 
principle which animated populist thought expressed a firm 
belief in a pervasive and fundamental order which, left to 
its own devices, would manifest itself through society.
This belief in an antecedent order allowed the Demo­
crats to formulate their platform in terms amenable to the 
nation’s political past. Moreover, this faith in what John 
Ward calls a "cosmic constitutionalism" led the populists 
by implication to the two logical axioms which controlled 
their political program: first, that the natural order of 
society subsisted apart from its institutions; and second, 
that political intervention in fact contaminated rather 
than preserved the natural order.** These two axioms com­
bined to generate a characteristic negative theory of 
government which in turn provided the Democrats with the 
logical mechanism they needed to address the issue of suf­
frage at the Constitutional level.
Under the populists’ negative theory, "the blessings of 
liberty" invented in the Constitution's Preamble signified
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merely a lack of intervention in the interactions of indi­
viduals whose fundamental equality before the law derived 
from an irreducible logical premise. Under this curious 
inversion of a political covenant, the right of suffrage 
could be treated as a political privilege acquired through 
the negation of political powers.40 Accordingly, argu­
ments for suffrage could take the form of propositions 
which removed specific prerogatives from logical loci and, 
by negation, relocated them as rights outside the con­
stituted powers of government. The realist ontology which 
lay at the base of the Democrats’ political theory allowed 
them to justify logical negation as a means of preserving 
the antecedent natural order of society. Thus they could 
forge a viable analytical link between political powers and 
individual rights while remaining within the methodological 
structures of the Constitution.
While ultimately Jackson’s own devotion to his party's 
ideology proved suspect in the light of his aggressive use 
of executive power, the logical formulation of that ideol­
ogy remains significant in the present context. For the 
Jacksonians articulated their negative theory of government 
in the key words "natural" and "artificial" -- terms which 
had likewise underwritten the theoretical constructs of New 
England Ramists, as well as those of Edwards, Adams and 
Jefferson. In a characteristic statement one Jacksonian 
spokesman claimed that the "natural" charter of privilege
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which existed among individuals could be threatened only by 
the institution of "artificial" advantages through legisla­
tive charters. "Once man was freed from the 'artificial 
institutions’ of society, he would 'walk abroad through the 
free creation’.”*1 Thus, in a curious rhetorical con­
currence, the Jacksonians in fact propounded a political 
argument almost identical to the logical argument which 
Ramus had brought against the Aristotelians -- an argument 
which rested on the commentitious nature of the artificial 
restraints which men imposed on the natural structures of 
the mind.
The increasing complexity of American life in the mid- 
19th Century, however, quickly debased the Populists' 
political ideal. Rapid expansion of the industrial and 
commercial life of the nation drastically reduced the 
sphere reserved for independent action. Moreover, the 
practical exigencies of conserving order on a continental 
scale encouraged an implementation of government controls 
which belied the Democrats avowed intentions. Yet although 
the Jacksonians’ platform became less and less relevant to 
the political realities of the nation, the die was cast.
The formidable forces of populism, previously contained 
within the limits of strict constructionism, gained 
legitimacy under the banner of the Democrats’ logical nega­
tions and threatened to unbalance the delicate dialectical 
mechanisms of the Constitution. Henceforth they would
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remain a permanent feature of American political life. In 
reaction, those alarmed over the political consequences 
searched their intellectual heritage for a means to 
neutralize the impact. They found an appropriate defense 
in an interpretation of law drawn directly from the Ramist 
structure of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution’s Preamble had expressed the major 
premise of a political proposition. Articles I and II had 
disposed the arguments of that proposition across various 
political loci. Article III, on the other hand, differed 
radically from the first two. Rather than disposing of 
political powers, it created an independent logical "place" 
in which it "vested" the crucial mechanism of judgement.42 
By placing the controlling process of judgement in an inde­
pendent logical locus, Article III in fact created a judi­
cial "place" wherein resided those dialectical tools neces­
sary for maintaining methodological control over the 
centripetal forces of popular democracy. Under the rules 
of Ramean logic, which identified the operation of law with 
the application of method, Article III in effect entrusted 
the antecedent logical structure of the nation to the 
Courts.
Ramus had placed judgement in control of the second and 
probative half of method. In the present context it is 
interesting to note that one of the major differences which 
pertained between Baconian and Ramean logic lay in Bacon’s
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extension of judgement across the entire field of dis­
course. Where Ramus had restricted the application of 
method to the disposition of terms, Bacon invoked it as a 
controlling principle in predication as well. Baconian 
logic would thus have represented the logical premise of 
the Constitution as susceptible of revision, as was the 
case under English Parliamentary forms. Ramean logic, on 
the other hand, rendered this impossible. Although the 
process of judgement -- i.e. the operation of the courts -- 
could adjust and reinterpret the disposition of political 
terms, the logical structure of the Constitution itself 
militated against intervention in its major premise. 
Therefore, although specific laws could be declared 
"unconstitutional," the Constitution itself could not be 
declared invalid. This fundamental legal issue, clearly 
grounded in a Ramean ontology, provided justification for 
Northern conservatives during the Civil War. The Union, 
Lincoln claimed, could not logically be dissolved. It had 
been invented as an irreducible logical premise grounded in 
objective truth and was therefore inviolable.
Article III in fact appointed the judiciary branch 
guardian of the national covenant. It created a special 
category of law which cast the Supreme Court in the role of 
that "inner monitor" on which New England Ramists had 
relied to adjudicate their disjunctive statements. Judi­
cial review in effect furnished a mechanism for submitting
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particular manifestations of the popular will to the test 
of logic. The process of judgement -- i. e. the applica­
tion of method -- allowed the Court to monitor the practi­
cal means by which factional interests achieved their 
political ends. Moreover, by making the judiciary an inde­
pendent arbiter over the disposition of the Constitution’s 
logical terms, Article III ensured that any subsequent 
relocation of those terms through amendment would not 
encroach on the minimal and universal conditions for 
political happiness set forth in the Preamble.43 Thus by 
authorizing the application of method to the composite form 
of the Constitution, Article III guaranteed the stability 
of a political model increasingly plagued by internal and 
external forces for change.44
The Supreme Court embodied a unique dialectical tool 
for controlling the political discourse of the nation. It 
allowed American legal theorists to adjust a transcendent 
national ideology to the present needs of a social environ­
ment where change exerted too obvious a force for revision 
to be ignored by any viable political construct. Early in 
the life of the new nation legal philosophers like Madison 
and Wilson had recognized the necessity of incorporating 
processive theories drawn from Scottish sources like Smith 
and Millar into the fabric of American judicial thought.45 
Following the logic of their argument, and responding to 
increasing pressures from disruptive debates over
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sovereignty and suffrage, Justices like James Kent and 
Joseph Story moved gradually toward a reevaluation of Jef­
ferson’s wholesale rejection of common law, seeing in its 
cumulative processes a means for incorporating the changing 
realities of American life into a characteristic body of 
American law.46 Since the structure of the Constitution 
precluded the possibility of common law principles usurping 
the logical antecedence of the national covenant, American 
jurists could safely adapt the common law’s reliance on 
historical precedent to American needs, thereby providing a 
legal rationale for judicial response to societal change.
Under the determining influence of its early Justices 
the American judiciary fulfilled its Ramist role as the 
arbiter of the nation's political conscience. Through a 
legal dialectic which measured societal change against the 
standard of a transcendent ideal, the Court brought 
American legal philosophy into conformity with the objec­
tive realities of American life. Indeed the characteristic 
ability of Ramean forms to bring the contingent effects of 
social experience under the operation of an antecedent 
order allowed American jurists to elevate the mores of the 
community into a moral absolute.47 Emerging ultimately in 
the legal pragmatism of men like Holmes and Brandeis, the 
realist metaphors which controlled American law in fact 
allowed for the development of characteristic principles of 
order which, like New England’s early Ramists, interpreted
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law as a rule for action. Moreover, the unique ability of 
Ramean metaphors to incorporate principles of development 
and change into fundamental logical structures prepared 
American legal models to absorb the intellectual shocks 
which the second half of the 19th Century held in store.
By viewing change as a refinement of structure, American 
jurists could adapt evolutionary models to characteristic 
American conceptions of order without impugning the logical 
integrity of their national ideal.4*
Newtonian paradigms had supported traditional natural- 
law reasoning. But Darwinian theory would demand a dif­
ferent formulation of law. As Darwinian theory gradually 
began to displace mechanistic models in the mid-19th 
Century, American jurists identified in it a scientific 
analogy which they could accept. Evolutionary theory 
placed mechanical constructs in a temporal frame. Yet it 
lent a certain permanence and constancy to the contingent 
world by viewing change as development. As such it took an 
intermediate position between mechanism and teleology 
curiously congruent to Ramean models. Indeed, even before 
the introduction of fully developed evolutionary theories 
in the second half of the 19th Century, Miller marvels, at 
how American legal models "often hovered on the very edge 
of an evolutionary philosophy [and] approached an insight 
into the organic."4* The present argument would contend
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that this flirtation with evolutionary forms drew directly 
on the metaphors which underwrote Ramean constructs.
The political adjustments which followed in the wake of 
the Civil War brought the logic of law full circle in 
America. The clarification of the political issues of 
sovereignty and suffrage accomplished through Constitu­
tional responses to the national trauma encouraged a sense 
of closure to the search for principles of order. The 
major premise of the Constitution had been defended with 
the nation’s blood. Henceforth the Union would stand 
"indivisible" as the political manifestation of that 
irreducible premise. Although the application of judicial 
review would continue to increase the structural density of 
American law, the antecedent order had been secured.
Indeed the major social and political constructs 
developed immediately after the Civil War, generally 
grouped under the rubric "Social Darwinism," in fact all 
operated within Constitutional boundaries. Herbert Spen­
cer, whose cosmic theory outlined a process by which a 
self-regulating nature moved from incoherence toward an 
equilibrium underwritten by a perfect order, was the pri­
mary source of these models. William Graham Sumner drew 
on Spencer’s principles of laissez-faire capitalism to 
argue for a unique amalgam of Jefferson’s naturalism and 
Jackson's negativism. According to Sumner an activist 
state not only denied biological fact. It presented a posi­
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tive deterent to progress. Thorsten Veblen, on the other 
hand, turned Spencerian doctrine on its head to develop a 
Theory of the Leisure Class which clearly reached back to 
Madison's Ramist image of the "workshop”. John Fiske fol­
lowed Jefferson in his attempt to interpret Darwinian 
theory at the level of the species. The struggle for sur­
vival, he claimed, supplied a biological warrant for 
cooperation and solidarity within the species. Lester Ward 
developed this moralistic view into a full-blown social 
ideology. Drawing on those somatic impulses incorporated 
into American thought by Edwards, he propounded a theory of 
"collective telesis" which gave biological substance to the 
social community which underwrote all American political 
thought.
All these different interpretations of change, however, 
operated within an antecedent frame which expressed a 
rational end. They could thereby change the face of 
American society without impugning its wider purpose. The 
conspicuous lack of revolutionary or anarchist ideology in 
America at a time when these forces ran rampant in Europe 
attests to the force of the paradigm, which the present 
argument would identify as overtly Ramean.50
As the nation’s political life became more assured, the 
intellectual energies expended in its defense could shift 
to related issues of scientific order which, under the 
impact of evolutionary theory, had become critically
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unstable. The search for order in modern American would 
subsequently focus on the means by which the nation's 
dialectical metaphors could accomodate powerful new concep­
tions of scientific law.
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Chapter 8 
BACON AND RAMUS:
The Logic of Science 
in
America
"The Age of Modern Science," Stow Persons notes, "coin­
cides with the span of American history."1 And in fact, 
the concurrence of revolutionary scientific advance with 
the formulation of American thought has had a determining 
impact on the disposition and thrust of American values. 
Morton White has gone so far as to claim that the entire 
history of American philosophy "may be represented by a 
cyclical curve depicting the fortunes of science."* The 
argument presented in Chapter VI tends to support that 
claim. Furthermore, it suggests, as does White, that the 
interactions between logical and scientific metaphors might 
prove even more decisive in the New World than in the Old.
Early American scientists explicitly adopted a Baconian 
ideal.3 But New England Puritans made significant adjust­
ments to that model as they applied it in the New World.
The frontier provided them with a unique opportunity. It 
offered a God-given clean slate standing ready to receive 
the lineaments of a new order -- a tabula rasa on which
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they could inscribe at will the principles and products of 
their method. In the New Eden Puritan scientists enjoyed a 
de facto Baconian laboratory from which all Idols save God 
had been exorcised -- a kind of "hypothetical space" in 
which inquiry could be pursued and theory applied outside 
traditional contexts. When, under the operation of the 
doctrine of means, Puritan divines discovered that the New 
Atlantis and the New Eden were in fact contiguous states, a 
powerful new notion of the role of science in society 
emerged.
The predisposition of American Colonials to view them­
selves as residents in Bacon's New Atlantis rested in part, 
to be sure, on Protestant eschatology.* Bacon’s "experi­
mental knowledge" correlated directly to the epistemologi- 
cal techniques implicit in the doctrine of means.3 More­
over, the Colonial scheme of redemption encouraged a view 
of inquiry which could readily extend itself to incorporate 
Bacon’s ideal of mastery.® Ramist logic had the 
flexibility and scope to accomodate both these value com­
plexes, largely due to the looseness of its definitions.
But the apparent affinity between Ramean and Baconian 
paradigms ran deeper than a superficial subsumption of 
practical knowledge under the rubrics of faith. It rested, 
in fact, on explicit methodological parallels which 
pertained between the two logics themselves.
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Bacon, like the New England Ramists, had viewed law as 
prescriptive -- that is, as a logical construct expressing 
a rule for action. Under the operation of his logic, Bacon 
could declare, as did the Puritans, that "Truth and utility 
are...the very same things."7 In fact, both Ramean and 
Baconian models harbored within their reliance on method 
the potential to issue in pragmatic injunctions like the 
foregoing and that expressed by Ramist eupraxia. * More­
over, they fostered a correlative tendency to give full 
weight to material relations and quantifiable values. But 
most significantly in the present context, Bacon and Ramus 
each shared a general confusion concerning the respective 
roles of hypothesis and induction which had a significant 
impact on American scientific models.
Bacon had built his logical model around a series of 
aphorisms described as "anticipations" which presented "the 
dawn of a solid hope" that the investigator's leap to 
theory, analogous to an act of faith, would be born out by 
the processes of verification.9 The New England Ramists’ 
method likewise built on composite statements which served 
as indices of divine intent, leading the mind through pro­
gressive stages of empirical confirmation. Both models 
manifested an appreciation of the essential congruence 
between experimental knowledge and rational insight. More­
over, both systematically conflated the roles which 
hypothesis and induction played in the identification of
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causal processes, consciously integrating the respective 
functions of evidence and truth.10
But where Bacon had left the methodological status of 
his aphorisms conspicuously vague, New England divines 
invoked prelapsarian rationality and Biblical truths in 
support of their composite forms. In the comprehensive 
Ramean method they thus found a means of validating experi­
mental knowledge which coincidentally supplied a logical 
justification for the construction of physical laws. In 
effect, Ramism provided the Colonial mind with the missing 
methodological links necessary to reconnect the "scattered 
occasions" of Bacon’s "knowledge broken."
The logical integration of hypothesis and induction 
achieved under Ramist doctrine clearly differentiated 
American Baconianism from its Continental counterparts.
The virtuosi of the Royal Society, who turned to Ramus for 
rhetorical guidance but to Wallis for instruction in logic, 
tended to exaggerate Bacon’s attention to inductive data 
and ignored his preoccupation with deep-seated systematic 
causes.11 They sacrificed the potential scope of Bacon’s 
science to its practical import.12 Newton’s 
intellectualization of the inductive process and Locke’s 
subsequent psychological critique served to further isolate 
English science from synoptic concerns. These restric­
tions, however, proved patently unaccceptable to Colonial 
Ramists. The ars technologicae required that empirical
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data be tied to an anological order to function as raw 
material for the construction of laws. Thus, although 
Bacon may have supplied the method of early American 
science, Ramus clearly supplied the motive.13
It proved crucial to the subsequent development of 
American science that the logical substructures of tech- 
nologia and eupraxia remained in place in the colonies 
throughout the transition from a medieval to a modern 
scientific view. Miller’s research clearly indicates a 
prolonged period of interaction between Baconian and Ramean 
paradigms in New England. He places the beginning of the 
shift from the old to the new physics in 1686, with the 
emigration of Charles Morton, but consistently argues for 
the persistence of Ramean logic well into the 18th Century. 
Even the introduction of Cartesian texts at Harvard 
represented "no radical break with Ramist methodology," he 
claims. Indeed, as late as 1719, logic in New England 
"continued to be closer to Ramus."14 George Daniels 
likewise places a definitive shift to the new learning well 
into the 18th Century, pointing out that Samuel Johnson 
completed a manuscript synopsis of Ramist technologia in 
1714 which "did not even demonstrate an acquaintance with 
Copernicus, to say nothing of Descartes, Boyle, or New­
ton."15 The fact that Ramean logical paradigms survived to 
interact with Baconian constructs well into the 18th
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Century served ultimately to differentiate American science 
from its French and English counterparts.
Indeed, any understanding of American science hinges 
directly on an appreciation of how Baconian method adapted 
itself to the requirements of Ramism in the context of the 
American frontier. Ramism supplied a compelling warrant 
for the pursuit of science. Under the joint operation of 
technologia and eupraxia, Bacon’s Book of Nature, as an 
emblem of God’s intention in the world, became the ideal 
object for scientific investigation. "After making the 
proper obeisance before the impenetrable sanctuary [of 
faith]," Miller claims, "the Puritan logician was free to 
pierce the very secret of nature, to seize upon the eternal 
and universal laws o, the cosmos."16 Since technologia 
established an analogy between natural law and divine 
decree, those trained up in method need place no restraint 
upon their study of nature, but could pursue scientific 
inquiry as an adjunct to faith itself. Since method 
expressed the formal mode of reason and reason necessarily 
conformed to the objective order of nature, its proper 
application must lead to a true comprehension of the 
material effects of the divine will.17 Moreover, eupraxia 
ensured that the fruits of inquiry would not only support 
the truths of revelation but actually work toward their 
realization in the new Zion.
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The tendency of Ramism to subordinate revelation to 
reason fostered a correlative tendency to maintain a 
theoretical noncommitment in the face of scientific 
advance. Nature’s ability to function as a symbol remained 
far more important to New England Ramists than which system 
of physics was used to explain its operation. In the con­
text of the ars technologicae it mattered little whether 
one employed Peripatectic or Newtonian constructs to des­
cribe the natural order as long as one accepted the essen­
tial analogy. Moreover, eupraxia clearly stipulated that 
the choice must be determined by practice, not doctrine, 
and verified by experience, not authority. Hence, since 
science posed no threat to faith, Colonial theorists could 
adopt its discoveries enthusiastically, provided only that 
they reconcile them, as did Edwards, through the applica­
tion of method.
Thus, while taking up the cry of Verulam in chorus with 
the virtuosi in London, American scientists had in mind an 
ideal far different from that pursued by Boyle, Sprat and 
Glanville. And the practical limitations imposed on the 
dissemination of information in the Colonies only served to 
reenforce this integration of religious and scientific pur­
pose. The "new learning” first struck the Colonial con­
sciousness through almanacs, "as ubiquitous in New England 
as the Bible and nearly as popular."1® These fragmentary 
summaries found their way into the pulpits of virtually
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every town and hamlet, from whence they filtered down to 
minds previously conditioned by Protestant paedia to rely 
on rational means in fathoming divine intent.1* Moreover, 
the denominational character and geographic distribution of 
colonial colleges encouraged the propagation of this 
scientific gospel not only in New England, but throughout 
the Colonies wherever New England’s "first fruits" were 
called to preach and teach.20
But the disruptions which diffused the focus of 
Puritanism in the 1720’s tended to broaden and consolidate 
the base of the Colonial scientific community. Although 
the population of New England nearly doubled during this 
period, that of the Middle Colonies almost tripled.21 The 
progressive urbanization of New York, Pennsylvania and the 
Mid-Atlantic Colonies likewise played an important role in 
shifting the balance of scientific knowledge off its 
Puritan axis. And the rapid growth of printing estab­
lishments, libraries, newspapers and almanacs -- cultural 
advantages previously confined largely to New England -- 
all tended to materially increase the intellectual 
resources of the more urban middle colonies and so to 
cultivate an "enlightened" scientific state of mind.22
The popularity of lecture series, an intellectual spin­
off of the Great Awakening, carried New England’s 
scientific gospel out of the pulpit and into a more secular 
forum. Inaugurated by Isaac Greenwood at Boston in 1727,
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the scientific lecture series (complete with illustrative 
apparatus) had, by 1740, become "sufficiently well received 
to become a lucrative source of income for lecturers 
[throughout] the colonies."*3 Figures like Archibald 
Spencer and Ebenezer Kinnersley "wowed" them from 
Portsmouth to Charleston with topics from electricity to 
anatomy and added substantially to the process of popu­
lar i zat i on.
Moreover the establishment of important educational 
institutions free from the direct influence of Puritan 
orthodoxy further loosened the hold which New England had 
previously enjoyed on American science. The College of New 
Jersey (1741), the Philadelphia Academy (1755), King’s Col­
lege (1754), the College of Rhode Island (1764) and Queen’s 
College (1766) all appeared on the scene during these cru­
cial three decades, acquiring libraries and experimental 
apparatus and vying for recognition as centers of 
scientific study. Moreover, as Hindle notes, the character 
of society itself in the Middle colonies had much to do 
with forming the character of these new colleges. "Those 
at Philadelphia, New York and Providence," he claims, 
"demonstrated a broader tolerance which mirrored the cos­
mopolitanism of the communities that supported them."24
By 1723 a nascent scientific community had arisen in 
New York, centered around Samuel Johnson, Cadwallader 
Colden, and James Alexander. In the present context it is
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interesting to note that Colden drew explicitly on 
Edwardsean logic, while Johnson had tangible ties to the 
physico-theologians of the Hutchinsonian school, one of the 
few surviving Ramist "covens" in England.25 By the 1730’s 
a similar group had coalesced around the figures of 
Franklin and Penn in Philadelphia. Although not until mid- 
century did either of these communities rival that of the 
older Citty, by 1768, with the establishment of the 
American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, the 
hegemony of New England in colonial science had been 
seriously threatened.
And yet the New England Way continued to contribute in 
significant ways to the construction of late Colonial 
scientific models. The perpetuation of Ramean logical sub­
structures via the philosophical program of Jonathan 
Edwards and the extension of those substructures to 
American social constructs through Revolutionary rhetoric 
ensured that American science would work for the advance­
ment of society as a whole, not for the enlightenment of an 
individual mind or the refinement of a disembodied 
scientia. Hindle stresses the fact that "continuity was 
more conspicuous than change" in post-revolutionary 
science, while Stearns points out the importance of its 
communal and federal aspects.26 The present argument would 
locate the source of the persistent features of post- 
revolutionary science in Ramist technologia and eupraxia,
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which insisted on the relevance of knowledge to the con­
struction of a redeemed community and represented science 
itself as the custodian of the social enterprise.
The Revolution, as the nexus of legal and logical meta­
phors in American life, established this communal ideal at 
the very core of the new nation’s intellectual life and 
guaranteed that it would continue to operate through its 
scientific models. The realist bias of Revolutionary 
ideology portrayed American science as a social endeavor, 
dependent upon a matrix of inquiry which transcended the 
needs and goals of individuals and reached out to embrace 
the original errand, transformed into a mission of social 
redemption. Stearns identifies this curious characteristic 
of American science as a part of "a subtle union of social 
forces originating in economic, demographic and urban 
growth."27 But the fact remains that European communities 
underwent similar patterns of growth without developing 
similar scientific ideologies. Again the present argument 
would attribute the difference to the survival of Ramean 
metaphors.
Brooke Hindle describes the impact of the Revolution on 
American science as primarily negative, arguing that it 
swept away much of its momentum -- a momentum which he 
claims was not regained until well into the 19th Century. 
Science was "badly disturbed and disrupted by the war,” he 
claims, citing as primary factors the focus of hostilities
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in the cities, the disruption of contact with the interna­
tional scientific community and the refocusing of 
intellectual energies on practical issues. While careful 
to discuss the positive accomplishments achieved during the 
war -- advances in cartography, engineering and medicine -- 
Hindle concludes that "the disruptive influence of the war 
upon the whole pattern of science in America was much more 
serious than the limited number of beneficial influences it 
provided.” Stearns concurs, maintaining that "while a host 
of technological contrivances testified to the inventive­
ness of the early Americans, they also testified to the 
overwhelming utilitarian bent of the American mind."*8 
Hindle’s and Steam's perspective, however, judges 
American science by the standards of the Royal Society and 
ignores those peculiar features of Colonial intellectual 
life which persisted and in fact matured in what he con­
siders the diminished scientific stance taken by the new 
republic. While belittling the "utilitarian emphasis" of 
post-Revolutionary science, Hindle overlooks the fact that 
the interaction of Ramean and Baconian metaphors in 
Colonial America had rendered utility a defensible 
scientific ideal.** Baconian "improvement", filtered 
through the philosophic lens of Ramist eupraxia, had 
emerged as a utility vastly different in both content and 
scope from that expounded in London. The utility promoted 
by Franklin, Jefferson and Paine possessed a dimension con-
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spicuouslv lacking in that pursued by Boyle and Sprat -- a 
dimension which derived directly from the Ramist compulsion 
to integrate means and ends. Under Ramean logic, utility 
became a reflection of purpose and technique a hallmark of 
design. In fact, the "merely" technological focus of post- 
Revolutionary science expressed values rooted deep in its 
Ramean past.
Indeed the essential continuity of American Revolution­
ary ideology with its Ramean heritage influenced the devel­
opment of post-revolutionary science in important ways. By 
representing God as the Architect of the national Citty, 
Revolutionary ideologues could transfer the emotional 
propulsion of Puritan eschatology onto the task of nation 
building. Science in the new republic would thus require 
no metaphysic to justify its elevation of practice over 
theory. The practical work of realizing America’s special 
destiny carried with it its own moral imperative. More­
over, the concurrence of this political ideal with the 
logical metaphors of Ramism encouraged American scientists 
to cast themselves in a similar image and contributed 
materially to the rationalization process by which the 
scientist and technician became the philosophers of the 
"Workshop of Liberty."
The cultural nationalism awakened by the Revolution 
extended itself readily to demands for scientific achieve­
ment.10 "What a field have we at our doors to signalize
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ourselves in!" wrote Thomas Jefferson, challenging science 
to fulfill its special mission in the new Republic of Let­
ters. Politicians and pundits commonly interwove the 
themes of independence and inquiry in appeals to the 
scientific community to "become a lamp to guide degraded 
and oppressed humanity." "In Europe Science reigns no 
more," one partisan claimed, "Their souls are fetter’d with 
tyrannic power." But in America, liberty "unfetters and 
expands the human mind, and prepares it for the reception 
of the most important science."31 "May we not hope," David 
Ramsay cried, revealing the deep philosophic undercurrents 
which supported the rhetorical linking of revolutionary 
zeal and scientific endeavor, "that the exalted spirits of 
our politicians and warriors will engage in
the...[promotion of] useful knowledge, with an ardor equal 
to that which first roused them to bleed in the cause of 
liberty and their country?"33
With such a challenge before it, American science 
turned wholeheartedly to its task. Benjamin Franklin, as 
archtype and champion of the cause, provided philosophic 
justification by reading into the Sermon on the Mount a 
literal interpretation of the Puritan doctrine of means.
In an explicit accomodation of Enlightenment ethics and 
Ramist technologia, Franklin propounded a scientific ideal 
which drew its inner dynamism from a deep conviction that 
the natural world reflected a rational order which man
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experienced through his senses and mastered through his 
intellect.33 Ramist eupraxia further guaranteed that all 
inquiry must issue in practical effects which contributed 
to the constitution of that order. For if all nature 
expressed a purpose, Franklin argued, then each natural 
phenomenon must possess an inherent value. By identifying 
and exploiting that value, man actually participated in the 
larger design. In fact, Franklin claimed, the ability of 
science to explicate the intrinsic usefulness of "nature’s 
ways” expressed its entire function and comprised its 
ultimate moral value.
Franklin’s instrumental ethics imparted a special 
accent to the new nation’s demand for "Usefull Knowl­
edge."34 His typically Puritan view of theory as a guide 
to action allowed him to forage nature for useful facts 
while taking for granted those abstract principles which 
served as the object of "pure" science. Moreover, by 
translating practical scientific achievements into evidence 
of a special ordination, Franklin lent a cultural and 
philosophic significance to technical advances which con­
firmed a continuing faith in America’s mission. Henceforth 
when post-revolutionary scientists appealed to utility, 
they appealed to a conception which reached out to deeper 
values. Each canal or railroad built, each physical 
obstacle overcome, each technical advance or invention
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became an icon of a national destiny writ large in the 
objective order of things.
The spectacular rate of growth and change which the new 
republic experienced in the half-century following the 
Revolution provided its scientists with ample opportunity 
for vindicating that special faith.35 A floodtide of 
immigration, the systematic extinction of the frontier, the 
vast expansion of the nation’s economic base and the social 
dislocations attendant on progressive urbanization all 
challenged the scientific community to supply the tools and 
materials needed to channel this torrent of progress into 
programs which would preserve the nation’s unique axiology. 
Encouraged by premiums, patents and limited monopolies, 
American scientists and entrepreneurs applied themselves 
enthusiastically to an agenda explicitly aimed at massive 
''improvements” which would contribute to the realization of 
the nation's millenial dream.36 Supported by religious 
appeals to "benevolence" and humanitarian movements for 
reform, post-revolutionary scientists slipped easily into a 
new role as Saints of the national Citty. Under the force 
of events and the operation of a distinct logical heritage, 
science became the intellectual correlate of the American 
frontier and the engineer the new folk-hero of the age.37
The belief that technology enjoyed a special affinity 
with the goals of democracy gained force with the rise of 
Jacksonian populism.38 In the expansionist atmosphere of
312
the 1820’s and 30’s, populist sentiment had little diffi­
culty in submerging any lingering Jeffersonian doubts about 
the value of "manufactures.” Moreover, the new Democratic 
rhetoric charged science with an explicit reform mission, 
portraying technological advance as part of a "general 
social revolution” directed toward "the benefit of...the 
whole body of the people."3® This mission was made 
manifest in the rise of polytechnic education and the 
lyceum movement, both designed to open avenues of self- 
improvement and thereby eliminate class distinctions. 
Moreover the propensity of Jacksonian partisans to articu­
late their ideals in terms which juxtaposed "the natural" 
and "the artificial" tended to shift the focus of 
scientific inquiry away from a concern for the perceived 
regularities of nature to a concern for the potential of 
its material effects. The hope of social redemption lay, 
they claimed, in the enhancement of everyday life and not 
in the rational comprehension of "artificial” laws by a few 
elitist minds.
As the infant republic marched to the cadences of Jack­
sonian rhetoric through the early decades of the 19th 
Century, a concurrent rush of material progress encouraged 
a mood of fervid optimism which only served to deepen 
America’s conviction that somehow science drove the inner 
engines of its millenial dream.40 Neither the economic 
distress of the 1830’s nor the gathering clouds of sec­
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tionalism in the 40’s could diminish the nation's faith in 
the power of technology to carry it forward to greatness.41 
The activist ideal imparted to it by Ramism in the 18th 
Century allowed American science in the 19th to construe 
mechanical contrivances as benefactions to the race and 
factories as vehicles of redemption. The power of inven­
tion manifested man’s special relationship to God and 
Americans seemed to possess that power to a degree which 
gave abundant assurance of national election.42 Expounded 
in scientific journals which enjoyed a wide circulation and 
preached throughout the country in lecture halls and 
lyceums, America’s new technological faith subsumed all 
previous formulations of national piety under its meta­
phors. Encouraged by discoveries of gold in the West, 
political successes abroad and a temporary respite from 
internal dissension in the Missouri Compromise, celebrants 
of America’s scientific gospel raised a chorus of self- 
congratulation which seemed to promise that Christ in the 
Second Coming would in fact arrive by train.
But the philosophic optimism of the 1850’s proved the 
worst possible preparation for the political and 
intellectual cataclysm of the Civil War.43 The War 
tarnished the credibility of the Union as the irreducible 
logical premise on which the national life had rested. Any 
consequent philosophic reconstruction would have to 
incorporate a redefinition of that premise in terms which
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could encompass the social realities consequent upon the 
War. Moreover, the War not only temporarily derailed the 
juggernaut of material progress which had propelled the 
nation forward for half a century, it also rent the tightly 
woven fabric of millenial self-righteousness in which 
American ideologues had carefully clothed the national 
dream. The harsh social and political realities of war and 
reconstruction urgently demanded a reevaluation of those 
phil osophic assumptions which lay at the base of American 
1 i f e . * *
Chief among these, of course, stood the national faith 
in technology as the tie that binds. The obvious failure 
of science, despite its success in spanning the continent, 
to prevent the disintegration of the union prompted a pain­
ful reassessment of the nation’s uncritical acceptance of 
the technological ideal. As post-bellum politicians and 
theorists turned jointly to the task of philosophic 
reconstruction, they looked to their former allies in 
science for reassurance that technology would in fact ful­
fill its extravagant promise.
By 1865, however, the American scientific community was 
in the throes of its own ideological revolution. Dis­
concerting new theories suggested during the preceding 
decades had exhausted the descriptive potential of existing 
metaphors and demanded a new synthesizing vocabulary. The 
vast accumulation of empirical data accomplished under the
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banner of Bacon threatened to encumber inquiry by its sheer 
weight and aroused the suspicion that perhaps science had 
exceeded the scope of its models. The Baconian method had 
proceeded under the assumption that the simple accumulation 
of particular facts would eventually yield a general con­
struct. But the avalanche of data culled from the explora­
tion of a continental laboratory had infinitely complicated 
the task of classification and had multiplied, shifted and 
rearranged methodological categories to the extent that 
they had become essentially meaningless.45
The case for chemistry provides a clear example of the 
problem. In 1768, the French chemist Lavoisier had estab­
lished a functional method for classifying chemical sub­
stances based on two criteria -- an enumeration of elements 
and an analysis of composition. Based on these criteria he 
constructed a series of analytical tables designed to meth­
odize the discipline. In one column he listed five 
categories of simple substances. In an adjacent column he 
identified compound substances as functions of those simple 
elements. Acids, for instance, formed one class of com­
pound substances produced by combining simple elements with 
oxygen, the "acidifying agent.” Lavoisier then assigned 
functional names to the resulting compounds -- the combina­
tion of sulphur and oxygen, for instance, yielded sulphuric 
acid. The same procedure was followed for salts, which 
became respectively sulphates and sulphites, and so on.
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Lavoisier’s neat, orderly construct stabilized the chaotic 
state of chemistry and provided a comprehensive system of 
nomenclature which made possible important theoretical 
advances.
But shortly after Lavoisier’s death, chemists discov­
ered several new elements which stubbornly refused to con­
form to his model. By 1830 they had identified several 
acids which contained no oxygen and at least three other 
substances which supported combustion. Clearly the new 
data demanded new metaphors. Since chemistry, unlike 
mechanics, reached into the very nature of substance 
itself, this dislocation of theory and data proved particu­
larly disconcerting. To make matters worse, by the 1860’s 
the classical atomic theory articulated by Dalton had been 
complicated by Helmholtz’ and Kelvin’s "atomic vortices," 
which attacked the assumptions of fixed mass which had 
characterized organic chemistry up to that point. The 
century had nearly ended before chemists could come to 
terms with the theoretical implications of the new data and 
offer alternative explanatory principles.46
Disillusionment with existing systems of classification 
could only aggravate the doubts which plagued American 
scientists following the War. The inability of Baconian 
models to provide reassurance became increasingly apparent 
as the millenial axiology which had previously supported 
them faded under the force of social circumstance.
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American science at mid-century indeed faced the painful 
realization that its logical constructs could no longer 
support its theoretical aspirations. Some Baconian 
diehards responded by claiming that the dislocations were 
only apparent, resulting from an insufficiently stringent 
application of method. Benjamin Silliman’s castigation of 
geology as a "merely theoretical and usually a visionary 
and baseless speculation" articulated this reactionary tac­
tic. Geologists must completely eschew theory, he 
declared, and apply themselves exclusively to an "actual 
examination into the nature, structure, and arrangement" of 
data in order to penetrate the mysteries of the world.47 
The irony here, of course, lay in the intrinsically his­
torical nature of geology as a science, a dimension which 
Silliman’s methodology completely denied.
Reactionary responses like Silliman’s generally served 
only to deepen the persistent tension between theory and 
practice. One notable exception, however, emerged in the 
field of social-statistical theory. As census information 
accumulated, politicians and planners began to develop an 
interest in trends, identifying the pursuit of progress 
with the logic of an empirically determined common good. 
Statisticians and census analysts claimed that by quantify­
ing the notion of "the common good," they could better 
define social order. A movement perfectly in tune with 
Jacksonian populism, this arithmetic conception of ethics
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transformed qualitative Enlightenment concepts into a 
majoritarian ethic which claimed the greatest good for the 
greatest number.48 But it did little to advance the devel­
opment of new scientific metaphors.
By contrast, some adventurous minds gave up the attempt 
to cope with data on a systems level and settled for synec­
doche -- the most notable being Emerson, whose use of 
literary technique went deeper than a stylistic habit of 
reading sermons in rocks and streams and ultimately took 
the form of a philosophic principle.49 Emersoii explicitly 
extended synechdoche to a justification of science by 
crediting technology with the power to carry the minds of 
men from an appreciation of particular inventions to a 
wider sense of wonder at their power.50 Like a good 
Ramist, Emerson insisted on the moral implications of 
science. Machines, he claimed, manifested "the same Spirit 
that made the elements at first."51 But these metaphoric 
excesses, characteristic of a wider Romantic compulsion, 
merely enhanced the intellectual ambiguity which ultimately 
served as philosophy for the entire Transcendental gener­
ation. The tendency to see technology as an objectifica­
tion of the power to create and redeem ultimately reduced 
the role of science to the socio-economic means by which a 
moribund Calvinism confronted an updated problem of Job. 
Although such a view went a long way toward validating
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programs for improvement, it did little to help formulate 
an actual philoso ph y of science.
By far the vast majority of American scientists turned 
to Scottish realism for reassurance.52 The facile formulas
of the Scottish school provided welcome support to a gener­
ation attempting to reconcile a devotion to science with a 
recognition that it no longer gave purpose and meaning to 
life. Moreover, the "mental philosophy" explicit in the 
Scottish realist position flowed easily into those 
phil osophic channels carved by Ramism in the bedrock of 
American thought.53 Its epistemological theories expounded 
an intellectually defensible version of the doctrine of
means; its scientific theories retraced the fading outlines
of Ramist technologia', and its ethical systems tapped the 
undercurrents of Ramist evpraxia.
Given logical expression in the treatises of Thomas 
Reid, Scottish realism patently rejected the logic of 
inference characteristic of British empiricism, portraying 
it as a huge collective error rooted in Cartesianism, which 
"like the Trojan horse... carried in its belly death and 
destruction to all science and common sense."54 By inter­
posing ideas between objects and the mind, Reid claimed, 
Descartes and all his Lockean progeny had obstructed the 
natural flow of invention and judgement. Dismissing asso­
ciation as "one of the main pillars of skepticism," Reid 
argued that the process of judgement preceded the formation
320
of ideas and hence fell "not within the province of reason, 
but of common sense.” "Natural judgements," he concluded, 
"are therefore a part of the furniture which nature has 
given to the human understanding. ...They are part of our 
constitution. ...They make up what is called the common 
sense of mankind."*s
Reid's topical orientation is patent here. But it 
becomes even more so in his redefinition of induction, 
which redrew the line between hypothesis and induction in 
such a way as to avoid inference entirely and so halt the 
fatal erosion of metaphysics. Newton’s Regulae, Reid 
argued, expressed, not rules of reasoning, but "maxims of 
common sense." They outlined a non-rational inductive 
principle which provided man with "an instinctive pres­
cience of the operations of nature. ...Upon this principle 
of our constitution, not only acquired perception but also 
inductive reasoning, and all our reasoning from analogy, is 
grounded," he claimed.56 By thus redefining inference as a 
disposition to belief, Reid provided a clear philosophic 
justification for the epistemology implicit in the doctrine 
of means, bringing welcome relief to American scientists 
defending their ideological model against methodological 
critics.
Reid’s logic exerted its strongest influence on 
American scientific theory through the work of Dugald 
Stewart, who maintained that the business of the scientist
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was simply "to ascertain those established conjunctions of 
successful events, which constitute the order of the 
universe... and then to refer them to their general laws" 
which could only be determined "by an examination of the 
principles of the human constitution" -- that is, by 
induction-according-to-Reid.57 This patently Ramean meth­
odology provided James McCosh at Princeton with a means to 
integrate scientific advances into a conservative theology. 
And McCosh in turn championed it across America as the 
deliverance of science as well as a justification for 
orthodoxy. In questions of method, McCosh declared, 
"Stewart must ever be referred to as an authority."58 That 
such a metaphysic could merge, even superficially, with 
Baconian models rested entirely on the philosophic ground­
work laid by Ramist technologia and eupraxia, which reen­
forced Reid’s "inductive principle" and gave it the ability 
to carry the mind from "successful events” to objective 
truth.
Francis Wayland, the most influential of the "American 
Scots," drew on Stewart and Reid to develop an elaborate 
scientific model which claimed to solve the troublesome 
"problem of induction" once and for all by simply making 
the entire predictive element of science over into analogy. 
Wayland’s "Philosophy of Analogy" rested on two principles: 
"First. A part of any system which is the work of an 
intelligent agent, is similar, so far as the principles
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which it involves are concerned, to the whole of that 
system. And, second. The work of an intelligent and moral 
agent must bear, in all its lineaments, the traces of the 
character of the Author."59 Thus Wayland went far oeyond 
the relatively modest claims which Reid had made for anal­
ogy to declare that it had not only a descriptive but a 
normative status. Analogical reasoning, he declared, dis­
closed not only the actual but the necessary structure of 
the universe.
The alacrity with which American scientists reached out 
to Wayland's "philosophy of analogy” indicates the depth of 
confusion into which they had sunk. As George Daniels 
points out, Wayland’s logic "was admirably designed to pro­
mote loose reasoning and hasty generalizations. Where 
previously the inductive process of confirmation had seemed 
intolerably endless, Wayland would dismiss it as largely 
unnecessary." Yet "virtually any American 
scientist... could serve as an illustration of the use of 
analogy in the Wayland sense," Daniels claims.90 Indeed 
the praise of analogy had reached such heights in America 
by 1848 that James Whelpley could take the final step and 
explicitly identify analogy as the exclusive method of 
science.
But even the uneasy alliance of common sense and common 
purpose achieved under Scottish realism could not withstand 
the fundamental shifts which occurred in scientific theory
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as the Century progressed. The stubborn refusal of the 
"imponderables" to remain in the inferential background of 
physics underscored the epistemological shortcomings of 
Locke’s psychological critique. Indeed Lockean constructs 
proved signally ill-equipped to cope with the problem of 
the "imponderables." Dedicated to the proposition that 
only sense makes sense, Locke had excluded from inquiry 
phenomena like atomic particles, electrical currents and 
fields of force. Consequently, the closer Baconian inquiry 
carried Lockean psychology to the fundamental building 
blocks of the universe, the less capable either became of 
coping with their own data. Yet the obvious explanatory 
power of hypothetically inferred entities demanded that 
they be dealt with analytically. All the major empiricists 
had wrestled with the problem. But still the stubborn 
irony persisted that the scientific tradition known as 
"atomism" could not absorb the concept of an "atom." A 
drastic revision of methodology would be necessary to admit 
these forbidden hypotheses as viable explanations of physi­
cal events.61
At the same time the inability of Newtonian mechanics 
to absorb the troublesome new fields of thermodynamics and 
electromagnetics discredited prevailing notions of order 
and change. The principles of classical mechanics declared 
all motion'reversible. But the existence of entropy, sug­
gested by Avogadro’s theory of gasses in 1811 and later
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confirmed by Carnot, Clausius and Kelvin in the second law 
of thermodynamics, asserted the existence of irreversible 
processes -- that is, of phenomena which tended inexorably 
toward a limit. Quantified by Fourier through 
trigonometric series expansions, the "irreversibility 
thesis" allowed for the description of such physical 
processes as frequencies and dynamic equilibria.
But Newtonian mechanics had no mathematical language 
adequate to the task of expressing irreversible processes. 
Statistical theory stepped in to fill the gap, particularly 
after James Clerk Maxwell applied his bit of Victorian 
whimsy to the problem, but statistical laws could not 
satisfy the methodological demands of classical physics. 
Moreover, the ether, which had previously served as a con­
venient repository for those properties of matter and 
energy which didn’t fit the Newtonian mold, could no longer 
offer any help since its assumed qualities had come under 
attack in the "ether drift" experiments of Michelson and 
Morley. The methodological conflict remained unresolved, 
in fact, until Einstein’s work on Brownian motion revealed 
the physical and philosophical import of atomic theory, 
providing a logical bridge from classical to quantum 
mechanics.8 2
The increasing credibility of these hypothetically 
inferred entities and forces distorted the logical 
categories under which men inquired into nature. Then,
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into this philosophic "critical mass," Darwin introduced 
the catalyst of evolution, destroying the relevance of 
analogical argument and forcing a reevaluation of the goals 
and processes of inquiry itself. As many of Darwin’s 
critics hastened to point out, evolution by natural selec­
tion did not describe a scientific principle based on 
induction. Despite Darwin’s massive array of evidence, his 
theory remained just that -- a unifying hypothesis with no 
objective ground in the natural world. Yet the inability 
of taxonometric methods to produce anything even approach­
ing the manifold explanatory potential of Darwin's model 
only served to underscore what critics and champions alike 
began to perceive as "the limits of Baconianism."•3
This series of methodological shocks proved particu­
larly disorienting to American theorists. Although 
prepared by Scottish realism to accept the explanatory 
potential of the "imponderables," American ideologues 
remained curiously loathe to accept their unsavory 
philosophic consequences. Reid’s endorsement of immediate 
perception allowed for the analysis of "imponderables" 
despite their stubborn refusal to display the normal 
attributes of matter. But microcosmic systems had little 
relevance to the Ramist ars technologicae and the doctrine 
of means specifically stipulated that man’s rational 
faculties could adequately comprehend the natural order.
How, then, could these unthinkable thoughts function in
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inquiry? Until concepts like atomic valency, radiating 
energy and molecular structure could boast an objective 
reference they literally had no "place" in scientific 
method.
Likewise, although prepared by a millenial axiology to 
sacrifice the concept of "reversibility” in physics, 
American theorists proved peculiarly reluctant to integrate 
the correlative notions of "force" and "field" into their 
cosmology. Irreversibility confirmed the directionality 
of time, a concept crucial to the eschatological bias of 
American ideology. But the second law of thermodynamics 
described a movement from order to disorder which encour­
aged analogical extensions of "dissipation" and "degrada­
tion" at the macrocosmic level. This presented an urgent 
phil osophical problem to minds trained up in Puritan doc­
trine and the Revolutionary faith.84
Moreover evolutionary theory drastically altered those 
taxonomic schemes which had previously supported the natu­
ral sciences. Indeed it struck directly at the roots of 
that analogical method which had allowed American ideology 
to extend its metaphors across all disciplines and effec­
tively neutralized both the content and the method on which 
American inquiry had come to rely. The classical notion of 
species, like the topical notion of a "place," had 
expressed a fixed grouping of terms under an immutable 
order. From this notion flowed the protean concept of the
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"great chain of being" on which all analogical reasoning 
drew. But Darwin’s principle of selection destroyed logi­
cal as well as biological fixity. By representing the 
species as naturally and inevitably mutable, it undercut 
not only the classification systems of natural science but 
both categorical and topical schemes of organization as 
well. The implications of the reduction of the species to 
a phenomenal level proved patent and devastating. "It is 
like confessing murder," Darwin himself remarked.65
By the early 1870’s, the compelling need for a new 
logic of science had become patent. Wayland’s naive, 
psychologized "principle of induction" simply could not 
supply data adequate to the demands of an increasingly 
sophisticated scientific community. The hypothetical 
notions arising out of thermodynamics and electromagnetics 
simply had no "place" in Baconian or Ramean methodology. 
Baconian science had no way to account for postulational 
entities, while Ramism, though supporting hypotheticals in 
discourse, had no way to produce logical predicates which 
could provide them with an objective content. Moreover, 
Darwin had exposed the monolithic conceptions of system 
which had characterized modern science up to that point as 
essentially inadequate descriptions of reality. The sweep­
ing philosophic implications of these methodological dis­
locations clearly underscored the fact that American logi­
cal models had fallen drastically out of step with funda­
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mental issues in the philosophy of science.66 Driven by an 
urgent need for new metaphors adequate to the expression of 
a reconceived reality, American scientists began a search 
for a new methodology. And a persistent Ramean heritage 
ensured that the first step in the process would be to 
articulate a logic which could underwrite the method.
The impact which these methodological shifts had on 
th ose national scientific models outlined in previous chap­
ters provides an interesting comparative reference for the 
logical accomodation achieved by American philosophy under 
the shock of scientific advance. In England, for example, 
Darwin’s developmental hypothesis confronted a Newtonian 
world whose physical aspect expressed absolute permanence 
and whose logical essence consisted in abstract quantity. 
Indeed for Newton, the abstract truths of mathematics 
enjoyed logical certainty precisely because they remained 
devoid of any empirical content.67 Such a mechanical 
universe left little or no room for biological analogy.68 
The transformations which had preoccupied Newton had no 
reference in concepts of process or growth. They took 
place rather through simple changes in the position of dis­
crete particles driven by purely mechanical means. The 
word "development" in its Darwinian sense thus had no 
reference in English thought.68
Locke’s associationist critique, carried to its logical 
extreme by Hume, expressed the inevitable methodological
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correlate of Newton’s corpuscular view. And just as 
English physics could not easily absorb the random events 
explicit in Darwin’s theory, so English logic resisted the 
concepts of probability and hypothesis implicit therein. 
Locke had denounced all hypotheses as mere "inventions and 
creatures of the understanding." Hypotheses had no addi­
tive value, he claimed, only a negative function as 
vehicles of verification. But since Darwinian theory 
tended to endorse hypotheses as constructive forms, Locke’s 
inferential logic and any philosophy of science based 
thereon must prove inadequate for its purposes.70 
Throughout the late 19th Century the Mills’ "savage logic,” 
which stubbornly upheld Newton’s limiting definition of a 
vera causa, perpetuated this Lockean bias in English 
science.71 In fact, only with a belated appreciation of 
Whewell’s "philosophy of discovery" did English logic begin 
to integrate the methodological implications of evolution 
into their philosophy of science.7*
Likewise French theoretical constructs proved curiously 
unresponsive to the philosophical demands of Darwinism.
The French scientific tradition had been initiated by a 
radical act of separation of man from his environment. 
Descartes’ cogito, extended to the natural world in Le 
Monde, had redefined science as an axiomatic discipline 
which itself determined and structured experience. "Allow 
your imagination to leave this world," Descartes enjoined
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the scientist, "and visit an entirely new one which I will 
cause to be born in these imaginary places."73 Under 
Cartesian rules, the scientist imposed his own logical 
order upon nature to extract meaning. By defining this new 
order, he guaranteed his ability to investigate it 
unencumbered by perceptual limits. But the logical 
priority thereby given to mechanism over experience made 
Cartesian constructs peculiarly unreceptive to evolutionary 
forms.
Cartesian logic had provided the philosophes with a 
justification for grounding change in antecedent law. But, 
like Newton's transformations, the naturalists’ trans- 
formism left no room for the precarious aspects of environ­
mental determinism described by evolution. Neither 
Laplace’s physics nor Diderot’s biology could accomodate 
concepts of emergence or novelty. This persistent 
Cartesian bias, made explicit in biology by Lamarck’s 
unilinear development and in logic by Comte’s positivism, 
continued to insulate French theory from the methodological 
implications of Darwinism in much the same way that Locke 
had done in England.74 Indeed not until the end of the 
19th Century, with Bergson’s "creative evolution," did 
French theoretical models begin to display genuine evolu­
tionary features.75
The German response to Darwinism proved somewhat more 
complex -- if no more positive -- than that of England or
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France. Prepared in some ways by a strong morphological 
tradition to accept developmental constructs in both 
science and philosophy, German theoretical models nonethe­
less displayed a curious incompatibility with evolutionary 
doctrine -- an incompatibility grounded ultimately in 
logic. While German dialectical models allowed for a prin­
ciple of development grounded in logical structure, they 
had no mechanism for extending that principle to existence. 
On the one hand, this rendered them more flexible and open 
to creative theory. On the other, it made it difficult for 
them to perceive the practical potential of Darwin’s work. 
Moreover, the philosophical idealism which dominated German 
thought throughout the 19th Century contained its own 
built-in evolutionary scheme which rendered Darwin's 
hypothesis essentially superfluous.7®
Wolffian logic had declared existence a "complement of 
possibility," strictly limiting any notions of biological 
development to a metaphoric movement within a logically 
antecedent frame. This doctrine, known as "preformation," 
stipulated that natural development took place as a succes­
sive unfolding of a predetermined organic constitution, not 
as an autonomous or random process like the one Darwin 
described.77 Kant’s reduction of Wolff’s logical 
categories to functions of time had done little to render 
Wolffian constructs more receptive to evolution since 
Kant's imperatives operated primarily on the noumena and
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had little relevance at the organic level. For Kant, 
although causal sequences pertained in both the noumenal 
and the phenomenal realms, each proceeded under the opera­
tion of its own imperatives.78 It was a misconstruction of 
these distinct imperatives which the Post-Kantians per­
petuated ad nauseam. Darwinian theory, on the other hand, 
placed Kant’s noumena and his phenomena on the same time­
line, as it were. By making psychic activity an evolu­
tionary consequence of physical development, Darwin not 
only neutralized Wolff’s metaphysical priorities, he pulled 
the logical ground out from under Kant. Unable to find 
support in its native philosophical traditions, German 
science fell back on an unrelenting experimentalism 
relieved by flights of idealistic fancy. Only with 
Nietzsche’s "Philosophy of Becouing" did it acquire a logi­
cal mechanism capable of establishing the priority of 
process over structure.79
Predictably, according to the current argument, the 
impact which Darwin had on American philosophy proved sub­
stantially different from any of these. Evolutionary 
theory struck chords in America which had no harmonics in 
European thought. In the New World, Darwin spoke directly 
to the heart of a young society whose national life 
appeared almost as a caricature of an evolutionary model. 
The transforming power of the environment exerted itself as 
a fact of life in America. Moreover, the philosophical
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implications of Darwinism converged there with an ideology 
grounded in concepts of conversion and election. When 19th 
Century American scientists reached out for principles of 
order, they reached out, not to Mill or Comte or Hegel, but 
to a distinctive logical tradition which had subsisted in 
American thought since the founding of the Citty. The 
phil osophic undercurrents of Ramism which had fed into 
American theory throughout the Colonial and Revolutionary 
eras ensured that the radical shifts in scientific theory 
described above would interact with logical metaphors sub­
stantially different from those encountered in England, 
France or Germany.
Although at first the American response to Darwinism 
followed a predictable course, the speed with which 
American theorists achieved an accomodation with its 
philosophic implications suggests the operation of factors 
unique to the American intellectual milieu.®0 The doctrine 
of means had explicitly acknowledged the precedence of 
creation over revelation. The Book of Revelation, it 
claimed, had been written as a sequel to the Book of 
Nature. This crucial doctrine, supported by the Ramist ars 
technologicae, had enabled Puritan divines in the 18th 
Century to interpret Newtonian mechanics as an expression 
of Providential design. In the 19th, it provided latter- 
day Saints with a cogent argument for incorporating evolu­
tionary theory into the national axiology.
334
In fact, as Darwinian theory adapted itself to the 
American intellectual environment it produced theoretical 
offspring which bore a strong genetic resemblance to their 
Puritan forebears. The Ramean metaphors embedded in 
American ideology translated the Darwinian hypothesis into 
a process by which each species underwent a refinement of 
structure directed at ensuring its biological 
"immortality." Development became an analog of conversion 
and survival a mode of redemption. Adaptation came to 
represent a biological integration of means and ends not 
unlike that achieved under the doctrine of means, while 
natural selection expressed the biological correlate of 
election. Thus evolution, viewed from a Ramean perspec­
tive, displayed a distinct realist bias. It extended a 
degree of permanence and constancy to the world of present 
experience by explaining it as a developing system of 
steadily increasing structural density.
By merging the developmental aspects of Darwinism with 
the emotional thrust of their ideology and the structural 
bias of their logic, American theorists could argue for a 
philosophical program which stood midway between mechanism 
and teleology -- an option not open to English theorists 
(committed to experience), French theorists (committed to 
mechanism), or German theorists (committed to structure). 
Technologia ensured that this distinctive evolutionary 
model would infiltrate those disciplines previously
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encompassed by natural philosophy.81 Eupraxia ensured that 
it would permeate the social and political economy as well. 
Indeed by the 1870’s, this unique national hybrid of Bacon, 
Ramus and Darwin had spread itself, in true panso phist 
fashion, across the entire spectrum of American thought.
In what Stow Person’s calls "a paradoxical mixture of 
scientific objectivity and moralistic preachment," 
theorists in all fields reached out to its metaphors for a 
means whereby to synthesize the increasingly disparate 
vocabularies of philosophy and science.82
"Gospellers" of all stripes hastened to invoke the new 
metaphors in support of their cause. The scientific 
gospellers, thrown off-stride by the War and its consequent 
dis i opt ’ ons, found renewed justification for their tech­
nological creed in an industrial naturalism which tempered 
a Malthusian interpretation of Darwinian selection with a 
persistent millenial axiology.83 The social gospellers 
concocted a reform ideology out of an amalgam of Baconian 
statistics, environmental determinism and Puritan ethics.84 
Theists like John Fiske and Frank Abbott attempted a 
philosophic reconstruction of orthodoxy which employed 
Baconian "improvement" and emergent evolutionism to but­
tress a traditional eschatology.85 And "evolutional 
idealists" like Joseph Leconte propounded laws of cyclical 
advance which read concepts of evolutionary growth as evi-
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dence of a dialectical reasonableness energizing the 
world.*•
The one characteristic which all these various 
theoretical constructs shared was a realist bias -- a bias 
embedded in what the present argument will call "the con­
tinuity thesis." The continuity thesis simply assumed that 
no absolute discreteness existed anywhere in nature or 
experience. It expressed the persistent commitment to 
antecedent structure which had permeated American 
intellectual life since New England’s "first fruits" had 
begun spreading the gospel according to Ramus in the 
1600’s.®7 Evident in such diverse constructs as Edwards’ 
logic, Adams’ covenant and Jackson’s populism, this commit­
ment continued to underwrite American thought throughout 
its period of philosophic adjustment in the 19th Century 
and became an integral part of those models which American 
science developed in response to scientific advance.
Indeed the realist of bias of their intellectual 
heritage enabled many American scientists to marshall sup­
port for new theoretical constructs by claiming that they 
merely restated this principle of continuity in 
"scientific" terms. Hence thermodynamics demonstrated the 
cosmic reality of purposefulness,®• while electromagnetics 
confirmed the existence of effective forces at work in the 
world.®* Darwinian theory, far from discrediting metaphors 
of continuity, merely made their logical structure objec-
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tive and open-ended. Sumner’s "folkways,"•* Ward’s "telic 
structures,"•* Piske’s "roaring loom of Time,"*1 and 
Leconte’8 "residuum"** all gave metaphoric expression to 
this characteristic commitment to perpetuate the principle 
of continuity in American ideology.
Predictably the "continuity thesis" emerged most 
clearly at precisely that theoretical point at which 
science and logic intersected -- at that nexus of American 
intellectual life where Bacon and Ramus had converged to 
create a unique scientific ideology. The intellectual 
atmosphere peculiar to the development of American science 
had encouraged the integration of natural history and natu­
ral philosophy. As late as 1874, Louis Agassiz could still 
give a ringing endorsement to this persistent Ramean 
orientation: "It cannot be too soon understood that science 
is one, and that whether we investigate language, 
philosophy, theology, history or physics, we are dealing 
with the same problem, culminating in the knowledge of our­
selves. ...Our own nature demands from us this double 
allegiance."** Bacon and Ramus’ joint conflation of 
hypothesis and induction had provided a methodology 
curiously well-suited to support such an analogical model.
But by removing God as the last remaining Idol in 
America’s Baconian laboratory, Darwin had, in a sense, made 
the analogy real. Under evolutionary doctrine natural his­
tory and natural philosophy did in fact express coordinate
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value systems, thereby rendering science, from a Ramean 
point of view, a system of encyclopedic radii which reached 
out to no encompassing circle. And the problem for 
American logicians became one not unlike that which 
medieval scholastics had faced in the doctrine of transub- 
stantiation -- that of determining whether a discrete fact 
could contain the logical attributes of a wider truth.
Thus stood the case for America’s philosophy of science 
when Charles Sanders Peirce began his inquiry into its 
theoretical structures in the 1870’s. Guided by concep­
tions of law and principles of order embedded deep in his 
intellectual heritage, Peirce would attempt a reconcilia­
tion of positive science and realist logic which clearly 
reflected the thrust and disposition of American values.
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(Ibid., 385). Daniel Boorstin presents a similar view in 
his chapter "The Quest for Useful Knowledge" in Lost World. 
213-224 .
33. McGiffert claims that Franklin "placed frontier 
morality on a utilitarian footing, and gave it empirical 
foundations." Without explicitly tying his argument to 
logical issues, he points out that Franklin stated his
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ethical maxims in hypothetic form, claiming this as 
"indicative of their scientific character" (Puritanism. 
151). Since Franklin's entire "Table of Virtues" is 
expressed as a collection of composite statements, it seems 
reasonable here to see this as indicative of their Ramean 
character as well. For a discussion of the moral and 
philosophical dimensions of Franklin's thought and their 
explicit ties to Puritan doctrine, see Koch, "Franklin and 
Pragmatic Wisdom" in Power. 14-22 and McGiffert, "The 
Puritan Becomes American" in Puritanism. 83-89.
34. Opinions on Franklin’s value as a scientist range 
from denigrations of his ineptness in mathematics (Conkin, 
Puritans. 90-91) to praise for his "passion for theoretical 
understanding" (Koch, Power. 16). Only an understanding of 
Franklin’s philosophic commitment to integrate theory and 
practice in a conception of utility which reached out to 
deeper values can serve to reconcile these two views. For 
balanced assessments of Franklin’s scientific accomplish­
ments and their place in the European and American 
scientific communities, see Stearns, British . 619-615; 
Daniels, Science. 64-68.
35. Daniels points out that "the public received a 
good return on its early investment in science. ...Despite 
[occassional] dissatisfaction, on the whole it was a good 
bargain for all parties involved" (Society. 205). For a 
narrative treatment of the explosive growth which occurred 
between 1800 and 1850 which specifically treats the inter­
relationship between rates of expansion and perceptions of 
progress see Oscar Handlin’s chapter "Migration and Expan­
sion" in Americans. 195-254.
36. George Daniels outlines the programs aimed at 
promoting practical improvements during this period in 
Society (114-121) and Jackson (6-33). Perry Miller refers 
his readers to a contemporary source in Samuel Miller’s 
Brief Retrospect of the 18th Century (1803), which he fash­
ions "one of the major productions of the early Republic, 
for a summary of that 'mass of improvements’ achieved by 
science in the years following the Revolution."
37. Bell points out that such an inversion would have 
been impossible in England where "the ruling class...was 
not educated to see the possibilities, through industry, of 
scientific techniques (Newtonian Science. 2).
38. Daniels argues that American science in fact 
entered a "crucial middle period" during the reign of Jack­
sonian ideology, a period "in which the foundations of our 
national scientific community were established” (19th 
Century American Science (Evanston, 1972), 54). Miller 
agrees that the rise of American technology was "in part a
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manifestation of [the] Jacksonian Revolution" (Life. 322). 
For a detailed discussion of the ties between Jacksonian 
populism and technological science, see Schneider's chapter 
"The Common Man" in History. 99-116.
39. Richard Hildreth, The Theory of Morals (Boston, 
1844), 271-272. See also Bruce Sinclair’s article "The 
Promise of the Future: Technical Education" in Daniels,
19th Century. 249-272.
40. Samuel Tyler presented the most systematic exposi­
tion of the national mood in his Discourse of the Baconian 
Philosophy (1846). Daniels identifies Tyler as "the fore­
most apostle of Bacon in America" and presents a perceptive 
analysis of his role in convincing the American public that 
applied science indeed pointed the way to social redemption 
(Jackson. 69-85, 54).
41. For a quantitative analysis of American science 
during this period see Robert V. Bruce, The Launching of 
Modern American Science (New York, 1987).
42. Perry Miller comments perceptively on the meta­
phoric value given to invention in the rhetorical flour­
ishes which politicians showered on American ingenui ty. 
Likewise Hans Jonas comments, in a more general vein, on 
the important metaphorical shifts which inventions like 
steam power imposed. Previous technological advances had 
harnessed natural powers, Jonas argues, leaving primal 
forces within the natural realm. But steam actually 
created an artificial force -- removing powers previously 
reserved for God and placing them in the hands of man
(Essays. 71-72).
43. J. L. Thomas describes the Civil War "as an 
intellectual counterrevolution" in a perceptive discussion 
of its effects on American philosophy in "Romantic Reform 
in America: 1815-1865" in Katz, Perspectives. 466-491.
44. Van Wyck Brooks presents a poignant picture of the 
intellectual disorientation which followed in the wake of 
the war at end of his narrative, The Flowering of New 
England: 1815-1865 (Boston, 1936). Perry Miller presents a 
more disinterested summary in American Thought: Civil War 
to World War I (New York, 1954). In the present context, 
it is important to note that these patterns of conflict 
made difficult theoretical issues inseparable from issues 
of enormous praticial significance and wide-ranging social 
consequence.
45. Daniels identifies the naturalists as one excep­
tion to the negative impact which a superabundance of raw 
data had on theory. Not until the 1860's, he claims, had
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American naturalists completed their preliminary work of 
cataloguing and labeling the wealth of flora and fauna the 
New World had provided. Undistracted by forays into 
theory, Daniels claimed, they were actually able to com­
plete this indispensible survey work more quickly (Jackson. 
102-117). Daniels’ observation may also help to explain 
the ease with which American natural science adjusted to 
Darwinism. Not yet having begun to formulate scientific 
constructs to support their data, American naturalists 
could adopt Darwinian principles without confrontations 
between it and existing models.
46. For a discussion of the significance of chemical 
developments in the 19th Century see G. M. Fleck, "Atomism 
in Late 19th Century Physical Chemistry,” JHI 24(19631:106- 
114.
47. Benjamin Silliman, American Journal of Science 
I(1818):416.
48. For a discussion of social statistics which 
reaches back to issues discussed in Chapter VI see P. C. 
Cohen, "Statistics and the State: Changing Social Thought 
and the Emergence of a Quantitative Mentality in America, 
1790 to 1820," WMQ, III 38( 1981 ):35-55 .
49. In social theory this synecdochic bias manifested 
itself in the reform ideologies of Samuel Gridley Howell, 
Dorothea Dix and Bronson Alcott who explicity defined the 
good of the community in terms of individual self- 
fulfillment. In the liberal arts the bias appeared in his­
torians like Francis Parkman and George Bancroft. In lit­
erature it emerged in the localism of Hawthorne, the 
psychology of Poe and the symbolism of Melville; in the 
graphic arts, in the keen perceptions of the Hudson River 
School.
50. See "Works and Days in Complete Works of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, ed. E. W. Emerson (Boston, 1903), VII, 185). 
In "Progress and Culture" Emerson went even farther, claim­
ing the "chief value [of technology] to be metaphysical" 
(Ibid., VIII, 220-221).
51. See "The Uses of Natural History" in The Early 
Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. S. E. Whicher (Cam­
bridge, 1959), I, 15-45); and Journals of Ralph Waldo Emer­
son (Cambridge, 1960), IX, 161). Leonard Neufeldt points 
out that such a view of technology is "virtually synonymous 
with what the classic Greek term techne denoted ("The 
Science of Power: Emerson’s views on Science and Technology 
in America," JHI 38(1977):333). In the present context it 
is interesting to note that it is also virtually identical 
to the philosophic rationale behind the Ramist ars tech-
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52. Next to Baconianism, Daniels claims, the Scottish 
philosophy was the most popular vehicle for 19th Century 
philosophers of science (Jackson. 199). Herbert Schneider 
agrees, outlining the process by which "Scottish philosophy 
invaded the country and rapidly crowded out the older 18th 
Century texts" (History. 208-211). Miller claims that "for 
five or possibly six decades [Scottish realism] constituted 
what must be called the official metaphysic of America" 
(American Thought, ix). Manfred Kuehn presents an argu­
ment, interesting in the present context, for the theoreti­
cal affinities between Scottish realism and German thought 
in his "The Early Reception of Reid, Oswald, and Beattie in 
Germany : 1768-1800," JHP 21(1983 ): 479-491 .
53. Although Reid can hardly be called a Ramist,
Howell points out that he was influenced by Ramus’ 1555 
French edition of the Dialectique and often referred with 
approval to Keckermann’s Systema Logicae. In his own Brief 
Account of Aristotle’s Logic (1773) he described Ramus "as 
having made additions to Aristotle’s theory of the syl­
logism" and called him a reformer in philosophy "who had a 
force of genius sufficient to shake the Aristotelian fabric 
in many parts." Howell also emphasizes Reid’s linguistic 
analysis as a survival of Ramean rhetoric (Howell, Logic. 
372-391 ) .
54. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind.... 
(Dublin, 1764), II, 455-457.
55. Ibid., II, 417-418.
56. Ibid., 497-499. See also Laudan, "Thomas Reid..."
in Butts and Daivs, Heritage. 122).
57. Outines of Moral Philosophy in Works of Dugald 
Stewart. (Cambridge, 1829), III, 376, 380.
58. James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy... (New 
York, 1875), 292. For a discussion of Stewart relevant to 
the present argument, see Salim Rashid, "Dugald Stewart, 
'Baconian' Methodology, and Political Economy," JHI
46(1985):246-257 . Interestly, Rashid describes Stewart’s 
as an "almost Austrian methodology".
59. Francis Wayland, American Philosophical Addresses 
ed. J. L. Blau (New York, 1946), 353.
60. Daniels, Jackson. 169-178.
61. For relevant discussions see J. P. Monteiro,
"Hume’s Conception of Science," JHP 19( 1981 ):327-342; N. S.
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Arnold, "Hume's Skepticism about Inductive Inference," JHP 
21 ( 1983 ) :31-55; D. E. Soles, "Locke’s Empiricism and the 
Postulation of Unobservables," JHP 23( 1985):339-369.
62. For relevant discussions see Bell, Newtonian 
Science, 152-168; Ian Hacking, "19th Century Cracks in the 
Concept of Determinism," JHI 44 ( 1983 ):455-475; S. G. Brush, 
"Irreversibility and Indeterminism: Fourier to Heisenberg," 
JHI 3 7 < 1976):603-630.
63. See Alvar Ellegard, "The Darwinian Theory and 19th 
Century Philosophies of Science," JHI 18( 1957): 362-393.
64. The attendant philosophic disorientation emerges 
explicitly in Henry Adams’ desperate "Letter to American 
Teachers of History" (1910). See Joseph Mindel, "The Uses 
of Metaphor: Henry Adams and the Symbols of Science," JHI 
26( 1965) :89-102.
65. Quoted in Hofstadter, Social Darwinism. 16. John 
Dewey pointed out that "the combination of the very words 
origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt" (John 
Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other 
Essays (New York, 1910),1-19).
66. As John Dewey noted in retrospect, "in laying 
hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency... the 
Origin of the Species introduced a mode of thinking that in 
the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge. 
...The issue," he warned, "lay primarily within science 
itself" (The Influence of Darwin. 1,2).
67. Under such a model, as Walter Ong points out 
"quantity and being tend to become interchangeable" 
("Psyche..., 20). By extension "being" tends to draw far­
ther and farther from the world of experience and to define 
itself through mathematical limits which have the paradoxi­
cal quality of existing only at that point at which their 
numerical ratios vanish. This was essentially the weakness 
which Berkeley perceived in Newton’s model and which he 
exploited in constructing his idealist response. For a 
dissenting view see J. W. Garrison "Newton and the Relation 
of Mathematics to Natural Philosophy," JHI 48(1987):609- 
626) .
68. Henry Guerlac points out that "there is but a 
single passage suggesting concern for living matter” in the 
1687 edition of the Principia ("Theological Voluntarism and 
Biological Analogies in Newton’s Physical Thought," JHI
44(1983):219-229 ) .
69. Peter Bowler points out that the word "evolution" 
did not acquire its current meaning in English until well
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into the 19th Century, in fact until after the battle over 
Darwin's theories had raged for a decade or more ("The 
Changing Meaning of Evolution," JHI 36( 1975 ) :95- 114 ) .
70. For a discussion of Locke which highlights these 
tensions in his methodology see James Farr "The Way of 
Hypothesis: Locke on Method," JHI 48(1987):51-72 and 
Laurens Laudan "The Nature and Sources of Locke's Views on 
Hypotheses," JHI 28(1967 ) :214 .
71. Walter Ong calls the Mills' logic a "savage logic 
learned from associationism and brooking absolutely no 
interference, statfing] bluntly that predication itself -- 
that is -- any conceivable human statement whatsoever -- 
does no more than mark the order of trains of thought" 
("Psyche..., 22). Mill’s view of hypothesis rested on 
three Lockean principles: any general conception expresses 
a mental representation of an entire class of individuals; 
no general conception is furnished by the mind until it is 
furnished to the mind; and a general conception never 
precedes analysis (Logic. II, 190, 191, 193). "Induction," 
he claimed, "is proof" and hypothesis has no "place" in 
induction (Ibid., I, 314). Thus, although Mill loudly 
praised Darwin’s theory as "an unimpeachable example of a 
legitimate hypothesis," he immediately qualified his praise 
with the condescending observation that Darwin, of course, 
had not been "concerned with the conditions of
proof...[since] he was not bound by the rules of Induction, 
but by those of Hypothesis" (Ibid., I, 353).
72. Whewell based his Philosophy of Inductive Science 
(1840) on three distinctly non-Lockean arguments: the his­
torical relativity of theory and fact; the constructive 
role of controversy in the progress of knowledge; and the 
indispensable role of hypotheses in the process of discov­
ery. In his later Philosophy of Discovery (1849), Whewell 
developed this position into a full-fledged theory of logic 
which validated hypotheses as additive notions. Renamed 
"Colligations of Facts," Whewell's hypotheses were "sup­
plied by the mind in order to bind the facts together," and 
actually drove the inductive process (for the complete 
argument, see Discovery. Chapter 22). Whewell's account 
had the obvious advantage of being able to accomodate Dar­
winian theory. (Scientific truth, he claimed, "is progres­
sive" (Ibid., 343).) Moreover his view on causation 
allowed for the introduction of notions of force. ("Force,” 
he argued, "is a quality not identical with events, but 
disclosed by means of them" (Inductive Science. I, 170).) 
Nevertheless, as C. J. Ducasse points out, the popularity 
of Mill’s Logic prevented a general recognition of the 
merits of Whewell'a theory. "Disregard of its merits," he 
claims, "was the easier because of its sharp break with the 
traditions of British empiricists" ("Whewell's Philosophy
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of Scientific Discovery," Philosophical Review 
60(1951):56). For a detailed discussion of the debate see 
E. W. Strong, "William Whewell and John Stuart Mill: Their 
Controversy About Scientific Knowledge," JHI 16( 1955 ):209- 
231 .
73. Adams, Oeuvres. XI, 31.
74. Unlike Darwin, Lamarck argued that habits became 
organized as instincts under the operation of the struc­
tural characteristics of the organism. These structures 
determine "an inclination towards the actions [which], bec­
oming habitual, have occasioned the development of the 
organs which execute them" (Zoological Philosophy, trans. 
Hugh Elliot (London, 1914), 11). By contrast, Darwin 
argued that "habits give structure, therefore habits 
precede structure, therefore habitual instincts precede 
structure" (Second Transformation Notebook transcribed by 
Gavin de Beer Bulletin of the British Museum of Natural 
History 2(1960), 106). For his part, Comte adopted a 
Cartesian ideal by explicitly rejecting any referential 
claim for logic. "Ideas govern and revolutionize the 
world,” he declared and proceeded from that simple dictum 
to outline a program whereby logic could provide a 
systematizing framework for knowledge. The fact that logic 
enjoyed no objective dimension in fact gave it its organiz­
ing power, he claimed in La synthase subjective. "Thus 
understood," Etienne Gilson observes, "Comte is a new Des­
cartes” (Recent Philosophy: From Hegel to the Present (New 
York, 1962), 273).
75. In a curious inversion of Cartesian metaphors, 
Bergson presented a philosophic rationale for evolution in 
which intuitive perceptions disclosed an objective process 
of "becoming." According to Bergson, time functioned in 
two separate modes: the "mathematical fictions" of physics 
and the sequential flow of "lived time" (temps v6cu). The 
first was conceptual, the second intuitive. Like Des­
cartes, Bergson claimed the superiority of the latter. But 
unlike Descartes he claimed that the intuitive perceptions 
of "lived time" could support conceptual analysis by 
providing an appreciation of the perceptual flow which made 
up existence. Through an appreciation of "lived time" man 
gained an intuitive insight into the continuous operation 
of an "61an vital" which generated the natural world. 
Bergson thus defined evolution as a creative process flow­
ing from a primordial impulse perceived intuitively.
76. J. H. Randall agrees that German thought in gen­
eral "found Darwin either irrelevant, or else a mere addi­
tional support" for prevailing philosophic schemes ("The 
Changing Impact of Darwin on Philosophy," JHI 22(1961):444.
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77. For a discussion of the biological implications of 
"preformation" theory see Francesca Rigotti "Biology and 
Society," JHI 47( 1986 ):215-233.
78. See the First Analogy of the "Transcendental Doc­
trine of Judgement," Critique of Pure Reason, and 
Proleaamena to any Future Metaphysics.
79. Nietzsche grounded causality in experience. "Our 
belief in causality," he claimed "is belief in force and 
its effect; a transference from our experience [to the 
world]." Causation, he claimed, is a habit of belief given 
objectivity by our "thinking compulsion into the process" 
(The Will to Power, trans. Hollingdale and Kaufmann (New 
York, 1968), 295, 301). Thus causal beliefs had a con­
structive role not only in inquiry, but in experience 
itself, projecting onto an objective reality the determina­
tions of an active will. The physical world is "a sort of 
primitive life in which all the organic functions... are 
still synthetically bound up with one another" awaiting the 
organizing power of an effective will to give it shape and 
meaning (Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan 
(Chicago, 1955), #36, #42-43). Clearly Nietzsche supplied 
a dimension missing from the monistic schemes of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel -- a dimension in which emergence and 
novelty could acquire objective meaning. For an interest­
ing discussion of Nietzsche which relates to the present 
topic see G. J. Stack "Nietzsche’s Influence on Pragmatic 
Humanism," JHP 20(1982):369-406.
80. Initially Darwinian theory provoked a reactionary 
response on the part of orthodox clergy, articulated 
against a backdrop of methodological dispute among 
scientists, culminating in an often incongruous accomoda­
tion between the two. F. A. P. Barnard, President of 
Columbia University clearly articulated the reactionary 
response: "Much as I love truth in the abstract, I love my
hope of immortality more....If this, after all, is the best 
that science can give me, give me, then, I pray, no more 
science" (quoted in H. W. Schneider "The Influence of Dar­
win and Spencer on American Philosophical Theology," JHI 
6(1945):4). Asa Gray of Harvard articulated the 
ambivalence of the scientists: "View these high matters as
you will, the outcome, as concerns us, of the vast and 
partly comprehensible system, which under one aspect we 
call Nature, and under another Providence, and in part 
under another, Creation, is seen in the emergence of a free 
and self-determining personality" (Natural Science and
Religion (New York, 1880), 102-3). James McCosh of Prin­
ceton displayed the adaptive instincts of the clergy, 
claiming that "supernatural design produces natural selec­
tion" (The Religious Aspect of Evolution (New York 1888),
7), while Henry Ward Beecher signalled their capitulation,
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declaring himself a "cordial Christian evolutionist" from 
the most influential pulpit in the land. "Design by 
w h o l e s a l e h e  rationalized in uniquely American imagery, 
"is grander than design by retail" (Evolution and Religion 
(New York, 1885) , 51-52) .
81. "Evolution was eagerly accepted as a substitute 
religion," J. H. Randall notes. Coming at what he describes 
as "the psychological moment” in an "Age of Anxiety," Dar­
winian theory, expanded under the operation of Ramean 
method, provided a "cosmic sanction" for the perceived 
realities of American life ("Impact...," 439).
82. Persons, Minds. 241. Person’s analysis identifies 
two distinct responses to two elements in Darwinian evolu­
tion -- heredity and environment. The first, operating 
under Malthusian assumptions, generated an essentially con­
servative response (here find Sumner and the naturalists, 
as well as Fiske and Abbott). The second, viewing the 
"struggle" for survival as an immanent process, generated 
an essentially liberal response (here find Leconte, Ward 
and Social Gospellers in general). While the distinction 
is instructive, however, it remains irrelevant to the pre­
sent argument since both evolutionary "schools" built their 
models on the same philosophic ground, as the following 
makes clear. Furthermore, a correlative argument could be 
made that these two "strains" of American Darwinism drew on 
the two operative components of American Ramism -- tech- 
nologia and eupraxia. For a discussion of the ambiguities 
of Darwinian struggle see Peter J. Bowler, "Malthus, Darwin 
and the Concept of Struggle," JHI 37(1976):631-650.
83. Herein lay the fundamental difference between 
Spencer and his American counterparts. Spencer mixed Lock­
ean empiricism with mechanics to develop what Bergson would 
later call "a false evolutionism" (Creative Evolution 
(London, 1907), xiv). He presented an essentially static 
model which equated progress with "persistence" and goals 
with "an impassable limit" (First Principles (New York, 
1903), 369). William Graham Sumner, on the other hand 
assumed the evolutionary efficacy of Protestant ideals. 
Sumner and his disciples refused to divorce the message of 
evolution from the "gospel of progress." Evolution, Rock­
efeller claimed "is merely the working-out of a law of 
nature and a law of God" (Quoted in Hofstadter, Social Dar­
winism . 45). Moreover, not only was evolution teleological 
-- it was open-ended. "There is no conceivable end to 
[man’s] march to perfection," Carnegie claimed, refuting 
Spencer (Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (Boston, 1920), 
327). Most significantly in the present context, American 
"Spencerians" retained a Ramean epistemology. Using a 
striking mixture of Ramean and Baconian metaphors, Sumner 
described experience as "a mixture of convention and
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wonder, half prudence, half gambling. What we call 'brute 
facts'...are partly to be understood as normal events, 
partly as 'acts of God'” (Schneider, History. 353). This 
desire to preserve the rational character of the inventive 
intelligence and minimize fortuitous instincts clearly dif­
ferentiates American from English "Spencerianism."
84. Drawing on a Jeffersonian view of biological com­
munity, the Social Gospellers constructed a reform ideology 
which refuted Darwinism as a conservative rationale and 
incorporated evolutionary theory into a program for social 
action. Henry George gave this "reforming Darwinism" its 
clearest quantitative expression in Progress and Poverty 
(1879) where he used a statistical approach to affirm the 
ability of political action to change the curve of develop­
ment outlined by Malthus and Spencer. Lester Ward gave it 
a philosophical base in his Dynamic Sociology (1883), argu­
ing from a distinction between telic and genetic phenomena 
to a conception of progress as a moral imperative rather 
than a physical law. Given fanciful expression and popular 
appeal in Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, the gospel of 
cooperation claimed the scientific ability to change "the 
conditions of human life...and with them the motives of 
human action" (Looking Backward (Boston, 1889), 60-61). It 
is interesting in the present context to compare this 
moralistic approach to scientific reform with its French 
counterpart, Saint-Simonian Technocracy. For Saint-Simon, 
the principle of cooperation expressed a social law driven 
by physiological mechanisms. For George and Ward it 
remained a moral law grounded in psychological structure. 
For a relevant discussion see R. B. Carlisle "The Birth of 
Technocracy: Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians," JHI
35(1974):445-464. Schneider comments on the necessity of 
viewing reform Darwinism "as indigenous and not merely as 
an extension of European movements" (History. 191).
85. According to the theists, Darwin had provided an 
evolutionary proof of God far more potent than the New­
tonian argument from design. "He who has mastered the Dar­
winian theory," Fiske claimed, "sees that in the deadly 
struggle for existence which has raged throughout countless 
aeons of time, the whole creation has been groaning and 
travailing together in order to bring forth that last con­
summate specimen of God’s handiwork, the Human Soul" 
(Miscellaneous Writings (Boston, 1884), IX, 19). Evolution 
in fact proclaimed a gospel of good cheer which identified 
redemption as a promise incarnate in the objective 
processes of nature itself (Ibid., VII, 184). Although in 
most cases the Christianity of the "theistic evolutionists" 
proved purely nominal (see particularly Frank Abbott's 
epistemological critique in Scientific Theism (1885)), 
their arguments were marshalled in support of an orthodox 
theology and a conservative ethic.
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86. "Organic evolution," Leconte maintained, "is by 
vis a tergo, a pushing upward and forward from below and 
behind." In social evolution, however, growth occurred "by 
a vis a fronte, a drawing upward and forward from above and 
in front by an aspiration, an attraction toward an ideal." 
The course of history represented a dialectical interchange 
between the two ("The Theory of Evolution and Social Pro­
gress," The Monist 5(July 1895 ):492-493). Like Hegel’s 
scheme, Leconte’s theory culminated on an ideal plane. But 
unlike Hegel, Leconte described an indefinite social 
advance characterized by a "residual accumulation" of 
reasonableness through which the ultimate laws of nature 
would be fulfilled (Evolution: Its Nature. Its Evidences , 
and Its Relation to Religious Thought (New York, 1894), 65- 
66). Variants of this idealism, from "Plato Clubs" to 
Christian Science, reached out into American life 
throughout the last decades of the 19th Century. Most 
clearly articulated by the St. Louis Hegelians and by 
Bronson Alcott's version of New England Transcendentalism, 
these movements voiced the persistent American desire to 
incorporate present experience into a wider spiritual econ­
omy. More pertinent to the present context, however, is 
the ultimate failure of "imported" idealisms to flourish 
unaltered in the American intellectual milieu.
87. Substantial support exists for assuming the 
predominance of Puritan and Ramean paradigms in the 
scientific debates over evolution. Van Wyck Brooks argues 
for Boston as the dominant "culture-city" after Spengler’s 
model (Flowering. 1936), 526-527), while Robert Bruce 
quotes a contemporary as claiming that Boston was "the only 
city where anything of account is done for science". Bruce 
pointB out that "it was evidently the human factor, the 
spirit, the values and resources of the people, that 
chiefly nurtured Boston science" (Launching. 32-35). Kuk- 
lick confirms this view (The Rise of American Philosophy 
(New Haven, 1977), xviii), while Stow Persons describes a 
characteristic "Protestant scholasticism" which, emanating 
from New England, ”provide[d] intellectual stability and 
order" to the nation (Minds. 202). Moreover, as Daniels 
points out, the centering of the initial round of debates 
in Boston ensured that the issues would be articulated in 
metaphors consistent with a New England "perspective”
(Jackson. 243). Only in the South, in fact, where they 
were "imbued with the spirit of Locke" did this dominant 
influence breakdown (Irving Bartlett, The American Mind in 
Mid-19th Century (New York, 1967), 115-116).
88. The idea of purpose, translated into an ideal of 
progress, displayed unique characteristics in the American 
context. "The American idea of progress was one intrinsi­
cally satisfied with most things as they were," Rush Welter 
points out. In America, progress would occur "within the
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framework of the existing social order." This American 
perspective, which Welter calls "a habit of mind,” clearly 
differentiated "the whole complex of American thought and 
behavior from that of Europe" ("The Idea of Progress in 
America: An Essay in Ideas and Methods," JHI 16(1955 ):404- 
405, 407). The present argument would locate the source of 
this "habit of mind" in a Ramean commitment to continuity.
89. "If the study of physics has taught us anything," 
Fiske argued, "it is that nowhere in Nature is inertness or 
quiescence to be found. All is quivering with energy" (The 
Idea of God as Affected by Modern Knowledge (Cambridge, 
1887), 149-150).
90. Sumner’s "folkways" expressed the evolutionary 
counterpart of Scottish "moral sense". As "the rules of 
the game" derived from experience and crystallized into 
laws, they provided a convenient rationale for political 
conservatism. But from a logical point of view, they reas­
serted the primacy of antecedent structure over discrete 
events. As symbolic renderings of environmental circum­
stances, Sumner’s "folkways" represented a peculiarly 
American synthesis of a Ramean heritage and the Darwinian 
hypothes is.
91. Ward's "telic structures" differed from Sumner’s 
"folkways" only in that they were functional and instrumen­
tal rather than merely symbolic. "The knowledge of experi­
ence," Ward claimed, is "a genetic product" which builds 
upon antecendent forms to supply rules for action under 
present conditions (Dynamic Sociology (New York, 1883), II, 
539). It is interesting in the present context to note 
that Ward differentiated between biologic and telic evolu­
tion in the classic Ramean terms "natural" and "artificial" 
and that his description of education as "the great 
panacea" had clear Comenian overtones.
92. "Our reason demands that there shall be a 
reasonableness in the constitution of things," Fiske argued 
in clear Ramean images. This rational constitution, woven 
on "the roaring loom of Time [as an] endless web of 
events ... make[s] more and more clearly visible the living 
garment of God" (Writings of John Fiske (Cambridge, 1902), 
118, 188-189). The logical patrimony is patent, becoming 
even more so as Fiske, following Edwards, disparages the 
"apparent antagonism between Science and Religion" and 
argues for the "epic of nature" as a palpable path to 
objective truth (Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (London, 
1874), I, 184).
93. According to Leconte, no evolving form was 
entirely new. "There is always a residuum, which accumlat- 
ing throughout geological times, goes to form the cycle of
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the earth's life and development" ("The Natural Law of Cir­
culation," Proceedings of the California State Teachers 
Institute. Sept. 13-16(1871): 66, 62). Leconte’s 
"residuum" clearly differentiated his developmental scheme 
from that of Lamarck and, in the absence of any cogent 
genetic theory, from that of Darwin also. Evolution, he 
maintained, was merely "a law of derivation" ("Theory of 
Evolution...," 487). Again, the controlling metaphors, as 
well as the synoptic focus, are clearly Ramean.
94. Louis Agassiz, "Evolution and the Permanence of 
Type," Atlantic Monthly 33(1874):95.
Chapter 9 
RAMUS. LEIBNIZ AND PEIRCE: 
Metaphors of Continuity 
in
Pragmatic Thought
By the 1870’s, when Charles Peirce applied himself to 
the task, several American theorists had already supplied 
important negative critiques of traditional logical models. 
But none seemed able to shore up their critique with a 
positive program sufficiently flexible to support both 
their individual philosophic concerns and the meth­
odological demands of evolution. Evolutionary models con­
tained an element of rudimentary contingency which seemed 
impervious to logical analysis. As Francis Bowen put it, 
"the tendency of Mr. Darwin’s theory...is to enlarge the 
domain of what is... arbitrary and contingent. ...[He] 
denies that the same physical antecedents are always fol­
lowed by the same consequents; he affirms that irregular 
and unexpected variations are perpetually interrupting the 
chain of orderly succession.”1 Chauncy Wright attempted an 
analytical explanation of these variations in his discus­
sion of the Unconditioned, but ended by employing the whim­
sical image of "cosmical weather" to accomodate it to his
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philosophy. His confusion before the randomness explicit 
in Darwinian theory emerged in a tortured equation which he 
gave as "the precise formula" for determining its impact.* 
Wright’s attempt to calculate the operation of random 
factors through the absolute variables of a mathematical 
equation expressed the essence of the methodological 
dilemma faced by logicians as they wrestled with the 
theoretical implications of Darwinism. For the logical 
analog of contingency is probability, not arithmetic. And 
although previous empirical philosophies had acknowledged 
the importance of probability, none had inquired into the 
logical or analytical relations which governed its opera­
tion. Bacon, for instance, had invoked a rudimentary form 
of probability in his Tables of Presence and Absence as 
well as in his gradualist interpretation of "prerogative 
instances."3 Similarly, Locke had acknowledged the impor­
tance of probable relations but had declared analogy as 
their "great rule," thereby neutralizing their potential 
impact on science.4 Of all the empiricists, only Hume 
seemed to have a mathematical conception of probability, 
but he limited its operation to those verifiable physical 
events which could be quantified.9 Significantly, all 
these theories remained non-additive -- that is, they had 
no means of accounting for the impact which one probability 
statement had on another. Hence, they could provide no 
mechanism for reckoning the cumulative aspects of develop-
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ment which stood in need of logical justification after 
1859.•
The natural laws which had underwritten Enlightenment 
science had existed outside of space and time on a plane of 
absolute mathematical certainty.7 The copula linking their 
constituent parts had thus found adequate expression in the 
equal sign and the verb to be. But evolution demanded a 
new logical grammar controlled by partial conjunctions 
which could express the manifold existential relationships 
it described. It demanded a modal logic which could give 
full scope to the constructive aspects of development and 
yet provide an objective reference for the heuristic 
process it implied. In many ways, it required an inversion 
of mental attitude curiously congruent to a Ramean logical 
paradigm.
Colonial Ramists had trafficked in cognitive relations. 
They had explicitly defined inquiry as "discourse" -- that 
is, as a methodology akin to grammar which assumed rather 
than verified its constituent terms and concentrated on 
determining the semantic relationships which governed them. 
Ramism construed inquiry as a means to determine the con­
nections which pertained between the content of logical 
loci. Its processes of invention and colocation served to 
arrange terms in objective patterns which the mind assessed 
against cognitive "templates" through the operation of 
judgement. These "templates," which structured man’s
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innate rationality, contained not only the outlines of 
providential design, but the accumulated wisdom of the 
race, stored for recall through inquiry.
Moreover, Ramism supplied a logical mechanism for 
expressing the adaptation of means to ends which lay at the 
heart of the evolutionary process. Ramist eupraxia could 
easily extend its principles to encompass the functional 
relationships which Darwin suggested between an organism 
and its environment. And technologia could provide a con­
venient framework within which to analyze biological change 
as a function of a permanent process. The Ramean substruc­
tures which supported American intellectual life thus had 
the potential to provide a philosophic platform for a 
processive theory of inquiry appropriate to a Darwinian 
world-view.
But the controlling metaphors of Ramean logic had been 
spatial. Under Ramean method, discourse had aimed 
primarily at providing a "map of the mind" -- a diagram­
matic representation of the contents of consciousness which 
could govern the disposition of terms. Significantly, the 
relationships among those terms, while objective, remained 
static. They had no temporal reference. Evolutionary doc­
trine, by contrast, effectively subsumed all relationships 
under the notion of process. It placed all phenomena, 
including causation, in a temporal frame.' Evolution, in 
effect, demanded not only a map of the mind, but a history
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as well. American theorists thus needed to accomplish a 
fundamental shift in metaphors before they could adapt 
their logical heritage to the demands of the new science. 
They needed to invest their static spatial analogies with a 
temporal dimension.
This was precisely the methodological task which 
Charles Peirce undertook in his cognitive theories, which 
set forth a processive theory of inquiry conceived as 
propaedeutic to a realist reconstruction of science. 
Peirce's logical theories established American logic in a 
trajectory which would carry it well into the 20th Century. 
In the present context, they also serve to demonstrate the 
persistence of Ramean metaphors in the substructures of 
American thought.
Peirce came upon his analysis peculiarly well- 
conditioned to grasp both its philosophic content and its 
logical scope. Born into what Van Wyck Brooks has called 
"the younger generation of 1849," Peirce matured in an 
intellectual atmosphere saturated with the philosophic con­
cerns of a Puritanism declining into reaction.* It is sig­
nificant in the present context to note that Peirce, alone 
among the later pragmatists, received no education abroad 
but developed his thought entirely within the confines of 
New England. Although he travelled extensively with the 
Geodetic Survey in pursuit of a livelihood and read widely 
across continental sources, his philosophical development
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proceeded almost exclusively within the intellectual orbit 
of Cambridge.1* Reared in a heterodox home where 
scientists of the stature of Agassiz, Gibbs and Gray fre­
quently joined Longfellow and Emerson in lively debate, 
Peirce absorbed the eclectic biases of a generation of 
self-conscious provincials who perceived as their revised 
errand the task of leading America forward to an indigenous 
culture.
Peirce's family had intimate ties with Harvard, where 
his grandfather had been Librarian and institutional his­
torian. His own father, a remarkable scholar steeped in 
mathematical lore and Unitarian theism, held chairs there 
throughout his career, as did his brother. During his 
youth, Charles enjoyed the best that the Harvard tradition 
had to offer and reaped the mature fruits of its 
intellectual atmosphere. Indeed until 1879, when he left 
for Johns Hopkins, Peirce remained immersed in the Harvard 
milieu. By the time he left its controlling influence, he 
had substantially matured as a thinker. Moreover, after 
Peirce left Baltimore, one scholar points out, he "lived in 
almost total isolation. Although he kept up a large cor­
respondence and followed the journals at least sporadi­
cally, he was not in direct contact with the men who were 
doing new and exciting work even in his own fields."11 
This intellectual isolation probably served to intensify 
and deepen Peirce’s reliance on those models which had
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governed his early intellectual life -- models which the 
present argument would identify as Ramean.
Charles frequently acknowledged his intellectual debt 
to his father, claiming "if I do anything it will be his 
work.”12 A brilliant mathematician who held chairs in 
mathematics, natural philosophy and astronomy, the elder 
Peirce also held strong views on the religious implications 
of science and expounded a philosophy which, like that of 
Colonial Ramists, claimed a special adaptation of the human 
mind to nature. He believed that knowledge of nature gave 
insight into God’s purposive plan and that inquiry and 
faith traced coordinate paths to truth. "The mind of man 
and that of Nature’s God must work in the same channels," 
he argued, explicitly identifying the pursuit of science as 
a correlary of religious duty.12 A proponent of the 
nebular hypothesis, he also subscribed to a pre-Darwinian 
view of cosmic evolution which maintained the action of a 
creative force in the initiation of a developmental process 
whose subsequent progression occurred according to 
universal laws.
Under his father’s tutelage, Peirce honed his substan­
tial analytical powers on a rigorous regimen of logic, 
mathematics and theory, and by the age of 25, had succumbed 
to an intense preoccupation with logic which would shape 
and direct his thought throughout his life. Thomas Goudge 
describes how Charles, while "still of tender age,...was
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given a table of logarithms, with one example of how to use 
it to find the logarithm of a number, and another to 
illustrate the multiplication of numbers by logarithms. 
Beyond that the boy had to fend for himself in the mat­
ter."14 Peirce himself relates how his father would 
require that he repeat the demonstrations of various 
philosophers and then "in a very few words would usually 
rip them up and show them empty."1* "From the moment when I 
could think at all,” Peirce claimed from the vantage point 
of 40 years, "I have been diligently and incessantly 
occupied with the study of methods [of] inquiry, both of 
those which have been and are pursued and those which ought 
to be pursued."1* "It was the topic to which he looked for 
the most enlightenment in philosophy," James Feibleman 
notes. "He studied all the logic he could find and probably 
read more books on the subject than any other student of 
his day."1 *
Peirce developed his own logic as a systematic reaction 
to European logical models -- a task for which his idiosyn­
cratic background had prepared him well.1* Deeply read in 
continental sources and trained in critical analysis by his 
formidable father, Peirce demonstrated his analytical 
skills in a series of methodological critiques which early 
betrayed the distinctly American character of his 
thought.1* In 1860, with the revealing invocation "I pray 
thee, O Father, to help me regard my innate ideas as objec­
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tively real," Peirce embarked on a philosophic odyssey in 
search of a method which could bring the increasingly 
urgent demands of experimental science into conformity with 
the conceptual demands of his own intellectual heritage.20 
"Science [had] hitherto been proceeding without the guid­
ance of any rational theory of logic," he would write later 
in life. "In my opinion, the time [had] come when it ought 
to be provided with a logic."21 Turning first to a com­
mentary on Kant, then to a critique of British empiricism 
and finally to a rejection of Cartesian psychologism,
Peirce had arrived by 1877 at a characteristic theory of 
inquiry which would survive the many tortured turns his 
philosophy would take over the course of his career.
Peirce’s later thought, which one can quote to support 
a variety of positions, can in fact be separated biographi- 
cally from his earlier works in logic considered here. The 
years between 1859 and 1879, a period which qualifies as 
"formative" for Peirce, found him confined almost com­
pletely within the Cambridge intellectual milieu. But in 
1879, less than a year after completing his crucial 
Illustrations of the Logic of Science, Peirce left Cam­
bridge for Baltimore where, presumably, a wider range of 
philosophic influences came to bear on his thought. Sig­
nificantly, however, Kuklick points out that when scholars 
look to Peirce for logical insights, they go "almost exclu­
sively to the published series of works that Peirce pro­
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duced in the 1860's and 1870’s.'' Boler concurs, adding 
that the logic developed during this period "does not drop 
out of his writings at all; on the contrary, it gains 
increasing prominence. 2 The present argument, of course, 
gains force by accepting the chronology of Kuklick and 
Boler, since those works written before 1879 provide the 
strongest evidence for the persistence of Ramean models.
As early as 1859, Peirce began transforming Kantian 
categories into his own triadic conception of reality. In 
Axioms of Intuition After Kant, he fused Kant’s "space" and 
"time” into a characteristic notion of a "third dimension." 
In 1865, in his seventh Harvard Lecture, he related Kant’s 
categories directly to issues in the logic of science. In 
1866 he laid out his own Method of Searching for the 
Categories, which led him a year later to his New List of 
Categories, considered by Peirce himself as his "one con­
tribution to philosophy ...the gift I make to the world."23
The key to Peirce’s Kantian critique lay in his 
insistence on the central role of sign relations in the 
structure and function of arguments, an inquiry to which he 
"devoted more labor...than to any other single field of 
research." By insisting that all reasoning consisted in 
sign relations, Peirce in a sense went behind Kant’s 
categories to examine the structural elements which 
underwrote their validity. In doing so, he neutralized the 
central Kantian notion of the ding an sich and replaced it
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with his own notion of reality grounded in relation. "The 
great and fundamental secret of the logic of science," 
Peirce claimed, is that "there is no term, properly so 
called, which is entirely destitute of information." Hence 
"there can be no conception of the absolutely incognizable, 
since nothing of that sort occurs in experience." In 1871 
he pointed out that his own idea of reality was "instantly 
fatal to the idea of a thing in itself."*1 Like Miller's 
good Puritan, Peirce declared that "cognizability. . . and 
being are... synonymous terms."** The result, Feibleman 
claims, "was the complete objectification of the Kantian 
system."*•
Peirce focused his critique of British empiricism on 
its associationist assumptions, which denied the shared 
elements of experience essential to Ramism. He declared 
Locke's psychological critique "wholly inadequate and 
false,” and argued, against Mill, that logic must extend to 
those "circumstances [which] are not within the range of 
our experience." Significantly, he identified Whewell as 
"the most profound [English] writer upon our subject," 
saying that his works contained "at least the possible germ 
of a strictly logical doctrine of induction." Comte he 
described as "helplessly restricted to a single 
intellectual point of view, while Mill, about whom "the 
worst thing to be said...is that he is an admirer of August
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Comte," he accused of falling victim to a p'jtitio principii 
through his excessive reliance on association.*1
Pointing out "the peculiarities of the English mind," 
Peirce criticized the empiricists as "a somewhat insular 
group of thinkers...[whose] chief methodological character­
istic.^..is the application of Ockham’s razor...to every­
thing which looks like a metaphysical superfluity." Asso- 
ciationism, he claimed "has nothing to do with logic what­
soever," repeatedly referring to the "peculiar lines of 
thought" which ran through English logic as a "certain fam­
ily resemblance" grounded in a "nominalistic tendency."** 
His critique culminated in the 1871 Review of Fraser's 
Berkeley, which consolidated his position into a fully 
articulated allegiance to a realism grounded in consensual 
Knowledge.
But Peirce reserved his most devastating critique for 
Descartes. "If Kant was his teacher, and Duns Scotus his 
friend,” Feibleman claims, "Descartes was his adversary.”** 
Peirce launched a major offensive against Descartes’ 
psychologism in three articles which appeared in the 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy beginning in 1868.*° In 
the first, Peirce redefined Cartesian intuition and intro­
spection as mediated inferential processes. In the second, 
he mounted an attack on the Cartesian pretension to 
universal doubt and innatism. Descartes, Peirce claimed 
had mistakenly confined reasoning to ”a single thread of
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inference depending upon inconspicuous preiisses," ignoring 
the fact that inference "derives its validity from its com­
bining the character of induction and hypothesis" (pace 
Bacon and Ramus!).11
Peirce reenforced this position in the third article in 
the series, which defended the syllogism on the purely 
Wolffian grounds that "the relation between syllogism and 
thought does not spring from considerations of formal 
logic, but from those of psychology" -- that is, from the 
natural structures of the mind. He recapped these argu­
ments in his Lessons in Practical Logic in 1869 where, sig­
nificantly, he quoted Peter of Spain in his own defense.
"It would be difficult indeed to overstate the importance 
of these three papers in the Peircean corpus,” Fisch 
claims.11 The present argument would certainly agree, 
since they led directly into the arguments presented in his 
Illustrations of the Logic of Science, for which they pro­
vide a curiously Ramean backdrop.
Scholars, encouraged by Peirce's own admission that as 
"a babe in philosophy [his] bottle was filled from the 
udders of Kant," as well as by the tenor and sheer volume 
of textual references, have generally given Kantian 
philosophy priority in discussing the origins of Peirce's 
thought.11 Research by Max Fisch, however, suggests an 
interesting dimension to Peirce’s abundantly analyzed
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ambivalence toward Kant -- a dimension which has special 
relevance for the present argument.
Fisch argues for a determining influence on Peirce’s 
thought by the writings of Leibniz. "The name of Leibniz 
was familiar in the Peirce household and in the Cambridge 
of his youth," he points out. "His father was a leading 
member of the Cambridge Scientific Club, which had several 
meetings on Leibniz.” Moreover, Fisch notes, throughout 
Peirce's college career -- that is, before and during that 
time during which scholars normally portray Peirce as 
immersed in Kant -- Benjamin Peirce was preparing and pub­
lishing his Analytic Mechanics, which "contained an appen­
dix arguing for a return to Leibniz' position on the force 
of moving bodies.” In 1876, just before Peirce began his 
Illustrations, Benjamin published his last work, "A New 
System of Binary Arithmetic," which he compared step by 
step with Leibniz' system.*4
It seems likely, in the light of Fisch’s observations, 
that Leibniz would have been a regular topic of sympathetic 
debate in the Peirce household during an important phase of 
Charles* intellectual development -- a phase which led into 
his critique of Kant. Fisch suggests that "while accepting 
without change scarcely any of his positive doctrines, 
Peirce identified himself more closely with Leibniz than 
with any other thinker." Leroy Loemker lends support to 
Fisch’s argument, claiming that Peirce "knew Leibniz better
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than any other Aaerican of his time.”*® Indeed, not only 
did Peirce’s exposure to Leibnizian logic preceed his 
exposure to that of Kant, Fisch claims, but Peirce’s read­
ing of Kant in fact proceeded in the context of "the liter­
ature in the light of which it was to be understood; espe­
cially ... Leibniz and Wolff."*®
"Peirce was no Kantian," Feibleman agrees, pointing out 
that Kantian philosophy remained "a discipline rather than 
a revelation of the truth” to Peirce and served him 
primarily as a negative example. Nor, he adds, did Peirce 
emerge as a neo-Kantian. "While [he] owed much in the 
formation of his philosophy to the influence of Kant, the 
result was not Kant’s philosophy nor even that of a good
Kantian." "In this distinction," he argueB, "is contained
the key to the understanding of much in Peirce's whole
position."*7 Kant’s Critique, although at first praised by 
Peirce as "perhaps the greatest work of the human 
intellect" was ultimately rejected as "in reality nothing 
more portentous than a sickly little nanny-goat masquerad­
ing as a world-shatterer," while Leibniz, by contrast, 
remained "the Columbus of the subconscious mind." "The 
reasoning of Leibniz," Peirce claimed, "was nearly, if not 
quite, of the highest order, being far more accurate than 
that of Kant or almost any metaphysicians that can be 
named." Kant, although "constituted by nature a great
logician, [was] not indeed to be compared with Leibniz, who
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in his later years, in his infinitesinal calculus, in his 
law of continuity... soared high above his earlier 
nominal ism. ’’* •
Fisch conjectures that Peirce’s persistent and out­
spoken preference for Leibniz over Kant may well mark his 
"first steps from nominalism toward realism.”1* Indeed 
Peirce’s fascination for scholastic realism, and for Duns 
Scotus in particular, dates from precisely the period which 
Fisch describes.40 Peirce turned to Scotus after, and in 
reaction to, his study of Kant and it was in his reading of 
Scotus that he found justification for his own logical 
program. "Pragmatism,” Peirce himself later pointed out, 
"could hardly have entered a head that was not already con­
vinced that there are real generals."41 By 1868, Peirce 
was ready to identify hiB position with scholastic realism 
and, by 1869, had identified that realism with the concept 
of continuity. By 1871, he had explicitly identified his 
own logic of science with Scotist realism and had concluded 
that "science has alwayB been at heart realistic, and must 
always be so."41
All these factors lead Fisch to claim that, in certain 
respects, Peirce’s pragmatism "was a  matter of going on 
from where Leibniz left off."41 If Fisch's reading of the 
documents is correct, Peirce’s enduring sympathy for "the 
glorious logical strength of Leibniz” may have important 
implications for the current argument, which would further
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claim that this affinity in fact rested on deep-seated 
resonances between Leibniz’ "great principle of continuity" 
and Peirce’s own native Ramean heritage.**
Synechism, "or the principle of universal con­
tinuity. . .which is involved in all existence," played a 
central role in Peirce’s thought.** "We ought to assume 
things to be continuous as far as we can," Peirce 
insisted.** In fact, he identified his own intellectual 
errand as the task of "carrying the idea of Continuity into 
all parts of philosophy."*7 As early as 1867, Peirce 
propounded a theory of continuity similar to Leibniz’ 
own.** In 1868, he reiterated that principle in three 
papers on the validity of the laws of logic.** In 1884, he 
again endorsed continuity, attributing the principle 
directly to Leibniz and in 1899 claimed, in a review of 
Renouvier’s La Nouvelle Monadology, that the principle of 
continuity "would form the basis of a philosophy in deepest 
unison with the ideas of the last half of the 19th 
Century."*0 Indeed as late as 1893, Peirce was still 
articulating a theory close to Leibniz’ in a discussion of 
the evolution of natural laws.*1 His later interest in 
topical geometry, existential graphs, and semiotics all 
maintained this persistent commitment to continuity.*1 
Peirce’s entire phenomenology in fact had harmonics in a 
Ramean logical paradigm.
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Although Peirce did not articulate his phenomenology, 
or phaneroscopy, until around 1900, indications of it 
appear in his thought as early as 1867, during that period 
in which Fisch describes him as "under the influence" of 
Leibniz. And Peirce’s phaneroscopy in fact contains clear 
echoes of Ramean metaphors. The Ramist ideal of an acces­
sible order totally within the ambit of the conscious mind 
emerged in his definition of philosophy as "an experimental 
science, resting on that experience which is common to us 
all." Truth is only necessary, Peirce argued, "in the sense 
that all the world knows beyond all doubt those truths of 
experience upon which [it] is founded." For Peirce, as for 
Ramus, philosophy, as "the most primal of all the positive 
sciences" rested always on the Ramean presuppositions that 
the phanera remained fundamentally the same for everyone, 
and were completely accessible to rational inquiry.5*
The conceptual congruences between Peircean and Ramean 
logic extend as well to Peirce’s theories of classification 
and communication. One need only insert the word "place" 
to make Peirce read like a Ramist when he defines a natural 
class as "a family whose members are the sole offspring and 
vehicles of one idea." His description of classification 
as "a kind of Argument by which general ideas are attached 
to the objects of experience," as well as his claims that 
thought "invariably needs something like a diagram" or 
"tabular array of familiar symbols” to make itself clear
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all employed explicit Ramean images. His faith in the 
argument as the fundamental logical form, his designation 
of judgement as the source of "leading principles," and his 
reliance on the intermediate step of colocation all echoed 
Ramean metaphors. Moreover, Peirce, in his semiotic, hoped 
to resuscitate the Ramean discipline of "Speculative 
Rhetoric" as "the highest and most living branch of 
logic."**
It is difficult, however, to demonstrate substantive 
ties between Ramean logic proper and Peirce’s philosophy. 
The Collected Papers contain only three references to 
Ramus, while Fisch’s Chronological Edition adds only three 
others to date. Fortunately for this author, Fisch has 
completed his Chronological Edition through 1878, the year 
in which the final Illustration appeared. The material 
contained therein can thus be construed as indicative of 
those Ramean factors which might have effected the forma­
tion of the argument Peirce makes in these crucial essays.
Unfortunately, the references are scattered and 
ambiguous. In one included in Fisch’s edition, Peirce 
brackets Ramus with Kant as a reformer in logic and 
science; in another he links him with Cicero and comments 
(negatively) on his rhetorical focus; in a third he links 
Ramus with Agricola and "the peculiarities of the humanist 
mind. In this same passage, however, Peirce significantly 
accuses Bacon and Locke of "putting aside the old syl­
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logistic and topics as though they contained something 
false, instead of being only incomplete.*9 In two of the 
references contained in the Collected Papers, Peirce shows 
some familiarity with Ramean texts themselves and includes 
Ramus in an etymological account of the Kantian term 
Kritik. In the third, he describes Ramus as representative 
of "a new awakening" which brought "rather important things 
to the tradition of logic." Here he ranks Ramus with Vives 
and Valla.59 In a later reference in a review of Greens- 
let's Joseph Glanvilie, Peirce credits Ramus with "attack­
ing Aristotle in large round style" and links him with 
G iordano Bruno.9 T
Yet in the present context, even this meager evidence 
proves significant. The fact that a logician of Peirce's 
stature would decline to analyze in depth the texts of a 
logician of Ramus’ stripe is not surprising. But the 
references show that Peirce, through his extensive read­
ings, had become familiar with Ramean models -- something 
which probably could not be said of most of his con­
temporaries. Significantly when the editors of the Century 
Dictionary needed entries on "Ramism" and "Ramist," they 
turned to Peirce, whose subsequent contributions described 
Ramism as a logical system "characterized by simplicity and 
good sense, [which] was set forth with some literary 
skill.”99
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Indeed, Peirce’s education and family background make 
it almost inconceivable that Peirce could have escaped some 
contact with Ramean texts in his early methodological 
inquiries. And the fact remains that Peirce found occasion 
to mention Ramus several times in his writings without 
seriously attacking him -- a priviledge not enjoyed by most 
other logicians. Moreover, Peirce’s sympathies for the 
philosophical implications of Ramism, though unattributed, 
emerge clearly in his own methodological orientation and in 
his adoption of those elements of Leibniz' thought which 
represent survivals of the Ramism which underwrote the 
German models discussed above.
Peirce declared his methodological affiliation early on 
in a note which described "two methods of viewing 
metaphysics which give rise to two methods of treating it. 
One starts by drawing the conceptions from logical rela­
tions and thence reasoning to their place in the mind; the 
other starts by drawing the conceptions from the system of 
psychology and reasoning to their logical meaning. The 
former," he decided, "seems to me, if less psychologically 
exact, to be more metaphysically true in its results, and 
it is the method I adopt."*• This methodological commit­
ment, with its clear Ramean overtones, remained firm 
throughout Peirce’s career.
The tie between Ramus and Peirce resides in fact in 
biography, not bibliography. Absorbed as a latent value
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system through the Cambridge intellectual milieu, his 
father's philosophical biases and the educational atmos­
phere of 19th Century Harvard, Peirce’s ''Ramism” appears in 
his writings as a commitment to those realist substructures 
which had governed American intellectual life since the 
founding of the Citty. His entire cosmology, with its 
explicit defense of "cosmic reasonableness" and "collective 
wisdom,” rests upon an ontology which, like Ramus’ own, 
acknowledged the reality of the shared elements of human 
experience.
Peirce held that logic comprised "the traditional expe­
rience of mankind." Thus it not only controlled inquiry, 
it revealed the actual structure of reality itself. These 
functions merged in the science of Bemiotic, which began 
with the Ramean assumption of a universe held in common 
through experience. Semiotic incorporated under its prin­
ciples "the total everyday experience of many generations 
of multitudinous populations."*0 Fisch claims that Peirce 
had committed himself to a semiotic view as early as 1868 
and was, at his death, still hard at work on 'A System of 
Logic Considered as Semiotic’. In fact, Fisch places all 
Peirce’s work in logic within a semiotic framework.*1 But 
this extension of logic to semiosis drew on directly on 
Peirce’s affinity for medieval logicians, Peter of Spain 
among them.** Moreover, it had harmonics in Peirce’s 
Ramean heritage, where the crucial doctrine of the logos
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provided it with a platform, as well as in the Comenian 
tradition which had remade German logic in the Ramean image 
-- an influence which in turn came to bear on Peirce 
through Leibniz.
Paul Conkin characterizes Peirce as one of "the last 
spiritual children of Puritan New England," a latter-day 
Saint who sought principles of rational order which would 
ultimately illuminate the purpose of the natural world.*1 
Drawing on powerful metaphors embedded deep in his 
intellectual heritage, Peirce set out to develop a logical 
system which could heal the rift between fact and form 
caused by science in the modern world. Like a good Ramist, 
he attempted in his logic to construct a probative frame­
work within which a cognitive covenant could link conduct 
and concept through a bond of meaning. This covenant, 
articulated most clearly in his Illustrations of the Logic 
of Science, proved to be one of the most enduring elements 
of Peirce’s shifting and often paradoxical thought.
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As Fisch’s chronology makes clear, by 1872 Peirce had 
committed himself almost exclusively to a methodological 
inquiry which culminated five years later in his Illustra­
tions of the Logic of Science.1 The Illustrations, which 
dared to acknowledge the sweeping philosophic implications 
of modern science, presented a cogent argument for a moder 
ate realism recast in a scientific image.* Peirce strove 
therein to provide a synoptic synthesis of order and func­
tion which could serve as logical ground for both the grad 
ualism implicit in evolution and the hypothetical 
inferences inherent in theoretical forms. Through a radi­
cal reformulation of experience grounded in biological 
function, Peirce dissolved meaning and method into alterna 
tive, though individually valid and purposively distinct, 
environmental responses. The resulting cognitive theory, 
which embraced Peirce's pragmatic maxim, made all 
intellectual meaning ultimately a matter of purposive 
action and tied existential fact to the very structure of 
thought.
The first Illustration appeared in 1877 under the title 
"The Fixation of Belief." Here Peirce undertook, through 
an analysis of the conditions of inquiry, to establish an 
objective ground for those "guiding principles of 
inference" for which he had argued in his earlier criti­
ques. "To describe the method of scientific investigation 
is the object of this series of papers," he affirmed. But 
"since each chief step in science has been a lesson in 
logic,” an analysis of "those rules of reasoning which are 
deduced from the very idea of the process itself" and which 
therefore "are the most essential," must precede any dis­
cussion of science. "A moment's thought will show,” he 
argued, "that a variety of facts are already assumed when 
the logical question is first asked. It is implied, for 
instance, that there are such states of mind as doubt and 
belief -- that a passage from one to the other is possible, 
...and that this transition is subject to some rules which 
all minds alike are bound by.” Only by understanding the 
grounds of this logical "transition," Peirce maintained, 
could one truly comprehend the methods of science.3
"The object of reasoning," Peirce observed, "is to find 
out, from the consideration of what we already know, some­
thing elBe which we do not know." But "that which 
determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference 
rather than another, is some habit of mind.”« These 
habits, he claimed, derived from an experiential passage
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from doubt to belief which "reminds us of the irritation of 
a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby."® Pointing 
out that "we generally know when we wish to ask a question 
and when we wish to pronounce a judgement," Peirce argued 
that there must be "a dissimilarity between the sensation 
of doubting and believing." The first surfaced as "an 
uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to 
free ourselves," while the second emerged as "a calm and 
satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid." The 
struggle involved in the passage from one to the other, 
Peirce concluded, must encompass the entire process of 
inquiry, a process which resulted in "there being estab­
lished in our nature some habit which will determine our 
actions."•
The existential priority of doubt and belief in 
Peirce's model allowed him to argue for the habits they 
produced as normative principles grounded in the organic 
metaboly of signs. Moreover, as positive determinants to 
action, habits took on an objective reality derived from 
the verifiable processes which generated them. "Habits 
guide our desires and shape our actions," Peirce claimed. 
Elsewhere he treated them as synonymous with natural law.7 
In fact, according to Peirce, habits controlled the entire 
process by which the mind crystallized itself into a 
determinate world of "concrete reasonableness." In a
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sense, he relied on habit to generate that perfect 
rationality which the Colonial Rameans had simply assumed.
Peirce’s environmentally determined habits thus gave 
him the objective justification he sought for the guiding 
principles which underwrote scientific discovery. Coin­
cidentally, they demonstrated a structural correspondence 
between reason and experience similar to that which had 
controlled the logic of Colonial Ramists. Like a good 
Ramist, Peirce subscribed to a logical theory congruent to 
the doctrine of means which interpreted ontology as a cog­
nitive enterprise. But by identifying habit as the 
ultimate logical interpretant, Peirce essentially subsumed 
the Ramist confusion of first and second intentions under 
his general theory of semiotic, arriving thereby at a 
curious inversion of Ramist ontology which "conceivefd] 
Nature to be perpetually making deductions in Barbara.” 
"Every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon," he 
claimed, "is a hypothesis that there is something in nature 
to which the human reason is analogous."*
But in order to extend this analogy to the methods of 
experimental science, Peirce needed to tie it to a cogni­
tive theory which could validate both the logical and the 
material aspects of inference. He needed to ground it in 
an ontology which, while relevant at the level of human 
action, could withstand an extrinsic test. Character­
istically, he turned to the principle of continuity,
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reformulated as "unlimited community," for a means by which 
to determine the objective validity of inferred "habits."
"The question of validity," Peirce noted, "is purely 
one of fact and not of thinking.” Hence beliefs must "be 
caused by nothing human but by some external permanency -- 
by something upon which our thinking has no effect." He 
located that "external permanency" in "the conception of 
truth as something public" -- in a typically Ramean convic­
tion that "the ultimate conclusion of every man must be the 
same.” Maintaining that the principle of continuity and 
the intrinsically provisional "scientific method of set­
tling opinion" expressed logically equivalent formulae, 
Peirce argued that "the problem becomes how to fix belief, 
not in the individual merely, but in the community.”•
The fundamental hypothesis of science, he pointed out, 
is this:
There are real things, whose characters are entirely 
independent of our opinions about them; those realities 
affect our senses according to regular laws, and, 
though our sensations are as different as our relations 
to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things 
really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experi­
ence and reason enough about it, will be led to the one 
true conclusion.
"The new conception here involved," Peirce concluded, "is 
that of reality." In fact, as Peirce had argued in his 
critique of Descartes, "the very origin of the conception 
of reality shows that this conception essentially involves
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the notion of COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and 
capable of a definite increase of knowledge."10
The intimate connection established here between 
reality, inquiry and community remained a permanent feature 
of Peirce's thought. He in fact based an entire cosmology 
on this "full and fixed connection" which, like Edwards’ 
own, anchored moral obligation in "a wider sort of social 
feeling."11 "The social impulse," Peirce maintained, "is 
rooted intrinsically in logic," reflecting environmental 
responses occurring at the instinctive level of life.
Since the integrity of that impulse rested on the self- 
consistency of logic and the self-corrective of method, 
Peirce could argue that it transcended the peculiarities of 
finite data and operated at the level of science.11 More­
over, by portraying cognition as the accumulation of objec­
tive beliefs which the mind instinctively rolled into 
habits, he could further claim that his normative princi­
ples remained within the reach of inquiry. But above all, 
by relocating the concept of reality in the notion of 
unlimited community, Peirce imparted a temporal dimension 
to logical forms which could accomodate the processive ele­
ments implicit in evolutionary thought.
For, in fact, the essence of Peirce’s notion of 
"unlimited community" lay in its time-dependent structure. 
"The idea of time," Peirce noted, "must be employed in
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arriving at the conception of logical consecution." A gen­
eral inference, he argued, "cannot be fully realized. It 
is a potentiality; and its mode of being is ease in 
futuro.” Moreover, since "there is no time in the Present 
for any inference at all, least of all for inference con­
cerning that very instant, ...the consciousness of the pre­
sent is...that of a struggle over what shall be; and thus 
we emerge from the study with a confirmed belief [in] the 
Nascent State of the Actual."1* Fisch claims that Peirce’s 
major contribution lay in "giving 'real' and ’reality’ a 
forward rather than a backward reference."14 The present 
argument would maintain that the significance of Peirce’s 
argument lay in its giving reality any temporal reference 
at all.
Under Peirce’s model, the process of inquiry coexisted 
temporally with an awareness of a changing reality. The 
static "spatial" dimensions of thought, while instrumental 
to the process, remained largely irrelevant to its ultimate 
goal, which aimed at a truth apprehended cooperatively over 
time.15 Moreover, since habits, as products of the experi­
ential passage from doubt to belief, constituted rules of 
procedure adopted under changing environmental conditions, 
they themselves partook "of the general nature of expecta­
tions of the future" and thereby retained a temporal dimen­
sion which ”correspond[ed] to the idea of probability." By 
conceiving of reality as a hypothetical construct "con­
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stituted by an event indefinitely future," Peirce 
accomplished that fundamental shift in logical metaphors 
needed to accomodate the time-dependent formulas of evolu­
tion. *• Significantly, he did so in a logical context con­
trolled by the principle of continuity -- a context 
which, although largely ignored by his successors, bore the 
unmistakeable imprint of a Ramean heritage.
In his second Illustration, which appeared under the 
title "How to Make our Ideas Clear," Peirce presented an 
epistemological account of how these logical principles 
emerged into consciousness.11 In his first essay, he had 
developed "a method for reaching a clearness of thought of 
a far higher grade than the 'distinctness* of the 
logicians." Now, having rescued inquiry from "the rich mud 
of conceptions" in which the "circle-squarers" had mired 
it, he sought a criterion for meaning which would allow for 
the extension of his model to empirical analyses.1* Draw­
ing on a musical analogy, Peirce presented an argument for 
"mediate consciousness" which he interpreted as the meth­
odological correlate of development.
"We have found," he reminded his readers, "that the 
action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, 
and ceases when belief is attained." Thus doubt, "however 
[it] may originate ...stimulates the mind to an activity 
[in which]...images pass rapidly through consciousness, one 
incessantly melting into another, until at last...we have
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attained belief." But in this "activity of thought," 
Peirce clained, there subsisted "two sorts of elements of 
consciousness" which he defined as "immediate" and 
"mediate."1* Likening the first to a single tone which is 
"completely present at every instant" and the second to an 
air which "consists in an orderliness in the succession of 
sounds," Peirce extended his analogy to describe thought 
itBelf as a relational complex -- "a thread of melody run­
ning through the succession of our sensations." Cognition, 
he argued, must therefore define a "system of relation­
ships" which revealed "a congruence in the succession of 
sensations which flow through the mind.” Hence "there must 
be some continuity of consciousness," he concluded, "which 
makes the events of a lapse of time present to us” and 
thereby drives the process by which prereflective impres­
sions become habits.20
The principle of continuity thus underwrote both 
Peirce’8 theory of truth and his related theory of cogni­
tion. Through it, he established the coalition between 
logical meaning and practical purpose which would inform 
the rest of his Illustrations. Since "the whole function 
of thought is to produce habits of action," he argued, "it 
is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to 
its function." Consequently, "what a thing means is simply 
what habits it involves; ...and there is no distinction of 
meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible
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difference of practice" -- a difference perceived through 
that "congruence in the succession of sensations" which 
structured thought. Peirce articulated the rule of proce­
dure here involved in the now familiar "pragmatic maxim":
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con­
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object.*1
On this maxim Peirce would ground the distinctive equation 
of process and reality which extended his cognitive theory 
to ontology.
"Reality," Peirce suggested, "like every other quality, 
consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things 
partaking of it produce." Since "the only effect which 
real things have is to cause belief," the ontological 
status of any phenomenon must depend on the mind’s activity 
in distinguishing false from true beliefs. In other words, 
it depended on "how we think," not "what we think." But, 
as Peirce had established in his first essay, "the question 
of validity [was] purely one of fact" and therefore 
"appertain[ed] exclusively to the scientific method of set­
tling opinion." Since he had already identified the 
"external permanency" which underwrote that method as 
"something public," Peirce could, by extension, define 
reality as "predestinate opinion." "The opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,"
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he intoned, "is what we mean by the truth, and the object 
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I 
would explain reality." Having forged this cognitive link 
between meaning and truth, Peirce was prepared to "cross 
the threshold of scientific logic,” a step he took in his 
next two Illustrations, "The Doctrine of Chances" and "The 
Probability of Induction."22
Peirce began his third essay with the observation that, 
although "science first begins to be exact when it is 
quantitatively treated,” it is "not so much from counting 
as from measuring...that the advantage of mathematical 
treatment comes." In fact, only through "the conception of 
continuous quantity" could mathematics become "the direct 
instrument of the finest generalizations.” Thus, he 
argued, "in the studies of numbers, the idea of continuity 
is ...indispensible." Through its ability to dissolve dif­
ferences of quality into differences of degree, the princi­
ple of continuity bridged the nominalist disjunction 
between absolute quantity and actual fact and supplied "a 
powerful aid to the formation of true and fruitful concep­
tions . ”2 2
The mathematical correlate of continuity, Peirce 
claimed, resided in principles of probability which, as 
methodological expressions of "continuous quantity," 
encompassed "the science of logic quantitatively treated.” 
But "there is a real fact," he maintained, "which cor-
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responds to the idea of probability, and it is that a given 
mode of inference sometimes proves successful and sometimes 
not, and that in a ratio ultimately fixed." Hence 
probability served to chart the relative frequency with 
which the passage from doubt to belief produced conclusions 
in harmony with the "predestinate opinion" which underwrote 
reality. Peirce described the procedure involved as fol­
lows :
There are two conceivable certainties with reference to 
any hypothesis, the certainty of its truth and the 
certainty of its falsity. The numbers one and zero are 
appropriated, in this calculus, to marking these 
extremes of knowledge; while fractions having values 
intermediate between them indicate... the degrees in 
which the evidence leans toward one or the other.
The object, he claimed, "is, from a given state of facts, 
to determine the numerical probability of a possible fact." 
Hence, "the problem of probabilities is simply the general 
problem of logic" and the meaning of any probability judge­
ment became explicable in terms of a conditional proposi­
tion based on "a kind of relative number."*4
But Peirce had already argued for an essential con­
gruence between meaning and reality in his two previous 
essays. How, then, could he bring the conditional proposi­
tions which expressed meaning in probability judgements 
into conformity with the "predestinate opinion" which sup­
ported that view? Once again, he turned to the principle
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of continuity to guarantee the objective validity of his 
model.
"The idea of probability," he observed, "essentially 
belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated 
indefinitely."** It thus expressed a quantitative analog 
of that cummulative inquiry described earlier as "the 
scientific method of settling opinion." Since the degree 
of belief in probability judgements varied with evidence 
drawn from both past and future events, Peirce argued, "in 
reference to a single case considered in itself, 
probability can have no meaning." Since the validity of a 
conditional statement "consists in the truth of [a] 
hypothetical proposition...and since the only real fact 
which can correspond to such a proposition is that whenever 
the antecedent is true the consequent is so also, it fol­
lows that there can be no sense in reasoning in an isolated 
case at all." Indeed, "the very idea of probability and of 
reasoning rests on the assumption" that the number of 
inferences drawn will be "indefinitely great.” Con­
sequently, Peirce identified "hope in the unlimited con­
tinuance of intellectual activity" as an "indispensable 
requirement of logic” and, predictably, tied that hope to 
"an interest in an indefinite community." In fact, he con­
cluded, "logicality inexorably requires...a conceived iden­
tification of one’s interests with those of an unlimited 
community."*•
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Having settled, at least to his own satisfaction, the 
question of the validity of probability judgements, Peirce 
turned next to a discussion of their structure. In "The 
Probability of Induction," he attempted to go behind Kant’s 
famous question, "How are synthetical judgements a priori 
possible?" to his own antecedent question, "How are any 
synthetical judgements at all possible?" "How is it," he 
wondered, "that a man can observe one fact and [probab ility 
notwithstanding] straightaway pronounce judgement concern­
ing another fact not involved in the first?" Character­
istically, Peirce approached this question through an his­
torical critique, drawing on distinctions between what 
Venn, in his Logic of Chance, had termed the "con- 
ceptualist" and the "materialist" views of probability.27
"The great difference between the[se] two analyses," 
Peirce noted, "is that the conceptualists refer probability 
to an event,” thereby isolating it from that flow of "con­
tinuous quantity" which underwrote legitimate probability 
judgements. "Conceptualistic writers," he complained, "do 
not admit of indeterminate probabilities." This, he 
warned, led to the misconception "that alternatives of 
which we know nothing must be considered as equally proba­
ble." And this misconception in turn implied "the 
thoroughly unclear idea of cases equally possible in place 
of cases equally frequent.” But this, Peirce declared, "is 
only an absurd attempt to reduce synthetic to analytic
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reasoning," pointing out that to assume all natural events
independent is to assume "that the chances in favor of that
of which we are totally ignorant are even."** Such an
assumption, moreover, encouraged the purely gratuitous con­
clusion "that Nature is a pure chaos, or chance combination 
of independent elements, in which reasoning from one fact 
to another would be impossible." In fact, "it would be to 
suppose all human cognition illusory and no real knowledge 
possible.”*• Peirce had definitively rejected such claims 
in his earlier critique of British nominalism.
Venn’s "materialists," on the other hand, accepted 
probability "as a matter of fact, i.e., as the proportion 
of times in which an occurrence of one kind is accompanied 
by an occurrence of another kind." They thus conceived it 
as "the ratio of frequency of events of a species to those 
of a genus over that species, thus giving it two terms 
instead of one" (emphasis Peirce's).*® Peirce's own 
definition of probability, given earlier in "The Doctrine 
of Chances", clearly conformed to this materialist view.** 
Moreover, Peirce perceived that by viewing probability as 
relative frequency, he could maintain its essential time- 
dependent structure and argue for its ability to generate 
synthetic inferences in tune with his theory of a con­
tinuous reality. Only by defining probability as relative 
frequency could he claim it as a viable means of investiga­
ting that manifold reality he had described.
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Peirce made clear his ontological commitment to 
probability in his analysis of chance. Probability as 
defined by the "conceptualists," he pointed out, "is the 
ratio of the favorable cases to all the cases." Chance, on 
the other hand, expressed "the ratio of favorable to 
unfavorable cases," and thus related to the process of 
belief, or habit, formation. The chance of an event, as 
opposed to its probability, represented the "combination of 
all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the 
given state of our knowledge." It therefore rested 
ultimately on the antecedent relationship between belief 
and fact. Moreover, as Peirce pointed out, the isolated 
events described by the "conceptualists," having a 
probability of 1/2, all enjoyed "an even chance, or 1/1." 
But "an argument having an even chance can do nothing 
toward reenforcing others, since according to the rule [for 
the multiplication of probabilities, given earlier], its 
combination with another would only multiply the chance of 
the latter by one.”*2 Thus the "conceptualists” had no 
mechanism for analyzing "conjoint probabilities" such as 
those expressed by the cumulative and interdependent 
phenomena described by evolution. Chance as reformulated 
by Peirce, on the other hand, could do just that.
"Chance," Peirce demonstrated, "is a quantity which may 
have any magnitude."*2 Moreover this quantity, he claimed, 
"has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief
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in it." Since the truth of any given phenomenon depended 
on its ability to govern the experiential passage from 
doubt to belief, the objective value of phenomena must vary 
in direct proportion to the intensity of belief which 
accompanied them. The mathematical relationship Peirce 
expressed as follows:
We have seen that the chances of independent concurrent 
arguments are to be multiplied together to get the 
chance of their combination, and therefore the 
quantities which best express the intensities of belief 
should be such that they are to be added when the 
chances are multiplied in order to produce the quanti ty 
which corresponds to the combined chance.
"The logarithm of a chance," Peirce noted, "is the only 
quantity which fullfills this condition." Tying this 
observation to Fechner's psycho-physical theories, which 
demonstrated that "the intensity of any sensation is 
proportional to the logarithm of the external force which 
produces it," Peirce declared his own representation of 
chance to be "entirely in harmony with this law." "The 
feeling of belief," he concluded, "should be as the 
logarithm of the chance, this latter being the expression 
of the state of facts which produces the belief."*4
By restructuring probable relations as synthetic 
inferences and tying them to the process of habit forma­
tion, Peirce effectively integrated the logic of 
probability and the logic of induction. The integration
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resulted in a "logic of relatives" to which Peirce had 
given early expression in his "Logic of Relatives Memoir" 
which Daniel Merrill has called "one of the most important 
works in the history of modern logic." In it Peirce 
replaced the copula "=" with the sign of illation ( ),
thereby making inclusion the fundamental logical rela­
tion.*9 This substitution, Merrill claims, "was an impor­
tant step on the road to a less algebraic approach to the 
logic of classes," a step whose origins, he admits, are 
"obscure."»• The present argument would suggest that 
Peirce's insistence on the relation of inclusion recalls 
the techniques of topical analysis which had governed 
Ramean forms. Although the level of analysis proved 
infinitely more sophisticated in Peirce, the compulsion to 
subsume relations under classes rather than under other 
relations characterized both models. Moreover, Peirce tied 
the logic of relatives directly to the function of symbols, 
thereby absorbing it into his larger science of semiotic, 
which also had harmonics in a Ramean paradigm.
Peirce’s conviction that the numerical value of chances 
varied in proportion to the state of our beliefs led him to 
the consequent belief that the synthetic inferences which 
governed their calculation must derive from "a classifica­
tion of facts, not according to their characters, but 
according to the manner of obtaining them" -- or, as Peirce 
had phrased it in his second essay, not on "what we think",
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but on "how we think." Although "in the case of analytic 
inference we know the probability of our conclusion,"
Peirce maintained, "in the case of synthetic inferences we 
only know the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding." 
Dut "as all knowledge comes from synthetic inference," he 
noted, "we must equally infer that all human certainty con­
sists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our 
knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have 
led to true conclusions." This "rule of induction," in 
which Peirce located "the whole utility of probability," 
merely reiterated in logical form "the principle that 
reality is only the object of the final opinion to which 
sufficient investigation would lead."*7
Thus Peirce's analysis of induction, according to which 
probable statements expressed time-dependent variations of 
a wider reality, led directly back to his recurrent theme 
of continuity. The identification of probability and 
belief accomplished under the doctrine of chances allowed 
him to claim that the principle of continuity was "simply 
what generality becomes in the logic of relatives. •  In 
his fifth Illustration, Peirce would carry his reformulated 
theories of probability and induction over into the physi­
cal sciences and demonstrate their usefulness in investiga­
ting "The Order of Nature."
Peirce proposed in his fifth essay "to inquire into the 
degree of orderliness in the universe" in search of "any
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general characteristic, ...any mannerism in the ways of 
Nature, any law everywhere applicable" which could assist 
in illustrating the logic of science. To that end, he 
applied those arguments developed in his earlier essays to 
a methodological analysis of the concept of order itself. 
"Any uniformity, or law of Nature," Peirce noted, "may be 
stated in the form 'Every A is B ’." "This is the same as 
to say, however, that 'there does not exist any A which is 
not B'; ...so that the uniformity consists in the non­
occurrence in Nature of a certain combination of charac­
ters. ...Conversely, every case of the non-occurrence of a 
combination of characters would constitute a uniformity in 
Nature." But this logical truism, he warned, would only 
lead the inquirer into an infinite regress unless he took 
into account the "highly-important logical principle" that 
"any plurality or lot of objects whatever have some charac­
ter in common (no matter how insignificant) which is pecu­
liar to them and not shared by anything el8e.",•
In support of this "highly important principle," Peirce 
offered the following proof:
The things, A and B, are each distinguished from all 
other things by the possession of certain characters 
which may be named A-ness and B-ness. Corresponding to 
these positive characters, are the negative characters 
un-A-ness, which is possessed by everything except A, 
and un-B-ness, which is possessed by everything except 
B. These two characters are united in everything 
except A and B; and this union of the characters of un- 
A-ness and un-B-ness makes a compound character which 
may be termed A-B-lessness. This is not possessed by
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either A or B, but it is possessed by everything else. 
This character, like every other, has its corresponding 
negative un-A-B-lessness, and this last is the charac­
ter possessed by both A and B, and by nothing else. It 
is obvious that what has thus been shown true of two 
things is autatis mutandia, true of any number of 
things. Q.E.D.
"In any world whatever, then,” Peirce concluded, "there 
must be a character peculiar to each possible group of 
objects." Hence, "whatever further conclusions we may come 
to in regard to the order of the universe, thus much may be 
regarded as solidly established, that the world is not a 
mere chance-medley."40
Peirce's proof established the logical impossibility of 
complete disorder. Since even an "endless series must have 
some character," Peirce could claim that "chaos is pure 
nothing."4* But in order to construct a corresponding 
material proof, Peirce had to tie his logical theorem to 
cognition. "As long as we regard characters abstractly," 
he pointed out, "the whole system of relationship between 
the different characters [is] given by mere logic.” 
Fortunately, however, "the explanation of induction by the 
doctrine of probabi1ities...is not a mere metaphysical for­
mula, but is one from which all the rules of synthetic 
reasoning can be deduced systematically and with mathemati­
cal cogency." Thus Peirce could maintain that his logic of 
relatives extended to those material propositions involved 
in determining the character of physical laws.4*
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"In order to descend from th[e] abstract point of 
view," Peirce explained, one need only "consider the 
characters of things as relative to the perceptions and 
active powers of living beings." To accomplish this,
Peirce redefined his theory of induction as "a process of 
sampling” which "only has its full force when the charac­
ter concerned has been designated before examining the 
sample."4* "When we take all the characters into account,” 
he warned, "any pair of objects resemble one another in 
just as many particulars as any other pair." But "if we 
limit ourselves to such characters as have for us any 
importance, ...then a synthetic conclusion may be 
drawn...on the condition that the specimens by which we 
judge have been taken at random from the class." These 
"statistical inductions," Peirce claimed, involved "the 
inference that a previously designated character has nearly 
the same frequency of occurrence in the whole of a class 
that it has in a sample drawn at random out of that class.” 
They therefore must inevitably lead to "a class of which 
the same predicate may be affirmed universally," provided 
only that the investigation prove "sufficiently prolonged." 
"The truth of this principle," he maintained, "follows 
immediately from the theorem that there is a character 
peculiar to every possible group."44
Armed with this method of statistical induction, Peirce 
could argue for the validity of the central assumption of
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physical science -- that "there exists a cause for every 
event, and that of a kind which is capable of being discov­
ered." But "if there be nothing to guide us to th[at) 
discovery," he cautioned, it "would have no chance of ever 
getting made." And yet experience demonstrated that "there 
are certain of our inductions which present an approach to 
universality so extraordinary that ...we cannot possibly 
think that they have been reached merely by accident." The 
concepts of space, time and force, he noted, all presented 
powerful arguments for the material efficacy of such 
theoretical forms.45
But how, Peirce wondered, could such inferences enter 
into consciousness at all, much less govern the experi­
ential passage from doubt to belief on which all inference 
relied. The only logical explanation, he concluded, lay in 
the assumption that "the mind of man is strongly adapted to 
the comprehension of the world; at least, so far as this 
goes, that certain conceptions, highly important for such a 
comprehension, naturally arise in his mind." In fact, 
Peirce maintained, the process of determining beliefs which 
governed the logic of relatives made it clear that "without 
such a tendency, the mind could never have had any develop­
ment at all." Moreover, as he hastened to point out, since 
"the great utility and indispensableness" of these "natural 
conceptions" suggested that they arose as "the results of 
natural selection," it followed that they did in fact
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relate to the process of habit formation.4* Consequently, 
under the terms of his model, Peirce could treat statisti­
cal inductions as practical beliefs which led to the forma­
tion of adaptive habits, which in turn reenforced beliefs.
Thus evolution, as the process by which organisms 
absorbed information about their environment and 
incorporated it into patterns of conduct, expressed an 
objective version of the theory of probability -- a kind of 
biological correlate of that progressive increment in 
knowledge described by the logical process itself. Peirce 
had argued earlier that the process of natural selection 
was itself "in large part, a question of logic" which 
merely applied "the statistical method to biology." Devel­
opmental theory, he pointed out, "shows how merely fortui­
tous variations of individuals together with merely fortui­
tous mishaps to them would, under the action of heredity, 
result, not in more irregularity, nor even in statistical 
constancy, but in continual and indefinite progress toward 
a better adaptation of means to ends." Since Peirce’s cog­
nitive model rendered all human knowledge "the development 
of our inborn animal instincts," he could further argue 
that evolution actually governed the incremental process by 
which reason became incarnate in the world. In a sense, to 
Peirce, evolution simply presented a special case "of the 
general adaptation of genetic products to recognizable 
utilities or ends ...whereby the existent becomes more and
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more to embody those generals which [are] said to be 
destined. "* 7
Moreover, having established the objectivity of natural 
order in a logical proof, Peirce could further extend his 
metaphors to portray evolution as a process of habit forma­
tion that implanted in man's mind certain rudimentary 
notions, like those of space and time, which accorded with 
the order of the natural world. But Peirce’s "rudimentary 
notions" bore no resemblance to "innate ideas" of the 
Cartesian stripe. In fact Peirce’s entire critique of Des­
cartes had rested on a rejection of such "metaphysical 
moonshine." Peirce’s notions derived rather from "the con­
stitution of the human mind,” being produced "partly by the 
object, partly by me," and thus avoided any of the subjec­
tive implications of Cartesian constructs. Because certain 
general features prevailed throughout nature, and because 
the investigating mind itself developed as a product of 
that nature, these general features became an integral part 
of the mind through the adaptive process of habit forma­
tion. Rather than representing indefensible a priori con­
cepts, Peirce’s rudimentary notions thus expressed a purely 
Ramean "affinity between the reasoner’s mind and nature’s," 
or, by extension, an "affinity of the human soul to the 
soul of the universe."**
The structural correspondence between logic and experi­
ence, previously established in "The Fixation of Belief",
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here provided a cognitive justification for those statisti­
cal inductions which governed the physical sciences. Fur­
thermore, by making the cumulative processes of evolution 
continuous with the life of the mind, Peirce brought his 
principle of continuity to bear on the construction of 
scientific laws, since to argue for evolution as the ground 
of induction meant simply to argue for statistical induc­
tion as the ground of "that fundamental law upon which all 
science rolls."4*
Indeed evolution, taken in conjunction with the logic 
of relatives, provided Peirce with the objective evidence 
he sought for his universal principle of continuity. "Nat­
ural selection," Peirce claimed, "is a mode of evolution in 
which the only positive agent of change in the whole pas­
sage from moner to man is fortuitous variation." But since 
"to secure advance in a definite direction chance has to be 
seconded by some action that shall hinder the propagation 
of some varieties or stimulate that of others," evolution 
must be "nothing more nor less than the working out of a 
definite end" controlled by "a machinery of efficiency" 
which ensured that, ultimately, "chance begets order." 
Peirce identified that machinery with his doctrine of 
chances, which stipulated that plurality implied 
relativity, which in turn rested on a continuous reality.50
"When we gaze upon the multifariousness of nature we 
are looking straight into the face of a living
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spontaneity," Peirce wrote. And yet somehow that primeval 
spontaneity gave way, through selection, to regularity. 
Peirce described the process as an extension of statistical 
generalization and tied it directly to his related theories 
of meaning and probability:
In the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a 
chaoa of unpersonalized feeling, which being without 
connection or regularity would properly be without 
existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in 
pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a 
generalized tendency. Its other sportings would be 
evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue.
Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and from 
this, with the other principles of evolution, all the 
regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any 
time, however, an element of pure chance survives and 
will remain until the world becomes an absolutely per­
fect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind 
is at last crystalized in the infinitely distant future
Thus, evolution "was but the consequence of a theorem in 
probabilities, namely, the theorem that if very many 
similar things are subject to very many slight fortuitous 
variations,...the result must, in the long run, be to pro­
duce a change of the average characters of the class."*1
Peirce’s subsumption of the biological under the logi­
cal aspects of evolution had important consequences for the 
construction of scientific laws. According to his 
statistical account, laws "emerged” from the experiential 
passage from doubt to belief as transcriptions of the con­
tinuous flow of experience. Hence they had the power to 
accomodate the primal contingency which plagued post-
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Darwinian science. "My hypothesis of spontaneity," Peirce 
claimed, "explains the general fact of irregularity 
...[thereby] loosening the bond of necessity." Moreover,
"it gives room for the influence of another kind of causa­
tion, such as seems to be operative in the mind." The 
objectively verifiable "coalesence, the becoming con­
tinuous, the becoming governed by laws," Peirce maintained, 
"are but phases of one and the same process of the growth 
of reasonableness." Chance thus became an active logical 
principle and the laws which governed its operation became, 
like all expressions of statistical regularity, continuous 
reconstructions of events grounded in the antecedent con­
tinuity of experience.52
Peirce’s model thus considered "laws themselves [as] 
subject to law." But his principles of probable induction 
stipulated that even the "law of laws must be...capable of 
developing itself." Since "the only conceivable law of 
which that is true is an evolutionary law," he reasoned,
"we therefore suppose that all law is the result of evolu­
tion." Furthermore, "if law is a result of evolution, 
which is a process lasting through all time," he argued,
"it follows that no law is absolute," but must rather 
relate to those time-dependent structures which comprised 
the continuous reality expressed by "unlimited community." 
So "it is clear," Peirce concluded, "that... habit, itself 
due to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance
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tendency toward habit-making, is the only bridge that can 
span the chasm between the chance medley of chaos and the 
cosmos of order and law." Habit, not inexorable law, 
expressed the ontological dimension of "the principle of 
universal continuity... which is involved in all exist­
ence . " * 3
Under Peirce's model, scientific investigation thus 
proceeded as a tentative inquiry into the time-dependent 
structures of habit. Hence it required logical techniques 
adequate to the task of charting the gradual ascendancy of 
order over the indeterminate and random events from which 
habits emerged. Peirce set out to supply those techniques 
in his sixth Illustration, which presented a functional 
analysis of the methodological roles of "Deduction, Induc­
tion and Hypothesis" in the context of his conjoint 
theories of meaning and truth.
"The chief business of the logician," Peirce began, "is 
to classify arguments," of which he himself recognized the 
three types enumerated in his title. Deductive arguments 
demonstrated "nothing but the application of a rule." 
Inductive arguments, "being something more than the mere 
application of a general rule to a particular case,” 
represented a type of "inversion of the deductive syl­
logism" which inferred "a rule from the observation of a 
result in a certain case." A similar yet distinct inver­
sion yielded hypothetical arguments, (or as Peirce called
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them, abductive inferences), which gave "the inference of a 
case from a rule and result." "Deduction," Peirce stipu­
lated, "is the only necessary reasoning. ...Induction is 
the experimental testing of a theory. ...Abduction [or 
hypothesis] consists in studying facts and devising a 
theory to explain them." Deduction defined terms; induc­
tion evaluated them. But only hypothesis explained any­
thing.54
Peirce illustrated his point thus:
Begin with this deduction in Barbara:
Rule - All the beans in the bag are white.
Case - These beans were in the bag.
Result - These beans are white
Now, infer the rule from the case and result:
Case - These beans were in this bag.
Result - These beans are white.
Rule - All the beans in the bag are white. 
This is an induction.
Next, infer the case from the rule and the result: 
Rule - All the beans from this bag are white 
Result - These beans are white.
Case - These beans are from this bag.
This is an hypothesis.55
The problem for experimental science, Peirce observed, lay 
in a general tendency to confuse the functions of these 
distinct types of argument. On the one hand, "con- 
ceptualist" theories of probability tended to reduce 
synthetic or inferential forms to analytic or deductive 
ones. Peirce had dealt with that issue in "The Probability 
of Induction." But other misguided theorists, although
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they might accept a "materialist" view of probability, 
still tended to confuse the related but distinct roles 
which hypothesis and induction played in discovery.
Indeed, "the analogy of hypothesis and induction is so 
strong," Peirce pointed out, "that... hypothesis has been 
called an induction of characters." But in the first place, 
he argued, "characters are not susceptible of simple 
enumeration like objects; [and] in the second place, 
characters run in categories” and hence could not be 
treated atomically. Those "mere affair[s] of arith­
metic ...[which] the physicists call an empirical formula" 
cannot therefore be likened to hypotheses since they rest 
"upon mere induction." Although "very useful as means of 
describing in general terms the results of observations," 
these inductions could never "take any high rank among 
scientific discoveries."*•
Hypotheses, on the other hand, introduced explanatory 
concepts which ”furnish[ed] the reasoner with [a] prob­
lematic theory which induction verifies." Peirce summed up 
the methodological distinction as follows:
Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases 
of which something is true, and infer that the same 
thing is true of a whole class. Or, where we find a 
certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of a 
class and infer that it is true of the same proportion 
of the whole class. Hypothesis is where we find some 
very curious circumstance, which would be explained by 
the supposition that it was a case of a certain general 
rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition. Or, where
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we find that in certain respects two objects have a 
strong resemblance, and infer that they resemble one 
another strongly in other respects.
"The great difference," Peirce argued, "is that [induction] 
infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed 
in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes some­
thing of a different kind from what we have directly 
observed, and frequently something which it would be 
impossible for us to observe directly."57
Peirce's methodological distinction had several clear 
implications for science, not the least of which was to 
provide a means of dealing with hypothetic inferences like 
the "imponderables."5* But its most important consequence 
in the present context lay in its ability to explain away 
that confusion of induction and hypothesis which had pro­
vided the logical ground and proved the practical undoing 
of the Baconian and Ramean models expounded by American 
theorists. The tendency of both Bacon and Ramus to sub­
stitute hypothetical or composite forms for inductive 
inferences had justified the Puritans’ organic polity and 
underwritten the formulation of a national ideology. It 
had provided an impetus for scientific inquiry and driven 
the engines of technological advance. But it had also 
hampered the adaptation of American logical models to the 
demands of the new science by making it unclear precisely 
how classification could aid in the construction of
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theory.*• Peirce, by retaining Bacon's emphasis on clas­
sification and redefining Ramus’ emphasis on structure, 
clarified the distinct methodological functions of induc­
tion and hypothesis and rendered them both genuine 
ingredients in a defensible logic of science.
Hypotheses, Peirce claimed, are really a means of 
intellectual ordering -- "a subsumption of a case under a 
class" which could generate the leading principles by which 
science progressed.*0 Peirce admitted that "the mind is 
forced by the very nature of inference itself to make use 
of [both] induction and hypothesis.” Indeed, he claimed, 
"the best inference, when all possible retrenchment has 
been made, is the one which being inductive has the most 
comprehensive subject and which being hypothetic has the 
most extensive predicate." Such composite inferences sup­
plied "most of the theories of physics." But "hypothesis 
alone,” he claimed, "affords us any knowledge of causes and 
forces, and enables us to see the why of things.”•1
Moreover, the validity of induction, he reminded his 
readers, derived from its self-corrective method. The 
validity of hypothesis, on the other hand, derived from its 
reliance on the antecedent reality of that "predestinate 
opinion" toward which induction tended. "When we stretch 
an induction quite beyond the limits of our observation," 
he explained, "the inference partakes of the nature of 
hypothesis." And since the principle of continuous reality
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stipulated that "there is no line to be drawn beyond which 
we cannot push our inference," hypotheses thus formed could 
reach out to those evolving lawB which Peirce had estab­
lished as objective ingredients in nature.•'
Although the cumulative processes which governed their 
construction rendered all hypotheses tentative, Peirce 
maintained that, "they are none the less important for 
that." In fact, "the great triumph of the hypothesis comes 
when it explains not only the formulae [of science], but 
also the deviations from the formulae." "In the current 
language of the physicists,” he noted, "an hypothesis of 
this importance is called a theory," since a lingering 
"contempt... clings to the word hypothesis” -- a contempt 
which he significantly attributed to "Lord Bacon." But 
unlike Bacon, who had denied hypotheses as valid while 
smuggling them surreptitiously into his theories, Peirce 
openly declared that "there is such a thing as hypothetic 
inference" which was "guided by reasons" derived directly 
from the cognitive processes he had described in his second 
111 ustrati on.* 3
Significantly Peirce argued that "the utility and 
value” of hie distinction between hypothesis and induction 
lay in its ability to clarify an "important psychological 
and physiological difference in the mode of apprehending 
facts." Unlike induction, he claimed, hypothetic inference 
involved "a single harmonious disturbance which I call an
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emotion." Since "every hypothetic inference involves the 
formation of such an emotion," Peirce concluded, hypotheses 
must represent "the sensuous element of thought." Induc­
tion, by contrast, expressed "the habitual element," while 
deduction, "as the logical formula for paying attention,” 
manifested "the volitional element of thought." Like 
Edwards before him, Peirce thus drew an analogy between 
hypothesis and emotion which became the ground of a 
"scientific imagination" which generated discovery. Indeed 
like all his Ramean forebears, Peirce never lost a compell­
ing sense of the priority of a directly experienced world 
which led the mind through rational inquiry to an apprecia­
tion of its aesthetic forms.*4
Both the rational and aesthetic power of hypothesis, 
Peirce maintained, remained unintelligible only as long as 
men ignored the evolutionary nature of thought. His own 
cognitive theory, through its emphasis on development, 
could account for hypotheses as intellectual mutations 
grounded in instinctive modes of response occurring at the 
prereflective level of life. Under Peirce’s model, 
hypotheses developed naturally as conjectures arising from 
the experiential passage from doubt to belief. They 
expressed rudimentary notions evolved under the impact of 
environmental forces which coalesced in the mind as 
explanatory inferences about the world. Moreover, the 
processive nature of inquiry accounted for the fact that,
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out of a multitude of possible constructs, the mind so 
often struck on fruitful theories. Thus the leading prin­
ciples which governed science merely reflected cognitive 
forms of the relatively fixed characters of experience.•* 
But such principles, Peirce pointed out, could only be 
expressed modally, as "conditional propositions concerning 
conduct." Since "the basis of Fact is hypothesis," he 
reasoned, the substance of thought itself must lie "in a 
conditional resolve." In his later writings, Peirce would 
extend this maxim to a comprehensive logical program, 
claiming that pragmatism itself rested on "the principle 
that every theoretical judgement expressible in a sentence 
in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose 
only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to 
enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a 
conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative 
mood." In fact, he concluded, "conditional propositions, 
with their hypothetical antecedents," expressed the 
"ultimate nature of meaning." But this was precisely the 
principle upon which Ramean logic had turned!**
Peirce's endorsement of hypothesis brought his argument 
full circle, tying the logic of science directly to that 
organic metaboly of signs which had underwritten objective 
truth in "The Fixation of Belief." Through an analysis of 
the evolution of logic, the Illustrations led Peirce back 
to an appreciation of the logic of evolution. By drawing
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on the cumulative aspects of developmental theory to 
accomplish a crucial shift in metaphors, Peirce succeeded 
in outlining a logical model which could accomodate the 
increasingly time-dependent constructs of theoretical 
science while still maintaining the characteristic bias of 
American thought. In fact, he used his methodological 
critique as a litmus to test the viability of the realist 
premise in the world of modern science.
In his assessment of the possibility of a logic of 
science, Peirce clearly came down on the side of his Ramean 
forebears. Like them, he insisted on logic as the for­
malized version of a native rationality embedded in the 
very structures of the mind. Under his revised model, 
inquiry still described a process by which the mind fitted 
finite data into appropriate "places" in probable state­
ments which drew their force from "an inseparable connec­
tion between rational cognition and rational purpose."*7 
This inviolable covenant in turn rested on a continuous 
reality which, reformulated as "unlimited community," 
became the logical analog of immortality, underwriting a 
faith in the mind’s ability to make those postulational 
leaps essential to the construction of theory. The "great 
principle of continuity” survived as a kind of meth­
odological correlate of judicial review, establishing a 
probative framework within which to assess those hypotheti­
cal imperatives defined by Peirce as laws.*8 And logic
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became, once again, the path the pilgrim trod on his jour­
ney toward a rational faith in the order and purpose of the 
world.•• Indeed, Peirce’s Illustrations, shaded throughout 
with the metaphors of the shared and organic elements of 
human experience, expressed the very essence of the 
American intellectual tradition -- a tradition with roots 
sunk deep in a Ramean logical paradigm.
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CHAPTER NOTBS
1. The Illustrations appeared in Popular Science 
Monthly between November 1877 and August 1878. They are 
included in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
ed. Hartshorn and Weiss (Cambridge, 1931-1958) as para­
graphs 619-693 of volume II, paragraphs 358-410 of volume V 
and paragraphs 395-427 of volume VI. (All subsequent 
references to this collection will be cited as CP, followed 
by volume and paragraph number.) They appear sequentially 
in The Writings of C. S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, 
ed. Max Fisch (Bloomington, 1982-1986) on pages 242-337 of 
volume III. (All subsequent references to this edition 
will be cited as CE, followed by volume and page number.
2. Fisch calls the Illustrations "the 19th Century 
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason 
and Searching for the Truth in the Sciences, and claims 
that ” so far no 20th Century Discourse has superceded it”
(CE 3.xxxvi i).
3. CE 3.245-246; CE 3.254.
4. CE 3.244-245. See also CP 5.486; CP 2.148.
5. In his later On the Algebra of Logic, Peirce reen­
forced this analogy, claiming that "thinking, as cerebra­
tion, is no doubt subject to the general laws of nervous 
action” (CP 3.155, see also CP 3.157).
6. CE 3.247. Elsewhere Peirce described belief as
merely "a habit of which we are conscious" (CP 4.53), "a 
cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will determine 
what we will do in fancy as well as what we do in action" 
(CP 3.160). Logic," he claimed, "takes its reason of 
existence" from habits "considered as determining an 
inference" (CP 3.161). "All you can have any dealings 
with," he warned, "are your doubts and beliefs. ...If your
terms 'truth' and 'falsity' are taken in such senses as to
be definable in terms of doubt and belief...well and 
good... But if by truth and falsity you mean something not 
definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you 
are talking of entities of whose existence you can know 
nothing, and which Ockham's razor would clean shave off"
(CP 5.416) .
7. CE 3.247; CP 1.175.
8. CP 2.713; CP 2.316. In inquiry "something... takes
place within the organism which is equivalent to the syl­
logistic process," Peirce claimed (CP 5.268, see also CP
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6.465). In 1883, Peirce even argued for precise 
physiological analogues of inference (see A Theory of Prob­
able Inference CP 2.694-754).
9. CB 3.244; CE 3.253; CE 3.251. The quest for truth, 
Peirce argued elsewhere, echoing Bacon, unfolded "not as 
the work of one man’s life, but as that of generation after 
generation, indefinitely" (CP 5.589).
10. CE 3.253-254, CP 5.311. Elsewhere Peirce defined 
reality as "that which sooner or later information and 
reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore 
independent of the vagaries of me and you (CP 5.311).
11. CE 3.251. Peirce’s objections to Cartesian doubt 
were based on this issue of moral obligation. For Peirce, 
Michael Weinstein claims, "Cartesian doubt is not only 
immoral because it is idle, but because it draws prac­
titioners away from the community of inquirers, the task of 
which is to resolve the real and living doubts that arise 
in the course of everyday life" (The Wilderness and the 
City (Amherst, 1982), 58).
12. CP 5.354. "With the scientific method," Peirce 
claimed, "the test...is not an immediate appeal to my feel­
ings or purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the 
application of the method" (CE 3.255).
13. CP 1.491; CP 2.148; CP 5.462.
14. CE 3.xxix.
15. Randall R. Dipert presents an interesting discus­
sion of "Peirce’s Theory of the Dimensionality of Physical 
Space," in which he argues that what distinguished 
Peirce’s theory from those of his contemporaries was 
precisely its temporal dimension, which allowed him to 
argue precociously for a non-Euclidean approach to the 
"space-time continuum" (JHP 16(1978):61-70) .
16. CP 2.145, CP 2.650; CP 5.331.
17. Many pages have been written on the genealogy of 
Peirce’s second Illustration, most focusing on the illusive 
"metaphysical Club" to which Peirce himself refers (CP 
5.12). For extended discussions see Kuklick, Rise, 47-54; 
Max Fisch, CE, 3.xxix-xxxv and "Alexander Bain and the 
Geneology of Pragmatism," JHI 15( 1954):413-444 ; Philip P 
Wiener, "Peirce's Metaphysical Club and the Genesis of 
Pragmatism," JHI 7(1946):218-233; Daniel D. O ’Connor, 
"Peirce’s Debt to F. E. Abbot," JHI 25(1964):543-564.
While any of the sources investigated in these discussions 
might well have been the proximate cause of Peirce’s maxim,
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however, the present argument would locate its "sufficient 
reason" in that Ramean tradition which sought to purge 
logic of its "commentitious" trappings.
18. CE 3.260-261.
19. CE 3.261-262. These elements emerge in Peirce’s 
later semiotic as the "monadic" and "diadic" relations.
The third, or "triadic" relation, is treated in the sixth 
Illustration as "abduction".
20. CE 3.262-263.
21. CE 2.265-266. See also CP 575. Feibleman 
identifies seven different formulations of the pragmatic 
maxim, of which the one quoted above is the first and most 
familiar. The remaining six he locates in CP 5.9, CP 5.18, 
CP 5.467, CP 5.438, CP 6.490, CP 5.412. It is interesting 
in the present context that Peirce illustrates his maxim 
with the concept of force. Force in particular, he claims 
is a "simple affair [which] has muddled men’s minds." But 
under his theory, Peirce claimed, force was no "mysterious 
entity", since "the idea which the word force excites in 
our minds has no other function than to affect our actions. 
...Consequently, if we know what the effects of force are, 
we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in 
saying that a force exists, and there is nothing more to 
know" (CE 3.270). So much for the "imponderables”!
22. CE 3.271-273, CE 3.275.
23. CE 3.266-268. Elsewhere Peirce argued that, since 
"future contingency is as real as the present" (CP 6.368), 
all existence was, in fact, "a matter of degree" (CP 
1.175). In some respects, Peirce’s arguments for con­
tinuity recall Wolff's descriptions of the complementum 
possibilitatis, which supplied the necessary conditions for 
the reality of individual entities. But where Wolff had 
stressed the distance between possibility and reality, 
Peirce bridged the gap with his "unlimited community."
24. CE 3.278-280. Peirce had made an early argument 
for his theory of mathematical probability in two of the 
Lowell Lectures delivered in 1865 (CE 1.189-204, CE 1.205- 
222). He reenforced his position in his Lectures on Prag­
matism (CP 5.21).
25. In 1905, Peirce reformulated this statement mathe­
matically: "When we say that a certain ratio will have a 
certain value *in the long run', we refer to the 
probability-limit of an endless succession of fractional 
values; that is, to the only possible value from 0 to 
infinity, inclusive, about which the values of the endless
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succession will never cease to oscillate; so that, no mat­
ter what place in the succession you may choose, there will 
follow both values above the probability limit and values 
below it" (CP 2.758). Again in 1910, he affirmed that "it 
is plain that, if probability be the ratio of the ocur- 
rences of the specific event to the occurrences of the gen­
eric occasion, it is the ratio that there would be in the 
long run" (CP 2.661). In fact, as Carolyn Eisele points 
out, Peirce consistently merges the concepts of infinity, 
continuity and probability ("C. S. Peirce at the Smith­
sonian," JHI 18( 1957):537-547) .
26. CE 3.284-285. In later writings, Peirce tied this 
idea of community back to his formulation of habit, claim­
ing it to be "quite analogous to any habit that a man might 
have" (CP 2.664) .
27. CE 3.303-304. "The conception of probability here 
set forth," Peirce had stated in "The Doctrine of Chances", 
"is substantially that first developed by Mr. Venn in his 
Logic of Chance. Of course, a vague apprehension of the 
idea had always existed, but the problem was to make it 
perfectly clear, and to him belongs the credit of first 
doing this" (CE 3.281.n). Peirce reviewed Venn’s Logic of 
Chance in 1867 (North American Review 105( 1867 ) :317-321 ) 
and substantially agreed with its representation of 
probability as "a statistical fact" and "a ratio." In "The 
Doctrine of Chances," however, Peirce took exception to 
Venn’s referring to the components of probability as 
"events." "Some of the worst and most persistent errors in 
the use of the doctrine of chances," he claimed, "have 
arisen from this vicious mode of expression." Peirce 
preferred to describe probability as belonging "exclusively 
to consequences,” declaring that "the probability of any 
consequence is the number of times in which antecedent and 
consequent both occur divided by the number of all the 
times in which the antecedent occurs" (CE 3.290).
28. "The conceptualist method of treating 
probabilities," Peirce argued, "really amounts simply to 
the deductive treatment of them" -- a treatment which led 
only to "absolutely worthless" inferences carrying "an even 
chance" (CE 2.304-307). Elsewhere Peirce presented a math­
ematical proof to refute the assertion that "ignorance is 
denoted by the probability 1/2” (CP 2.747).
29. CE 3.292, 3.296, 3.298, 3.301.
30. CE 3.291-292.
31. "Probability," Peirce oberved elsewhere, "depends 
solely upon the relative frequency of a specific event... to 
a generic event" (CP 3.19). Thus it "never properly refers
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immediately to a single event, but exclusively to the hap­
pening of a given kind of event on any occasion of a given 
kind" (CP 2.661). Peirce defined probability variously as 
"the science of the laws of irregularities" (CP 2.769), "a 
statistical ratio" (CP 5.21) and "a fraction whose 
numerator is the frequency of a specific kind of event, 
while its denominator is the frequency of a genus embracing 
that species" (CP 2.747).
32. CE 3.293-294.
33. See CE 3.292-293, 3.298-303 for the proof.
34. CE 3.293-294. See also CP 2.677.
35. For the "Logic of Relatives Memoir, see CE 2.359-
429. See also CP 2.710 and CP 4.5 where Peirce defended 
his position. For a discussion of the memoir and its 
importance see Merrill’s introductory essay "The 1870 Logic 
of Relatives Memoir" in Fisch, CE 3.xlii-3.xlviii. See 
also Feibleman’s chapter "The Logic of Relatives" in Intro­
duction . 105-110.
36. CE 2.xlii-2.xliii.
37. CE 3.295, 3.305. Probability statements, Peirce 
claimed, provided the only form of argument which gained 
accuracy through repetition (CP 2.729). Hence their 
validity depended on "a method which, if duly persisted in, 
must in the very nature of things, lead to a result 
indefinitely approximating to the truth in the long run"
(CP 2 . 781 ) .
38. CP 5.436.
39. CE 3.307-308.
40. CE 3.308-311 .
41 . CP 2.784, CP 5.431. See also CP 5.342.
CM CE 3.315-316.
43. CE 3.311. Goudge points out that, in his
of predesignation, Peirce is "indicating his dissent from 
the view of scientific procedure which regards it as start­
ing with the dispassionate collection of facts. His empha­
sis on predesignation," Goudge claims, "is a reminder that 
facts are always selected because of their relevance to a 
particular problem at hand" (Thought. 163). Disinterested 
inquiry, Peirce claimed, occurred only "at the very vanish­
ing point of intelligence." In fact, "the interest which 
the uniformities of Nature have for an animal measures his
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place in the scale of intelligence" (CE 3.312). Peirce 
defended this position in Lesson 15 of his "Lessons from 
the History of Scientific Thought”.
44. CE 3.316-318. Peirce develops this argument in 
the context of a critique of Mills' contention that "induc­
tion depends for its validity upon the uniformity of 
Nature" (CE 3.314-316).
45. CE 3.317-318.
46. CE 3.317-318. Elsewhere, Peirce affirmed that 
logicality itself "is the most useful quality an animal can 
possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of 
natural selection" (CP 5.366).
47. CE 3.244; CP 1.395. See Philip Weiner, "The 
Evolutionism and Pragmaticism of Peirce," JHI 7(1946): 321 — 
354.
48. CP 1.7; CP 1.28; CP 1.121; CP 5.47. For Peirce, 
it always remained " somehow more than a figure of speech 
to say that nature fecundates the mind of man with ideas, 
which, when these ideas grow up, will resemble their 
father, Nature" (CP 5.92). For a fascinating discussion of 
this aspect of Peirce's thought S. Morris Eames, Pragmatic 
Naturalism: An Introduction (Carbondale, 1977). Eames 
treats Peirce’s notions as "transactional analyses" of 
experience. The present argument would attribute them to a 
predilection for structural correspondences grounded in a 
persistent Ramean bias.
49. CE 3.319. It is essential to note here that 
Peirce’s view of evolution, as well as his "statistical 
inductions," were transitional rather than transformative 
and therefore dynamic and uni-directional. In the Lowell 
Lectures, Peirce had argued that scientific inferences 
occurred "in one determinate direction, which is not 
reversed" (CE 1.471 emphasis his). Hence, Peirce’s view of 
incremental inferences could accomodate the concepts of 
irreversibility explicit in thermodynamics as well as those 
implicit in evolution. For discussion of some of the 
scientific implications of Peirce’s view see Stephen 0. 
Brush, "Irreversibility and Indeterminism: Fourier to 
Heisenberg," JHI 37(1976):603-630.
50. CP 6.296, CP 1.205, CP 1.269, CP 6.297.
51. CP 6.553, CP 6.100, CP 6.33, Peirce Ms dated Jan. 
24, 1909 entitled "Why should the Doctrine of Chances raise 
Science to a Higher Plane", p.16 quoted in Weiner,
"Peirce’s Evolutionism," 335.
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52. CP 6.60, CP 5.4. Peirce extended this argument to 
metaphysics as "tychism." The principle references are 
found in CP 6.189-209.
53. CP 6.91, CP 6.101, CP 6.262, Peirce Ms L107, p.10 
quoted in Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," 493. Peirce 
developed this argument in "The Architecture of Theories", 
where he attempted to "search out a natural history of laws 
of nature." "The only possible way of accounting for the 
laws of nature and for uniformity in general," he argued, 
"is to suppose them results of evolution" (CP 6.12). For 
discussions of Peirce’s view of natural law relative to 
Hume see the "Letters to Samuel P. Langley, and 'Hume on 
Miracles and Laws of Nature," in Weiner, Values. 275-321. 
Peirce significantly identifies the difference between 
their views as "a different conception of the function of 
hypothesis and of the logic of hypothesis" (Ibid., 283).
54. CE 3.323-3.235, CP 5.145.
55. Peirce held that the rule of inversion applied to 
all syllogistic moods and figures (CP 2.512, CP 2.619). On 
this view, deductive reasoning became the touchstone of 
logic, a position which caused Peirce some difficulty as 
his thought developed in the direction of indeterminism in 
later years. Goudge points out that Peirce was forced to 
revise this view as his relativistic sympathies matured
(Thought. 188-194). In the present context, Peirce’s 
argument for an inverse relationship had important implica­
tions for his ontology, since the "A-lessness, B-lessness 
proof” quoted above supported his entire conception of law.
56. CE 3.330, CE 3.333.
57. CP 2.776, CE 3.332, CE 3.326, CE 3.335.
58. Peirce in fact illustrated his point with the same 
kinetic theory of gasses described above as being so 
"troublesome" (CE 3.334-3.335).
59. Deely makes an interesting observation in this 
regard which has implications for the present argument. 
"When induction was revised by Bacon," he points out, "it 
was revived in such a way that the interrelation of certain 
essential structures of the mind’s working were lost from 
view, i.e., the developmental or historical aspects of the 
mind’s construction of concepts." In fact, all post- 
Baconian studies, Deeley claims, ignored the basic dif­
ferences between types of logical arguments, until Peirce 
attempted to clarify the issue. Fisch agrees that Peirce’s 
"major single discovery was that what he at first called 
hypothesis and later abduction or retroduction, is a dis­
tinct kind of argument, different from both deduction and
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from induction." But Deely claims that Peirce’s theory was 
merely a rediscovery of Poinsot’s theory of ascensus and 
descensus, itself a survival of the summulist tradition.
The present argument would place the point of origin in a 
more recent incarnation of the same tradition -- namely 
that of Colonial Ramists. See John Deely, Introducing 
Semiotic. 72.
60. CE 1.428, CP 1.470, CP 2.465, CP 2.769.
61. CP 5.145, CE 3.336, CP 5.171-172. It is important 
to note here the relationship between Peirce’s definition 
of hypothesis as a subsumption under a class and his 
insistence on inclusion as the fundamental logical rela­
tion, discussed above. "Leading principles" defined the 
classes under which arguments were subsumed, and thereby 
governed the relationship of inclusion which Peirce deemed 
fundamental. Hypothesis, by extension became the source of 
all knowledge (see CP 2.462, 2.465, 2.576, 2.588). The 
Ramean patrimony is clear. For an interesting contrast on 
the issue of hypothesis, see James Farr, "The Way of 
Hypothesis: Locke on Method," JHI 48(1987): 51-72.
62. CE 3.336, CP 2.508-511. Gallie points out that 
"although Peirce's writings on this issue are distressingly 
scrappy, there can be no doubt that he did not wish the 
scope of his pragmatism to be restricted to thoughts, 
statements, or hypotheses concerning questions of empirical 
fact. Pragmatism, he maintains, has an important relevance 
to those parts of our knowledge which are commonly 
described as purely formal, or apodictic" (Peirce and Prag­
matism (Harmondworth, 1952), 161).
63. CE 3.334.
64. CE 3.336-337; CE 2.229; CE 3.337-3.338; CP 1.46-
48. "Peirce relied exclusively upon the claim that the 
property of feeling is irreducible to a property of mat­
ter," Robert Almeder points out ("The Idealism of Charles 
S. Peirce," JHP 10(1972):484). Conkin agrees. "True 
belief, in the pragmatic sense," he points out, "involved 
feeling as well as intellect, volition as well as verbal 
symbols. The experiential value, the attractiveness of 
anything, including an idea, resides in the felt quality 
that accompanies it. Thus the problem for... science is the 
definition of the quality that gives vitality and life and 
power to the idea of rationality" (Puritans and Prag­
matists . 257). Weinstein concurs that "within the general 
project of American classical philosophy... Peirce’s con­
tribution is the most vitalistic, the closest to a prayer 
to life. ...He has a direct appreciation of the
irreducibi1ity of the ’qualities of feeling', which he 
gathered under his category of ’firstness’ and which kept
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him from substituting general ideas for lived experiences 
(Wilderness. 55).
65. CP 1.316. Weiner points out that "there is in a 
Peirce a Schellingian tendency to regard the forms of 
thought as constituting the forms of reality, and that 
whatever is regulative of thought is bound to be trans­
formative of things or events, for the latter embody feel­
ings or ideas ("Evolutionism...," 347-348).
66. CP 5.535, CE 1.7, CP 5.499, CP 5.18, CP 5.453. 
Boler places this observation in an interesting perspective 
by tying Peirce's definition of conditional statements to 
his definition of causation. Since Peirce argues that a 
single event cannot be a cause (CP 6.67, CP 6.600) and that 
meaning derives from an expectation of future actualities 
(see above), he can subsequently argue that composite rela­
tions encompass causality. "If there is any would-be at 
all," Peirce observed, "there is more or less causation, 
for that is all that I mean by causation" (CP 8.225, n.
10). Boler ties this argument to Peirce distinction of 
"consequence" and "consequent," a distinction he claims 
was insufficiently understood by the scholastics. See 
Boler, Real ism. 94-116.
67. CP 5.412.
68. Fisch makes some tantalizing observations which, 
if pursued, might have important implications for the cur­
rent argument. More than half of the members of the famed 
Metaphysical Club, he points out, were lawyers -- among 
them, Nicholas St. John Green, who Peirce identified as the 
"grandfather" of pragmatism. Fisch describes "the law- 
dominated Metaphysical Club" as focusing on seminal 
"predictive theories” fully "five and a half years before 
logical pragmatism." Indeed, he questions the common 
assumption "that Peirce had little or no interest in law, 
in the philosophy of law, or even in political and social 
philosophy," noting that his wife Zina's activism 
inevitably embroiled him in discussions relating to legal 
theory and that his own family had as strong a background 
in law as they had in mathematics and science. Indeed, 
when Peirce was elected a member of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences in 1867, Fisch observes, he was assigned 
to Class III, Moral and Political Sciences, Section I, 
Philosophy and Jurisprudence, along with Green and Holmes, 
rather than to Class I, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, 
Section I, Mathematics, with Chauncy Wright (CE 3.xxx- 
xxxv). While Fisch’s comments certainly do not constitute 
evidence that Peirce consciously viewed legal constructs as 
analogous to logical order as Colonial Ramists clearly had, 
it does tend to support the link established in Chapter VII 
between American political forms and Ramean logical meta-
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phors. Moreover, it suggests that the realist bias of 
Peirce’s thought served to perpetuate the influence of 
those Ramean metaphors across the generation of logical, 
legal and scientific theorists who would build upon his 
pragmatic maxim.
69. Peirce makes this analogy explicit in "A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God," Hibbert Journal 
7( 1908 ) :90-112 . For a discussion of the implications of 
the analogy for science see Peter T. Turley, "Peirce’s Cos­





A Theme from Peirce
Peirce’s unique cosmology drew its force from the for­
tuitous convergence of a logic grounded in antecedent 
structure and a science grounded in consequent function.
Rv subsuming the processive theories of modern science 
under the Ramean bias of his intellectual heritage, Peirce 
could argue for a rational appreciation of the logic of 
life which Darwin’s evolutionary theories taught. More­
over, he could extend the logical outlines of his argument 
to embrace the cosmic dimensions of an evolution conceived 
as the progressive realization of rational purpose in the 
world. In short, he could reestablish inquiry as an 
endeavor in which the vocations of Saint and scientist 
merged.
Peirce labelled his cosmological synthesis agapiaa and 
defined it as a pervasive doctrine of continuity. In 
agapistic evolution, Peirce maintained, the functional 
processes of nature conformed to an overarching purpose 
radiating from a cosmic rationality essentially indivisible
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into discrete thoughts or isolated personalities. By 
virtue of their participation in this cosmic whole, indi­
vidual entities or events possessed no absolute finitude, 
but existed rather as stages in an ongoing process of 
reconciliation whereby the final goals of thought became 
the ruling habits of things. Inquiry, in turn, case to 
embrace the total intellectual life of humanity and was 
identified with the logical process itself, while reality 
became an ideal state of complete information -- essen­
tially knowable, but never fully known.
The ontological correlate of Peirce's model rested on 
his categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness -- 
modes of being which in their integral relations expressed 
the continuous structure of reality. Firstness, the mode 
of pure potential, entailed "positive qualitative pos­
sibility;” Secondness, the mode of existence, comprised 
"the being of actual fact;” and Thirdness, the mode of gen­
erality, encompassed "the laws which will govern facts in 
the future."1 Inquiry, Peirce argued, in fact charted a 
logical passage from Firstness to Thirdness -- and an anal­
ogous ascent from the lawlessness of prerefelective events 
to the perfect rationality of habit.
Firstness, Peirce tells us, affected consciousness as 
"an actual passage at arms between the ego and the non­
ego," but had no intellectual value. It entailed no mental 
occurrence, only a physical event which brutally forced
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itself upon the mind. Firstness, Peirce explained, "is 
the reality. It is not in propositional fora." Hence it 
had no psychological status. Mental construction, he 
argued, entered consciousness only at the level of Sec­
ondness, where the mind formed perceptual judgements which 
gave "the intellect’s description of the evidence of the 
senses." Secondness comprised the world of fact with which 
reason dealt, thereby providing the cognitive ground for 
Thirdness, the methodological analog of the principle of 
continuity. Thirdness -- or generality, or habit, or law 
-- thus formed an ineluctable part of the cosmos which 
"poured in on us through every avenue of sense."1 Without 
it, Peirce claimed, inquiry at any level must fail.
Peirce’s entire cosmology depended on the ontological 
status of Thirdness. Without it as a regulative principle, 
his pragmatic theory of meaning, along with his realist 
reconstruction of science, simply could not stand against 
the reductionism explicit in nominalist and positivist 
logic.1 But ultimately, it was the inter-relatedness of 
Peirce’s three categories which provided the strongest sup­
port for his cosmology. His assumption that a syn- 
categorematic relation pertained between the organic func­
tions of Firstness and the higher symbolic functions of 
Thirdness served to break down the rigid dualism between 
organism and environment on which both sensationalist 
psychology and nominalist science had turned. Under
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Peirce’s model, the organism joined with its environment in 
a transactional process governed by the relational matrix 
of the categories. Laws unfolded as the product of a 
method whereby the mind explored a shared reality. And 
truth took on the aspect of a collective wisdom expressed 
through conduct.
But Peirce’s methodological synthesis could not stand 
against the centrifugal forces at work in American 
intellectual life as the 19th century drew to a close. As 
the nation struggled to recover from the trauma of civil 
war and reconstruction, rapid changes in its economic and 
demographic base wrought an inversion and confusion of 
values. The absorption of vast numbers of immigrants from 
increasingly disparate cultural backgrounds and the social 
dislocations which came in the wake of progressive 
urbanization tended to disrupt traditional ideologies.
While the Metaphysical Club met in Boston, the Tammany Club 
met in New York. While Emerson preached self-reliance in 
Cambridge, enterprising citizens defrauded the Home of 
Independence and Brotherly Love in Philadelphia. The 
Chicago Fire destroyed a thriving urban center, while ter­
ritorial expansion destroyed a vast natural wilderness. As 
the national government struggled to adapt a federal 
political system to an increasingly centralized economy, 
American labor stumbled through the Homestead and Pullman 
strikes. And as widespread corruption tainted leadership
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at the local and national levels, Robber Barons 
precipitated an actual and metaphoric restructuring of 
values in the gold crisis and the Erie War.
1887 ushered in disastrous drought and the Interstate 
Commerce Act. 1888 brought devastating blizzards and a new 
interpretation of the 14th Ammendment. 1890 marked the
passage of landmark anti-trust legislation, yet 1892 still 
saw bloodshed at Haymarket Square and the formulation of a 
powerful Populist platform which described a nation 
"brought to the verge of moral, political and material 
ruin."4 1893 brought panic.
As all these tangible influences worked profound 
changes in the fabric of American society, so the attempts 
to construct a philosophic rationale for them signalled an 
equally profound adjustment in the nation’s intellectual 
life.9 The collapse of the Social Darwinian dream and the 
disintegration of Unitarian ethics caused a noisy battle to 
be joined between transcendental visionaries and 
utilitarian die-hards who brought forth a flood of patent 
remedies for the philosophic malaise which plagued the 
nation. But this embarrassment of speculative riches 
itself inspired confusion and stimulated doubt. Commager 
claims that in fact it served to "atomize" America’s 
philosophic response. "The political readjustment of the 
Revolutionary era," he explains, "had been prepared for by 
generations of thought and training and a decade of high-
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minded discussion. ...[But] there was no comparable 
philosophical preparation for the effort to come to terms 
with the new world of science and technology that loomed up 
over the horizon in the closing years of the 19th 
century."* And indeed, the single thread which seemed to 
run through the nation's eclectic intellectual life at the 
turn of the century appears in what Morton White has called 
a consistent "revolt against formalism" -- a revolt against 
precisely that synoptic impulse which had underwritten all 
inquiry for Peirce.7
But the fate of American philosophy after 1890 can also 
be characterized as a loss of continuity -- an analytical 
fragmentation of that continuous reality which Peirce had 
so laboriously constructed through his categories. Indeed 
James, Dewey and Royce -- the three philosophers who owed 
the most to Peirce’s pragmatic insights -- each seemed 
intent on breaking off a piece of Peirce’s organic whole 
and elevating it to the status of an ultimate truth. James 
sinned againBt Firstness by confining the possibilities of 
experience within the ambit of an individual mind; Dewey 
betrayed Secondness by limiting human aspiration to the 
social order; and Royce transgressed against Thirdness by 
transforming the relational matrix of the categories into 
an ideal consciousness. Each, in his own characteristic 
variation on Peirce’s theme of continuity, lost sight of 
the essential inter-relatedness of Peirce’s categories and
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so lost touch with that continuous reality which they 
underwrote.
William James was the worst offender -- if only by 
virtue of his uncanny ability to mask his defection in a 
vivid popular style which made it all the more palatable to 
minds seeking respite from the rigors of formal analysis. 
James departed radically from Peirce’s model in the 
elaboration of his own pragmatism in the 1890’s. Although 
only three years younger than Peirce, James lagged far 
behind him in philosophical development. The 1860’s, which 
found Peirce already immersed on his systematic critique of 
Kant, Mill and Descartes, found James still "swamped in 
empirical philosophy."* In fact not until well into the 
1880's, after Peirce had already drawn out the logical 
implications of his Illustrations, did James "outgrow" his 
attachment to empiricism and begin to elaborate his own 
philosophical system -- for which he drew heavily on prin­
ciples enunciated by Peirce.
But, as Ralph Barton Perry has observed, James played 
havoc with many of Peirce’s central assumptions. Indeed, 
"perhaps it would be correct, and just to all parties," he 
claims, "to say that the modern movement known as prag­
matism is largely the result of James’ misunderstanding of 
Peirce."* James Feibleman goes somewhat farther, claiming 
that "not even by the utmost exertion of tolerance and 
sympathy can James' philosophy be said to be an extension
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or development of Peirce's, although no doubt certain 
aspects of it...were suggested to James by Peirce."10 
Peirce himself, in later years, did what he could to dis­
tance himself from James' formulation of pragmatism, his 
clearest rejection of it appearing in the famous essay 
"What Pragmatism Is."11 Peirce had intended his pragmatic 
maxim as a theory of meaning -- that is, as a meth­
odological guide to the logical process itself. "Professor 
James," Peirce complained in 1908, "remodelled the matter 
and transmogrified it into a doctrine of philosophy, some 
parts of which I highly approved, while other and more 
prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as opposed to 
sound logic.”**
Ironically, Peirce himself had invited James' mis­
construction by insisting as early as 1868 that "every sort 
of modification of consciousness... is an inference" and 
explicitly establishing a "striking analogy" between emo­
tion and hypothesis.1* Indeedn, "The Doctrine of Chances" 
had identified three "sentiments" as the "indispensable 
requirements of logic." But Peirce's perception of the 
"emotive" or "sensitive" aspects of logic had related 
directly to his aesthetic vision of a continuous reality. 
"When we consider,” he pointed out, "that logic depends on 
a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in 
action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the 
only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that
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other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the 
social impulse, why should we wonder to find social senti­
ment presupposed in reasoning?"1* James, on the other 
hand, took Peirce’s argument from "social sentiment," 
stripped it of all its logical attributes, and arrived at a 
cognitive theory which pursued pragmatic meaning among the 
purely psychological effects of sense experience.
Peirce had explicitly dismissed psychology as 
irrelevant to the process of determining meaning. In an 
argument which would have served his Puritan ancestors well 
in their continuing battle against "enthusiasm," he pointed 
out that psychology could not supply self-validating predi­
cates and therefore could not serve as a means to investi­
gate truth. Peirce, in fact, doubted that there was "any 
such thing as psychology, apart from logic on the one hand 
and physiology on the other." Therefore, he invited inves­
tigators to "adopt any theory that seems to you acceptable 
as to the psychological operations by which perceptual 
judgements are formed." What mattered was the inferential 
process itself, conceived as a function of the formal prop­
erties of thought. At the heart of inference, Peirce 
argued, lay habit -- "the essence of the logical inter- 
pretant" -- and habit "is not an affectation of conscious­
ness." Perceptual judgements themselves thus occurred 
entirely outside the realm of psychology in that region 
defined and controlled by habit.18
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James, on the other hand, translated Peirce’s logical 
maxim into the language of associationist psychology, 
replacing "conceiveable" with "sensible" effects as the 
controlling factors in inquiry. Where for Peirce (as for 
Ramus), judgement had provided a method for fixing meaning 
at the level of argument, for James it became a method for 
determining truth at the level of experience. Under James’ 
analysis, judgement became a mere matter of "pointing" -- a 
process which, in the tradition of Locke and Hume, "must 
terminate in the world of orderly sensible experience."1* 
"What science means by ’verification’,” James explained,
"is no more than this, that no object of conception shall 
be believed which sooner or later has not some permanent 
and vivid object of sensation for its term. ...Conceived 
objects must show sensible effects or else be dis­
believed."17 Truth, he maintained, denoted the satisfac­
tory accomodation of one sense datum with another, not the 
agreement of perceptual judgements with an antecedent 
order. In direct opposition to Peirce’s analysis of 
probability, James declared truth "an event" which stood in 
relation, not to a continuous or shared reality, but rather 
to the history of an individual mind.*'
James stubbornly refused to submit his psychological 
conception of truth to critical analysis, dismissing Kant’s 
famous distinction between analytic and synthetic forms as 
"one of his most unhappy legacies" where Peirce had found
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it one of his most fruitful. The words "analytic" and 
"synthetic" did not label intrinsic qualities of experience 
for James or even cognitive modes. They simply portrayed 
ways in which the mind classified experience. The clas­
sification depended upon purpose, and the purpose depended 
on the will. "The analytic-synthetic debate," James 
claimed, "is thus for us devoid of all significance." In 
fact, in an ironic inversion of the Baconian ideal, James 
declared the differentiation of these forms an "idol of the 
tribe” and banished them from inquiry!1*
James arrived ultimately at the conviction that 
synthetic and analytic processes were not only dynamically 
continuous, but functionally indistinguishable. "Life, 
...concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will," he 
claimed, encompassed both analysis and synthesis 
inextricably fused in a flow of experience which "exceeds 
our logic, overflows and surrounds it." Experience so con­
strued remained impervious to formal inquiry. "For my own 
part," James admitted, "I have finally found myself com­
pelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and 
irrevocably."20 Logic, he maintained "stands to the 
psychological relation... only as saltatory abstractness 
stands to ambulatory concreteness. Both relations need a 
psychological vehicle; and the 'logical* one is simply the 
'psychological' one disemboweled of its fullness and 
reduced to a bare abstractional scheme.” For Peirce, logic
445
had been constitutive of a continuous reality. For Janes 
it became merely "a transformation which the flux of life 
undergoes at our handB in the interest of theory."11
Peirce deplored James' lack of logical rigor and his 
inclination to confound psychology with logic. In his 
review of the Principles of Psychology, he attacked James' 
disregard for analytic/synthetic distinctions and charged 
him with an "uncritical acceptance of data...[which] prac­
tically amounts to a claim to a new kind of liberty of 
thought." "The notion that the natural sciences accept 
their data uncritically we hold to be a serious mistake," 
Peirce objected. On the contrary, he pointed out, the 
first thing a physicist does is to subject his data "to 
rigid criticism to find whether these phenomena are objec­
tive or subjective." Moreover, by refusing to give "any 
exhaustive scrutiny of his new logic in its generality," 
Peirce warned, James displayed "an originality of the 
destructive kind."11
In general, Peirce found James' Principles to be "a 
large assortment of somewhat hetergeneous articles loosely 
tied up in one bag, with tendencies toward sprawling" —  an 
ironic assessment considering the source! James, he 
claimed, seemed prone to "subject to severe investigation 
any doctrine whatever which smells of intelligibility" and 
to rely rather on "the general incomprehensibility of 
things" as an explanatory principle. The book, he argued,
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"should have been preceded by an introduction discussing 
the strange positions in logic upon which all its arguments 
turn" —  the most alarming of which to Peirce was its 
proposal to "banish from psychology" those ideas which com­
prised "the direct data of consciousness.” Not only does 
James propose, "by the simple expedient of declaring 
certain inquiries extra-psychological, to reverse the con­
clusions of the science on many important points," Peirce 
complained, "but also by the same negative means to decide 
upon the character of its data" in order to validate his 
method.1 *
The argument between James and Peirce turned on their 
respective definitions of perception. Peirce, like a good 
Ramean, had characterized perception as the logical opera­
tion of judgement -- that is, as a mediate stage of 
inference between the "firstness" of pure sensation and the 
"thirdness" of habit. James, on the other hand, vigorously 
denied that perception required any "additional wheelwork 
of the mind." "To call perception unconscious reasoning," 
he argued, "is either a useless metaphor or a positively 
misleading confusion between two different things." "So 
far," he maintained, "from perception being a species of 
reasoning, properly so called, both it and reasoning are 
coordinate varieties of that deeper sort of process known 
psychologically as the association of ideas, and 
physiologically as the law of habit in the brain.”14
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Peirce, predictably, protested and accused James of 
"forgetting his logic” or, what was even worse, attempting 
to subsume it under psychological categories. All percep­
tion, Peirce argued, "involves a conscious, though it may 
be an indistinct, reference to a genus of arguments.” "To 
explain any process not understood," he maintained, "is 
simply to show that it is a special case of a wider des­
cription of process which is more intelligible." Percep­
tion thus "attains a virtual judgement. ...It subsumes 
something under a class, and not only so, but virtually 
attaches to the proposition the seal of assent.''19
James, he objected, ignored the logical structure of 
composite statements (pace Ramus!), pointing out that "we 
might suppose he had never heard of the modus ponens."* • 
Rather he depended on "some ultra-Leibnizian unconscious 
perception” to supply his middle terms.17 James, along 
with other associationists, Peirce claimed, assumed that 
"the proposition 'If A then B ’ is represented by the asso­
ciation itself, which is not present to consciousness.”
But this telescoped the triadic process of reasoning into 
an overly simplified diadic association -- in short, into 
James’ process of "pointing".** On the contrary, Peirce 
maintained, since "unconscious inference does not...mean an 
inference in which any proposition or term of the argument 
is unconscious," but rather simply an "inference in which 
the reasoner is not conscious of making an inference,” per-
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ception did in fact entail a type of synthesis which 
occurred, not at the level of psychology, but rather at 
that formal level defined and controlled by logic.**
James always maintained a sort of surreptitious meth­
odological dualism which allowed him to accept, for the 
purposes of psychology, the existence of certain intrinsi­
cally psychical or mental realities. He never quite 
escaped the legacy of Descartes and Locke. Although the 
distinction between thought and thing originated for him 
within experience as a function of perception, the distinc­
tion still pertained. Peirce, on the other hand, could 
portray matter as "mind hide-bound with habits,” since his 
description of cognition rested on the inter-dependent 
physiological states of doubt and resolution rather than on 
some external relation between the mind and consciousness. 
By dismissing, or perhaps just not comprehending, the logi­
cal content of Peirce's argument, James effectively trans­
formed his organically grounded perceptual judgements into 
vehicles of causal rather than analytical consequence.
Where Peirce had made ideas clear by considering their 
logical content and their general or habitual purport,
James made them clear by considering their psychological 
and behavioral effects, giving them an actual causal 
status.*0
Although James, like Peirce, accepted pure experience 
as the irreducible ground of cognition, his associationist
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bias led him to view perception as a process of selective 
abstraction which occurred within experience, rather than 
as an integral part of a aanifold logical process. Hence, 
for James, Peirce's prereflective percepts and his mediate 
judgements (the materia of Firstness and Secondness) both 
collapsed into a pervasive "ontological emotion" which 
became the existential cement binding the mind to its 
objects. Thirdness disappeared completely. Where for 
Peirce belief had comprised "the demi-cadence which closes 
a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life," 
for James it became a "craving of the heart” which issued, 
not in the rational assent of a perceptual judgement, but 
in an emotional consent to feelings. This consent 
manifested itself through the will, which projected "our 
inveterate propensity to choice" onto the world.*1
"The will,” James claimed, "mentally considered, is 
consent to a fact of any kind." Indeed, belief and will 
not only controlled "inseparable functions,” they actually 
denoted two names for the same psychological phenomenon of 
subjective preference.** By contrast, the associationists 
had identified the will with a nervous discharge correlated 
to a physical "feeling of effort." But this "feeling of 
effort” represented an externalization of the will which 
James, drawing on Edwardsean metaphors, could not accept. 
For James, the will projected an inward flowing sensation 
which actually helped to shape its physical counterpart.
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Indeed, the feelings or actions precipitated by the will 
becane irrelevant to the analysis of the intent itself, 
which lay ultimately in the realm of psychology. But this 
"redirection" of the will, which allowed James to equate 
its operation with belief, carried him a considerable dis­
tance from Peirce’s original pragmatic insight.
"In every proposition," James argued, stepping defini­
tively outside Peirce’s logical construct, "four elements 
are to be distinguished, the subject, the predicate, and 
their relation (of whatever sort it be), and finally the 
psychic attitude in which our mind stands toward the 
proposition taken as a whole.” By introducing "psychic 
attitude" as a fourth element in cognition, James effec­
tively vitiated the constitutive force of Peirce's logical 
categories and gave the will, as the vehicle of "selective 
interest," a controlling role in inquiry. "Without selec­
tive interest," James claimed, "experience is an utter 
chaos.”* *
James’ version of selective interest, however, bore 
little or no resemblance to the "predesignation" described 
by Peirce in his defense of statistical inductions. Indeed 
Peirce, like James, denied the efficacy or even the pos­
sibility of totally disinterested inquiry. But for Peirce, 
the "predesignation of characters" had controlled a logical 
"process of sampling” which determined the relative fre­
quency of terms within a class.14 For James, on the other
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hand, selective interest actually conferred reality upon 
individual sensation. It manifested the propensity of the 
will to direct the mind in the gratification of private 
interests. Thus, in a sense, James lifted Peirce’s 
''predesignated characters" from within a manifold logical 
process and relocated them in the stream of consciousness 
of an individual mind.
James insisted that ’the concept of 'being’ or 'fact’ 
is not wider than or prior to the concept of 'content of 
experience’,” thereby tying all cognition to primary data 
and confining it within the boundaries of Firstness.1*
This in turn ensured that the individual will would control 
the results of inquiry. The will, James claimed,
"determine[s] what we notice; what we notice determines 
what we do; and what we do determines what we experience." 
Hence reality became "largely a matter of our own crea­
tion." Since "our own reality...is the ultimate of 
ultimates for our belief," James concluded, "the world of 
living realities...[must be] anchored in the Ego, con­
sidered as an active and emotional term." No unlimited 
community, but rather "the absolute, uncriticised reality 
of the Self is the root of the whole matter."1*
James here approached a Nietzschean concept of the 
Absolute Individual. Only his scientific training -- and 
perhaps a bit of his own "unconquerable subjectivity" -- 
caused him to temper his psychological model with a
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philosophy of radical empiricism rather than developing it 
into a full-blown existentialism.*7 And yet, by insisting 
on the primacy of the person in his psychology and turning 
the dynamics of analysis inward through his reliance on the 
will, James clearly moved beyond the logical position of 
Peirce into a purely philosophical stance curiously 
reminiscent of Edwards.** James’ radical empiricism 
aspired to be more than a theory of inquiry. It aimed 
rather at an actual metaphysics of experience -- one which 
would solve the problem of cognition by collapsing Peirce’s 
categories into a "neutral monism” generated by the cona­
tive rather than the cognitive dimensions of thought.
James’ radical empiricism, however, had the great dis­
advantage of leaving moral issues definitively aside.**
His refusal to clarify, or even to acknowledge, a distinc­
tion between analytic and synthetic propositions led to a 
consequent lack of clarity on the nature of moral judge­
ment. This was precisely the problem which had plagued the 
Cartesians, who had solved it through their "provisional 
morality." But although James at all points appears to 
assume a moral dimension in the same way that Descartes 
acquiesced to his authoritative ideal, he interpreted that 
dimension, not as a commitment to community mediated by an 
idea, as for Peirce, but rather as an effort at sympathy in 
which individual experience encouraged human solidarity. 
James believed in a moral universe. But he had nothing to
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offer others except that they might participate in his own 
acquiescence.40 "Morality," he declared, "is simply a mat­
ter of will. The moral idea, once selected, is sustained 
by a resolute effort of attention and 'erelong succeeds in 
calling up its own congeners and associates, and ends by 
changing [a] man's consciousness altogether. And with his 
consciousness his action. ...The free will controversy is 
thus extremely simple," he concluded. "It relates solely 
to the amount of effort of attention which we can at any 
time put forth."41
For Peirce plurality had implied relativity and 
relativity had implied community, supplying a logical 
ground for moral action. "Individualism and falsity," 
Peirce declared, "are one and the same." He had therefore 
worked tirelessly to "grind off the arbitrary and individu­
alistic character of thought" through an investigation of 
its formal structures.40 But for James plurality implied 
variety and variety implied individuality, moving him much 
closer to existentialism than Peirce ever got.4* The risk 
for James personally lay in having to contend with a kind 
of Pascalian angst grounded in a realization of his own 
finitude. This sensation of cosmic isolation drove him to 
his famous encounter with "panic fear” which led him 
ultimately to develop his views on radical contingency as 
consolation. "Radical empiricism,” James himself pointed 
out, "leads to the assumption of a collectivism of personal
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lives, ...variously cognitive of each other, variously con­
ative and impulsive, genuinely evolving and changing by 
effort and trial, and by their interaction and cumulative 
achievements making up the world."4*
James’ opaque pragmatic morality thus grew directly out 
of what Peirce perceived as his lack of logical rigor. For 
Peirce, pragmatism always remained the "logic of 
hypothesis” expressed through modal forms and grounded in 
the integration of means and ends. But the intimate con­
nection between moral and rational behavior for which 
Peirce h—  argued rested, as it had for Ramus, on the cen­
trality of hypotheticals in inquiry -- on the "ought” rela­
tion expressed by composite constructions. James, on the 
other hand, had collapsed Peirce’s composite relations into 
diadic associations, thereby transforming his "if...then" 
statements into far leB8 stringent "either... or” statements 
in order to allow for the operation of his uncriticized 
Self. He thereby destroyed the intrinsic Peircean/Ramean 
connection between logic as rational inquiry and law as a 
moral imperative. James’ "either... or" relations, although 
descriptive of atomic experience and prescriptive of per­
sonal conduct, remained essentially non-referential and 
thus had no apodictic force. While this allowed James to 
ignore the theory of practice which had been so central to 
Peirce and to conceive of axiology rather as the study of 
preferential behavior, it also led him by consequence to
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adopt an instrumental theory of value which lacked the 
aesthetic qualities of Peirce’s theoretical vision.
In a sense, James’ retreat from hypotheticals amounted 
to an acceptance of the principle of eupraxia and a 
rejection of the supporting ars technologicae. His commit­
ment to the individual and to the maxim that "thought con­
sists in acts” made practice, not truth, the sole aim of 
inquiry. Peirce, on the other hand, had argued that 
thought was intended to "apply to...conceived action" and 
claimed that in his own pragmatic maxim he had been "speak­
ing in no other sense than that of intellectual purport.’*s 
Pragmatism, he warned, "is correct doctrine only in so far 
as it is recognized that material action is the mere husk 
of ideas. ...The end of thought is action only in so far as 
the end of action is another thought." Thus the goal of 
inquiry is not practice but "conditional general resolu­
tions to act...[which] by modifying the rules of self- 
control modif[y] action, and so experience too."4* Peirce 
had relied on the force of these "conditional general 
resolutions" to underwrite his moral vision of "social 
sentiment" and an unlimited community. But where Peirce’s 
maxim called for selfless commitment to a continuous 
reality, James’ called for "free enterprise in the moral 
realm" and a license to enjoy post-rationalized "moral 
holidays" into the bargain.47
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Pragnatism ultimately became the logic of self-control 
for Peirce. Under his model, the very conditions of 
scientific inquiry had a presumed ethical bias. The gener­
ation of logical laws or habits necessarily entailed moral 
considerations since logic itself required the application 
of self-control in intellectual operations. But this in 
turn required some rule against which to measure method.
The logically good, Peirce concluded, must simply represent 
a particular species of the morally good. Peirce, in fact, 
came increasingly to substitute the ethical term "control" 
for the biological term "habit" in his writings, arriving 
at length at the conclusion that the real test of any 
hypothesis lay "in its value in the self-controlled growth 
of man's conduct of life."4* Through ethics -- "the study 
of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared to 
adopt” -- logic could construct "a sort of composite 
photograph of the conscience of the members of the com­
munity." Self-control thus became a virtual prerequisite 
for citizenship in the world of rational endeavor.4*
But Peirce’s ethical ideal could not survive James’ 
voluntaristic assault. Pragmatism emerged from its 
encounter with radical empiricism chastened and sobered, 
having lost confidence in its own ability to function as a 
normative science. It was in this diminished state that 
John Dewey found it when he embarked on his own project of 
reconstruction near the turn of the Century. Concerned
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that the voluntaristic emphasis of James' psychology 
obscured the ethical dimensions of pragmatism. Dewey 
undertook to restore Peirce’s ideal of community, if only 
for the limited purposes of social reform.
"The problem of restoring integration and cooperation 
between man’s belief about the world in which he lives and 
his beliefs about the values and purposes that should 
direct his conduct," Dewey declared, "is the deepest prob­
lem of modern life."80 He agreed with James that without 
an experiential reference, no concept, however self- 
consistent, could have any existential import. But experi­
ence, he argued, "is not a verb that shuts man off from 
nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further 
into the heart of nature."81 Hence the place to search for 
those integrative factors which gave purpose and meaning to 
life must be within the processive functions of experience 
itself -- that is, within that sphere of interaction 
between primary sensation and the mind which Peirce had 
termed Secondness. Dewey’s entire philosophical program 
can in fact be seen as an attempt to reintegrate James’ 
"absolute, uncriticized Self" into a moral program recon­
ceived as natural science -- all under the category of Sec­
ondness made comprehensive and renamed simply Nature.
In an effort to avoid James’ existential dilemma, Dewey 
offered a physiological, rather than a psychological, anal­
ysis of judgement. By establishing physiology as the
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matrix within which cognition occurred, Dewey could argue 
for an empirical account of logic which subsumed all 
inquiry, including its formal properties, under the rubrics 
of adaptive behavior. "All logical forms," Dewey declared, 
"originate in operations of inquiry."*1 So construed, logic 
became a function of life and judgement a shorthand trans­
cription of the flow of experience which allowed for the 
management of conduct. These transcriptions indeed con­
tributed to the construction of "habit systems". But they 
enjoyed no ontological status, serving merely to define the 
"actual operative presence of connections in the subject- 
matter of direct experience."**
Peirce had considered inferential judgements constitu­
tive of a shared reality. James had affirmed their crea­
tive role but had confined their operation to the constitu­
tion of a private world. Dewey took a middle course, argu­
ing that although inferential forms grew out of interactive 
encounters with the environment, they were not necessarily 
reducible to the conditions of individual response. "Expe­
rience," he pointed out, "reaches down into nature; it has 
depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic 
extent. It stretches. That stretch," he argued, "con­
stitutes inference."**
Through this radical reduction of ontology to 
epistemology, Dewey placed conscious activity in control of 
logic, effectively subsuming it under Peirce's category of
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Secondness.* * It was the process of drawing inferences, 
Dewey argued, which conferred aeaning on experience, not 
reference to an atonic nind or an extant reality -- that 
is, reference back to Firstness or forward to Thirdness. 
Indeed Dewey obviated the need for either Firstness or 
Thirdness by portraying the "irritation of doubt" and its 
resolution as conscious reactions to problematic situa­
tions. Inquiry, he claimed, "is the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that 
is so determinate in its constituent distinction and rela­
tions as to convert the elements of the original situation 
into a unified whole.”** Thus judgement became, not 
rational assent as for Peirce, nor voluntary consent as for 
James, but rather "an act" which projected purpose onto the 
world.
This proved a far cry from Peirce's "sensation" of 
doubting or James’ "sentiment" of belief. Under Dewey’s 
model knowledge in fact became "a product, mediated through 
certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit [which] 
presupposed prior experiences and mediated conclusions 
drawn from them." But this amounted in turn to a complete 
objectification of Peirce’s category of Thirdness. The 
object of knowledge, Dewey claimed, is merely a situation 
refashioned by conscious activity in order to solve a prob­
lem. The validity of an idea thus had nothing to do with 
its conformity to an external reality. Ideas had value
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only aa they proved capable of reconstructing the world.57 
Through inference, Dewey claimed, the mind gave apposite 
form to an extrinsic environment by "stretching" experience 
into instrumental configurations which in turn controlled 
conduct. Thus all general propositions proved "strictly 
normative in character, having as their sole excuse for 
being, and their sole test of worth, their capacity to 
regulate descriptions of individual cases...[and] operate 
instrumentally in first-hand dealings with reality."5*
Peirce objected strongly to Dewey’s position, claiming 
it tantamount to a reduction of logic to "a natural history 
of thought." Although the formal properties of thought 
might develop within the context of experience, Peirce 
argued, they were in fact antecedent to it and evolved only 
according to an independent law itself evolving -- a prin­
ciple which he claimed was "stripped by Dewey of all 
rational precision." Dewey, Peirce complained, confused 
proximate human purposes with the final goals of inquiry 
and so reduced analysis to problem solving. Thus, where 
Dewey claimed to have established a "science of 
intelligence," Peirce denied that he had even described an 
intelligent science.**
But Dewey’8 instrumental logic did have the signal 
advantage of maintaining an extrinsic reference for logical 
forms -- something which James’ radical empiricism could 
not do. By making inferential judgement over into a con­
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scious activity, Dewey removed it from James’ psychological 
world and relocated it in public space, thus giving it an 
ethical dimension. "A continuous way of organized action," 
he protested against James, "is not a particular."
Although the formal properties of thought might originate 
in individual reactions to stimuli, those reactions them­
selves involved the projection of goals which in turn con­
ditioned future response, thereby supplying a ground for 
moral action.•• Dewey articulated his position in his 
famous "reflex-arc" theory which, in a sense, threw a curve 
at psycho-physical parallelism. "So far as... judgement is 
identified as an act," he claimed, "all a priori reason 
disappears for drawing a line between the logic...of the 
recognized sciences and that of conduct."*1 Thus James’ 
existential insecurity became a matter for depth psychology 
and logic reentered the community as an instrument of 
social purpose.
Ironically, it did so under the auspices of Peirce’s 
own principle of continuity. "There is a continuity of 
inquiry," Dewey declared, "[in which] the conclusions 
reached in one inquiry become means, material and proce­
dural, of carrying on further inquiries. 1 Hence, the 
logical process possessed an intrinsic social dimension. 
Moreover, since the ends of inquiry conditioned its means, 
instrumental values could in fact emerge from within the 
data of primary experience through the application of
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reason. Unlike Peirce, however, Dewey argued that although 
the logical process resembled that of "entering into a con­
tract [in that] it commits the enquirer to the observance 
of certain conditions," those conditions did not extend to 
the stipulation of ends, which rather issued from the 
process itself.** Hence, where James had relocated 
Peirce's logical process in the individual stream of con­
sciousness, Dewey relocated it in social interaction.
Dewey’s characteristic definition of judgement as "an 
act" effectively refocused pragmatic inquiry on those 
operational concepts which directed experience rather than 
exploring its private contours or revealing its structure. 
In a sense, Dewey became the ultimate Baconian, developing 
his entire melioristic program from the aphorism: Knowledge 
is Power. Dewey in fact regarded Bacon as a prophet of 
pragmatism because of his emphasis on knowledge as a means 
of control. But Dewey's concept of power bore little 
resemblance to Peirce’s concept of self-control. Science 
"is not a force to invoke against impulse and habit," he 
warned against Peirce. Indeed it "is born of impulses" 
whose "effectual organization into continuous dispositions 
of inquiry" constituted method. Thus where Peirce had 
described moral behavior as that which imposed controls 
over natural processes in the interests of formal struc­
ture, Dewey described it as a means to effect a harmony 
between natural processes in the interests of constructive
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interaction.•4
By thus making values immanent in nature, Dewey 
rendered social intelligence the preeminent moral method, 
creating a new role for education as an agent of change.
The mind, Dewev claimed, is "an organ of service for the 
control of the environment in relation to the ends of the 
life process.”45 Since reason in its adaptive function had 
constructive potential in both the moral and the physical 
realms, it became imperative to direct that potential into 
productive channels. The "ought” relation, Dewey argued, 
"does not descend out of the a priori blue or as an impera­
tive from Mount Sinai."44 We learn what "ought" to be by 
exploring experience -- that is, in the same way that we 
acquire knowledge. Thus all values are had in context and 
so remain both objective and shared. Moreover, if ethical 
values in fact subsisted within experience, he argued, 
education could provide a vehicle for expanding their mean­
ing and enlisting them in the service of reform. The pri­
mary role given to education ultimately became the hallmark 
of Dewey’s pragmatic program, setting him apart from both 
Peirce and James in his emphasis on knowledge as a mode of 
participation.
But Dewey’s reform ideology rested on a curious inver­
sion of the nation’s millenial dream. American ideologues 
had consistently portrayed the existential order as a prac­
tical means to a transcendent end -- eupraxia the means,
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technologia the end; politics the means, liberty the end; 
benevolence the means, redemption the end; capitalism the 
means, progress the end. Peirce had perpetuated essen­
tially the same vision in his scheme of agapistic evolu­
tion. Dewey, on the other hand, working in the context of 
Jamesean psychology, dissipated the millenial thrust of 
this characteristic ideology by relocating both the means 
and the ends of his instrumental model in a perpetual pre­
sent fully comprehended within the bounds of a 
reconstructed society. While he reintegrated James' 
sovereign Self into Peirce’s organic community, he did so 
under a charter which ignored its "unlimited" aspects.*7 
Dewey's renovated Citty in fact rested exclusively on a 
foundation of present experience.*• Forsaking Peirce’s 
millenial quest for perfect rationality as well as James’ 
existential plea for absolute assurance, Dewey simply 
settled for a concrete though imperfect reality susceptible 
of improvement.*• He just wanted a better world -- and 
devil take the Promised Land. His community thus emerged 
as a thoroughly domesticated and naturalized social unit 
with its eyes fixed firmly on the present.
By eliminating the theoretic aspects of Peirce’s prin­
ciple of continuity, Dewey succeeded in avoiding the angst 
which had plagued James. But his rendering of pragmatism, 
having passed through the crucible of James’ critique, con­
tained a note of resignation -- a sense of something lost.
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By confining man’s aspirations within the social order, 
Dewey effectively neutralized the central insight which had 
energized the American intellectual tradition since it 
emerged from the faith of the Fathers. Although his axiol­
ogy, grounded in an ambiguous ideal of shared imperfec­
tions, allowed pragmatic values to be applied as a social 
program, it presented a sort of plodding promise to minds 
raised up in a millenial dream and trained to seek a per­
fect wisdom. It was this lack of transcendence, this loss 
of dimension, which Josiah Royce protested as he witnessed 
the steady dismantling of Peirce’s categorical structures. 
But if James can be faulted for confining Peirce’s princi­
ple of continuity to the individual mind and Dewey blamed 
for restricting its operation to society, Josiah Royce must 
stand accused of granting continuity an absolute existence 
and dissolving it, to paraphrase James, in a sea of Third- 
ness.
Morton White has described Royce as "the logician of 
the Oversoul," a borderline scholastic who marshalled 
immense intellectual resources in defense of a metaphysics 
which Emerson was content to convey in an epigram.70 Royce 
himself recognized Peirce as a profound influence on the 
development of his thought. In letters to James, he dis­
cussed his indebtedness to the Illustrations and to 
Peirce's Boston lectures, while in both volumes of The 
World and the Individual, he named Peirce as a source of
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inspiration.71 Peirce did not always prove grateful for 
the attribution, however, feeling that Royce confused his 
realism with an idealism of the Hegelian stripe -- a 
metaphysics roundly rejected by Peirce in his Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy articles and in his correspondence 
with William Torrey Harris.7* While he approved of some of 
Royce’s logical positions, Peirce in fact tried to distance 
himself as much as possible from most of Royce’s metaphysi­
cal conclusions.7*
Like Peirce, Royce described a continuous reality 
"which is present to an absolutely organized experience.”74 
But unlike Peirce, who had characterized his model as a 
logical possibility, Royce insisted on his as an ontologi­
cal necessity. By extending the metaphors of evolutionary 
growth far beyond the boundaries of Peirce’s community of 
inquiry, Royce arrived ultimately at an absolutist concep­
tion of continuity which subsumed all logic under purely 
mental categories and connected inquiry "in all the so- 
called realism of our prosaic modern research, with the 
dreamers who dreamed [and] the fantastic poets who 
failed."7* For Peirce, truth had functioned as a regula­
tive postulate, the continuous reality disclosed by inquiry 
reflecting the logical process writ large. But for Royce, 
logic became a sample of the Absolute writ small, inquiry 
merely driving the mind forward into ever more com­
prehensive systems of order.
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Once again, the argument turned on the issue of judge­
ment. Royce, working like Dewey in the context of Jamesean 
psychology, transformed Peirce's mediating perceptual 
judgements into "partial functions of a self" which pro­
jected purpose onto experience. Judgement, he claimed, "is 
a will seeking its own determination." It reflected a cog­
nitive process "only in so far as it is, at the same time, 
a voluntary process, an act, the partial fulfillment...of a 
purpose."7* Thus, although an idea "means to be true 
[when] it intends a sort of correspondence with an object," 
Royce maintained, "what correspondence it intends is 
determined...solely by the purpose which the idea 
embodies. "7 7
Hence judgement, as a process whereby men clarified 
their interests and intentions, described "an inner inter­
pretation of our own attitude toward the world."7* But 
unlike James, who had confined the operation of "selective 
interest" to individual experience, Royce expanded the 
sphere of "interpretation" to encompass that "absolutely 
organized experience" which served as ground for his 
Absolute. He described an infinite impersonal experience 
to which truth could correspond, and then simply postulated 
a hypothetical subject to comprehend it. By so doing he 
lifted the principle of continuity out of the social and 
psychological contexts in which Dewey and James had respec­
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tively lodged it and relocated it in an ideal consciousness 
which comprehended an infinite meaning and purpose.
Peirce, of course, protested -- as he had against both 
James and Dewey -- that judgement derived its validity from 
the relational matrix in which it operated and not from the 
exclusive jurisdiction of any one of its component parts. 
Judgement indeed reflected purpose, he admitted. But any 
expression of purpose "refers to the future" and is there­
fore necessarily a "more or less vague” conditional resolu­
tion "to do a thing under certain circumstances.” To 
elevate such a conditional resolve to the status of a 
transcendent Purpose, Peirce objected, would require the 
actual fulfillment of all the conditions of possibi lity 
entailed by the judgement, which would in turn require "no 
less than the entire life of the thinker." Royce’s trans­
lation of conditional resolutions into intensive proposi­
tions, he claimed, overstepped "the limits of admissible 
interpretation" of his pragmatic maxim, leaving "no room 
for possibility or any lower mode than actuality, among the 
categories of being."7*
Peirce had maintained real possibility, or chance, as 
an active category which provided shades of pragmatic mean­
ing definable as ratios. A similar notion of possibility 
had presented James with occasions for personal reassurance 
and Dewey with opportunities for social reconstruction. By 
contrast, by invoking Purpose as the controlling factor in
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"interpretation" and raising logical intension to a cosmic 
plane, Royce foreclosed on the notion of real possibility 
and offered simple inclusion as the ultimate form of 
intelligibility. But Royce’s cosmic principle of inclusion 
bore no resemblance to Peirce’s more modest logical one, 
which had operated as an affair of mediation rather than 
definition. Under the impact of Royce’s transcendent 
"Interpretor" the tentative, self-corrective aspects of 
Peirce’s method dissolved into an absolute dialectic 
expressed in pseudo-pragmatic form.*0
By elevating Peirce’s composite "if...then" statements 
to the status of inviolable dialectical relations, Royce 
removed them from the objective realm and relocated them 
under the operation of a "Theoretical Ought" which stipu­
lated that finite or objective purposes merely gave frag­
mentary expression to a wider truth. The difference 
emerged clearly in their respective treatments of "leading 
ideas.” Peirce’s leading ideas had functioned as 
hypotheses which the inquirer tested by the application of 
method -- that is, through observation and experience. But 
Royce’s leading ideas functioned as "guides" which remained 
by definition impervious to inquiry. They functioned 
"despite, or even because, of the fact that evidence can 
neither confirm nor refute them."*1 Royce’s theory of 
science thus departed radically from Peirce’s regulative 
and heuristic method. Indeed the "conceivable effects"
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which controlled method for Peirce, having passed through 
successive incarnations as James’ "sensible" and Dewey’s 
"social” creatures, emerged ultimately in Royce as objec­
tive manifestations of a transcendent point of view,**
Royce called his speculative model Absolute Pragmatism 
-- a curious contradiction in philosophical terms which 
must certainly have caused the careful Peirce, already dis­
mayed over James’ abuse of his "bantling pragmatism", no 
small distress.** Royce offered his own variation on 
Peirce’8 theme as a means whereby to invest the prag­
matists’ call to action with a moral imperative. Concerned 
to bolster Dewey’s instrumental values with the apodictic 
force of an absolute metaphysic, Royce simply made "inter­
pretation" the ruling category of his logic and gave it, A 
la Peirce, a social dimension. "All search for truth," 
Royce agreed, "is a practical activity, with an ethical 
purpose. ...A purely theoretical truth, such as should 
guide no significant active process, is a barren absur­
dity." But to designate truth as expedient, he argued 
against James, is simply to give "just a scrap of your per­
sonal biography.” Hence Royce claimed that James’ brand of 
pragmatism failed as a conception of truth, since it failed 
as a conception of ethics.**
In an attempt to reverse that error, Royce offered an 
alternative conception of moral obligation which simply 
subsumed all ethical considerations under the selective
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interest of an Absolute Will before which both Peirce’s 
"unlimited community" and James’ "uncriticized Self" paled. 
Royce’s definition of "interpretation" allowed him to 
represent the Absolute itself as an extended individual 
capable in its omniscience of determining final purpose and 
thereby elevating pragmatic meaning to the level of 
certainty. Indeed, under Royce’s analysis, Peirce’s 
unlimited community actually took on the psychological 
aspects of James’ sovereign self and emerged as a self- 
interpreting social mind which comprised the very essence 
of morality.
Royce articulated his ethical program in a 
phenomenological analysis of loyalty which declared the 
community the primal core of the social self. His argument 
drew on a crucial shift of logical metaphors. Royce dis­
tinguished subsumption under a class from membership, 
invoking the mathematical image of the infinite series as 
justification. The relation of the individual to the com­
munity, he argued, described more than the relation of part 
to whole since the community itself transfigured the indi­
vidual and raised him to higher level of being. Hence the 
social aggregate emerged as "one conscious spiritual whole" 
capable itself of interpreting.
"A community is not a mere collection of individuals," 
Royce maintained. "It is a sort of live unit, that has 
organs, as the body of an individual has organs. ...Not
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only does the community live, it has a mind of its own -- a 
mind whose psychology is not the same as the psychology of 
an individual human being."** This social mind interpreted 
the ideas of all the members of the community to one 
another. Indeed "a genuinely and loyally united community 
which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal 
sense, a person. ...On the other hand, any human individual 
person in a perfectly literal sense, is a communi ty."•«
By treating James’ behavioral manifestations as signs 
and Dewey’8 interactive conduct as interpretation, Royce 
could actually portray the social process as an infinitely 
extended "determination of self." "A process of inter­
pretation," Royce argued, "involves, of necessity, an 
infinite sequence of acts of interpretation." Moreover, 
each time someone interpreted a second to a third, a tri­
adic community of interpretation existed. Interpretation 
thus involved a process in which the mind interpreting and 
the mind interpreted to achieved a unity and in a sense 
became an individual. This synthetic individual, as the 
possessor of a mediating idea, projected an actual "spirit 
of community" which itself took on the lineaments of an 
interpreter capable of setting and achieving goals.
Through this process, society became in effect a "Communi ty 
of Interpretation" which "unifie[d] all the social varie­
ties and all the Bocial communities which, for any reason, 
we know to be real in the empirical world." Indeed "the
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history of the universe, the whole order of time, is the 
history and the order and the expression of this Universal 
Community" which commanded, by virtue of its very constitu­
tion, the loyalty of man to Man.*7
Royce’8 philosophy of loyalty thus restored that trans­
cendent dimension missing from James’ and Dewey’s 
instrumental programs -- indeed, it restored it with a 
vengeance. In what Kuklick terms "a dramatic postulation 
leap," Royce restated America’s characteristic millenial 
dream as a function of formal mathematics and Darwinian 
lore, describing the social-evolutionary emergence of the 
species into a spiritual community.** But as he leapt, 
Royce let go that line which had kept Peirce securely 
tethered in the objective world. By sacrificing the rela­
tional matrix of Peirce’s categories to an overarching 
category of Being, Royce effectively abandonned the tenta­
tive, self-corrective method which had underwritten 
Peirce’s thought in favor of a dialectical certainty which 
made James’ psychological assurance appear positively 
anemic by comparison.
James, Dewey and Royce each enriched a portion of 
Peirce’s encyclopedic thought -- James with his psychologi­
cal critique, Dewey with his sociological program and Royce 
with his ethical analysis. But none of the three seemed to 
appreciate the "principle of universal continuity" on which 
Peirce had insisted. In fact, each seemed intent on sub­
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verting the relational matrix which Peirce had established 
in favor of one or another of its component parts. The 
result in each case was a curiously monophonic refrain 
which lacked the depth and symmetry of Peirce's "symphony 
of intellectual life." Peirce had attempted to offer a 
comprehensive method for defining truth as well as 
determining meaning and managing conduct. The harmonic 
support which each of his categories gave to the otherB 
allowed him to extend that method across all disciplines 
and claim universal jurisdiction for his logic of science. 
James, Dewey and Royce, on the other hand, ended by playing 
instrumental variations on discrete segments of Peirce’s 
theme and missing its polyphonic structure.
Like a good Ramean, Peirce had developed his practics 
within the boundaries of an encircling ars technologicae, 
continually integrating the functional status of means and 
ends in the construction of a continuous reality. This was 
the characteristic American visiu., which his successors 
obscured -- some by excess, some by default. This was the 
faith of the Fathers, the platform of the politicians, the 
agenda of the scientists which had underwritten the devel­
opment of American ideology since the founding of the 
Citty. It would remain for a later generation of American 
intellectuals, chastened by the trauma of World War and 
domestic disaster, to restore the outlines of Peirce’s 
synoptic thought and reestablish American logic in a
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Effects," Collected Essays. 243. James argued that truth 
was "revealed to the heart," a bias he came by naturally 
via a father steeped in Swedenborgian mysticism and 
sustained by an Edwardsean faith. Educated at Union Col­
lege, a center of Neo-Edwardsean orthodoxy in the early
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19th Century, Henry James, Sr. spent a large part of his 
life articulating a characteristic theology which stressed 
the intimate and unmediated communion of each man with God. 
Tying Edwards’ psychological interpretation of revelation 
to the communal aspects of New England Transcendentalism, 
the elder James arrived at a philosophy which acknowledged 
the intuitive feelings and metaphysical satisfactions which 
lay beyond "mere" intellectual reasoning and advocated a 
program of salvation which went far beyond simple schemes 
of self-improvement. As with Peirce, for whom the 
intellectual propensities of the father were also visited 
upon the son, James absorbed many of the compelling 
insights of his formidable father, claiming at one point 
that he "derived all his intellectual life” from him 
(Letters. I, 219). A comparative investigation of Benjamin 
Peirce and Henry James, Sr., made in the context their 
sons’ later intellectual development, would make a fas­
cinating study.
32. James, "Pscyhology of Belief," 343, 331.
33. Ibid., 325, 352; "What the Will Effects," Col­
lected Essays. 247; Principles. I, 402.
34. CE 3.311-318. See above, pp ?? Chap VII.
35. James, Letters. II, 236. For Peirce, on the other 
hand, sign was the wider category. While all thoughts were 
signs, not all signs were thoughts (CP 1.538, 5.253).
36. James, Pragmatism. 83-84, 120-122; "Psychology of 
Belief," 333,352.
37. James, "Is Life Worth Living?," 22. James’ anti- 
intellectualism was grounded, not in a logical dkepticism 
as for Peirce, but rather in a concern for the vitalistic 
dimensions of psychic life. Like Schopenaur and Nietzsche, 
he held that any abstraction from experience diluted the 
vivid perceptions of good and evil which fed the inner life 
-- a life which must be grasped from within the individual 
organism without reference to any mediating concepts or 
even to the experience of others. James’ own experience 
with "panic fear" perfectly expressed this view. But 
rather than remaining trapped in the lived experience of 
his own ontological insecurity like a good Existentialist, 
James chose -- an important word! —  to forge his own path 
"beyond good and evil." "It is at this point," Weinstein 
claims, "that the possibility for an American exist­
entialism was lost" (Wilderness. 80). For an interesting 
related discussion see George J. Stack, "Nietzsche’s 
Influence on Pragmatic Humanism," JHP 20(1982):369-406.
38. Peirce, on the other hand, had declared that the
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person "is only a particular kind of general idea" (CP 
6.270). The difference in orientation derived from the 
type of reality which the two ascribed to relations. For 
Peirce, relations had been cognitive, although experienced 
as a part of analysis. But James argued that relations 
"must themselves be experienced relations" (Essays in Radi­
cal Empiricism (Cambridge, 1976), 22). In short, they must 
be "felt." James would never admit to anything which 
existed outside of experience. He would never allow, as 
did Peirce, the inherently unverifiable on the grounds of 
"mere" logic. He never seemed to comprehend that Peirce’s 
logic itself grew from and encompassed experience.
39. James sustained no active interest in social 
theory and evidenced only a quixotic interest in social 
causes. He was guilty, Hofstadter claims, "of only the 
remotest interest in systematic or collective social 
reform" (Social Darwinism. 134).
40. The difficulty for James, beginning from his radi­
cal empiricist position, was to establish some community of 
meaning which would make his "willed" theoretic beliefs 
applicable to life. This was essentially the difficulty 
which C. A. Strong and Dickinson Miller pointed out to him, 
suggesting that he should, on pragmatic grounds, regard the 
world as a context held jointly by many observers which 
served to locate individual perceptions in a public space. 
By 1912 Janes had deferred to their comments, conceding 
that differences in perspective were public differences and 
therefore presupposed a common frame of reference (Essays 
in Radical Empiricism. 85). This revised position, which 
James called "natural realism", in fact took him quite 
close to Peirce’s own argument, although Peirce had 
approached the problem, characteristically, from a logical, 
rather than a psychological, point of view. For an inter­
esting discussion which ties this issue to related issues 
addressed in Chapters III and IV, see E. G. Howells, "Hume. 
Shaftesbury, and the Peirce-James Controversy," JHP
15 <1977):449-462 .
41. James, "What the Will Effects," 246-248.
42. Quoted in Weiner, Values. xxii; CP 1.178.
43. For an intriguing discussion of some of the
broader implications of plurality and individualism which 
relate directly to post-Darwinian philosophical adjust­
ments, see Hans Jonas, "The Biological Foundations of Indi­
viduality” in Essays. 185-205. "Individuality," Jonas 
maintains, "implies discontinuity."
44. James, Collected Essays. 443-444 (emphasis mine).
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45. CP 5.402n; CP 5.423.
46. Quoted in Perry, Thought and Character. II, 424- 
425; Weiner, Values. xxii.
47. Commager, Mind, 96.
48. CP 6.480. Goudge places the shift in Peirce’s 
thought around the turn of the century (Thought. 294-295).
49. CP 5.130, 1.573.
50. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 
1929), 43.
51. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago, 1925),
i i i .
52. For Dewey this meant simply "that while inquiry 
into inquiry is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, 
primary inquiry is itself causa essendi of the forms which 
inquiry into inquiry discloses" (Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry (New York, 1938), 4, 119). James, on the other 
hand, appears at some points to admit the existence of 
"fundamental categories, long ago wrought in the structure 
of our consciousness, and practically irreversible, which 
define the frame-work within which our answers must fall"
(Pragmatism. 382; Principles. II, 618).
53. John Dewey, From Absolutism to Experimental ism 
(London, 1930), 27.
54. Dewey, Experience and Nature. 4.
55. "Dewey," Feibleman claims, "is, by his predilec­
tions, a realist of the Peircean persuasion, but, led by an 
interest in the metaphysical importance of actuality to 
substitute activity for the place occupied by the particu­
lar in Peirce’s philosophy, he came to hold an explicit 
nominalistic position which is essentially alien to the 
point of view we associate with the name of Peirce." 
Feibleman lists thirteen specific points on which Dewey is 
in accord with what he terms the "realism" of Peirce, 
including the relativity of matter and form, the abstract 
character of scientific objects, the equation of ideas and 
possibilities, etc. But, he concludes, "the notion that 
the shift from the particular to the act marks a gain in 
generality is the error which pervades Dewey’s whole 
account of logic and makes his philosophy over into one 
which is in opposition to that of Peirce" (Introduction. 
482-483, 475).
56. Dewey, Logic. 104-105, 143.
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57. Dewey, Quest for Certainty. 24-26, 132-134- 159- 
161. To put it in the terns of Peirce's scholastics, 
thinking for Dewey became ratio rather than intellectus.
58. John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory (Chicago, 
1903), 13.
59. C. S. Peirce, review of "Studies in Logical 
Theory," The Nation 79(1904 ) :220; CP 5.508.
60. Dewey, Experience and Nature. 196.
61. Dewey, Studies. 13. This aspect of Dewey’s 
thought reached its fullest development with Mead’s Mind. 
Self and Society. which declared all meaning to be 
implicit in various phases of the social act. Mead 
developed Dewey’s theme of the reciprocal relation between 
the individual and society into a full-blown social 
psychology. "If we admit," he pointed out, "that the 
evolutionary process consists in a mutual determination of 
the individual and his environment, ...moral necessity in 
conduct is found in the very evolutionary situation." 
(Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (Chicago, 1936), 
168). Mead also drew heavily on semiotics for his theory 
of self-hood, linking him in retrospect to Peirce. But 
unlike Peirce, Mead saw the mind as an emergent, not a gen­
erative, force in semiosis. Hence he defined reality as a 
complex of perspectives organized around the principle of 
sociality. In a sense, Mead’s "socialty" functioned, as 
Thirdness had for Peirce, as a regulative principle.
62. Dewey, Logic. 8-9. "So far as I know," Dewey 
wrote, "Mr. Charles S. Peirce was the first to call atten­
tion to this principle, and to insist upon its fundamental 
logical import. ...Mr. Peirce states it as the principle of 
continuity" (Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment 
of Morality (Chicago, 1903), 14). Ironically, however, 
when Studies in Logical Theory appeared in Chicago under 
Dewey's editorship, the preface noted a "pre-eminent 
obligation ...to William James" but failed to acknowledge 
any debt to Peirce.
63. Ibid., 17.
64. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 
1922), 195-196.
65. John Dewey, "The Interpretation of Savage Mind," 
Psychological Review 9(1902):219. Dewey developed this 
theme in his famous argument against the "spectator theory 
of knowledge." Mind, he claimed, is no spectator observing 
the world from without. It is in the world as a part of 
the process. Similarly, intelligence is not something man
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brings to bear on nature. It is nature itself creating and 
preserving opportunities for a richer life.
66. John Dewey, The Theory of Valuation (Chicago, 
1939), 32.
67. For a discussion of Dewey's concept of community 
which has interesting echoes in the present context, see 
Beth J. Singer, "Dewey’s Concept of Community: A Critique," 
JHP 23( 1985 ): 555-569. Singer comments on the emphasis 
which Dewey's model places on communication as a component 
of community. See also B. T. Wilkins, "James, Dewey, and 
Hegelian Idealism," JHI 17( 1956):332-446. Wilkins compares 
James' and Dewey’s concepts of the individual in the con­
text of a communal ideal.
68. Dewey's philosophy did not, however, lack for an 
aesthetic dimension. The qualities of primary experience, 
he claimed, were all aesthetic. They possessed a symmetry 
and a balance (notice that he carefully avoids the word 
order!) which, when transformed by the mind into substance, 
constituted art. The arts in fact portrayed an intensified 
form of experience which had the power to restore con­
tinuity to men’s lives by putting them back in touch with 
the source of their intellectual and institutional con­
structs. For Dewey, as for Emerson, art thus possessed a 
redemptive power. This was essentially the aspect of 
Dewey’s naturalism which Santayana developed. Ethics and 
aesthetics, Santayana claimed, were the product of 
"imaginative impulses fortunately moral" (Winds of Doctrine 
(New York, 1975) , 108).
69. This is where Dewey’s pragmatism spilled over into 
Progressivism. The ambiguous program of progressive reforms 
drew on precisely those "moral emotions" which Dewey had 
validated through his logic. For what Hofstadter calls 
"The Current of Pragmatism" running through progressive 
ideology, see Social Darwinism. 123-142. See also Alan 
Cywar, "John Dewey: Toward Domestic Reconstruction, 1915— 
1920," JHI 30(1961):385-400.
70. Morton White, Science and Sentiment. 228, 299.
71. Perry, Thought and Character. I, 788; II, 421.
72. CE 2.162-309; CE 2.132-161.
73. See CP 1.343; 3.563 and Peirce’s review of "The 
World and the Individual," The Nation 75(1902):94-96).
James was similarly ambiguous in his response to Royce’s 
idealism, writing to him in 1900: "I lead a parasitic iife 
upon you, for my highest flight of ambitious ideality is to 
become your conqueror, and go down in history as such, you
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and I rolled in one another’s arms and silent (or rather 
loquacious still) in one last death-grapple of an embrace"
(Letters. II, 136).
74. Josiah Royce, The Conception of God (New York 
1898), 31.
75. Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy 
(Boston, 1892), 281.
76. Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New 
York, 1900), 325, 332. Royce’s argument was grounded in 
the distinction between what he termed the Worlds of Des­
cription and Appreciation, the one embodying objects or 
external meaning, the other embodying purpose or internal 
meaning. Royce maintained that since the World of Descrip­
tion presupposed the World of Appreciation, the world of 
objects must exist as a part of an infinite purpose viewed 
from the perspective of an ideal mind. See Kuklick’s chap­
ter "The World and the Individual" in Josiah Royce: An
Intellectual Biography (Indianapolis, 1972), 99-118 for an
in depth discussion.
77. Royce, World. I, 319-320.
78. Josiah Royce, The Outlines of Psychology (New
York, 1903), 164, 194-196. Kuklick describes Roycean 
interpretation as "that form of cognition involved in the 
knowledge of mind. When a man clarifies his own interests 
and meanings and acquires knowledge of his self, he is 
interpreting,” he explains, adding that "through inter­
pretation we also learn of the social relations between man 
and man, our knowledge of other minds" (Royce. 213). The 
important thing to notice here is that Royce’s process of 
interpretation is confined exclusively to the knowledge of 
minds. Using self-knowledge as the paradigmatic form of 
interpretation Royce ultimately concluded that the whole 
world process was mental (The Problem of Christianity 
(Chicago, 1968), 245).
79. C.S. Peirce, review of "The World and The Individ­
ual," The Nation 75(1903):94-96.
80. "The whole clash of rationalistic and empirical 
religion," James had pointed out, centered on "the validity 
of possibility." James solved the problem with his charac­
teristically apt discussion of "the possible chicken" and 
"the actual egg" (See Perry, Thought and Character. 727- 
728). But Royce attacked James' view on the status of pos­
sible experience in The Absolute and the Individual, where 
he concluded that valid possible experiences in fact merely 
reflected part3 of the actual experience of the Absolute. 
Royce thus went beyond the fallibilism which had tempered
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Peirce's tentative method to a dialectical argument in 
which "The Possibility of Error" effectively transformed 
James’ provisional "Will to Believe" into a palpable path 
to truth. Royce in fact considered the possibility of 
error to be the only escape from relativism and the 
guarantor of absolute truth.
81. Royce*s Logical Essays, ed D. Robinson (Dubuque, 
1951), 263-274 (emphasis his). "While experience is always 
the guide," Royce argued in the same passage, "the attitude 
of the investigator towards experience is determined by 
interests which have to be partially due to what I should 
call the 'internal meaning’, that human interest in 
rational theoretical construction which inspires the 
scientific inquiry; ...[Thus] the theoretical constructions 
which prevai1...are neither unbiased reports of the actual 
constitution of an external reality, nor yet arbitrary con­
structions of fancy."
82. "The seeming," Royce argued, "is opposed to 
reality only in so far as the chance experience of one 
point of view gets contrasted with what would be, or might 
be experienced from some larger more rationally permanent, 
or more inclusive and uniting point of view" (The Concep­
tion of God (New York, 1909), 30-31). Royce seems here to 
be espousing Peirce’s ideal of an unlimited community of 
inquiry. "Yet there is a difference," Morton White points 
out, "between Peirce's view...and Royce's view, because 
where Peirce refers to a normal eye, Royce refers to a 
larger, more organized and uniting experience; and thereby 
hangs a tale that leads to Royce’s Absolute" (Science and 
Sentiment, 221).
83. CP 5.414.
84. Josiah Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 
1908), 324-348, 336-337.
85. Royce, Problem of Christianity. 194 218, 80.
86. Letters of Josiah Royce. ed. John Clendenning 
(Chicago, 1970), 646. Although Royce’s early arguments had 
viewed inclusion as a simple relation of part to whole, his 
later writings contain this more complex interpretation. 
Kuklick attributes the shift in Royce’s argument to a 
reciprocal influence between himself and James. See chap­
ters 2 and 4 in Royce. 25-48, 67-97. Schneider on the 
other hand, attributes the shift to Peirce’s suggestion 
that Royce investigate logic and formal mathematics. See 
History. 415-424.
87. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 272-273. Herbert 
Schneider points out that "the type of community which
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Royce means is exhibited better in the church than in 
science. The true church, and here Royce’s idealism 
reverts to Calvinism, is a community of memory and hope, a 
unity of faith and redeeming grace. ...Ordinary political 
society does not conform to this type of community, for it 
breeds individualism, and individualism is 'the sin against 
the Holy Ghost.’ To be a real individual, one must be a 
loyal member, for only through God’s grace in the community 
is salvation, self-hood, possible. God is simply the 
'spirit-of-the-community’, the essence of loyalty"
(History. 423-424).
88. Kuklick notes that evolution became for Royce "the 
form in which finite creatures, constrained to time and 
space, must perceive the world-self." Evolutionary theory 
merely described "how the temporal constantly yearned to 
overreach itself; with the ever-increasing growth of con­
sciousness, it strove for the eternal" (Rise. 157). Royce, 
in fact, claimed that idealism was the only philosophy 
which could grasp the underlying significance of Darwinian 
thought. See Kuklick’s chapter "The World of Description 
and Philosophical Psychology" in Royce, 67-97.
EPILOGUE
In 1910 James died. Two years later Santayana began 
his retreat into intellectual exile. Within another two 
years Peirce had passed from the scene, leaving behind that 
ragged assortment of articles, papers, notes, drafts, let­
ters and scribblings which constitute his collected works. 
By 1916 Royce had merged with his cherished Absolute, leav­
ing the prolific and articulate Dewey as the "spokesman" of 
American Pragmatism. Dewey’s one-dimensional program 
proved signally incapable of expressing the energizing 
insights which had lain behind Peirce’s manifold thought. 
And yet, his was the voice which preached pragmatism to the 
generation of scholars and theorists who emerged from the 
trauma of World War in search of a philosophic rationale.
Peirce’s papers remained in disarray for some twenty 
years after his death -- indeed for those two crucial 
decades during which Neo-Progressives, Neo-Liberals, Neo- 
Democrats, Neo-Conservatives, Neo-Romantics, Neo-Humanists, 
Neo-Orthodoxy, Neo-just-about-everything vied for 
preeminence of place in the reconstruction of the nation’s 
ideology. The economic instability of the 1920’s and the 
resultant social dislocations merely served to deepen the 
philosophic malaise consequent upon the war, encouraging a 
bumper crop of Neo-Critics who presided over what Henry May
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has called "the end of American innocence." Campaigning 
under various reactionary banners -- anti-intellectualism, 
anti-modernism, anti-urbanism, anti-positivism, anti­
relativism -- these intellectual gad-flies unfortunately 
proved more adept at dismantling their philosophic past 
than at articulating a viable program for social regenera­
tion. Facilitated by social cynics and social visionaries 
alike, the prevailing mood of disillusionment and decline 
gradually degenerated into what T. Jackson Lears has 
described as a kind of "cultural neuresthenia" which 
betrayed the sorry state of the national consciousness.
Dewey’s pragmatism offered no solace. Indeed, his 
instrumentalism appeared as a kind of cruel caricature of 
the millenial dream which had previously supported the 
nation's intellectual life. Frustrated by a lack of moral 
rigor in American life and a concommitant lack of logical 
rigor in American thought, a movement arose to widen the 
philosophic debate. Significantly, this movement reached 
out, not to the psychologism of James, or the 
instrumentalism of Dewey, or the idealism of Royce, but 
rather to what Alfred Kazin has called "the instinctive 
realism" of the American mind -- a realism integral to the 
philosophic program of Peirce, but temporarily obscured by 
the less stringent formulas of his successors.
Developed variously as an indigenous Neo-Realism, a 
derivative Critical Realism, and through Structuralist and
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Semiotic analyses, this movement tended generally to accept 
the objectivity of particular things, endorse the independ­
ent reality of noetic structures, emphasize the centrality 
of sign relations, and acknowledge the intimate connection 
between knowledge and belief. Grounding their arguments in 
the "existential realism of common use," this new gener­
ation of realists revalidated that world of consensual 
knowledge which had underwritten Peirce’s pragmatic vision 
and prepared the way for a reassessment of his logical 
program. By 1935, supported by developments in mathemati­
cal logic and refinements in the philosophy of science 
articulated by figures such as Einstein, Russell, Whitehead 
and Freud, they had created an intellectual climate in 
which Peirce's theories could gain a sympathetic hearing. 
Indeed, the publication of the early volumes of Peirce’s 
Collected Papers in the late 1930’s instituted a revival of 
interest in his thought which, far from dissipating itself 
among the various scholarly perspectives it spawned, has 
tended rather to gain force and direction, serving 
ultimately to establish Peirce as a crucial figure in the 
development of American thought.
From the vantage point of the 1990’s we read Royce with 
nostalgia, James with sympathy and Dewey with forebearance. 
But we read Peirce with recognition. In his philosophical 
program we recognize echoes of our intellectual past, solu­
tions for our complex present and a justification for hope
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in a problematic future. Indeed in Peirce we continue to 
recognize a true spokesman of the American mind -- a voice 
speaking with accents peculiar to our native Ramean 
heri tage.
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